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Introduction.  
How Global Can Be Global Future? 
Leonid Grinin, Ilya Ilyin,  
Peter Herrmann, and Andrey Korotayev 
Globalization processes continue to develop and we should pay more and more attention 
to them. We also need to systematize our ideas about globalization and Global Studies to 
somehow fit the realities. We hope that our Yearbook contributes to the realization of this 
goal. 
The present volume is the fifth in the series of yearbooks with the title Globalistics 
and Globalization Studies1. However, why Globalistics, not Global Studies? Elsewhere we 
explained that the notion of Globalistics first appeared in Russia, this is a translation of the 
Russian term globalistika; however, we believe it might be useful within the English 
Global Studies thesaurus. We are sure that the introduction of this term is meaningful, be-
cause it expresses the vision of systemic and epistemological unity of global processes, the 
presence of a relatively autonomous field with its own research subject. Morphologically 
this term is identical with such well-established designations of academic disciplines as 
Economics, Linguistics, Physics, and so on (for more details see Grinin, Ilyin, and Korota-
yev 2012b, 2013b, 2014b).  
In all the issues we strive to describe the leading process of the present-day world – 
globalization – in all the aspects and dimensions. Furthermore, we have to note that glob-
alization is not only – and we suppose not primarily – about interconnectedness of eco-
nomic activities in a narrow sense (trade, value chains of production etc.). More relevant 
in the long term is the alignment of ‘lifestyle’, in some cases as a matter of directly influ-
encing each other and assimilation; in other cases as matter of setting a principle of orien-
tation that is aligning the various processes into one long line of big historical develop-
ment, creating a world order. As such it goes far beyond the World System be it one of 
500 or 5000 or even 10000 years (see Frank and Gills 1993/1996; Grinin and Korotayev 
2009b, 2014b). Instead, this constellation is now not about dependencies but about a new 
stage of union of opposites and contradictions. Though always present throughout history, 
the mutual dependency is now emerging for all actors as a somewhat conscious strategic 
moment which includes the interpenetration of the different life worlds. This means as 
well that paradoxically the principally retard of the socio-political dimension of the pro-
cess gains in part and temporarily a dominant position: life and living follows rules for 
which the economic conditions are still emerging. The periphery itself is increasingly 
shaped by the characteristics of the centre and, vice versa, the ‘Brazilianisation’ becomes 
prevalent and visible and moves into the middle of the societies of the centre. 
1 For the earlier issues see Grinin, Ilyin, and Korotayev 2012a, 2013a, 2014a; Grinin, Ilyin, Herrmann, and Korotayev 
2015. 
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The subtitle of the present volume is Global Transformations and Global Future. We 
become more and more accustomed to think globally and to see global processes. And our 
future can all means be global. However, is this statement justified? Indeed, in recent 
years, many have begun to claim that globalization has stalled, that we are rather dealing 
with the process of anti-globalization. Will not we find ourselves at some point again in an 
edifice spanning across the globe, but divided into national apartments, separated by walls 
of high tariffs and mutual suspicion? Of course, some setbacks are always possible, be-
cause the process of globalization cannot develop smoothly. It is a process which is itself 
emerging from contradictions and is shaped by a new contradiction. They often go much 
further than underlying systemic changes allow. They break forward, as the vanguard of a 
victorious army, and then often meet resistance of various social and political forces and 
may suddenly start to roll back just at the moment when everyone expects their further 
offensive. We believe that this is what is happening with globalization at present. 
The problem is that there is a great disproportion between different dimensions of 
globalization that creates great tensions. To diminish these disproportions it is necessary to 
closely merge the socio-political component of global change (political globalization) with 
the narrowly understood economic dimension (for definitions and paradigms of globaliza-
tion, see Andreev, Ilyin, and Zinkina 2015). Obviously, the latter is far ahead of the for-
mer. And further development would be difficult without such a catch-up. Yet, the narrow-
ing of the gap between economic and political globalization is inevitable and we denote 
this process as a reconfiguration of the World System (see Grinin 2013; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2012; Grinin, Ilyin, and Andreev 2016). 
The major vectors of this reconfiguration include weakening of the former core of the 
World System (the USA and the West), and simultaneous strengthening of the positions of 
a number of peripheral countries and a generally increasing role of the developing coun-
tries. However, one should bear in mind that the ‘catching up’ (between the political and 
economic components of globalization) will also bring severe political and geopolitical 
crises in different regions. Elsewhere we have considered the crises and turmoil in the 
Middle East after 2010, as well as the Ukrainian crisis as both ‘reconfiguring’ and geopo-
litical crises which require transformations in the world order. At the same time, grave and 
probably unexpected crises in other societies or regions seem rather possible. Their ab-
ruptness may be akin to earthquakes. And to continue the geological metaphor, one should 
note that just like the tectonic shifts occur under the most mobile Earth's crust and at the 
boundaries of tectonic plates, the reconfiguring crises occur in the least stable regions and 
societies which are situated at the junction of geopolitical ‘plates.’ Both the Middle East 
and the Ukraine are regions of this kind. Nevertheless, many of the ruptures are also visi-
ble in other areas – actually for instance in the different aspects of European disintegra-
tion, reaching from anomie of political legitimacy and Brexit to xenophobia. 
We also argue that stability or instability of the world order depends on the stable or 
fragile character of the balance of power. The current balance of power obviously under-
goes some transformations. If the suggestion of the weakening role of the United State is 
correct, what would the shift towards a new balance look like? We assume that one of 
probable scenarios is the creation of various alliances between countries to strengthen their 
positions and increase opportunities. As we have seen, this process has even involved the 
United States, usually reluctant in taking over different commitments. Thus, the search for 
a new balance of power has already started and it will be manifested in a more active crea-
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tion of various alliances and coalitions of countries and their associations. We denote this 
process as an epoch of new coalitions (Grinin 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013; Grinin and Korota-
yev 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014a, 2015). This process of reshuffling brings up the issues of the 
loss of power, or may we say that the crumbling away of the hegemonic role is not least a 
matter of the dissolution of the ‘American dream’ and the ‘American lifestyle’. The sug-
gestion that ‘another world is possible’ is not limited to alter-mondialists but it is equally 
prevalent in the emerging economies as for instance the BRICS and Latin America. How 
strong these movements will be is still an open question. But at least they clearly show that 
the strive for a new hegemonic system is going far beyond the claim of a new dominance 
on the world market. 
Against this background of the different layers of change we believe that the political 
future of our planet will be still and even increasingly global, but the path to the future will 
take different route and it will be increasingly coined by global turbulence and instability. 
The First Part of our yearbook is devoted to the field of Big History. What is Big His-
tory? Big History is a vast and extremely heterogeneous field of research, encompassing 
all forms of existence and all timescales, bringing together constantly updated information 
from different scientific disciplines and the humanities. The unique approach of Big Histo-
ry has opened up vast research agendas, taking a variety of forms. This discipline weaves 
together various disciplines into a single narrative where interdisciplinary work is not only 
possible, but essential. As has been mentioned on a number of occasions, the rapidly glob-
alizing world needs global knowledge that can explain a unified global system (about Big 
History see Hughes-Warrington 2005; Nazaretyan 2005; Spier 2005; Christian 2005; Car-
neiro 2005; Markov, Korotayev, Grinin 2009; Grinin, Carneiro, Korotayev, and Spier 
2011; Grinin and Korotayev 2009a; Grinin, Korotayev, and Baker 2014). Thus, we may 
say that globalization itself becomes propulsion for Big History.  
The Second Part is devoted to the issues of global demography and the articles pay 
special attention to the global ageing which constitutes one of the most powerful trends of 
the modern world and that will change our world dramatically in the forthcoming decades. 
The Third Part includes articles dealing with various aspects of globalization and in-
ternational politics.  
Finally, the last part (Part IV) is devoted to two topics: climate and energy which both 
are the sources of anxiety. How fatal can be climate change for humanity? Will there be 
enough energy for our descendants? What will be the energy of the future? We hope that 
our yearbook articles will help readers better understand these challenges and possible 
responses to them. 
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Part I. BIG HISTORY AND GLOBAL HISTORY 
 
 
10500. The Darwinian Algorithm  
and a Possible Candidate for a ‘Unifying Theme’ 
of Big History 
 
David Baker 
 
 
This article postulates another aspect of the long sought-after ‘unifying theme’ of 
Big History, in addition to the rise of complexity and energy flows. It looks brief-
ly at the manifestation of the Darwinian algorithm, that is to say an algorithm of 
random variation and non-random selection, in many physical processes in the 
Universe: cosmology, geology, biology, culture, and even the occurrence of uni-
verses themselves. This algorithm also seems to gradually open more forms of 
variation and more selection paths over time, leading to a higher level of free 
energy rate density, or what we know as ‘complexity’. In fact the complexity of 
the object under discussion seems to correspond to the available number of se-
lection paths. The article closes with a bit of philosophical reflection on what the 
Darwinian algorithm and the rise of complexity could possibly mean for humani-
ty and the future of the cosmos. 
Keywords: Universal Darwinism, random variation, non-random selection, 
complexity. 
One thing that the inaugural International Big History Conference in August 2012 made 
clear was that one of the major tasks of Big History in the coming years is to prove it can 
sustain research projects, just like any other genre of historical scholarship. As someone 
who entered the field to do precisely that, I know that such research is not only possible, it 
is essential – both to bridging the gap between the sciences and humanities and to our un-
derstanding of the history of life and the cosmos. The unique approach of Big History has 
suddenly opened up a vast horizon of research agendas, or, to put it another way, triggered 
a speciation event where hundreds of new niches have opened up, waiting to be filled.  
The ecological terrain is vast and the numbers that currently populate it are few. I urge 
anyone interested in researching in Big History to do so. The research comes in a variety 
of forms. There are, of course, Esther Quaedackers's Little Big Histories that cover the full 
13.8 billion years of any subject – extending the Big History perspective to any line of 
inquiry. There are also research agendas that pursue debates and questions about a certain 
chunk of the grand narrative, but nevertheless hearken back to broad trends. Many of these 
are highlighted in the course we teach in Sydney, and many of these would make excellent 
fodder for graduate research projects that can be realistically achieved within a set 
timeframe. There are also more ambitious ideas that deal with the unifying themes of Big 
History, themes which encompass the full trajectory of the universe and underscore  
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the full chronology of 13.8 billion years. In this short article, I have no intention of assert-
ing that this is true, but I do wish to illuminate a research agenda to figure out if it is. 
To explain what we are dealing with, let us go back. Our story begins with a bang. 
And there is no point asking what happened ‘before’ the Big Bang. That is the wrong sort 
of question. Thanks to space-time relativity, there was no ‘before’ the Big Bang. Time as 
we know did not exist before the universe did. What is more, at the moment of the Big 
Bang, we are talking about a singularity of such intense heat and such intense pressure that 
the laws of physics would have broken down. Trying to describe what happened ‘before’ 
the Big Bang using the rules with which humans are familiar is rather like trying to de-
scribe colour to a dog.1 Accordingly, the Big Bang is the earliest start date on any histori-
cal timeline a human being may care to construct. A tiny fragment of a second later, or 
0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 seconds to be more precise, we 
already have the first major tick on our timeline. I insert the decimal to give the reader a 
full idea of the infinitesimal scale, something that the exponent leaves somewhat under-
stated, but this is Planck time (10–43) the smallest length of time that has any physical 
meaning. Gravity had come into being. Then we have the next major event on our  
timeline between 0.000000000000000000000000000000000001 seconds (10–36) (and 
0.00000000000000000000000000000001 seconds (10–32) after the Big Bang. The universe 
cooled ever so slightly from Absolute Hot by a few degrees Kelvin, allowing strong nucle-
ar and electroweak forces to become more distinct, completing the collection of funda-
mental forces that control the physical processes of our universe. Around the same time 
the universe inflated due to the creation of a false vacuum and the gravitational repulsion 
and negative pressure of scalar fields, and grew faster than the speed of light (which is 
around 300,000 km per second) to an enormous size while continuing to cool, and then the 
scalar fields decayed into energy reheating the universe to its ultra-hot state. During the 
period of inflation, quantum fluctuations shaped the future growth of our universe, by cre-
ating minute variations in density, which were then inflated to such a large scale that they 
created the clumps of hydrogen and helium which in turn created our galaxies. These 
slight variations are mirrored in the temperature of Cosmic Background Radiation (CBR).2 
During the period of 10–36 and 10–32 seconds, most of the heavy lifting that set the physical 
processes of the universe in motion was accomplished. The clock was wound, the rules of 
the game were set, and the rest of the tale can be told with staggering accuracy using the 
familiar laws of physics. 
What of other regions beyond the cosmic horizon of the visible universe? Our region 
endured a brief surge of inflation that explains small irregularities, the expansion rate, and 
the nature of further development. It would appear that there are other regions, each un-
dergoing a different amount of inflation and developing physical properties vastly differ-
ent to our own. Inflationary cosmology predicts that once inflation takes hold in one re-
gion, it causes accelerated expansion and inflation in other regions, producing a ripple ef-
fect (Guth 2007). Inflation is still underway in regions beyond our cosmic horizon. We are 
just one bubble where inflation has slowed down, like a hole in a block of Swiss cheese. 
Other regions in the ‘multiverse’, totally inaccessible to us, will also slow down in a runa-
                                                          
1 And this absence of a conventional line of causality is what makes a twentieth century pseudo-scientific rehash of a 
medieval argument involving a supernatural First Cause so absurd (Craig 1979). 
2 The account of these events is given a decent treatment in many works, for instance, David Christian (2004: 24–27) 
and John Barrow (2011). 
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way reproduction of universes. Until recently, we thought that one set of physical laws 
governed by a Grand Unified Theory was possible, and then we thought string theory il-
luminated a small number of possible sets of physical laws, now M-Theory shows that a 
vast number of functioning sets of physical laws with different properties, dimensions, and 
fundamental forces can exist and function (Duff 1998). The estimated number of sets of 
physical laws that is favoured by physicists at the present time is 10500 (Hawking and 
Mlodinow 2010: 118). That number embraces all the possible sets of physical laws that 
could form the basis for a universe when it cools down enough for those physical laws to 
become distinct, and it pops into existence, like a bubble in boiling water. These sets of 
laws fall together in the inflationary stage as a universe cools just a split second after the 
Big Bang (see, e.g., Hawking 2001; Emiliani 1995: 82; Christian 2004: 27; Chaisson 2001: 
126; Davies 1995: 28–35; Greene 2004: 312–313; Guth 1997: 20). Their formation appears 
to be the outcome of a random process (Barrow 2011: 214). Each set of laws determines 
density, temperature, fundamental forces, constants, dimensions, and whether or not things 
like matter exist. The actual number of universes based on those sets of physical laws is 
probably much higher, with many variations, but they all fall within the selection constraints 
of 10500. Those universes that do not fall within those constraints do not get to exist.  
Here is the fundamental basis for the Darwinian algorithm, a major research area in 
Big History. 10500 is therefore a very important number. It is the number of working sets of 
physical laws, the number of parameters in which a universe can occur. It is the primordial 
niche of all evolution, the foundation for an algorithm of random variation and non-
random selection, a process that seems to arise time and time again alongside the rise of 
complexity in the universe (Dennett 1996: 48–61). The algorithm even seems to govern 
the formation of universes themselves. A Darwinian algorithm is anything that obeys 
a process of random variation and non-random selection. The game of ‘universal natural 
selection’ appears to be the first instance in the cosmic story where such an algorithm hap-
pens. The selection constraints appear to be the number of sets of physical laws in which a 
universe can start to exist. Universes appear randomly in inflationary space and only those 
universes that fall within the constraints of 10500 are non-randomly selected to form stable 
functioning universes. In such a scenario, universes are not constrained by any form of 
direct competition, but a form of ‘niche selection’ where the physical attributes of a uni-
verse that are capable of dwelling within a cosmic set of constraints make a form of non-
random selection possible. 
Nevertheless, that primordial niche is extremely wide, as you might expect from a 
form of selection that goes back to the birth of universes. To give you an idea of how many 
variations of sets of physical laws could exist, take a trillion of them, and then multiply that 
trillion by a trillion. Then another trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × 
trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion 
× trillion × trillion × trillion × × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × tril-
lion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × trillion × 
trillion × trillion × trillion. By comparison, 1014 is the number of years before the end of 
star formation, when every single last star will flicker out and the universe will wander in 
a cosmic graveyard of pitch black.3 1040 is roughly the number of years before the death of 
matter (Adams and Laughlin 1997). And 10100 is roughly the number of years before the 
3 100 trillion years (Adams and Laughlin 1999: 35–39). 
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total heat death of our universe.4 The number of different sets of physical laws that form 
the game of cosmic selection is greater still. That is the magnitude of 100500. Some of 
those universes that arise would operate without electromagnetism. Some of those uni-
verses would never form clumps of hydrogen and helium, and by extension stars and gal-
axies. Some of those universes would never form atoms at all. And some of those univers-
es would be based on properties, fundamental forces, and dimensions that, once again, in 
trying to understand how they operated using the physical concepts with which we are 
familiar in this universe would be like trying to explain colour to a dog.  
From this primordial niche comes a vast array of scholarly works that recognize the 
Darwinian algorithm in a variety of universal processes. At the cosmic level, Lee Smolin 
and E. R. Harrison have both proposed models for universes themselves, with those more 
likely to produce black holes or intelligent life, respectively, being favoured (Smolin 1997; 
Harrison 1995: 193). Both remain highly speculative and favour a hereditary connection 
between universes. At the end of the day such selection criteria and heritability may not 
even be required since the number 10500 is so large that it covers every variation to make 
inheritance between universes unnecessary and yet still mathematically finite, making 
non-random selection possible. Wojciech Zurek has created a model whereby the predict-
able physics of the Newtonian realm emerge from the chaos of the quantum world –  
a model that recently gained some new evidence (Zurek 2003; Burke et al. 2010: 1–4). If 
this is correct, then it provides an explanation for the uncertainty in quantum physics. The 
chaos at the quantum level does not abrogate the idea that the universe functions in a cer-
tain way, as would-be scientific determinists have lamented, because the very randomness 
at the quantum level is fundamental to the prevailing system. In the geological realm, 
Robert Hazen et al. have proposed an evolutionary model for the generation of new min-
erals (Hazen et al. 2008). While making sure to clarify that the model differs from biology, 
the authors highlight several places where selection, punctuation, and gradients for change 
are present, exponentially increasing the number of mineral types throughout geological 
history, from stellar nebulae, through planetary accretion, and all the changes thereafter. 
But the most thorough examination of the Darwinian algorithm in areas beyond the realm 
of biology has been within cultural evolution. The idea was first pioneered by Donald 
Campbell and later revived by Richard Dawkins, and then most effectively, in my opinion, 
developed by Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd (Campbell 1960; Dawkins 1976; Boyd 
and Richerson 1985). In cultural evolution, any ideas, knowledge, beliefs, values, skills, 
and attitudes that are more practical or more appealing, are easier to learn or are better 
geared toward survival, are more likely to lead to social prominence than others, spread 
more easily from person to person. Those cultural practices that lead to early death or so-
cial stigma are less frequent or simply disappear (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 5–12). From 
so simple a beginning, came a flood of works on cultural evolution in recent years.5 It also 
                                                          
4 If total heat death is indeed what awaits it. There are a number of possible scenarios and perhaps others undiscovered 
(Adams and Laughlin 1997). 
5 Many works have been written on the subject, though I believe Richerson and Boyd remain the most successful at 
explaining it. Richard Dawkins, by contrast, as recently as The God Delusion (Dawkins 2006: 228) claimed Susan 
Blackmore (1999) held that honour. A number of other works have also been written on the subject: Stephen Shen-
nan (2002), Ruth Mace, Clare J. Holden, and Stephen Shennan (2005) – particularly David Bryant, Flavia Filiman, 
and Russell Gray (2005) who advocate the NeighborNet program to plot trees for both vertical and horizontal trans-
mission for all the Indo-European languages, John Ziman (2000), and a close runner up to Richerson, Boyd, and 
Black more is Stephen Shennan (2009), notable for its many in-depth investigations. 
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provoked a great deal of debate.6 Two of the most rigorous bits of research, in my opinion, 
have been Lake and Venti's work on nineteenth century bicycle technology and Ritt's work 
on the formation of dialects and new languages (Lake and Venti 2009; Ritt 2004). Finally, 
at the recent conference, my colleague and fellow big historian, Christian Jennings, and  
I have discussed how Darwinian algorithms are used to fill a range of useful functions in 
the computer realm. Not all mechanisms of information in a computer are processed in a 
Darwinian algorithm. But since the 1970s, numerous programs have employed a ‘genetic 
algorithm’ which is a search heuristic that mimics the process of natural evolution. The 
computer automatically finds better ways to run programming through a game of variation 
and selection. It is currently employed in bioinformatics, engineering, economics, chemis-
try, mathematics, and more. Various entities of the universe are simply different forms of 
information – whether energy flows, DNA, or cultural ideas – and they seem to be pro-
cessed by the same algorithm just as information in a computer. It is not the place of this 
article to confirm or deny the accuracy of the assertions cited above, but rather to exhort 
big historians to future research, especially on any project that ties these various manifes-
tations of the Darwinian algorithm together into one theory. The spectre of the algorithm 
has already been spotted by a number of scholars working in a number of disciplines. This 
could be what unites them all – an elegantly simple process, a form of variation, selection, 
and preservation that underwrites all things.  
It may also have a trajectory. If the Darwinian algorithm is present, if not instrumen-
tal, at every stage in the rise of complexity in the universe, it may be that this pattern tends 
ever more to greater forms of complexity. And it would appear that the number of possible 
outcomes is relative to the complexity of the process under discussion, hence why relative-
ly few outcomes make it from the quantum to the Newtonian level, why only a few thou-
sand variations emerge from the geological level, whereas in biological evolution the 
number of possible selection paths is increased manifold, and the number of cultural varia-
tions is exponentially greater still. When we arrive at something as complex as culture and 
modern human society, with a free energy rate density 25 times higher than the average 
product of genetic evolution and 500,000 times higher than the Milky Way, there are a 
mind-boggling number of combinations of ideas and innovations. The rate of complexity 
seems to increase with the number of viable selection paths. 
Table 
Generic Structure Free Energy Rate Density (erg s↑(–1) g↑ (–1)) 
Galaxies (e.g., Milky Way) 1 
Stars (e.g., Sun) 2 
Planets (e.g., Earth) 75 
Plants (biosphere) 900 
Animals (e.g., human body) 20,000 
Brains (e.g., human cranium) 150,000 
Society (e.g., modern human culture) 500,000 
Source: Chaisson 2001: 139. 
                                                          
6 For instance, see Joseph Fracchia and R. Lewontin 2005: 1–13, 14–29, and 30–41, in several back and forth exchang-
es. Fracchia and Lewontin's misunderstanding of what cultural evolution actually led both sides to more or less repeat 
the same arguments at each other. 
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At the recent conference, I asked futurist and IBHA board member, Joseph Voros 
what sort of complexity we might expect to see from an intelligent species capable of har-
nessing increasing levels of energy, that is, the power of stars and the galaxy, known as 
Type II and Type III civilisations. He said that another exponential increase in free energy 
density was less likely than an increase in the complexity of networks. It would appear, for 
the time being, cultural evolution and the complexity it bestows is the highest point in this 
process of which we are yet aware. Others may open up that we cannot predict, but it is 
worthwhile to understand exactly what cultural evolution involves. There are two tiers of 
human evolution. The first is genetics, which operates in the same way as for other organ-
isms. Those genes gave humans a large capacity for imitation and communication. Those 
two things enabled the second tier. Culture operates under similar laws, but on a much 
faster scale. Cultural variations are subject to selection and the most beneficial variations 
are chosen. Unlike genes these variations can be transmitted between populations of the 
same generation and can be modified numerous times within that generation. Like a high-
way overpass looming over older roads, cultural evolution can blaze along at a much faster 
rate of speed. Ultimately, culture accumulates. Population pressure compels some of this 
accumulation to be geared toward increasing the human ability to extract resources from 
the environment. This process raises the carrying capacity, which produces more people, 
which produces more accumulation, which in turn raises the carrying capacity. The cycle 
continues and grows in complexity.  If expressed as a general principle, it may be said that 
the rate of growth of the carrying capacity of a human population is relative to the number 
and connectivity of variant innovations. 
The second evolutionary tier of culture, a swifter form of evolution, should not come 
as a surprise in a Darwinian algorithm. Gradually through natural selection, not only do 
species become better at surviving, they become better at evolving. This follows the logic 
that improving the rate of your improvement of your survival chances is just as naturally 
selected for, since it also improves the rate of your survival. Logically, a third tier is likely 
to emerge where our growing knowledge allows us to directly guide the evolution of our 
genes. If we discard the manmade concept of tiers, in a sense through a relatively short 
evolutionary process of 200,000 years, our genes have evolved the ability to develop more 
rapidly and efficiently. The universe is composed of webs of energy of varying complexi-
ty. Life-forms are entities that harvest energy to perpetuate their complexity, to spread it, 
and even to increase it. Human history has been dominated by this hunt for resources. Our 
evolution, both genetic and cultural, has ultimately been geared toward aiding this hunt. 
Standard evolution can be defined as the change in the traits of a population of organisms 
through successive generations to sustain or increase their complexity. Human evolution 
can be described as the change in traits and behaviours between populations of the same 
generation and through successive generations to sustain or increase their complexity. 
We now know that there is no hard-and-fast division between the organic and inorgan-
ic world. As such, life can be (somewhat coldly) defined as a series of physical processes 
that contain a hereditary program for defining and directing molecular mechanisms that 
actively extract matter and energy from the environment that are converted into building 
blocks for the perpetuation and reproduction of those physical processes (Spier 2010: 77). 
Life is the only thing in the universe that does this. Stars, minerals, and the rest of the in-
organic world do not actively seek out matter and energy from the environment. Even ob-
jects as gigantic as stars burn their fuel like lamps and candles and eventually flicker out. 
This has been proceeding since the beginning of the universe. Eventually every single last 
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tiny slow burning star will be extinguished. Only life has the agency to go out and extract 
energy from the environment to keep itself going. We do not just sit still and wait for death 
to take us. We fight – for a time. If we want to preserve our vast complexity, we have to 
continue harvesting matter and energy to keep ourselves going. All other considerations 
are secondary. It is the bottom line of human history. During most, if not all, of our histo-
ry, the quest to extract matter and energy to perpetuate our existence has been the overrid-
ing theme (Spier 2010: 116). It is the battle with disorder, chaos, entropy, and the second 
law of thermodynamics which we have carried on since the very beginning of our exist-
ence, and it is a battle that physicists believe we must eventually and inevitably lose. 
This brings me to the topic of how the Darwinian algorithm relates to how we per-
ceive ourselves in the grand narrative and how Akop Nazaretyan at the recent conference 
exhorted big historians to provide the world with non-exclusive ‘meanings of life’ – be-
yond religion and ideology that inevitably vilify the infidel and the ‘other’ – to ideas of 
meaning that bind the entire human race together in common cause (Nazaretyan 2010).  
If the Darwinian algorithm prevails at many stages in the rise of complexity in the uni-
verse, then it is possible that the evolution of life and species capable of cultural evolution 
is just another stage in this trajectory, just like star formation or planetary accretion. At 
risk of sounding sensationalist and glib, two things that I abhor, I must state that research 
in this direction may possibly provide us with something approaching a secular and objec-
tive ‘meaning of life’ that unites us all. 
There are as many as 10500 possible sets of physical laws for universes. Each of these 
sets of physical laws governs the evolution of a universe in various ways. Our universe is 
13.7 billion years old, very complex life on Earth about 550 million, and the human race 
as we know it only about 200,000. Our local star is middle-aged and will last only another 
5 billion years and will boil the Earth's surface dry in well under 3 billion. If the human 
race does not destroy itself in the meantime, it has hundreds of millions of years to exist 
and evolve on Earth, after which time we could venture out into other solar systems and 
long outlast the death of our own. We could huddle around the fires of hundreds of thou-
sands of stars in the habitable section of the Milky Way for nearly a trillion years and 
more stars would be produced in the centre of the galaxy and eventually spread out and be 
used too. But unless we somehow learn to create stars ourselves, in 100 trillion years every 
single last dim little star will have flickered out and the universe will become a cosmic 
graveyard, where bodies of dead stars and planets will wander in pitch black. Until, of 
course, the energy that creates matter itself (which, remember, is really just a congealed 
form of energy) in 1040 years will grow feeble and matter will cease to exist, and then after 
a period of 10100 years, even black holes will cease to exist, and the universe will be an 
empty orb of weak cosmic radiation – a victim of Heath Death. 
Here is the grim fate to which we must resign ourselves that also seems to indicate 
that our story and the story of the universe itself is ultimately and objectively pointless. 
Yet, the notion of the Darwinian algorithm of random variation and non-random selection 
governing processes in the universe as disparate as geology, biology, and culture, indicates 
another interesting possibility. Life is the only entity in the universe that actively harvests 
energy rather than just burning down and in only the last 250 years human beings have 
mastered the atom and figured out how to harness energy in impressive magnitudes.  
The next ‘spontaneous’ rise of complexity in the universe will be down to intelligent life. 
Current physical processes in the universe indicate a future of heat death. But those calcu-
lations do not take the evolution of intelligent life into account. That grim fate for the uni-
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verse may be avoided. It is very difficult to see why the wheels are churning when we our-
selves are inside the machine. We have millions, billions, if not trillions of years before us, 
to devise a way to keep the lamps of the galaxy lit, energy flowing, and the universe itself 
from ‘dying’. And, perhaps most profoundly of all, life itself may have been another one 
of those ever-present Goldilocks conditions: an entity that keeps harvesting and creating 
energy to perpetuate the complexity of the universe. Like tiny white cells in the human 
body, our small and seemingly insignificant species may nevertheless have an extremely 
important role in the universe. Our fates might be bound together. It may be why we are 
here. In that sense, the ‘meaning of life’ is a fairly easy question. The question of the 
‘meaning of the universe’, on the other hand, is a much more difficult proposition.  
At any rate it remains an open possibility – and it has significance for us today, not 
just trillions of years from now. Albert Camus (1913–1960), a French writer and philoso-
pher, once said that in all philosophy there is only one problem, and that is suicide – judg-
ing whether life is or is not worth living amounts to the most fundamental question of phi-
losophy (Camus 1942: 15). In the secular scientific narrative of Big History, we are robbed 
of traditional answers to that question. In a cold, often cruel, empirical universe based on fact 
and not on fantasy, we do not have access to the pre-packaged meaning, morality, and life 
purpose that animates religious culture. What we are left with is a universe that evolved from 
impersonal physical laws and is so vast as to reduce all the trials of daily life and indeed all 
human history to a state of woeful insignificance. The universe does not owe you a sense of 
purpose. It does not owe you a sense of comfort. Lacking an objective scientifically rein-
forced meaning of life and purpose to existence, where the universe has no higher role for 
living things, there ultimately is no point. In such a state of affairs that is the hard, grim, in-
evitable fact. You are an accident of physics, kept alive by an evolutionarily instilled fear of 
death that translates into a multitude of subjective, often paltry, excuses for why you have 
not yet opened your throat. Even good answers to that question, like the noble scientific cu-
riosity to explore the universe, or love, or duty, or stubbornness (KBO, the motto from Brit-
ish trenches in the First World War, keep buggering on), just sound like provisional reasons 
so we can move on and stop thinking about it. Even now the reader's mind may be racing, 
reminding themselves of their own reasons for living. And perhaps these subjective excuses 
are all we can ever hope to achieve. The Darwinian algorithm, however, returns to the ques-
tion of an objective secular scientific meaning of life and whether life is or is not worth liv-
ing – the fundamental question of philosophy. 
Research on the Darwinian algorithm may be crucial in a variety of ways. From it we 
might attain a greater sense of where humanity fits in the history of the universe. We 
might identify some of the processes that govern human development and also identify the 
universal context in which humanity faces the distant future. From here it may be possible 
to establish an objective sense of human purpose in the universe, though the validity of 
this last step is far from certain. And when I use words like ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ I do 
not engage with the idea of strong emergentism and those scientists who are using con-
cepts of strong emergence to revive ‘religiosity’ and the feelings of ‘awe’, ‘creation’, ‘en-
chantment’, ‘transcendence’, ‘reverence’, ‘gratitude’, and ‘objective and universal morali-
ty’, normally associated with the traditional religions.7 I have no desire to replace religion 
with science or anything else for that matter in an increasingly secular age.8 I am content 
                                                          
7 The most explicit statement to this effect is Ursula Goodenough and Terrence Deacon, ‘The Sacred Emergence of 
Nature’ (Goodenough and Deacon 2006). 
8 See also Stuart Kauffman, ‘Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred’ (Kauffman 2006), and also the seminal 
(and less proselytising) works on emergence, Stuart Kauffman (1993, 1995), and also Terrence Deacon's recent ode 
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to let such feelings of ‘religiosity’ go. Empirical work on the Darwinian algorithm should 
not be optimistic or indulge in mysticism. To mature intellectually in the twenty-first cen-
tury, one must stop being such a child and admit that the questions of existence and moral-
ity are not as clear-cut as old religions had led us to believe, the answers are not often up-
lifting, and it is harder to take refuge in feelings of reverent religiosity today than it was in 
the time of your ancestors. Science will not revive those feelings. Being perpetually con-
fused and scared is part of being an adult in the twenty-first century. We are in the process 
of casting aside old fairy tales. Now is not the time to be inventing new ones. But it is my 
fear that research on the Darwinian algorithm will be just another desperate grasp at a 
comforting myth. I remain characteristically pessimistic about its prospects, but it is too 
interesting a possibility to pass up. But the possibility may fail and join the ranks of other 
pathetic exploits in pseudo-science, in which case there is very little besides subjective 
reasoning between you and the stark contemplation of the grand unfolding tale of 
13.8 billion years. 
Paul Dirac (1902–1984), English theoretical physicist who predicted the existence of 
antimatter, and whose brother, Felix, committed suicide in 1925, wrote his entire philoso-
phy of life on three pages of a notebook in 1933, in which he said: 
My article of faith is that the human race will continue to live forever and will devel-
op and progress without limit. This is an assumption that I must make for my peace 
of mind. Living is worthwhile if one can contribute in some small way to this endless 
chain of progress (quoted in Farmelo 2009: 221). 
There is, of course, absolutely no guarantee that humanity or our descendant species 
will not go extinct, and much to indicate the contrary as we enter the bottleneck of the 
twenty-first century. But perhaps Dirac is right, despite this assumption. Perhaps, within 
the Darwinian algorithm, life is worthwhile if we can contribute in some small way to the 
rise of complexity in the universe – a strange, blind, but inexorable process that has been 
proceeding for 13.8 billion years. 
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The twentieth century science, from physics to neurobiology, redefined our under-
standing of the world, overturning the linear worldview of Newtonian physics for  
a more dynamic image. Especially as illuminated by complexity theory, this 
worldview suggests a conception of evolution in which phenomena adapt to each 
other, at many scales, embedded in a continually expanding universe of intercon-
nected agents. Given this conception, human culture has evolved to adapt to 
changing conditions which, thus far, have generated a social world whose com-
plexity has increased to serve a larger, more technologically advanced, more high-
ly interconnected population. To demonstrate this conception of evolution, one can 
examine the Axial Age and Modernity as cultural ‘phase transitions,’ periods of 
experimentation punctuating periods of relative stable social structures. Such an 
examination offers an insight into the potential for Big History to contribute to so-
lutions of the many challenges that call for innovative adaptations across our 
world. 
Keywords: relational evolution, world story, Axial Age, Modernity. 
Big History often focuses on the increasing complexity in the cosmos, life on Earth, and hu-
man culture that evolution has produced. David Christian discusses ‘the endless waltz of 
chaos and complexity’ (2004: 511), and Fred Spier, ‘the rise and demise of complexity at all 
scales’ (2011: 21). Yet, with the possible exception of Eric Chaisson (2001), writers in our 
discipline have not examined the dynamics by which complexity increases. In this essay,  
I want to reframe this discussion, drawing on the principles of complexity theory, because, 
while Big History treats complexity as a measure of diversity and interaction, complexity 
theory treats it as a dynamic to be examined (Bondarenko 2007). My purpose is to explore 
how an understanding of this dynamic – and the conception of evolution it suggests – can 
become an intellectual tool for our discipline. 
My argument is that evolution is a much ‘thicker’ process than traditional theory sug-
gests. Such a conception of evolution can enable students of Big History to reconsider any 
number of issues and develop a deeper understanding of the dynamics of both biological and 
cultural evolution. To explore this argument, I want to touch on four major issues: 
 two key principles of complexity theory; 
 the conception of ‘relational’ evolution suggested therein; 
 the resulting theory of historical evolution; 
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 an examination of the Axial Age and Modernity in terms of this theory, as periods 
of punctuation, and why this perspective can be so valuable. 
In an essay of this length, I can only begin this exploration. In addition, I have little 
choice but to oversimplify a number of issues that deserve deeper consideration. So I want 
to ask the readers' indulgence for this obvious limitation. With that caveat, I turn to the 
dynamics explored in complexity theory. 
Complexity Theory Dynamics 
Complexity theory emerged in the late 1970s, as researchers in fields, ranging from fluid 
dynamics to economics, armed with desktop computers, modelled their subjects on non-
linear mathematics and began finding striking similarities across disciplines and scales (for 
a full discussion see Pagels 1988). Those similarities suggested a meta-discipline, com-
plexity theory, which, for me, is best understood as the study of ‘the patterns that emerge 
as complex, multi-scaled phenomena evolve’ (Baskin 2013: 4). I prefer the word ‘phe-
nomenon’, to the more generally used ‘system’, to describe the networks complexity theo-
ry studies, because, where the concept of systems suggests mechanical stability, that of 
phenomena (see Barad 2007) indicates more dynamic structures. 
Two principles of complexity theory are critical to my argument – the structure of 
matter as nested networks and ‘attractors’. First, physical reality is composed of networks 
of agents embedded in networks at many scales, from atoms networked in molecules to 
organs networked in living bodies, and solar systems in galaxies. As a result, understand-
ing the behaviour of an ant colony as phenomenon requires at least knowledge of the be-
haviour of the ants that are its micro-scale agents, the colony itself, and its macro-scale 
environment.  
The second critical principle is the attractor, which represents the dynamic balance be-
tween the behaviour of the agents and the constraints of the environment. The term attractor 
comes from non-linear mathematics, describing the pattern in phase space into which the 
solutions to equations are drawn. Lorenz's ‘Butterfly Attractor’ is among the best known. In 
complexity theory, more generally, an attractor describes the pattern of behaviour, of all pos-
sible behaviours, that characterizes any phenomenon under specific conditions (Cohen and 
Stewart 1994: 204–207). Over time, a phenomenon's attractor will draw it to behave some-
thing like this figure, which I first scribbled as a ‘back-of-the-cocktail-napkin’ doodle when I 
was wrestling with complexity theory's basic principles.  
 
Fig. 1. Life Cycle of an Attractor 
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Put a chunk of ice in a pot on the stove and turn up the heat. It will remain solid until it 
approaches its melting point, then enter a turbulent phase transition, and transform into 
liquid. It will remain liquid until it approaches its boiling point, become turbulent again, 
and transform into gas. Phenomena, then, oscillate between turbulent phase transitions, in 
which their agents seek the behaviours that enable them to survive current conditions, and 
the stable states in which those behaviours form their characteristic attractors.  
To my surprise, I soon realized that much human behaviour conforms to this pattern. 
Human psychological development, the economy's boom/bust cycle, and the rise and fall 
of human empires (Baskin 2008, 2009) – all conform to this pattern. It also reflects other 
thinker's analyses, from Foucault's evolution of Western episteme (1994) to Arrighi's cy-
cles of Western Capitalism (1994). At some point, I realized that this pattern also reflects 
the still-controversial theory of punctuated equilibrium (Gould 2002), and that  
I had probably been strongly affected by the discussions of it I had read. 
The Life Cycle of an Attractor is meant to be what Bruno Latour (2005) calls a ‘pano-
rama’ – overly neat and coherent, an approximation of the networks it maps, not a mathe-
matical or even literal representation. The panoramic map is not the territory, merely a 
guide for the explorer. Nonetheless, the behaviour of many evolving phenomena conforms 
to this figure, suggesting a model of evolution. 
Evolution like Molasses 
We live today in an environment in which a new worldview is emerging (see Laughlin 
2005; Boje and Baskin 2010; Smolin 2013), and our understanding of evolution is chang-
ing to meet this new worldview. The traditional conception of evolution, the ‘neo-
Darwinian’ ‘modern synthesis’ ‘asserts that this history of life at all levels – including and 
even beyond the level of speciation and species extinction events, embracing all macroev-
olutionary phenomena – is fully accounted for by the processes that operate within popula-
tions and species’ (Hoffman 1989: 39). Like the Newtonian worldview in which it devel-
oped, neo-Darwinian evolution is linear, focusing on cause-and-effect changes in distinct 
entities, a ‘straight line of continuous transformation of one species into the next’ (Tatter-
sall and Schwartz 2001: 33). Richard Dawkins' theory of the ‘selfish gene’, which reduces 
organisms to vehicles for their genes, is an excellent example of this approach (Dawkins 
1976). 
Mainstream cultural evolution articulates a similar conception of ‘evolutionism’. As 
Robert Carneiro (2003) notes, evolutionism has gone in and out of favour with anthropol-
ogists since Herbert Spencer began discussing the idea in the 1850s. Much of the disa-
greement about such cultural evolution centred on the Newtonian sense of determinism 
often associated with its ‘stages’ and ‘directionality’. Carneiro insists that this Newtonian 
reading misinterprets such thinkers as Leslie White and Gordon Childe. With his more 
dynamic reading of evolutionism, for example, Carneiro explains that, while cultural evo-
lution has a direction, increasing social complexity – that is, movement toward more hier-
archical socio-political levels – ‘a process can have a direction without having a goal’ 
(Ibid.: 163). He goes on to define cultural evolution as ‘a series of adaptive readjustments, 
each adding to the structural complexity of the society and often initiating a series of other 
internal changes that further contribute to its evolution’ (Ibid.: 199). Nonetheless, Carneiro 
does not develop a fully dynamic interpretation of cultural evolution. 
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With this traditional view of evolution, researchers made great strides during the twen-
tieth century. However, a more dynamic and non-linear worldview is emerging today, and 
the conception of evolution itself is evolving. The point I want to make is not to criticize 
theorists such as Dawkins or Carneiro; the traditional understanding of evolution reflects 
the worldview in which it developed. As a new worldview emerges, so does a different 
understanding of evolution. I shall follow Lee Smolin (2013: xvi) in calling it ‘relation-
al’ – that is, phenomena are best described in the context of the networks of which they are 
part. Many of my ideas are certainly not original. I draw on or independently developed 
ideas, to name only a few, that include the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ of Niles Eldredge and 
Stephen Jay Gould (2002), Stuart Kauffman's ‘adjacent possible’ (2000: 150), Henri 
Claessen's Complex Interaction Model, which incorporates many of the dynamics of my 
model (Claessen 2000); and Mark Taylor's image of living things as both ‘genuinely crea-
tive’ individuals and the ‘product of the matrix of relationships in which they exist’ (Tay-
lor 2007: 335). By organizing such ideas with a complexity-oriented discourse I am trying 
to move toward a fuller and a more coherent theory. 
Consider the image most often used to express the traditional conception of evolu-
tion – the ‘Tree of Life’ (e.g., Pyne and Pyne 2012: 269), a static, two-dimensional image, 
beginning in its roots as the most primitive form of life and growing to its apogee in Man. 
With dynamic evolution, a more appropriate image might be molasses moving downhill, a 
colloid of many particles, affecting each other, and being affected by both the hill and the 
weather. Relational evolution moves, then, at multiple scales, along the balance between 
the demands of external conditions and the conditions of a set of phenomena's internal 
networks. Over time (see Fig. 1), the still-weakly-connected agents of an incipient phe-
nomenon in a phase transition – whether the living things in an ecosystem after an extinc-
tion event or the people in a social network after a collapse – search for behaviours that 
enable them to survive and thrive in current conditions. When those agents find successful 
behaviours, they begin to practice them and continue as long as the behaviours produce 
success.  
Over time, they build relationships by practicing these behaviours, and the longer they 
succeed, the deeper the relationships become and the more the welfare of the agents comes 
to depend on those relationships. It is this dependence on specific behaviours and relation-
ships that gives any attractor its power to constrain its agents' responses. Agents in the phe-
nomenon continue to adapt to external change, until, at some point, those agents have be-
come too wedded to their behaviours to adapt. At this point, the phenomenon enters ‘se-
nescence’, a concept Stan Salthe (1993) developed to describe the evolution of ecosys-
tems, and the agents subsume environmental change to their characteristic patterns. 
Finally, the external change becomes so great that agents can no longer survive; so the 
attractor collapses. At that point, agents, often connected in less extensive networks, must 
either dissipate so that the phenomenon no longer exists as a functioning network or re-
enter the phase transition so that it can develop another attractor. Clearly, other processes – 
ageing or the tendency to form self-reinforcing cycles – are also at work, often interacting 
with evolution. A fuller consideration would touch on them more. 
Today, societies across the world seem in senescence. One sees evidence in the grid-
lock in American government or the corruption in Russia and China, in the economic cri-
sis in the European Union or the chaos of the ‘Arab Spring’. Overwhelmed by decades of 
rapid change, those in power depend so deeply on the old attractors that support their 
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wealth, power and sense of self, that they cannot make the fundamental changes today's 
conditions demand.  
Because phenomena evolve at many scales simultaneously, the agents that make up 
any network continually undergo what Francois Jullien (2011) describes as ‘silent trans-
formations’. The process of ageing goes on every moment of every day throughout our 
bodies, even though most people rarely note it. In this way, Jullien notes, we are not so 
much getting older as the ageing world is taking us with it. Most of these transformations 
are habitual, often programmed; others are essentially experiments by which agents strive 
to respond to changes in their environments, Kauffman's exploration in the adjacent possi-
ble (Kauffman 2000). In this way, a myriad of micro-scale changes among agents, often 
barely noticeable, are tested within the phenomenon, and those that survive become availa-
ble for further development. Such micro-scale changes are only partially expressed in stable 
states; however, during a more chaotic phase transition the agents are freed to explore the 
full potential that these changes have inherent within them. In biological evolutionary theo-
ry, these tendencies are described as ‘developmental canalization’ and ‘developmental 
plasticity’, respectively (Hoffman 1989); similarly, Elman Service (1988) described this 
dynamic as the ‘Law of Evolutionary Potential’. One advantage of a complexity-oriented 
conception of evolution is that it explains this dynamic in both organic and cultural evolu-
tion at a more detailed level.  
In genetic theory, mutations build up in organisms when ecosystems are stable, and 
remain latent or not fully expressed until the more chaotic phase transitions, when organ-
isms explore survival strategies (Cohen and Stewart 1994). Mammals first appeared about 
210 million years ago; they remained ‘mainly small, nocturnal, tree-dwelling creatures’ 
(Leakey and Lewin 1995: 66), surviving in ecological niches in which they could avoid 
dinosaur predators. They would then accumulate the mutations that would enable those 
that survived to dominate all the world's ecosystems, until the extinction event that re-
moved the dinosaurs 65 million years ago. It was only in the ensuing ten-million-year 
phase transition that mammals could explore the full potential of their  
140 million years of silent transformational mutations, in the wide-open ecosystems they 
now inhabited. Once again, I have oversimplified; any dynamic as complex as the emer-
gence of mammal dominance deserves much fuller examination than is possible here. 
In cultural evolution, innovations, such as writing, also develop through millions of si-
lent transformations. Written notation appeared in a variety of times and places, as knots, 
notches, or pictographs, as an aide to memory (Fischer 2001). With growing populations, 
agricultural surpluses, and increased trade, such marks became invaluable for keeping rec-
ords. Full writing systems appear to have emerged as a part of the process of state-
formation, in order to manage increasingly great resource bases, in the late fourth century 
BCE in, first, Sumer, and, then, Egypt (Nissen 1988). Throughout the pre-axial period, 
however, the resulting literacy would remain what Assmann (2012) calls ‘sectorial’ – that 
is, used in the accounting, religious, and government sectors in which it emerged. Used 
more and more widely in such cultures, it was still constrained in a stable state where cul-
ture was predominantly communicated and managed orally. With the phase transitional 
Axial Age, people in such cultures as Greece, India, and China, freed of the constraints of 
their stable state, would experiment with writing and develop its most powerful potentiali-
ties. Literacy would become ‘cultural’, penetrating ‘into the central core of culture’ (Ass-
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mann 2012: 383), enabling the personal reflection that reading drove or the ‘religions of 
the book’, for instance (Ong 1982).  
What makes relational evolution different from the neo-Darwinian approach is not the 
facts of evolution; many neo-Darwinians will agree with most of what I have thus far writ-
ten here (e.g., Hoffman 1989). The difference is in the basic discourse, some would call it 
a paradigm that makes these agreed-upon facts significant. The discourse in traditional 
evolution focuses attention on the development of individual changes, the most extreme 
example being Dawkins' selfish genes (1976). A relational approach, on the other hand, 
focuses on both individual developments and the context of wide, deeply interconnected 
networks of evolving phenomena, perhaps even of the universe itself. Evolution therefore 
suggests the thickness of molasses. It occurs on many scales – biological evolution on the 
molecular, cellular, organic, species and ecosystem, geologic and climatic scales, and cul-
tural evolution on the individual, family, social organizational, cultural, ideological, tech-
nological and economic scales. The interaction of all such changes creates evolutionary 
patterns. In addition, the evolution of the inanimate Universe, life on Earth, and human 
culture all affect each other. The first major shift in human social evolution occurred after 
a development in inanimate evolution, the end of the Ice Age, which made more complex 
social structures necessary. Similarly, events in the evolution of life, the domestication of 
grains and animals, for example, have contributed to human social evolution. Thus, inter-
actions between events in the three forms of evolution further thicken the process. 
This relational discourse suggests ways to re-examine a variety of issues in biological 
and culture evolution. For example, is evolution gradual, as neo-Darwinians believe, or 
subject to punctuated equilibrium (e.g., Hoffman 1989)? So intense was the disagreement 
that, in The Blind Watchmaker (Dawkins 1986), Dawkins entitles a chapter ‘Puncturing 
punctuationism’. Yet, a relational approach largely resolves the disagreement. On the mi-
cro-level, agential evolution, in genes or individual people, is gradual; however, when the 
stable state of the macro-level goes into phase transition, the environment, whether ecosys-
tem or culture, punctuates its equilibrium, driving radical adaptive changes for survival 
purposes at the micro- and meso-levels. Both processes are essential to evolution; to focus 
on only one is to misrepresent the full complexity of the facts. Similarly, the suggestion 
that biological and cultural evolution are different because the biological is mostly ‘Dar-
winian’ and the cultural, mostly ‘Lamarkian’ (e.g., Grinin et al. 2011) shifts with relational 
evolution. The difference here is in the carriers of ‘genotypic’ information. In biological 
phenomena that carrier is DNA, embedded in the body; in cultural phenomena it is a varie-
ty of stories, narratives, and meta-narratives people in any culture tell each other (e.g., 
Lyotard 1984). Take into account these differences in how information is carried, and the 
mechanism of both types of evolution seem remarkably similar. 
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Human Social Evolution 
From this relational point of view, a panorama of human history over the last 50,000 years 
might look something like this (first presented in Baskin and Bondarenko 2011). 
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Fig. 2. Human history as ‘punctuated equilibria’ 
History is too messy and abundant, and, what we know with certainty, too limited, to as-
sume that events should conform to our abstractions; so I left this figure imprecise. For 
example, the movement indicated in the figure is overly linear. For the most part, cultural 
stable states do not simply end and phase transitions begin; rather, societies often move 
back and forth between the two. Still, the basic pattern seems valid as a Latourian panora-
ma, rather than attempt to articulate the truth. 
This conception of cultural evolution has a significant explanatory power. For in-
stance, the period from c. 3000 BCE to 1500 CE is often defined as the ‘tribute’ (Tainter 
1988; Amin 2009) ‘stage’ of society. Yet, the social institutions in Greece, India and Chi-
na, before and after the Axial Age, are clearly distinct – mythic religion vs. religions of the 
book, for example, or government by royal lineage vs. bureaucracy (e.g., Lewis 1990). The 
evolutionary model I am developing explains those differences as two cultural stable states 
that represent adaptations to different levels of complexity. This understanding was recent-
ly validated by its similarity to the more mathematically rigorous work of Korotayev and 
Grinin (2012: 34), in modeling the growth of urban populations. 
 
Fig. 3. Dynamics of World Urban Population 
Note: In millions, for cities of more than 10,000, 4000 BCE–1990 CE, logarithmic scale. 
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Here we see that urban population remains essentially flat in pre-axial and post-axial stable 
states, while it increases exponentially in the Axial Age and Modernity. According to Ko-
rotayev and Grinin, such rapid population growth results largely from an acceleration in 
technological innovation. Viewed in terms of relational evolution, this acceleration of in-
novation reflects the phase transition and the enhanced ability to experiment with and to 
socially integrate the wide range of social mutations – manifested, for example, in the 
feedback loops of increased collective learning – that had already developed, as well as 
new innovations.  
In the rest of this essay, I shall explore whether, as a relational theory of evolution 
suggests, the Axial Age and Modernity share similar dynamics. Space limitations make it 
impossible to explore key issues such as capitalism, imperialism, or developments outside 
Eurasia in any detail. If this theory does seem accurate, however, it should offer fascinat-
ing insights into such topics at another time.  
At the heart of events in both cultural phase transitions is the transformation in the cul-
tural ‘phenotype’, the institutional structures that enable continuing survival, which re-
quires a new cultural ‘genotype’, the equivalent of organic DNA. Bondarenko and I call 
that cultural genotype a ‘world story’. Such culture-defining sets of stories must answer a 
series of questions about survival including:  
 How did we human beings get here? 
 What is our purpose? 
 Who are ‘we’ as a group, and how should we behave toward each other and our 
world? 
 How should we manage the communities in which we live? 
 Why, in a world full of fear and pain, should we not kill ourselves? 
In this way, the world story of hunter-gatherers had to explain the ‘profane’, day-to-
day issues of survival, from how to hunt and gather, house and clothe themselves to social 
relationships in groups that rarely exceeded 30 members; yet, it also had to explain the 
sense that ‘sacred’ forces ‘incomprehensible, intractable but eminently efficacious’ (Cail-
lois 2001: 22), were continually moving things – from climate shifts to the animals they 
hunted and the flora they gathered. Such world stories are not merely ‘religious’ (see 
Nongbri 2013); they articulate a discourse that integrates spiritual concerns with social, 
economic and political questions, encoding any society's cultural attractor. Moreover, as 
Taylor (2007) notes of his expanded concept of religion, world stories function both to 
create the ground for social structure and to destabilize it, especially during times of cul-
tural phase transition. 
The world stories of the predominant pre-axial states (c. 3000 BCE – c. 800 BCE) fo-
cused on maintaining order amid the forces of chaos that threatened large societies de-
pendent on agricultural surplus. In Sumeria, Egypt, and China, for example, controlling 
the sacred forces threatening large-scale agriculture, from drought and flood to the devas-
tation of war, was central. In all of them, the king was conduit to the divine, whether as 
god himself or, more often, master of order-creating ritual. In Egypt, for example, the 
pharaoh had to practice the rituals that ensured Ma’at, both the triumph of order over cha-
os and justice for society at large (Assmann 2008, 2011). The resulting societies were insti-
tutionally integrated, so that worship, politics, and economics – as in the use of temples for 
grain collection and distribution (e.g., the story of Joseph administering the seven years of 
plenty and seven of famine, Genesis, 41) – function as parts of an order as integral and nat-
Baskin • The Dynamics of Evolution 29
ural as the order and chaos they balance. This style of world story successfully governed 
these societies until c. 1000 BCE, when the combination of increased trade and wealth,  
a wider use of writing, and rapid improvements in warfare, especially the iron metallurgy 
that made weapons cheaper and more plentiful (McNeill 1982), as well as a doubling of 
world population between 3000 and 1000 BCE (Livi-Bacci 1992), demanded a new way 
of living in the world. 
The Axial Age 
Pre-axial social structure began to break down in the Mediterranean world c. 1200 BCE, 
when the ‘Sea People’ (e.g., Sandars 1987) destroyed both Hittite and Mycenaean cultures 
and drained the power of Egypt during the twelfth century BCE. In China, the Zhou Dyn-
asty began losing control of its territories by the middle of the tenth century BCE, eventu-
ally disintegrating into 170 competing kingdoms (Fairbank and Goldman 2006). Karl Jas-
pers (1953: 1) named the resulting transition the Axial Age (800–200 BCE), the ‘axis in 
world history ... which has given birth’ to everything that followed. The school that fol-
lows his lead (e.g., early Bellah 1976; Eisenstadt 1982; Armstrong 2006) explains the sim-
ilar experiences in these states largely in terms of a spiritual transformation that, for them, 
happened unpredictably in unconnected cultures. Relational evolution, on the other hand, 
suggests that this period represents, as Assmann (2008, 2012) points out, cultural break-
downs followed by breakthroughs that drove total social transformations in societies that 
were experiencing the same sort of increase in complexity.  
To adapt to it, people in these societies needed to recreate their institutions, from the 
pre-axial order that emphasized loyalty to one's lineage to a more formal connection and 
sense of obligation. In describing China's axial experience, Mark Lewis (1990: 246) notes 
that, just as warfare was transformed from a means of defending honor among aristocrats 
to the tightly organized extension of armies of hundreds of thousands directed by the will 
of a single man, the commander, ‘all of society was re-imagined in terms of the hierar-
chical ties of superior and subordinate’. In Greece, this movement toward order and con-
trol appeared in the phalanx and later the troops of Philip of Macedon, as well as the bu-
reaucratic empires that emerged from Alexander's conquests. 
To transform their institutions in this way, they would first have to re-interpret their 
world by evolving new world stories. As Assmann (2011) notes of the Israelite experience, 
the new world stories evolved through roughly three phases. In each, people, freed of their 
older world-story attractors, behaved according to their evolving stories, experienced the 
results, and then changed the stories in response. Assmann identifies the phases of axial 
world story as ‘foundational texts’, ‘religious texts’, and ‘commentary’. Rather than his 
‘religious texts’ (for a discussion of some problems with this term, see Nongbri 2013),  
I shall use the term ‘tragic/new world story texts’, to include Timothy Reiss's understand-
ing of tragedy. For him, the tragic reflects a ‘sense of injustice’ and ‘the inevitable gap 
between the human known and knowable and all that escapes discourse’, ‘appearing at cer-
tain moments of seemingly abrupt epistemic change ... making a new class of discourse pos-
sible’ (Reiss 1980: 20, 2). Tragedy recognizes the terror that people experience as their old 
order no longer works.  
For the sake of brevity, I shall focus on the axial experiences in Greece and China (for 
a treatment of the process in Israel, see Assmann 2011; for the Indian experience, several 
essays in Eisenstadt 1986).  
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Each culture's foundational texts articulate group identity as ‘remembered past’, mix-
ing myth and history (Assmann 2011: 59), translating pre-axial mythos into a world where 
the cultural attractors have collapsed. The fear of chaos dominates all of them. In Greece 
that fear appears in the poetry of Hesiod and the epics of Homer, articulated in divine fig-
ures who eat their children and precipitate a decade-long war over a beauty contest. Faced 
with this chaotic and capricious world, Homer shows the aristocracies of the Greek states 
as fractious brothers, coming together to protect each other's honor, going to war over Hel-
en and defeating the eastern enemy, Troy. The Greek poleis enacted this story when they 
cooperated to defeat the Persians in 490 and 480 BCE. Having achieved this success in 
enacting their foundational texts, these city-states acted like brothers again, fighting 
among themselves over political and economic control in alliances led by Athens and 
Sparta. The devastation of the Peloponnesian Wars would drive Greece's Golden Age of 
tragic/new world story texts.  
In China, the foundational texts are also about taming chaos, although the High God 
of the Shang Dynasty (Di) had been translated into the concept of Heaven (Schwartz 
1985). Order was Heaven's gift so that the key issue would be why people introduce disor-
der by deviating from it. The actors in China's axial foundational texts are not divinities, 
but early ‘sages’, such as Yu, who invented irrigation and water control after the Great 
Flood of the Yellow River, or the kings Yao and Shu, who exemplified an ordered practice 
of public rule (Ibid.; Lewis 1990). The ideal inherent in this foundational myth was of or-
der through strong kingship in an extremely hierarchical, united China. Partly as a result, 
the central theme of China's Axial Age was the movement from fragmentation to unity, 
from chaos to order. In this way, in the Spring and Autumn period (771–476 BCE) early 
Axial Age China witnessed a constant state of war – one account lists 540 interstate wars 
and more than 130 civil wars in one 295 year period (Lewis 1990: 36) – intensifying the 
fear of chaos that had existed previously. By the end of the Spring-and-Autumn period, 
warfare had reduced the number of competing states from 170 to seven. It would also 
stimulate the tragic/religious texts that appeared in late axial China.  
In the axial societies, the terror provoked by these wars would combine with the in-
creased integration of writing beyond the scribes and formal keepers of social order to en-
courage a level of reflection previously unknown (see Assmann 2012). Literacy facilitated 
the rise of individualism, as reading, an individual activity, begins to replace communal 
storytelling, and it became possible for people to become more reflective with a text in 
front of them (Ong 1982). The tragic / new world story texts in these societies would be 
one result of this increased reflection. 
In Greece, those texts appeared first in the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Eu-
ripides, which span the fifth century BCE, from the beginning of the Persian Wars in 
499 BCE to the end of the Peloponnesian Wars in 404 BCE. The tragedies demonstrated 
how even good people become caught up in chaotic forces, no matter how hard they resist. 
These texts demonstrate Reiss' (1980: 21) ‘moment of rupture’, as people recognize that the 
old ways do not work, and that the order provided by reason can be disrupted by dark sa-
cred forces. 
The new world story to explain this chaos and terror emerges in Greece from its tradi-
tion of philosophy, with all the experimental variety one would expect in a period of phase 
transition: the Pythagoreans (fifth and sixth centuries BCE) insisted on the ultimate reality 
of numbers; Heraclitus (fl. 550) saw reality as a constant change; and the atomists, such as 
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Democritus (fl. 410), viewed reality ‘as a lifeless piece of machinery’ (Lindberg 2007: 29–
30). All this intellectual searching culminated in the philosophy of Plato (427–328 BCE) 
and Aristotle's practical application (384–322 BCE).  
Having lived through the devastation of the Peloponnesian Wars, Plato knew first 
hand that human-induced chaos had to be controlled. To do so, his philosophy emphasizes 
rationality, insisting that the world was created by a rational spirit, the Demiurge (see Ti-
maeus), based on the abstract Forms of things, their true reality. Chaos crept into the 
world, not because of the Forms, but the material with which the Demiurge worked (e.g., 
Bellah 2011). Because, as the Parable of the Cave (Republic) indicates, most citizens never 
understand the reality of Forms, they are governed by emotions and appetites, and gov-
ernment must prevent those emotions and appetites overwhelming citizens' reason. To 
make such government work, Plato replaced the heroic leaders of Homer with his theoros, 
the philosopher who ‘loves the spectacle of truth’ (Nightingale 2004: 98). The theoros 
would allow most citizens to have their ‘unfalsifiable’ mythic beliefs (mythos), but they 
themselves would live by the rational, ‘falsifiable’ logos. Plato recognized that such a ra-
tionally governed life was only for a very few. For the rest, he suggested that the gods, 
goddesses, and narratives of the old world story would be sufficient.  
Aristotle, born after this devastation, ‘was able calmly to look around the new world 
that Plato had opened up and explore its many possibilities, without rancor’ (Bellah 2011: 
395–396). Plato's Demiurge would become Aristotle's ‘Unmoved Mover’, a divinity of 
pure thought, beyond our world of matter, and the cosmos it created contained both the 
chaotic, ever changing world below the Moon and the unchanging Heavens (Freely 2012: 
28), rotating in perfect circles. Humans created chaos only because they would not allow 
the pure intellect of the divine to guide them. To avoid chaos, the polis must train citizens 
in using their reason. Aristotle's many other studies continued to apply his own rational 
principle to one field of study after another, answering the questions behind any world 
story. His Ethics, for example, explored how the individual could achieve eudaimonia to 
live the life of theoria. In these and other explorations, Aristotle would ‘sketch out most of 
the fields of inquiry that would preoccupy later thinkers’ (Bellah 2011: 395).  
The Chinese experience with tragic/new world story texts manifested itself as the 
philosophical flowering of the ‘hundred schools’, which arose in the century leading to  
the Warring States period (403–221 BCE). These schools reflected the wide variety of 
thought responding to the violence of the Spring-and-Autumn period, as articulated by the 
shih, the growing class of often-wandering scholars dispossessed from their noble lineages 
(Schwartz 1985). All of them were trying to understand the same tragic dilemma: If order 
was the gift of Heaven, why was chaos so widespread? Why had men lost ‘the Way of 
Heaven’? Three of these schools would define the positions that would be negotiated into 
China's post-axial world story. For the Confucians, the issue was social: the Zhou had al-
ready achieved a ‘universal, all-embracing, ethicopolitical order’ (Ibid.: 65). Only by re-
establishing that order could social order be recaptured. To do so, Confucius (551–
479 BCE) and his followers focused on living life according to the ritual formulas for 
one's position and on education as a means for both individuals and society at large to un-
derstand the ‘Way’ of humans in society. For the Daoists, the issue was more personal: the 
overly civilized order of the Confucians had made it impossible for people to behave natural-
ly, in consonance with the Way and the Heaven-given laws of change (Graham 1989). Only 
by the individual learning the Way and acting according to it could order be returned. Final-
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ly, the Legalists believed that the problem was the passionate, unruly nature of human beings 
and that order required clear, harshly enforced laws so that people knew exactly what be-
havior would be expected and what would happen if they did not conform (Feng 1976). 
Throughout the Warring States period, the intensity of warfare increased, as armies 
reached several hundred thousand men (Lewis 1990). By 300 BCE, even Mencius (c. 372–
289 BCE), the strongest Chinese believer in human goodness, recognized that the only 
way to social order was unity (Schwartz 1985). With a complex cosmology already in 
place (Ibid.: 350–382), these three perspectives would become more and more closely in-
tertwined throughout China's commentary period.  
Assmann (2011: 269) describes the period of commentary as ‘an indispensable ac-
companiment to the cultural transformation ... keeping those texts alive by bridging the 
ever widening gap between them and the changing reality of life’. In this way, as Alexander 
spread Hellenism, Rome rose in the West, and the Qin united China at the end of the  
Axial Age, as population and wealth increased, and technology accelerated, new ways of 
governing and behaving in increasingly complex societies could be articulated and enacted. 
In Greece, this commentary would play itself out in philosophy and science, continu-
ing its evolution through the Hellenistic period and later. The rationalist commentary that 
began with Plato and Aristotle continued through the work of thinkers such as the Cynics 
and Neo-Platonists in the Hellenistic period, early scientific thinkers such as Ptolemy and, 
later, the Fathers of the Church, such as Augustine and Origen (e.g., Gillespie 2008). Sig-
nificantly, their central assumptions were set in place by Plato and Aristotle, including the 
analysis of the world as distinct ‘things’, the concept of a soul separate from the body, the 
idea of an Unmoved Mover, and the emphasis on moral distinctions. All these assumptions 
would be integrated into the world stories of the Roman Empire and, later, that of Western 
culture. 
The Chinese commentary period seems to have been underway in the fourth century 
BCE. Throughout it, the Chinese thinkers of all schools would borrow from each other to 
develop the most effective philosophies for aiding kings in the seven states in their efforts 
to unite the country. The Legalist Han Fei (d. 233 BCE), for example, briefly the chief 
minister for the King of Qin as he was uniting China, borrowed from Daoist Laotzi's ideas 
about the Way and wu-wei, probably best translated as effortless action (Slingerland 
2003), to provide a metaphysical basis for his emphasis on punishment (Graham 1989).  
In spite of a reaction against the extreme Legalistic policies of the First Emperor, so that it 
lost its position as a school of philosophy, the concepts of Legalism remained key assump-
tions for the Chinese government. Neo-Confucianism, with its emphasis on right behavior 
and education, incorporating elements of both Daoism and Legalism, would become the 
state philosophy (Fairbank and Goldman 2006).  
Modernity as Another Axial Phase Transition 
The terms in which Modernity is often described – Latour's (1993: 10) ‘new regime, an 
acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time’, for example, or Samir Amin's (2009: 13) 
‘claim that human beings, individually and collectively, can and must make their own his-
tory’ – could also characterize the Axial Age. As a result, it makes sense to examine Mo-
dernity (c. 1500 CE to the present) as a phase transition in human history with remarkably 
similar dynamics. 
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As with the Axial Age, the ability of an older world story to govern an increasingly com-
plex society was breaking down. For more than a millennium, the bureaucratic empires of By-
zantium, the Islamic world, and China had justified themselves with world stories in which 
religions of the book were integrated with the efforts of the secular kings and bureaucracies 
that enabled them to govern vast territories. So successful were the post-axial empires that the 
conquests of the Yuan Dynasty, led by descendents of Genghis Khan, united Eurasia as a 
world economic system in the thirteenth century (Abu-Lughod 1989). Then, in 1453, the Ot-
tomans took Constantinople, threatening to overwhelm Christian Europe.  
Yet, within 200 years, these empires were losing the ability to respond to the social 
complexity that they had enabled. With a world population that would exceed one-half 
billion before the end of the sixteenth century (Livi-Bacci 1992: 31), the first system of 
worldwide trade by the end of the thirteenth century (Abu-Lughod 1989), and acceleration 
in the rate of technological innovation in Islam and China (e.g., Lindberg 2007; Temple 
2007), their old world stories began to falter. As Jack Goldstone (1991) notes, the inability 
of government to adapt to the needs of growing populations as economic activity evolved 
caused the mid-seventeenth century revolts in England, China, and the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottomans and Chinese fell back into the older behaviors that would enervate them 
when faced with Western imperialism. The English, in the midst of their phase transition, 
moved forward.  
In addition, the European politics was fragmented, as in early axial China and Greece, 
with Italian city-states, German principalities, and emerging national states in Spain, Por-
tugal, France and England (e.g., Bondarenko and Korotayev 2011). In fact, writers, such as 
Eric Jones (2003), claim that Europe's political fragmentation in 1500 CE was key to its 
subsequent rise. Moreover, as the axial transformations were partly driven by innovative 
applications of writing and iron metallurgy, early modern Europeans took printing (Eisen-
stein 2005) and the commercially efficacious machine, both invented in China, ‘to a high 
pitch’ (Jones 2003: 58), that, together, made a higher level of complexity possible, and 
with it the ability to respond to a more complex environment. 
Since the fall of Rome, Western Europe had experienced a chaos of diverse influences – 
from the rationality of ancient Greece, through the memory of the Roman Empire, and mon-
otheism, through Christianity, to the Germanic, Viking and Islamic invasions. By the end of 
the twelfth century, the foundational text of the modern period began to emerge, initially in 
the stories of the Quest for the Holy Grail (Spengler 1932), combining the restless spirit of 
multiple invasions with the Christian, theo-centric tradition of worship and belief, especially 
as articulated in the Apocalyptic millennialism of that period (e.g., Noble 1999; Gillespie 
2008). As suggested below, these stories would not express their full power until some time 
around 1500, when the breakthrough of the modern phase transition followed the breakdown 
of the medieval period. 
Even as the grail quest literature was championing the authority of a social order join-
ing the Catholic Church and the feudal economic/political class, events continued to pro-
voke chaos. The loss of Jerusalem in 1187, followed by the failure of the Third Crusade 
(1189–1192) to retake it, undermined the legitimacy of the Papacy's claim to represent 
God on Earth. After the Mongol creation of a world economic system in the thirteenth cen-
tury, increasing trade and wealth would build the fortunes that would finance the Renais-
sance, but also encourage the corruption in the Church, especially the Papal indulgences, 
which allowed the rich to ‘buy’ salvation, outraging Martin Luther. Finally, the Black 
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Death (1348–1350) and the Hundred Years War between England and France (1327–
1453) would devastate the population of Europe (Gillespie 2008). The medieval world 
story would then break down and the modern phase transition would begin.  
This phase transition would consist of a series of social explorations of Kauffman's 
adjacent possible, each of which led to a social consensus, the enactment of that consen-
sus, a series of (mostly unexpected) results, and new explorations. Perhaps the most strik-
ing, this evolving modern world story repeatedly destabilized the institutions and belief 
systems created when it was enacted.  
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, both the Renaissance and Reformation looked 
to different paths for governing an increasingly complex society. The printing press intro-
duced by Gutenberg c. 1450 (see Eisenstein 2005) changed the nature of communication, 
making increasing amounts of knowledge available to the Renaissance and personal reading 
of the Bible to the Reformation, generating a significant acceleration of the collective learn-
ing so central to cultural evolution (Christian 2004); the machine, employed in everything 
from the printing press to the newly improved firearms, intensified politics, warfare and 
commerce. Building on these innovations, the Renaissance strove to improve human life 
by employing the increasing store of knowledge; the Reformation used the availability of 
Bibles in the vernacular to challenge the often-abused spiritual monopoly of the Catholic 
Church (Gillespie 2008). For Martin Luther, the End of Time was near. As a result, for 
many in the Reformation, there was no need for the attempts at education and reform 
championed by Renaissance spokesmen such as Erasmus. The Reformation won out, 
plunging Europe into 150 years of devastating religious wars, as the Spring-and-Autumn 
wars had devastated China. 
Even before these wars culminated in the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and the Eng-
lish Civil War (1642–1651), the tragic/new world story texts would begin appearing in 
Shakespeare's major political tragedies, Hamlet, King Lear, and Macbeth, in the first few 
years of the seventeenth century. There, he demonstrates the inadequacy of the medieval 
model of monarchy, with its dependence on family lineages and the relationship between 
the king and his knights. As with the Greek tragedians' criticism of Homeric ideals, Shake-
speare points us to Reiss's (1980) moment of rupture when a new way of governing a more 
complex world must emerge. By the end of the religious wars, the new world story was 
also emerging. 
That story had roots in a growing tradition of scientific rationalism. Francis Bacon 
(1561–1626), for example, called for an experimental science whose priest-like devotees 
would ‘discover the hidden powers by which nature moves in order to gain mastery over 
it’ (Gillespie 2008: 39). In addition, Kepler, Copernicus and Galileo conceived of ‘the ma-
chine of the universe ... similar to a clock’, to use Kepler's words (quoted in Dolnick 2011: 
182), and written in the language of mathematics. The explorations of this mechanistic 
worldview turned on the issue of how best to apply scientific realism to govern a world 
weary of war's chaos.  
For René Descartes (1596–1650), science was the rational search for the Truth that 
would ‘discover the ground for a radical transformation of European society’ (Gillespie 
2008: 177). Such a science of certainty was possible for two reasons. First, the human be-
ing alone was a thinking being with the godlike ability to remake the world. Second, sci-
ence can be true because mathematics, as the language of the universe, is true, and, Des-
cartes believed, God is not a deceiver. A different version of this rational world story came 
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from Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), for whom science was not so much the search for the 
truth, but for knowledge of how things worked. Because God was omnipotent – and thus 
capable of deceiving human beings – science must study the dynamics by which God 
willed motion to occur. Human beings can never know the truth of these dynamics, only 
that an explanation works, enabling them to manipulate a segment of the world (Gillespie 
2008: 177). 
Descartes' version, with its emphasis on the ability of science to achieve certainty, 
would become the central statement of the modern era's world story for the next 300 years. 
Its emphasis on mathematics, in particular, allowed those enacting the story to dismiss the 
messiness of life, especially after the century and a half of religious wars, as deviation. 
Only mathematics, the language in which God revealed His Book of Nature, was real. 
Such a science would fulfill the growing belief in progress, ‘leading toward ever greater 
perfection of human nature’ (Nisbet 1970: 5). The story would be enacted and further ar-
ticulated in Robert Boyle's experiments in physics, William Harvey's description of the 
circulation of blood, Isaac Newton's mechanical physics and calculus. In many ways, Des-
cartes and Newton were Modernity's Plato and Aristotle, the two thinkers who finally crys-
tallized the theory and practice of their world story.  
Meanwhile, Europe's grail quest knights were exploring the world – first the Spanish 
and Portuguese, then the Dutch, English, and French – trying to do God's work of bringing 
salvation to the heathens and, incidentally, profits back home. They looted the gold and sil-
ver of the Americas, buying themselves ever more tightly into the world economic system 
and whetting their taste for the fine products of the East (Frank 1998).  
The commentary on the new world story would emerge over the next 250 years, explor-
ing how best to apply it. Among the key issues were the transformation of worship and belief 
from a shared part of the common world story to a private matter (Nongbri 2013) and the 
intensified application of Modernity's great social experiments – nationalism, the nation state 
and capitalism – throughout the Enlightenment. Among the mutations of the world story that 
would contribute to this process are: 
 Baruch Spinoza's (1632–1677) ‘obscene’, ‘profane’, and ‘blasphemous’ (Nadler 
2011: 2–3) interpretation of the Bible, his identification of God with Nature, and his insist-
ence that democracy and freedom of expression would enhance the power and stability of 
the state;  
 John Locke's (1632–1704) social contract with which people form government to 
protect their interests (Pagden 2013), key for the democratic nation-state; and 
 Adam Smith's (1723–1790) ‘invisible hand’, which created a quasi-religious free-
market philosophy to replace Christianity's omnipotent God (Israel 2011). 
Throughout this period, people would enact this evolving world story, introducing so-
cial mutations ranging from a host of scientific discoveries and technologies to more effec-
tive industrial organizations, better weapons to more efficient military structures, as well 
as the imperialistic successes they enabled. As long as society seemed to exhibit the En-
lightenment ideal of progress, the rationality so critical to its worldview seemed to promise 
the perfection of man envisioned by Descartes (Ibid.). However, when French finances 
began to fail and the monarchy could no longer meet its responsibilities to the people 
(Goldstone 1991), a wave of destabilization, articulated by philosophers, such as Diderot 
and D'Alembert, in France, and Priestly in England, began to create a ‘widespread con-
sciousness in influential circles of the need to abolish privilege and rank’ (Israel 2011: 
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229), as well as a conservative reaction. When the French monarchy failed, however, the 
result was not government by the ideals of Enlightenment rationality, but a devastating 
destabilization in an explosion of full-flowered nationalism and revenge, leading to two 
decades of war, evoking the same emotions religion had during the religious wars. 
After Napoleon was finally exiled in 1815, Europe continued following its ideal of pro-
gress, with further commentary on the world story and enactment of it. The Industrial Revolu-
tion and its critics, from Charles Dickens' novels to Karl Marx's economics, drove the evo-
lution of the new world story into new areas of the adjacent possible. And Bacon's ‘priests’ 
of science would continue to destabilize the world story as they enacted it. The geological 
theories of Charles Lyell and evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin set the stage for driv-
ing God out of the modern world story, exciting the same reaction as Spinoza had. More 
and more, the modern world story was appearing increasingly unstable. 
Then, in the twentieth century, it began to collapse. First, scientists, practicing the 
Newtonian methodology they had learned, discovered that their worldview was, if not 
wrong, then, at least, askew. Albert Einstein's theories of relativity showed the dead matter 
of Newtonian physics to be structures of transformed energy. Then quantum mechanics 
demonstrated that Newtonian distinct ‘things’ were intimately interconnected, and its de-
terminism open to chance and contingency (Smolin 2013). Second, after three generations 
of peace in Europe, at a point where Enlightenment progress appeared to be pointing to-
ward human perfection, two world wars erupted, with levels of devastation proving that 
rationality could not be the cornerstone of human nature Descartes and those who fol-
lowed him had believed (e.g., Berman 1992).  
In addition, since World War II, the modern confidence in the value of education, free 
trade, and human equality has destabilized the political order by which Western Europe 
had dominated the world for more than two centuries. As people in formerly ‘backward’ 
nations have taken advantage of scientific education, they have entered into full partner-
ship in a world economy where China is likely to become the leading power. As the Inter-
net has accelerated the process of global interconnection, the nations of the world are be-
coming increasingly interdependent in trade, financial dealings, and resource allocation, as 
well as their attempts to control the dangers posed by terrorism, environmental contamina-
tion and global warming (Sachs 2008). Here one of the most powerful experiments of the 
modern world story, national culture, has become one of the chief obstacles to solving all 
these problems (e.g., Smith 1995). Because different national cultures, based on their 
unique histories, include different ways of thinking about the world, it has become increas-
ingly common for people from those cultures to experience the world very differently 
(e.g., Nisbett 2003). For example, Western and Chinese business people have different 
understandings of the concept of Law (Baskin 2009), leading to significant mutual antago-
nism over issues of intellectual property. 
In order for our societies to adapt to all these changes, still another world story is 
emerging. Nobel Laureate in Physics Robert Laughlin (2005) calls its worldview ‘emer-
gent’, David Boje and I (Boje and Baskin 2010) ‘post-Newtonian’, Smolin (2013) ‘rela-
tional’. In this paper, I have used Smolin's relational, a term used similarly in Taylor 
(2007), because it implies that the ‘things’ we experience as distinct behave both as agents 
and as members of networks interconnected to other agents, in the moment and historical-
ly. Such a worldview, I believe, stands at the heart of Big History, and has also been in-
corporated in other social sciences – Latour's (2005) sociology of actor networks, for ex-
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ample, or the philosophy of Karen Barad (2007) as well as much of Michel Foucault's 
(1994) ‘anthropology’. It is, after all, the relational interconnection of agents, often on 
many scales, in both space and time, that makes a relational conception of evolution so 
thick.  
Conclusion 
Despite the unavoidable oversimplification, I hope that I have demonstrated that the basic 
dynamics of the Axial Age and Modernity seem similar, from the social breakdown and 
political fragmentation through the intense social, political and technological innovation, 
from the terror roused by periods of intense warfare through the evolution of new world 
stories. Clearly, the Axial Age and Modernity also have significant differences. The axial 
transformation occurred in four very different cultures, which remained only tenuously 
connected. On the other hand, the modern transformation began in one area and spread 
across a globe that became increasingly interconnected. Yet, both periods seem unmistak-
ably to confront the need to adapt to a significantly higher level of social complexity. 
I believe that further examination will show relational evolution can be valuable to the 
study of Big History. A relational perspective, after all, offers tools to explore how nation-
al cultures evolved as parts of their societies' world stories, under deep historical pressures. 
This analysis is essential because it is the world story that contains any culture's definition 
of identity – our group vs. the other. As Ed Hall (1976) points out, most people still be-
lieve that anyone who does not behave according to their own culture is a barbarian, un-
couth at best and insane at worst. Yet, with all the problems the world faced that can only 
be solved by international cooperation, the human community needs to redefine this issue 
of identity. Such a redefinition has been part of past cultural phase transitions. During the 
Agrarian Revolution, group identity was expanded from membership in a small band to 
membership in a state. During the Axial Age, it was again from the state to the empire. 
Unfortunately, we humans seem to need to define the world as ‘us’ and ‘other’. Yet, with-
out an invasion from space, we have run out of others. 
The alternative is, not to expand, but to thoroughly redefine what we mean by us and 
other. As Big History demonstrates, the human race comes from a single origin. The dif-
ferences between us are a matter of adaptations to different circumstances, and the ques-
tion becomes whether human beings can let go of the implication of enemy that has been 
built into the other. Can we see the other as someone like us, who merely found a different 
story? Without such a redefinition, it seems unlikely that people from different cultures 
can come together to discuss issues of mutual interest – from economic integration to nu-
clear proliferation and ecological degradation – without the distortions of cultural differ-
ence and enmity.  
At first, this seems an impossible goal. When the United Nations cannot address the 
chaos in Syria, the European Union is increasingly troubled, and some of the most indus-
trialized nations refuse to agree with treaties on global warming, the combination of power 
politics and cultural difference seems insuperable. Yet, who, living in a hunter-gatherer 
band 1,500 years ago could have imagined identifying as a member of a city of 80,000, 
such as Ur in 2800 BCE (Modelski 2003: 28), or a nation of a billion, such as China and 
India today? We, human beings, are capable of learning to live and think very differently, 
especially when our survival depends upon it. For me, Big History has the potential to 
contribute to this effort of relearning what it means to be a human being in a fully global-
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ized world, rather than one largely segregated by culture, as the world was even 500 years 
ago. And I invited the reader to consider the analysis in this essay, as sketchy and over-
simplified as it is, as a set of tools in the further development of Big History.  
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This paper considers the subspecialty of adaptive technology. It looks at tech-
nology development in the light of our rapidly changing world and in the context 
of Big History. The author makes a case for past technologies serving as models 
from which new technologies may be developed. In this way, he sees a collective 
knowledge of the past, as well as considerations of the present and future, con-
ferring survival benefits on civilization. In this way, Big History holds great 
pragmatic promise for humanity. 
Keywords: adaptive technology, Big History, traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK), future studies, indigenous heritage. 
Big History is involved in a great project of expanding the view of humanity's place in the 
universe. Its studies are leading to new connections between previously separated entities, 
from cities and minerals to shipping lanes and thermoclines. But as scientists and scholars 
develop new insights of cosmic history, they should also think back to their ancestors – to 
our forefathers and foremothers who took their living from the land, sea, rivers and 
hillsides of the ancient world. They should also think about today's indigenous peoples 
who are custodians of a middle tradition between the old and the new ways. Such reflec-
tion on the past should not be a focus of just antiquarian interest but it should also reflect a 
present-day concern for sustainable adaptation to life on our rapidly changing planet. 
Classically minded scholars tend to designate the small agrarian cities of 5000 years 
ago as the ‘start of civilization’ but, in fact, the individual components that collectively 
constitute ‘civilization’ existed long before Mesopotamia became its so-called cradle.  
The first understandings of the universe began with our Paleolithic ancestors, not with Ne-
olithic rulers and priests. These understandings developed in continual and collective pro-
cesses, beginning with the evolution of our genus more than two million years ago. 
This is borne out with the discovery that many of the traditional hallmarks used to iden-
tify ‘civilization’ began before the adoption of agriculture. Take, for example, permanent 
residency in single locations and the development of ceramics. Hunters and gatherers lived 
in permanent communities in places like Palestine and Japan over 10,000 years ago, while 
pottery has been pushed back 20,000 years with its recent discovery in southern China 
(Wu et al. 2012). Indeed, it was hunters and gatherers who developed strategies that led to 
the development of agriculture. While hardly news to most scholars, it is a fact that needs 
to be better articulated with a public that tends to focus on technological and social aspects 
of Neolithic society. 
The hunting and gathering peoples of the world knew their landscapes and water-
scapes better than the farmers who had to micro-manage their crops on small plots of 
lands. Agriculture might have allowed the division of labor so that a few specialists could 
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spend their time studying the stars, but, in the older tradition, a majority of hunters and gath-
erers acquired such knowledge of nature. This, indeed, is a point made by social scholar 
James Tierney: ‘The tendency is to lump all our ancient ancestors into the category of 
hunter-gather. This implies to the lay person, as well as many scholars, that these were 
small bands forever on the move, with little or no behaviors that we might describe as 
“advanced culture”’ (Tierney 2011: 290). 
Examples 
On low alpine peaks along the coast of Maine are small cuts in the granite ledges. These 
elongated holes were quarries dug a hundred years ago to extract mica. Maine was one of 
the world's large mica producers back then. Mica is an igneous form of silicon whose 
name can be translated from Latin as ‘a glittering crumb’. Indeed, as you walk up the tote 
roads on these hills, the earth glitters with fragments that fell off horse-drawn carts a cen-
tury ago. Mica is inert, flexible, lightweight, non-conducting, and opaque. In earlier days, 
it was used as windows in boilers (isinglass), in lanterns to shield lampshade fabric from a 
wick's flame, as well as insulation for electrical plugs and toasters. Today, mica is used in 
atomic force microscopy, which produces high resolution, three-dimensional imaging.  
This is an example of how older uses of technology can be migrated into more modern 
uses. There is nothing unusual about this process. People have adapted older technologies 
into newer ones for millennia – this paradigm of transferrable technology is a backbone of 
material sciences. Pigments that our ancestors developed for use on the walls of caves, like 
Lascaux and Duogate and Blombos, have been developed for use on the walls of the inter-
national space station and are even enroute to Mars (NASA 2012).  
My professional training lies in the disciplines of geography and archeology.  
The research that I entered focuses on the movement of humans into the northern Appala-
chian Highlands – the frontier region between Canada and the United States. While this 
research has been about past events, I soon discovered a specialty of adaptive technology 
that can be called ‘futures archeology’. This specialty became apparent one day in 1994, 
when I discovered the remains of a half-dozen deserted farms, which lay on a hillside, in 
the woods, many kilometers from any presently existing habitation.1  
After a long day of work, when I got back to my tent that night, I discovered that I had 
neglected to measure the downhill dimensions of a causeway. So I got up at 05:00 the next 
morning. It was raining. I had breakfast – as the rain got worse. I crossed the river, parked 
my car at the end of a dirt road, and began hiking through the forest. The rain came down 
even harder. However, it turned out that this torrential downpour was a very fortunate ex-
perience, since I got to see the causeway in action. 
A causeway is a stone bridge that allows humans and livestock to cross over a stream 
but allows water to pass beneath it in such a way to minimize erosion. In this case, the 
causeway worked brilliantly, 150 years after its construction and abandonment.2 The water 
pooled upstream and drained through the stonework, leaving the stone crossing dry and the 
streambed intact.  
                                                          
1 Barry Rodrigue, Maine Historic Preservation Commission, ME 534-016. 
2 Barry Rodrigue, Maine Historic Preservation Commission, ME 534-014.  
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Fig. 1. Causeway plan. Barry Rodrigue, Causeway No.1, Concord, Maine, ME 534–
014, for the Maine Historic Preservation Commission, Augusta, Maine (USA) 
I took the measurements that I needed and hiked back out of the forest. Back at my field 
camp, I mentioned the experience to the owner of a hunting lodge. She said this design 
would solve one of their problems, as their stone causeways washed out every year. This 
began my thinking about old methods being used to solve modern problems. Conversa-
tions with archeologists and other professionals revealed similar examples of adaptive 
technology.   
However, simple adoption of old techniques can be problematic. One infamous exam-
ple is that of the sailing vessel, John F. Leavitt. In the wake of the oil crisis of 1973–1974, 
people began to search for alternatives to petroleum power. A well-designed adaptation of 
a traditional coastal schooner was developed in Waldoboro, Maine (USA) – it was 30-
meters long and had two masts rigged with fore and aft sails. In the winter of 1979, it set 
sail down the eastern seaboard of the United States with a cargo of lumber, bound for Hai-
ti. However, it foundered in moderate seas off Long Island, New York. After much study 
of the incident, the problem was identified as the crew not having sufficient knowledge of 
commercial deep-water sailing, which had been lost in the century since the era of ‘wind, 
water and wood’ (Koltz 1980: 40–42).3 In other words, knowledge needs to go with tech-
nology. 
Bridges to the Present 
The examples of this more complete development of technology and its use abound. Two 
examples may be seen in Alaska. Archeologists, biologists and indigenous peoples in 
Southeast Alaska have begun collaborating to deal with declines in the region's basic fish-
eries economy. Traditional halibut hooks fashioned by the indigenous Tlingit were de-
signed in such a way so as to avoid capture of immature fish and large breeding females, 
while their intertidal salmon weirs allowed for capture of fish only at certain times of an 
ebb tide. This was a technology-based method of conservation (Ratner and Holen 2007: 
45–46, 48). Likewise, architectural studies of earth-fast, traditional housing among the in-
digenous peoples of Alaska led to construction of new housing forms in Anuktuvuk Pass,  
                                                          
3 I would like to thank Nathan Lipfert of the Maine Maritime Museum for his background information of this incident 
and others. 
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a Nunamiut Eskimo community in the Brooks Mountain Range in the Alaskan arctic. By 
merging traditional design and with high-tech design, the result was a cut in the cost of house 
construction and a reduction in the annual heating fuel use by a factor of ten. This kind of 
merger of traditional and modern skills is referred to as ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ 
or TEK (Ratner and Holen 2007: 45–46, 48).  
Russian anthropologist Anatoly Alekseyevich Shtyrbul, who teaches in Western Sibe-
ria, at the Omsk State Pedagogical University, has carried this view further by stating that 
the so-called ‘primitive’ traditional societies possess many of the skills that we will need 
to adapt to the future.4 Shtyrbul is echoed by American archeologist, Stephen Scharoun, 
who specializes in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century farm technology and systems of farm 
management. His career was not chosen because of an atavistic appreciation for the past. His 
view is that with the decline of cheap fossil fuel, we should know such techniques, so that 
we can adapt them to soon-to-be changing forms of food production.  
This is by no means a unique view, as many journals, societies, books, individuals and 
organizations advocate it. In the United States, Foxfire magazine was begun in 1966, the 
Whole Earth Catalog in 1968, and the Small Farmer's Journal in 1976. These are the 
kinds of technological compilation begun by encyclopediasts in fifteenth-century China 
and eighteenth-century France. The designer, Victor Papanek, devoted his life to such ap-
plied uses, as in his 1971 book, Design for the Real World.  
Since the 1980s, agricultural scientist Anil Gupta of the Indian Institute of Manage-
ment in Ahmedabad has researched grassroots innovation by common people throughout 
South Asia.5 Alexander Petroff has successfully established a self-sustaining program of 
agricultural recolonization based on oxen power in eastern Congo, an area lacking petrole-
um access. Petroff envisions his organization, Working Villages International, to be appli-
cable to other regions of the world.6  
But what is new about these efforts is that the present and future circumstances of life on 
Earth have so dramatically changed, and that a new, degraded world is in sight – one with 
little cheap energy, one that is polluted, overpopulated, and trying to adapt to collapsing 
infrastructures. Such adaptations as articulated by Shtyrbul and others are perhaps more 
important than ever. So, what does this kind of adaptive technology mean for Big History? 
Big History and Adaptive Technology 
In a way, adaptive technology could be seen as an extension of Little Big Histories, where 
a complete historical profile is given on a subject. In this respect, Esther Quaedackers has 
analyzed Tiananmen Square as an expression of building styles, making connections be-
tween human and other animals' construction techniques, while Craig Benjamin has ana-
lyzed the deep history of Jericho as the world's oldest and continually inhabited city 
(Quaedackers 2011; Benjamin 2011).  
However, adaptive technology moves the concept of Little Big Histories a few steps 
further into the realm of filtering them for pragmatic lessons, for application to life. It thus 
could become prescriptive as well as descriptive. We, Big Historians, have done well in 
describing the past and beginning the assemblage of deep historical contexts. I propose 
that a next step might be more in the direction of applications.  
                                                          
4 This discourse was part of Shtyrbul's presentation at the Fifth International Conference on Hierarchy and Power in the 
History of Civilizations (Shtyrbul 2009). 
5 Gupta's organization, the Honey Bee Network (http://www.sristi.org/hbnew/), promotes grassroots innovation. 
6 See the website for Working Villages International at http://workingvillages.org/. 
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In his study of the Little Big History of Jericho, Craig Benjamin has outlined the factors 
that gave Jericho such an advantage, such as reliable fresh water source, protected valley, 
closeness to a major trading route, fertile soil, etc. If we were to convert such a predictive mod-
el to a prescriptive model, it might point us in directions to plan our lives for more stable and 
equitable existence – for example, on site locations for cities like Camargue, France (below sea 
level) or San Francisco, USA (on an earthquake fault). 
Our indigenous societies are repositories of knowledge and ways of learning that the 
modern world will increasingly come to need as our access to cheap fuel dwindles and the 
damage from industrial waste increases. This is not to advocate for the celebration of primi-
tiveness or ethnic identity, but an acknowledgement that we need to establish a ‘world herit-
age commons’ where the best ideas, both technology and process, are assembled and 
adapted.7  
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The paper begins in the recognition of the importance of ‘world history’ and con-
siders some of the current challenges this field faces. It considers several im-
portant contributions to the field that illuminate the value of fresh approaches: 
James Scott's construction of ‘Zomia’, Emmanuel Todd's historicization of 
‘France’ as a nation, Bin Wong and Kenneth Pomeranz's new approach to Eura-
sian economic history, and Victor Lieberman's analysis of the strange synchrony 
between Southeast Asia and Western Europe over a millennium of political devel-
opment. The essay concludes with several historiographical maxims: avoid euro-
centrism, expect variation, look for mechanisms of inter-connection, avoid capture 
by ‘nation-state’ concepts, and pay attention to different schemes of historical time. 
Keywords: world history, eurocentrism, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, nation, 
region, historiographical maxims. 
Global Historiography 
A question that arises in historiography and the philosophy of history is that of the status 
of the notion of ‘global history’. This issue is important in contemporary debates about 
world history – for example, when economic historians make the case for Eurasian history 
rather than French history or Japanese history. There the view is that expanding the scope 
of vision from the separate nation states of Europe or Asia to the broader panoply of mul-
tiple peoples, cultures, and structures is helpful when it comes to understanding the past 
four hundred years. But what are some of the more general concerns that make thinking 
about global history an interesting or important topic? 
One important reason for thinking globally as an historian is the fact that the history 
discipline – since the Greeks! – has tended to be eurocentric in its choice of topics, fram-
ing assumptions, and methods. Economic and political history, for example, often privi-
leges the industrial revolution in England and the creation of the modern bureaucratic state 
in France, Britain, and Germany, as being exemplars of ‘modern’ development in econom-
ics and politics. This has led to a tendency to look at other countries' development as non-
standard or stunted. So global history is, in part, a framework within which the historian 
avoids privileging one regional center as primary and others as secondary or peripheral. 
Bin Wong makes this point very strongly in China Transformed  (Wong 1997). 
Second is the apparent fact that when Western historical thinkers – for example, He-
gel, Malthus, Montesquieu – have turned their attention to Asia, they have often engaged 
in a high degree of stereotyping without much factual historical knowledge. The ideas of 
Oriental despotism, Asian overpopulation, and Chinese stagnation have encouraged a car-
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toonish replacement of the intricate and diverse processes of development of different 
parts of Asia by a single-dimensional and reductive set of simplifying frameworks of 
thought. This is one of the points of Edward Said's critique of orientalism (Said 1978). So 
doing ‘global’ history means paying rigorous attention to the specificities of social, politi-
cal, and cultural arrangements in other parts of the world besides Europe. 
So a global history can be expected to be more agnostic about patterns of develop-
ment, and more open to discovery of surprising patterns, twists, and variations in the ex-
periences of India (and its many regional differences), China, Indochina, the Arab world, 
the Ottoman Empire, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Variation and complexity are what we 
should expect, not stereotyped simplicity. (Geertz's historical reconstruction of the ‘thea-
tre state’ of Bali is a case in point – he uncovers a complex system of governance, sym-
bol, value, and hierarchy that represents a substantially different structure of politics 
than the models derived from the emergence of bureaucratic states in early modern Eu-
rope [Geertz 1980].) A global history needs to free itself from eurocentrism. 
This step away from eurocentrism in outlook should also be accompanied by a broaden-
ing of the geographical range of what is historically interesting. So a global history ought to 
be global and trans-national in its selection of topics – even while recognizing the fact that 
all historical research is selective. A globally oriented historian will recognize that the po-
litical systems of classical India are as interesting and complex as the organization of the 
Roman Republic. 
Another aspect of global history falls more on the side of how some historians have 
thought about historical structures and causes since the 1960s. History itself is a ‘global’ 
process, in which events and systems occur that involve activities in many parts of the 
world simultaneously. Immanuel Wallerstein is first among these, with his framework of 
‘world systems’ (Wallerstein 1974). Wallerstein's prologue to the 2011 edition of the book 
is a very useful reflection on criticisms and reception of the book in its original version 
(Wallerstein 2011). But the basic idea is a compelling one. An effort to explain the English 
industrial revolution by only referring to factors, influences, and experiences that occur 
within England or on its edges (Western Europe) is inadequate on its face. International 
trade, the flow of technologies from Asia to Europe, and the flows of ideas and peoples 
from Asia, Africa, and the Americas have plain consequences for the domestic economy 
of England in 1800 and the development of machine and power technologies. And  
a ‘globally minded’ historian will pay close attention to these trans-national influences  
and interdependencies. This aspect of the interest of global history falls within the area of 
thinking about the scope of the causal factors that influence more local developments. 
An important current underlying much work in global history is the reality of colonial-
ism through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the equally important reality of anti-
colonial struggles and nation building in the 1960s and 1970s. ‘The world’ was important in 
the capitals of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium because those nations exerted 
colonial rule in various parts of Africa, Asia, and South America. So there was a specific 
interest in gaining certain kinds of knowledge about those societies – in order to better 
govern them and exploit them. And post-colonial states had a symmetrical interest in sup-
porting global historiography in their own universities and knowledge systems, in order to 
better understand and better critique the forming relations of the past. 
Then there is the issue of climate and climate change. The ‘little ice age’ had major 
consequences for population, nutrition, trade, and economic activity in Western Europe; 
but the same climate processes also affected life in other quarters of the globe. So to have 
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a good understanding of the timing and pace of historical change, we often need to know 
some fairly detailed facts about the global environment (Fagan 2000). 
A final way in which history needs to become ‘global’ is to incorporate the perspec-
tives and historical traditions of historians in non-western countries into the mainstream 
of discussion of major world developments. Indian and Chinese historians have their own 
intellectual traditions in conducting historical research and explanation; a global history is 
one that pays attention to the insights and arguments of these traditions. 
So global history has to do with 
 a broadened definition of the arena of historical change to include Europe, Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East, and the Americas; 
 a recognition of the complexity and sophistication of institutions and systems in 
many parts of the world; 
 a recognition of the trans-national interrelatedness that has existed among conti-
nents for at least four centuries; 
 a recognition of the complexity and distinctiveness of different national traditions 
of historiography. 
Dominic Sachsenmaier provides a significant recent discussion of some of these issues 
in Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a Connected 
World (Sachsenmaier 2011). Sachsenmaier devotes much of his attention to the last point 
mentioned here, the ‘multiple global perspectives’ point. He wants to take this idea seri-
ously and try to discover some of the implications of different national traditions of aca-
demic historiography. More than half his book is devoted to case studies of global histori-
cal research traditions and foci in three distinct national contexts – Germany, the United 
States, and China. How do historians trained and en-disciplined in these three traditions 
think about the core problems of transnational, global history? Sachsenmaier believes that 
these differences are real, and that they can be productive of future historical insights 
through more sustained dialogue. But he also believes there are conceptual and methodo-
logical barriers to these dialogues, somewhat akin to the ‘paradigm incommensurability’ 
ideas that Thomas Kuhn advanced for the physical sciences. And he does a good job of 
articulating what some of these conceptual barriers involve: 
Certain hierarchies of knowledge became deeply engrained in the conceptual worlds of 
modern historiography. Approaching the realities and further possibilities of alternative 
approaches to global history thus requires us to critically examine changing dynamics 
and lasting hierarchies which typify historiography as a global professional environ-
ment… It will become quite clear that in European societies the question of historio-
graphical traditions tended to be answered in ways that were profoundly different from 
most academic communities in other parts of the world (Sachsenmaier 2011: 17). 
So Sachsenmaier's attention is directed largely to the conceptual issues and discipli-
nary frameworks that are pertinent when we consider how different national traditions 
have done history. What he has to say here is very useful and original. But he also makes 
several of the points mentioned above as well – the need to select different definitions of 
geography in doing history, the need to put aside the stereotypes of eurocentrism, and the 
value in understanding in depth the alternative traditions of historical understanding that 
exist in the world. 
Here I want to look at some of the specific historiographic issues that have delayed, 
but sometimes furthered, the development of a more truly global history. 
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Methodological Nationalism 
Are there logical divisions within the global whole of social interactions and systems that 
permit us to focus on a limited, bounded social reality? Is there a stable level of social ag-
gregation that might provide an answer to the ‘units of analysis’ question in the social sci-
ences? This is a question that has recurred frequently in several areas of the social sciences – 
on regions, on levels of analysis, and on world systems. Here I will focus on the nation-
state as one such system of demarcation. 
We can start with a very compelling recent critique of current definitions of the social 
sciences. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller offer an intriguing analysis of social sci-
ence conceptual schemes in ‘Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, 
migration and the social sciences’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). The core idea is the notion 
that the social sciences have tended to conceptualize social phenomena around the bounda-
ries of the nation-state. And, these authors contend, this assumption creates a set of blin-
ders for the social sciences that makes it difficult to capture some crucially important 
forms of social interaction and structure. 
Their view is a complex one. They think that the social sciences have been trapped 
behind a kind of conceptual blindness, according to which the concepts of nation and state 
structure our perception of social reality but disappear as objects of critical inquiry. Second, 
they argue that there were real processes of nation and state building that created this blind-
ness – from nineteenth century nation building to twentieth century colonialism. And third, 
they suggest that the framework of methodological nationalism itself contributed to the con-
crete shaping of the history of nation and state building. So it is a three-way relationship be-
tween knowledge and the social world. 
‘Nationalism’ has several different connotations. First, it implies that peoples fall into 
‘nations’, and that ‘nations’ are somewhat inevitable and compact social realities. France 
is a nation. But closer examination reveals that France is a social-historical construct, not a 
uniform or natural social whole. (We will consider Emmanuel Todd's version of this ar-
gument in the next section.) Alsatians, Bretons, and Basques are part of the French nation; 
and yet they are communities with distinct identities, histories, and affinities. So forging 
France as a nation was a political effort, and it is an unfinished project. 
Second, nationalism refers to movements based on mobilization of political identities. 
Hindu nationalists have sought power in India through the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
on the basis of a constructed, mobilized (and in various ways fictional) Hindu identity. 
The struggle over the Babri Mosque, and the political use to which this symbol was put 
in BJP mobilization, illustrates this point. But ‘nationalist politics’ also possess a social 
reality. It is all too evident that even fictive ‘national identities’ can be powerful sources 
of political motivation. So nationalist politics in the twentieth century were a key part of 
many historical processes. (Michael Mann's The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining 
Ethnic Cleansing  illustrates this point [Mann 2005].) And, of course, there may be mul-
tiple national identities within a given region; so the ‘nation’ consists of multiple ‘na-
tionalist’ groups. Ben Anderson's Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (Anderson 1983) provides an extensive development of the polit-
ical and constructed nature of ethnic and national identities. Also relevant here are 
(Frank 1998), (McNeill 1986), and (Hall and Fenelon 2008). 
What about the other pole of the ‘nation-state’ conjunction – the state? Here the idea is 
that the state is the seat of sovereign authority; the origin and enforcement of legal institu-
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tions; and the holder of a monopoly of coercive power in a region. A state does not inevi-
tably correspond to a nation; so when we hyphenate the conjunction we make a further 
substantive assumption – that nations grow into states, and that states cultivate national 
identities. 
The fundamental criticism that Wimmer and Schiller express – the fundamental defect 
of methodological nationalism – is that it limits the ability of social scientists and histori-
ans to perceive processes that are above or below the level of the nation-state. Trans-
national processes (they offer migration as an example) and sub-national processes (we 
might refer to the kinds of violent mobilization studied by Michael Mann in the Dark 
Side of Democracy [Mann 2005]) are either invisible or unimportant, from the point of 
view of methodological nationalism. So the methodology occludes social phenomena 
that are actually of great importance to understanding the contemporary world.  
Wimmer and Schiller seem to point in a direction that we find in Saskia Sassen's work 
as well: the idea that it is necessary for the social sciences to invent a new vocabulary that 
does a better job of capturing the idea of the interconnectedness of social activity and social 
systems (Sassen 2007). The old metaphors of ‘levels’ of social life organized on an ascend-
ing spatial basis does not seem to work well today when we try to deal with topics like glob-
al cities, diasporic communities, or transnational protest movements. And each of these cri-
tiques makes a convincing case that these non-national phenomena are influential all the way 
down into the ‘national’ orders singled out by traditional classification schemes. 
France as a Nation? 
The idea of ‘nation’ has been tested in many settings. One is the case of France. Is France 
one nation? What makes it so? And what are the large socio-cultural factors that led to 
modern France? These are the questions that Emmanuel Todd raises in The Making of 
Modern France: Ideology, Politics and Culture  (Todd 1991). Todd is one of this genera-
tion's leading historians in France, and his conception of the challenge of history is worth 
studying. He is a ‘macro-historian’, in that he is interested in large processes of change 
over extended stretches of space (for example, the extension of industry across the map of 
France from 1850 to 1970, or the patterns of religious dissent from the twelfth to the twen-
tieth centuries), and he singles out characteristics of family structure, demography, litera-
cy, and religion as a set of causal factors that explain the patterns of historical change that 
he uncovers. 
Todd's starting point seems exactly right: the ‘nation’ is not a particularly salient level of 
analysis for making sense of large historical change in the case of France. Social, economic, 
and political developments should not be presumed to unfold at the level of the nation. Todd 
puts forward a simple but apt criterion for choosing a level of analysis for historical inquiry: 
‘one has to observe the social and economic behaviour of the human beings in question and 
discover their scale in order to define closed and homogeneous groups which then can be 
called society X or economy Y’ (Todd 1991: 7). And in fact, he argues that ‘France’ is better 
understood as a configuration of regions and zones than as an integrated national system. As 
he puts the point, ‘one can represent France as a heterogeneous and open area in which so-
cial, economic and political forces emerge, spread and establish themselves quite inde-
pendently of the central power and of the overall national structure’ (Ibid.: 8). And: ‘Notions 
of “French society”, “French economy”, “French industry”, “French working class” are to 
some extent myths’ (Ibid.: 7). (It is interesting to observe that this is one of G. William 
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Skinner's central insights into Chinese history as well, especially in his analysis of the histor-
ical relevance of ‘macroregions’ in China [Skinner 1977].) 
So what are the patterns and causal factors that have given rise to ‘modern France’ 
in Todd's reckoning? Crudely, Todd argues that there are large regional patterns of cul-
ture, demography, and property that created distinct dynamics of change across eight 
centuries of French history. The southern half of France is characterized by complex 
family systems with several generations in the same household and a low rate of repro-
duction, in contrast to the nuclear families of the north and their higher rate of reproduction. 
The family values of the southern region gave greater importance to literacy and educa-
tion than the nuclear (and larger) families of the north. And family structure, patterns of 
inheritance, and land tenure are in turn highly relevant to the formation of large patterns 
of ideology. (A similar logic is expressed in another of Todd's books, The Explanation 
of Ideology: Family Structure and Social Systems [Todd 1985].)  
The central analytical device in Todd's argument is a fascinating series of maps of 
France coding the 90 départements of France by such variables as the per cent of women 
holding the baccalauréat, the percentage of priests accepting the serment constitutionnel 
(revolutionary loyalty oath) in 1791, or the percentage of workers in a given industrial sec-
tor. The maps display striking geographical patterns documenting Todd's interpretation of 
the large historical patterns and their underlying anthropological and geographical causes.  
At the largest scale, he argues for three axes of historical causation: a north-south axis de-
fined by family structure that creates differentials of literacy and population growth; an 
east-west axis defined by the diffusion of industry from northern Europe into eastern 
France and across the map from east to west; and a political pattern different from both of 
these, extending from Paris at the political center to the periphery in all directions. The 
following is a great example; Todd is interested in observing the degree of ‘religiosity’ 
across France around the time of the Revolution, and he uses the percentage of priests who 
accepted the oath of allegiance demanded by the Revolutionary government as a measure. 
The resulting map reveals conspicuous patterns; the periphery and the south stand out as 
non-conformist. 
Todd also argues that there is a causal order among the large social factors he singles 
out. Family structure is causally relevant to literacy and education level; literacy is rele-
vant to religious dissent and the emergence of Cathars, Waldensians, and Protestants; fam-
ily structure is relevant to reproductive rates which are in turn relevant to the spread of 
industry; and traditions of inheritance are relevant to a region's receptiveness to the ideol-
ogy of the Revolution. And the patterns created by these causal processes are very persis-
tent; so the southern belt of high-literacy départements of the twelfth century coincides 
almost exactly with the pattern of high incidence of baccalauréats and doctors in the late 
twentieth century. 
A particularly interesting part of Todd's analysis is his effort to map out the agrarian 
regimes of pre-revolutionary France (the ancien régime). He observes that this has not 
been done by existing studies of French rural society, and that there is no suitable statisti-
cal data on the basis of which to do so for the eighteenth century in any case. However, he 
makes use of the first census in 1851 to infer back a century in order to arrive at an analy-
sis into four categories: large estates with hired labor, peasant proprietorship, tenant farm-
ing, and share-cropping. And using the mid-nineteenth century census data he constructs  
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a map of France that indicates the distribution of agrarian property regimes across the ter-
ritory (Todd 1991: 60). 
The large estates are concentrated in the center of France, including Paris; while peasant 
proprietorship (sometimes combined with share-cropping) predominates in the southern tier. 
Note as well how closely these patterns conform to the distribution of family structure and 
fertility at the top of the posting. And Todd argues that these patterns showed substantial 
continuity before and after the Revolution (Ibid.: 61). In other words, there is a very substan-
tial overlap between agrarian regimes and the anthropological-demographic patterns dis-
cussed earlier. Todd then uses these geographical patterns to explain something different: the 
pattern of de-christianization that took place over the century following the Revolution. Ba-
sically, de-christianization is associated with the regions involving a large number of land-
less workers, whereas this cultural process was least virulent in regions of peasant proprie-
torship. In other words, he offers an explanation of ideology and religion in terms of a set of 
demographic and social characteristics that are distributed differentially across regions. 
I have not touched on the dynamics of politics at all here, which is an important piece 
of Todd's work. But these comments suffice to illustrate the pattern of historical thinking 
represented by Todd's work. It is striking for its effort to cross genres, incorporating geog-
raphy, anthropology, and sociology into the formation of large interpretations of French 
history. And it is striking for the scale of the canvas that he attempts to paint. 
Beyond Divergence 
Let us turn now to another of the key challenges of global history, the effort to eliminate 
eurocentrism from historical analysis. There has been a major debate in economic history in 
the past twenty years about what to make of the contrasts between economic development 
trajectories in Western Europe and East Asia since 1600. There had been a received view, 
tracing to Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, that European ‘breakthrough’ was the norm 
and Asian ‘stagnation’ or ‘involution’ were the dysfunctional cases. E. L. Jones represents 
this view among recent comparative economic historians (Jones 1981). Then Kenneth Po-
meranz and Bin Wong challenged this received view in a couple of important books. Pome-
ranz argued in The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy  that the premises were wrong (Pomeranz 2000). He argued that Chinese produc-
tivity and standard of living were roughly comparable to those of England up to roughly 
1800, so China's economy was not backward. And he argued against the received view's 
main theories of Europe's breakthrough – the idea that European economic institutions 
and property rights were superior, or the idea that Europe had a normative or ideological 
advantage over China. Instead, he argued that Europe – Britain, to be precise – had con-
tingent and situational advantages over Asia that permitted rapid growth and industriali-
zation around the end of the eighteenth century. These advantages included large and 
accessible coal deposits – crucial for modern steam technology – and access to low cost 
labor in the Americas (hidden acreage). Bin Wong made complementary arguments 
in China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience  
(Wong 1997), where he addressed the parallel processes of development of political and 
economic institutions in the two sets of polities. Wong's most fundamental insight was that 
both processes were complex, and that balanced comparison between them is valuable. 
Now the debate has taken a new turn with the publication of R. Bin Wong and Jean-
Laurent Rosenthal's Before and Beyond Divergence: The Politics of Economic Change in 
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China and Europe  (Rosenthal and Wong 2011). Rosenthal is an accomplished historian of 
European economic development, and Wong is an expert on Chinese economic, social, and 
political history. So their collaboration permits this book to bring together into one argument 
the full expertise available on both ends of Eurasia. The book aims to unsettle the debate in 
fundamental ways. Wong and Rosenthal take issue with a point that is methodologically cen-
tral to Pomeranz, concerning the units of comparison. Pomerantz wants to compare England 
with the lower Yangzi region in China, and he gives what are to me convincing arguments 
for why this makes sense. The authors want to compare Europe with China, making England 
a special case. And they too have good reasons for their choice.  
Second, they disagree with the temporal framing that has generally been accepted 
within this debate, where economic historians have generally focused their research on the 
early modern period (1600–1900). Against this, they argue that the causes of divergence 
between Europe and China must be much earlier. They set their clock to the year 1000, 
and they examine the large features of political and economic development that started 
around that time.  
Finally, they offer crippling objections to a number of standard hypotheses about Im-
perial China as a place to do business. They show that there were alternative credit institu-
tions available in Ming and Qing China. They show that the Chinese state was sensitive to 
levels of taxation, and kept taxes low (generally comparable to European levels). And they 
show that Imperial social spending (the granary system, for example) was generally effec-
tive and well managed, contributing to economic prosperity. So the traditional explana-
tions for Chinese ‘stagnation’ do not work as causal explanations.  
They find one major difference between Europe and Asia during the first part of the 
second millennium that seems to matter. That is the multiplicity of competing states in 
Europe and a largely hegemonic Imperial state in China and the scale of the relevant zones 
of political and economic activity. Chapter 4, ‘Warfare, Location of Manufacturing, and 
Economic Growth in China and Europe’, lays out this argument. The competing states of 
Europe were frequently drawn into conflict; and conflict often resulted in warfare. 
The authors argue that this fact of competition had a fateful unintended consequence.  
It made fortified cities much safer places than open countryside. And this in turn changed 
the calculation about where ‘manufacture’ could occur at lowest cost. Labor costs were 
higher in cities, so absent warfare, producers were well advised to pursue a putting-out 
system involving peasant workers (proto-industrialization). But with the threat of maraud-
ing armies, European producers were pushed into urban locations. And this in turn gave 
them incentives to develop labor-saving, capital-intensive techniques. Putting the point 
bluntly: China did not have an industrial revolution because it was too safe an environment 
for labor-intensive production. 
These debates about how best to position the comparison of different aspects of Eura-
sian economic and political development provide very important impetus to a better ver-
sion of global history. There is a very vibrant field of work underway with this trans-
Eurasian perspective (see also Arrighi 2007 and Beckwith 2009). 
Zomia 
Now let us consider a particularly interesting challenge to methodological nationalism, 
James Scott's recent theorizing of Zomia in The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist 
History of Upland Southeast Asia (Scott 2009). Scott opens this most recent book with 
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quotations from frustrated pre-modern administrators and missionaries whose territories 
included the peoples of inaccessible highland regions – Guizhou, highland Burma, and 
Appalachia. Scott finds that the geographical circumstances of highland peoples mark 
them apart from the political organizations of the valleys; states could control agriculture, 
surplus, and labor in the lowlands, but were almost entirely incapable of exerting sustained 
rule in the highlands. And he finds that highland cultures and systems are more or less de-
liberately shaped to elude the grasp of the state; linguistic variety, swidden agriculture, and 
ethnic opacity all work to make the art of rational administration all but impossible.  
The book is a significant contribution to the social and political analysis of very large 
swatches of the world. 
Scott makes use of the concept of ‘Zomia’ to capture the highland peoples of South-
east Asia. Scott estimates the population of the minority peoples of Zomia at 80–100 mil-
lion. What is intriguing about this definition of space and social reality is that it is not de-
fined by nation-state boundaries and jurisdiction, by linguistic groupings, or by ethnic and 
national identities. Scott emphasizes the enormous linguistic and ethnic variation that oc-
curs across this expanse of space. ‘In the space of a hundred kilometers in the hills one can 
find more cultural variation – in language, dress, settlement pattern, ethnic identification, 
economic activity, and religious practices – than one would ever find in the lowland river 
valleys’ (Chapter 1; Kindle location 343). 
Two central arguments take up much of Scott's attention in the book. One is an argu-
ment about the logistics of state power in a pre-modern agrarian society and the agency of 
‘fugitive’ peoples. Essentially he argues that pre-modern agrarian societies were only able 
to impose their rule over a tight radius of perhaps 300 kilometers, when it came to collect-
ing taxes, grain, and manpower. Moreover, this radius of power reduced significantly 
when population was distributed over mountainous country. So as a practical matter, the 
pre-modern states of Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia were river-valley states, and the peo-
ples of the highlands were rarely subject to central rule. This argument resonates with Mi-
chael Mann's analysis of pre-modern state power in The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, 
A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760  (Mann 1986). On this scale, the King-
dom of Chicago would barely be able to exert its will over the peasants of Peoria or Mil-
waukee; and Indianapolis would be a distant and irrelevant place. 
And, he argues, the peoples of the highlands deliberately organized their activities in 
ways that made the power of the state least effective. 
Virtually everything about these people's livelihoods, social organization, ideologies, 
and (more controversially) even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic 
positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length (Kindle loc 26). 
The other central theoretical argument that Scott offers concerns the question of ethnici-
ty and identity. Like Ben Anderson (1983), Scott believes that the identities of Burman, 
Mon, Khmer, Tai, or Shan are constructed identities, not essential or ancient. 
Identity at the core was a political project designed to weld together the diverse peo-
ples assembled there. Bondsmen of allied strongmen, slaves captured in warfare or 
raids, cultivators and merchants enticed by agricultural and commercial possibilities: 
they were in every case a polyglot population (Kindle loc 1166). 
The central plain of what would become Siam was, in the thirteenth century, a 
complex mix of Mon, Khmer, and Tai populations who were an ‘ethnicity-in-the-
process-of-becoming’ Siamese (Kindle loc 1172). 
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The book takes up the argument that Scott began in Seeing Like a State: How Certain 
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed : that a central task of the state it to 
render its territory and population ‘legible’ (Scott 1998). The state needs to be able to reg-
iment and identify its subjects, if it is to collect taxes and raise armies; so sedentary, mo-
bile, peripheral peoples are antithetical to the needs of the state. This argument begins in 
Seeing Like a State; and it gains substantial elaboration here. And it is a fundamental call 
for a different approach to conceptualizing and studying the cultures and populations of 
Southeast Asia: not by ethnic group, not by national boundaries, but rather by the common 
circumstances of material and political life in high, rugged terrain. 
Scott's work almost always takes the form of an imaginative re-framing of problems 
that we thought we had understood. But once looking at the facts from Scott's point of 
view, we find that the social phenomena are both more complex and perhaps more obscure 
than they initially appear to be. And the Zomia concept seems to force us to rethink the 
way we partition social space and the concept of ethnicity – highly responsive to the com-
plaints against methodological nationalism. 
Zomia Reconsidered 
So what about Zomia? How does this concept hold up when considered by other experts 
on Southeast Asia? As noted, Scott turns in his usual creative, imaginative, and innovative 
treatment of the subject matter; the book is an absolutely captivating argument about the 
push and pull between states and fugitive peoples. As such, it suggests the possibility of 
bringing some of the central ideas and analyses to bear on other geographies as well. But 
how accurate is Scott's reading of the primary historical experience of these parts of 
Southeast Asia – Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Cambodia, and Bangladesh? 
This is the question posed by a recent issue of the Journal of Global History, with es-
says by C. Patterson Giersch, Magnus Fiskesjo, Sarah Turner, Sara Shneiderman, Bernard 
Formoso, and Victor Lieberman. All the essays are fascinating, including the editorial in-
troduction by Jean Michaud. But particularly important is Lieberman's essay. Lieberman is 
one of the leading contemporary historians of Southeast Asia, and he is a very fertile and 
imaginative thinker himself. So his responses to Scott's arguments are worth looking at 
closely. (His recent two-volume work, Strange Parallels: Volume 1, Integration on the 
Mainland: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830 [Lieberman 2003], is directly 
relevant to Scott's analysis.) 
Lieberman begins by establishing the territory on which he agrees with Scott. First, he 
accepts the fact of a growing separation between lowland and highland peoples in South-
east Asia during early modern times, and he agrees about the importance of analyzing this 
pan-Southeast Asian phenomenon. Another point of agreement is the fact of highlander 
agency. Lieberman agrees with Scott's insistence that highland peoples throughout 
Southeast Asia crafted their own social worlds in response to the political and natural 
environments that faced them. So Lieberman acknowledges the importance and boldness 
of Scott's effort at providing a comprehensive historical study of Zomia. But Lieberman 
offers a series of important criticisms of Scott's historical case. 
First, he finds Scott's documentation to be weak, in that it makes little use of Burmese-
language sources. This has led, in Lieberman's opinion, to a number of errors of fact, some 
more significant than others. He cites estimates of literacy, for example; Scott says less 
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than 1 per cent of people were literate in Southeast Asia, and Lieberman documents 50 per 
cent for Burma in 1800. 
More significantly, Lieberman believes Scott over-estimates the importance of man-
power as a determinant of military success in the region. The degree of maritime com-
merce was equally important, he argues. And this is critical to Scott's argument, since 
competition for manpower is one of the primary reasons Scott cites for the efforts of low-
land states to attempt to dominate the highlands. 
Finally, and most important, Lieberman argues that there is little documentary evi-
dence for significant population flight from lowland to highland (Lieberman 2003: 339). 
This is key to Scott's interpretation, and Lieberman argues the evidence is not there to sup-
port the claim. After reviewing Scott's own evidence and some additional data of his own, 
he argues that Scott may have over-estimated ‘flight’. Moreover, Lieberman argues that 
Scott's interpretation of the highlands becomes so dependent on one causal factor, state 
oppression, that it neglects the processes of development that were internal to the highland 
societies themselves. ‘Ecological and cultural conditions that were intrinsic to the hills  
and that were substantially or completely divorced from the valleys receive little or no 
attention’ (Lieberman 2003: 343). 
This point is more important when we consider an example not included in Scott's 
analysis – the highland peoples of Borneo/Kalimantan. Lieberman argues that these tribes 
had virtually all the characteristics of culture and agriculture displayed by Zomians, in-
cluding swidden cultivation and a proliferation of local languages, and Scott interprets 
these traits as deeply defensive. Yet these features of highland life emerged in Borneo 
without the pressure if a surrounding predatory lowland state (Ibid.: 345). And this casts 
serious doubt on Scott's anarchist, anti-statist interpretation of Zomia. 
Lieberman's point is not that Scott's interpretation of Zomia is unsupportable. Rather, 
his point is that it is a bold and substantive interpretation of a complex historical domain, 
and it requires serious, fact-based consideration. And this is exactly what the essays in this 
special volume of Global History promise to do. 
This debate is interesting and important, in part, because it sheds light on the practical 
empirical research challenges that arise when we consider bold new interpretations of social 
data. A bold hypothesis is advanced, purporting to pull together the processes of develop-
ment observed in a variety of places; and then there is the practical question of evaluating 
whether the hypothesis is born out when we do the detailed, local historical research needed 
to test its basic assertions. In this case, Lieberman is suggesting that several of the compo-
nents of the theory are found wanting when applied to highland Burma. 
Strange Parallels 
Let us close by considering Lieberman's own way of recasting traditional ways of parsing 
the world in his recent work. Lieberman uses the phrase, ‘strange parallels’, as the title for 
his two-volume study of Southeast Asian history (Strange Parallels: Volume 1, Integra-
tion on the Mainland: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830) (Lieberman 1999). 
Besides offering a highly expert history of Burma and its many kingdoms between 800 
and 1830, Lieberman poses a fascinating and novel question: how can we explain the sub-
stantial historical parallels that existed between Burma and various parts of Europe, in-
cluding especially France and Russia? He writes: 
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In fact, in mainland Southeast Asia as well as in France, the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries ended the third and inaugurated the last of four roughly synchronized cy-
cles of political consolidation that together spanned the better part of a millennium 
(Lieberman 1999: 2). 
The figure that Lieberman provides illustrates the kind of synchrony that Lieberman is 
highlighting – over a sweep of some thousand years, there is a rough-and-ready corre-
spondence in the patterns of territorial consolidation that existed in Burma and France. 
Lieberman's current work broadens the canvas by looking at broad temporal patterns 
of consolidation and turmoil across the full expanse of Eurasia, including Russia, France, 
Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. In two volumes of Strange Parallels  he documents a 
degree of synchrony among widely separated polities that demands explanation. Here is 
how the pulsing of consolidation and disintegration looked in Southeast Asia: 
In sum – in lieu of four modest charter polities in 1240, 23 kingdoms in 1340, and 9 or 
10 kingdoms in 1540 – mainland Southeast Asia by the second quarter of the nine-
teenth century contained three unprecedentedly grand territorial assemblages; those 
of Burma, Siam, and Vietnam (Kindle loc 799). 
Lieberman defines consolidation as a broadening of scope of a polity, including ter-
ritory, population, war-making capacity, and fiscal reach. And he notes that each of the 
world polities he studies shows a sequence of consolidation, followed by periods of tur-
moil and breakdown. And this was true as much in Burma as it was in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century France. Moreover, and this is his key point, these periods show a re-
markable degree of synchrony, from Kiev to Paris to Burma. So here is the central ques-
tion: what kinds of global triggers or events could have created this synchrony? 
Lieberman poses the crucial historical question in these terms: ‘Why should distant 
regions, with no obvious religious or material links, have experienced more or less coordi-
nated cycles? If we discount coincidence, what hitherto invisible ties could have spanned 
the continents?’ (Lieberman 2003: 2) To further complicate the picture, Lieberman points 
out that there were other regions of the world where these patterns of consolidation did not 
occur, or did so on a very different timeline. So we can exclude the idea that there was 
some common global cause leading to simultaneous pulses of consolidation; rather, South-
east Asia and Western Europe were synchronized, but India was not. 
Lieberman's explanation of this observed historical synchrony goes along these lines. 
He believes that both internalist and externalist approaches have a role to play. The inter-
nal historical dynamics of the state systems in Burma and Western Europe were governed 
by particular local factors. But they each created a tendency towards consolidation of land 
and power. And external factors provided periodic ‘pulses’ that served to synchronize these 
internal patterns of development. So the effects of an external factor – maritime trade – 
pushed both Western Europe and Burma into extended periods of state formation and con-
solidation. This story combines several ideas about causation: local processes that are de-
veloping according to their own imperatives, and occasional system-wide pulses that bring 
these local processes into synchrony. And the explanation allows Lieberman to place the 
intellectual frameworks of both Tilly and Wallerstein into the story. 
Here are a few candidates that Lieberman considers as possible mechanisms of syn-
chrony. For the tenth – thirteenth century, he considers the effects of global climate fluctu-
ation, disease, Viking invasions, and the predations of Mongol armies from Inner Asia. 
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And for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries he considers the expansion of Eurasian 
trade, modern arms, and monetary uses of silver in Europe and Asia (Kindle loc 8745).  
Internal to each polity are factors that appear to be local in their effects: population 
change, agricultural improvements, new organizational forms in governance, military, and 
taxation, and the diffusion of literacy and national culture. But the logic of these processes 
does not imply any sort of global synchrony; so, once again, what would serve to link con-
solidation and disorder in France and Burma?  
This is world history you can get your teeth into. It is detailed, making use of the best 
available sources for each of the regions and polities considered. And it is bold in its effort 
to arrive at trans-continental, even global causes of these local developments. Lieberman's 
approach is important for debates about history and the social sciences because it leads us 
to ask different questions about historical causation and historical time. And it provides 
important new thinking about how to approach the nexus between regional, national, and 
global history. 
Conclusion 
World history is more timely today than ever. ‘Globalization’ is almost a cliché, from 
‘The world is flat’ to ‘the homogenization of cultures’ to the ‘commodification of place’. 
Everyone now recognizes the fact of globalization in the contemporary world. But we 
need to understand the many ways in which many parts of the world were deeply and sys-
temically interconnected long before the post-World War II wave of revolutions in com-
munications networks, rapid travel, containerized shipping, and military power contributed 
to the current interconnectedness of most countries and peoples. We need a strong histori-
ography for the global world. 
To be most productive, however, we need to approach the tasks of global history with 
some fresh thinking. There are several key points that have emerged as fundamental. 
The first is to be vigilant about making Eurocentric assumptions about development and 
change. Whether in the domains of politics, economics, or culture, it is crucial to avoid the 
assumption that Europe set the model for developments in key areas of historical change. 
New historiography of Eurasian economic development illustrates the power of an ap-
proach that avoids Eurocentrism, including Bin Wong, Ken Pomerantz, and Prasannan 
Parthasarathi (Parthasarathi 2011). 
A second is to expect variation rather than convergence. There are many ways that 
human societies have found to solve crucial problems of coordination, order, production, 
and the exercise of power. Global historians need to be alert to the development of alterna-
tive institutions of politics, economics, culture, or social cohesion in different locales.  
In particular, it is important to take note of divergences as well as parallels in the political 
and economic development of great civilizations like those of India, China, Southeast 
Asia, or West Africa. 
Third, it is important to avoid being captured by the conceptual schemes of national-
ism and states. ‘France’, ‘Indonesia’, and ‘India’ are places with diversity and internal var-
iation, and they each followed distinct rhythms of consolidation as states and nations. It is 
often more revealing to look to regions that cross the boundaries of existing states; we 
learn much by looking at the dynamics of change in regions that are smaller than nation-
states (the American South, for example, as an economic and racial regime that had little 
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in common with Northern cities); and it is sometimes the case that we are best off consid-
ering the histories of dispersed peoples and activities (Zomia, diasporic histories, bandits). 
Fourth, the way in which we consider historical time sometimes needs more critical 
reflection. Lieberman's focus on the punctuated patterns of consolidation that took place 
from Burma to Kiev is one aspect of this reflection; the world's clock was synchronized in 
a pattern that was quite distinct from the internal patterns of change in each of the affected 
countries. And the historian needs to be attentive to both clocks. Likewise, world historians 
need to be open to considering temporality on a range of scales – from the months of the 
Terror to the decades of contention that preceded and followed the French Revolution, to  
the century and a half that separated the French Revolution from the Chinese Revolution. 
Fifth, the global impact of environmental factors needs to be given the emphasis it de-
serves. Climate change, exhaustion of woodlands, extension of mining and extraction – all 
these processes and factors influence human activity at a range of levels, and their impact 
needs to be assessed carefully on the basis of historical and physical data. 
Finally, world historians need to pay particular attention to the mechanisms of influ-
ence through which places exchanged cultural and economic material in the long centuries 
from the development of substantial Mediterranean trade in the ancient world to the ship-
ping lanes of the contemporary world. Trade, the diffusion of ideas through cultural con-
tact and migration, the effects of the book trade, the military logic of colonialism, the ad-
vent of organized long-distance communication and travel, the creation of international 
governance institutions – these mechanisms of social exchange constitute many of the 
pathways through which global integration occurs, and their dynamics are worthy of close 
attention by historians. 
Significantly, almost all these factors find their way into the work of many recent his-
torians who are taking on the challenge of making sense of the history of the modern 
world. World historiography is on a very promising path. 
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Mass Primary Education  
in the Nineteenth Century 
Julia Zinkina, Andrey Korotayev, and Aleksey Andreev 
In this paper we review the nineteenth-century origins of the contemporary ap-
proach to primary education provision. As we trace the spread of mass primary 
education in Europe as well as in other regions of the world we come to conclu-
sion that this was a truly global phenomenon of a planetary-scale importance. 
Moreover, the expansion of the mass education contributed significantly to an-
other global phenomenon – the emergence of nation-states. 
Keywords: education, formal education, mass education, popular education, 
Prussia, Austria, education in Europe, education in the world. 
During the long 19th century (1789–1914, as defined by Hobsbawm) despite major historic 
and social differences almost every country of Western Europe introduced an innovative 
idea of mass education, which later evolved to a compulsory general education (Ramirez 
and Boli 1987: 2). 
However, there are three main aspects which distinguish modern education systems 
from those existing 150 years ago, namely: centralization, secularization, and subsidiza-
tion (Ansell and Lindvall 2013). Let us briefly describe them. 
Centralization implies a distribution of power in the education sphere between nation-
al, regional, and local branches of government. 150 years ago all decisions in the sphere of 
education were made by the local legislative bodies. On the contrary, starting from the 
1870s (in some cases even earlier) the national legislative bodies started to increase their 
influence on the primary education. There were two main patterns of education centraliza-
tion: by liberal or democratic parties in the democratic countries or by authoritarian or dic-
tatorial parties in the dictatorial countries.  
Secularization means that the secular authorities started to gain control over and to 
manage the school systems. Hitherto the church had had a full control of the education 
system. 
Subsidization implies that the states provide most of the funding that keeps schools 
running (Ansell and Lindvall 2013: 505–508). 
Meanwhile, Boli, Ramirez, and Meyer specify the following three main institutional 
features of all the contemporary systems of mass education: 1) mass education is univer-
sal, standardized, and rationalized; 2) mass education sets the same goals and has similar 
organization forms all over the world; and 3) one of the key goals of mass education is to 
provide socialization for each individual, who is considered to be the main social unit (Bo-
li, Ramirez, and Meyer 1985: 147–149). 
 This study has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 15-18-30063). 
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Andy Green mentions three main aspects of primary education reform: development 
of universal forms of education provision, rationalization of administrative and institution-
al structures, and development of state financing and control (Green 2013: 11).  
A Historical Survey of the Evolution of Compulsory  
Primary Education in Western Europe 
Prussia: The first step to mass education was taken in 1763, when Frederick the Great 
issued a decree which made primary education obligatory for all Protestants living in rural 
areas. Some time later this decree was extended to several cities as well. Education be-
came a priority in rural areas as it was crucial for the army: the Seven Years' War revealed 
a severe lack of literate officers. The decree implied the creation of a unified system of 
compulsory primary education (Melton 1988: 173–175). 
School education lasted throughout the year; the school day was six hours long in win-
ter, fall, and spring, and three hours long in summer. Half of the time was devoted to reli-
gious education and learning of catechism. Fines were imposed on those families who re-
fused to send their children study at schools. Local parish was to help the indigent families 
pay for school education (Melton 1988: 175). 
In the 1770s, the Prussian government started financing schools so that school teach-
ers and directors could receive salaries which for the first time in the Prussian history 
made it possible for the students to study at schools for free. Yet, de jure free compulsory 
school education was introduced much later (Melton 1988: 179). 
It was not only Frederick the Great who contributed to the Prussian education reform. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century the education system obtained several significant 
features: a special legislative institution was established to control the education system in 
the country (the Bureau of Education which was the part of Interior Ministry); special tax-
es were imposed to finance the education system, state education system was established, 
and certification was implemented for primary school teachers (Ramirez and Boli 1987:  
4–5; Green 2013: 13). 
After the decree of 1810 the education became secular with three-year education  
becoming compulsory. In 1826 education was compulsory already for everyone aged be-
tween 7 and 11. Every parish had their own primary schools, and all the teachers were to 
undergo certain training (Green 2013: 14). 
Austria: Frederick the Great's practice inspired the Austrian government (with the 
help of Prussian experts) to issue a decree on compulsory primary education in 1774.  
In accordance with that law primary education became compulsory for all the children 
between 6 and 12 years old. School education took five days a week. It was forbidden to 
hire those who did not have school graduation certificate as apprentices or servants. Each 
town and each parish were obliged to have their own primary schools (Melton 1988: 212). 
In 1769 Maria Teresia ordered Austrian local authorities to prepare an improvement 
plan for the primary education system. A special commission was created to achieve this 
goal. In 1773 this commission made several suggestions on standardization of courses, 
course books and teaching methods. It is important to mention that there was a big differ-
ence between rural and urban schools: rural schools could teach only reading, writing, 
arithmetic, and religion while urban schools had a wider range of courses to be taught at 
their disposal, including German, orthography, math, history, geography, etc. The main 
reasons for such diversification were, firstly, the apprehension not ‘to overeducate’ rural 
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population so that they would flow to the city in the search for a better life, and, secondly, 
the strife to educate experts in the cities (Melton 1988: 211). 
Denmark: Denmark is considered to be the first country in the world that introduced 
a government-controlled system of compulsory mass education. The system of state 
schools started to evolve in 1721. However, a strong connection between the government 
and the education system was established in 1789, when the Great school commission 
started to work. In 1814 this commission made a report, which later became the basis of 
the Danish contemporary school education system. In 1842 basing on the Danish model 
the Swedish liberals introduced the School Reform Bill. In accordance with the Bill a state 
system of primary schools was established in the country (Ramirez and Boli 1987: 7). 
France: The idea of primary education system appeared at the end of the eighteenth 
century and even had some impact on the laws of 1791 and 1833. However, those laws 
had never come into action. Napoleon Bonaparte paid major attention to the development 
of universities and lyceums, providing higher education while the mass primary education 
was beyond the primary concerns then. In 1816 every commune was obliged to maintain  
a primary school for boys. In 1833 the same obligation was extended to schools for girls. 
By the time of the Second French Empire France was prepared to spread education in 
terms of legislation and administrative resources. However, this idea was put into practice 
only after France had been defeated in the war by Prussia (1870–1871). By 1882 a system 
of free universal compulsory primary education was established together with a special 
Ministry (Chanet 2012: 118–122; Green 2013: 14–15). 
England: The English system of primary education developed with delay in compari-
son with other countries of Western Europe (Wright 2012: 21; Green 2013: 16). During 
most of the nineteenth century the primary education was provided mainly by the church 
and mainly for the children of poor parishioners. It was not earlier than in the 1860s that 
the government started to participate in the development of the education sphere. In 1860 
the government drew up a State Code of Rules related to the organization of primary 
schools. In 1862 the Code was adjusted. It regulated the range of school courses and estab-
lished a national system of quality inspections, which checked the reading, writing and 
math skills of certain students. The financing for schools depended on the inspections re-
sults (Wright 2012: 22). 
In 1870 the government adopted an education law which required every child aged 
above 5 and under 12 to be provided with a place at school. If the region lacked places at 
schools, the state built new schools, and the region was responsible for their maintenance. 
This issue was the most crucial in big industrial cities. It was the first major step in estab-
lishing a state system of schools (Wright 2012: 22). 
In accordance with the Law on primary education adopted in 1880 it became obligatory 
for every child aged above 5 and under 10 to study at school. In 1891 primary education be-
came free of charge. In 1893 the upper age limit was increased to 11, and to 12 in 1899. In 
1895 the system of funding was changed and its size began to depend on the education 
quality in general and not on the knowledge of certain students (Wright 2012: 40; Ste-
phens 1998: 79). 
Finally, in accordance with the Law on education adopted in 1902 the government 
elaborated a system of subsidies which allowed local authorities to establush secondary 
schools. The students who graduated from primary schools could enter secondary school 
education on competitive basis (Wright 2012: 22).   
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Europe: It is crucial to mention that the spread of primary education by the end of the 
19th century was influenced not only by the year when the compulsory primary education 
had been introduced, but by the education policy conducted during the century as well (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1. The year when the compulsory primary education had been introduced 
and the proportion of children studying at schools 
Country Year of compulsory primary education introduction 
Percentage of primary school 
students 1870 г., % 
Prussia 1763 67 
Denmark 1814 58 
Greece 1834 20 
Spain 1838 42 
Sweden 1842 71 
Portugal 1844 13 
Norway 1848 61 
Switzerland 1874 74 
Italy 1877 29 
Great Britain 1880 49 
France 1882 75 
Ireland 1892 38 
Netherlands 1900 59 
Luxembourg 1912 – 
Belgium 1914 62 
USA – 72 
Source: Soysal and Strang 1989: 278. 
Thus, the spread of primary education in 1870 correlates very weakly with the year when 
compulsory primary education was introduced. France, Switzerland and the USA have the 
highest enrolments, although these counties had not established their national education 
systems by that time. However, they did have a lot of schools, supervised by the authori-
ties of different level. Hence the spread of school education was rather wide. There is a 
major difference between the above mentioned countries, on the one hand, and Prussia 
along with Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, whose education systems were es-
tablished by the governments themselves. 
The Spread of Mass Primary Education in Other Regions  
of the World 
By 1900 North-American countries, Australia, New Zealand and some countries of North-
ern and Western Europe took the lead in spreading of school education. In the majority of 
Northern European countries the enrolment varied from 60 to 75 per cent (Benavot and 
Riddle 1988: 205–206). In other regions, especially in Asia (except for Japan), Middle 
East and North Africa the spread of school education was significantly more modest. 
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Table. 2. Primary education enrolment among the school-aged, 1900 and 1935–
1940, % 
Region In 1900, % In 1935–1940, % 
North America / Australia and New Zealand 86.0 79.1 
Northern Europe 67.3 72.0 
Southern Europe 37.5 50.8 
Eastern Europe 28.6 48.2 
South America 22.3 40.7 
Central America 21.0 33.7 
The Caribbean 41.5 59.0 
Asia 13.7 30.6 
Middle East and North Africa 11.1 22,5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 14.9 19.6 
World in general  32.9 40.8 
Source: Benavot and Riddle 1988: 202.  
However, as it often happens, the data presented in Table 2 disguises significant intrare-
gional differences. In each region there is a country or two where already by 1900 the 
spread of primary education was comparable with that in several European countries.  
Say, in South America we can analyze the data for Argentina and Chile. The primary en-
rolment in Argentina was relatively high already in 1870 (20.9 %1) and rose steadily, reach-
ing 33.9 % in 1900 (in comparison with Greece, Italy, Bulgaria etc.) and 58.2 % in the peri-
od between 1935 and 1940 (comparable with Sweden, Belgium etc.). National education law 
in Argentina was adopted in 1884. In accordance with this law primary education became 
compulsory and was free of charge for students. Syllabuses, courses and teaching methods 
were unified and kept under complete state control throughout the country. Special national 
and regional councils were in charge of this control (Gvirtz, Beech and Oria 2008; Southwell 
2013). 
In Chile the spread of primary education was a little lower than in Argentina: 18.7 % 
in 1870, 21.7 % in 1900 and 47.5 % in 1935–1940. Nevertheless, this is still close to some 
Eastern European and Southern European countries. We would like to point out that Chile 
was the first country in South America to establish a state education system in 1842 
(Schiefelbein and Farrell 1980: 160). During the second half of the 19th century this sys-
tem was rapidly developing. A system of teachers' training was established, curricula and 
the range of courses were standardized in accordance with state requirements, various 
textbooks and course books were published and distributed among all the regions and 
provinces (Soifer 2009). 
In 1900 the literacy level in Argentina (51–52 %) and Chile (43–44 %) among resi-
dents aged above 10 was also rather comparable with that of South European countries. 
High literacy level was also present in Uruguay (54 %) and Cuba (38 %) (Astorga, Berges, 
and Fitzgerald 2006: 766; Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000: 172: Newland 1994: 452). 
Japan is the most remarkable country in the nineteenth-century Asia in terms of distirbu-
tion of primary education. Japan made a ‘great leap’ in he period between 1870 and 1940, 
rising its primary education enrolment from 19.7 % in 1870 to 49.3 % by 1900, and further-
                                                          
1 Hereinafter the enrolment data is provided from Benavot, Riddle 1988: 205–207. 
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more to 60.5 % by 1935–1940. The Meiji government acknowledged that an effective 
adoption of western technologies was impossible without developing a relevant education 
system. In 1872 a school system decree was issued. In accordance with the latter each 
child was obliged to complete an eight-year education. However, it was a challenge to 
bring the law into action. In 1886 the Decree on primary schools divided all the schools 
into two groups: ordinary schools with four-year compulsory education and schools of a 
higher level with two-four-year additional education for those who graduated from ordi-
nary schools. In 1907 the duration of compulsory education period was prolonged to six 
years (Godo and Hayami 2002: 963; see for details Duke 2009; Lincicome 1995). 
Although less known than the case of Japan Thailand also enjoyed a considerable pe-
riod of successful spreading of primary education. In 1890 the primary education enrol-
ment amounted to 0.5 %. However, it grew significantly in 50 years, rising to 7.1 % by 
1920, tripling by 1930, and further doubling by 1935–1940, reaching by this period the 
value of 52.6 %. There was similar dynamics in Taiwan, especially after the Japanese Oc-
cupation, when primary education enrolment rose from 2 % in 1900 to 26.1 % in 1930 and 
52.8 in 1935–1940. 
Sub-Saharan Africa also had its leader – the Republic of South Africa, where the pri-
mary education enrolment rose from 24.7 % in 1870 to 43.5 % in 1940.  
We would also like to emphasize that in many developing countries the values of pri-
mary education enrolment rose significantly during the period from 1870 to 1940 as well: 
from 1.9 % to 12.3 % in India; from 7.6 % in 1900 to 24.9 % in 1935–1940 in Egypt; from 
1.6 % in 1890 to 26.7 % between 1935 and 1940 in Venezuela; from 9.5 % in 1890 to 
30.9 % between 1935 and 1940 in Peru. Thus, the evolving of mass primary education was 
a significant global process. 
Aims and Results of Establishment of Compulsory Primary  
Education Systems  
As it has already been mentioned above, for Frederick the Great the role of primary educa-
tion was closely connected with the military needs. Literate officers and soldiers could 
increase the capability of the army (Melton 1988: 173–175). Those countries who fol-
lowed the Prussian practice also took this idea into account. In particular, after the defeat 
in Franco-Prussian War France made a decision to establish a national system of compul-
sory primary education. 
Education systems considerably contributed to the formation of national identity. 
Thus, the Prussian ‘state attempted to use mass schooling to create a more unified national 
citizenry and thereby consolidate state power both within the nation and relative to other 
national states’ (Ramirez and Boli 1987: 5). In this case the key goal for education was to 
unite the country and make students view themselves as national citizens in the first place 
and only then as residents of certain administrative units (Ramirez and Boli 1987: 4–5). 
Therefore, the extension of states' power onto the sphere of mass education was cru-
cial for the formation of nations (Ansell and Lindvall 2013: 506). Indeed, mass education 
helps people become true members of a society and citizens of a nation-state. It makes 
citizens loyal to the state and obliges them to contribute to large-scale national campaigns 
such as wars, tax deductions, and voting. Mass education makes people become devoted to 
a common system of aims and symbols and helps them behave appropriately in various 
situations (Ramirez and Boli 1987: 3; Boli, Ramirez and Meyer 1985: 159). 
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Finally, by the end of the nineteenth century mass education became a factor influenc-
ing economic growth, which was the reason for implementing this system in England after 
this system had already proved to be effective in Germany, England's main rival (Wright 
2012: 22). 
We would like to conclude the paper with Andy Green's words:  
The formation of national education systems in early nineteenth-century Europe 
marks the beginning of modern schooling in western capitalist societies. With the 
coming of the school system, education became a universal and national concern, em-
bracing all individuals and having effects on all classes in society. Learning became 
irreversibly equated with formal, systematic schooling, and schooling itself became  
a fundamental feature of the state. The national education system thus represented  
a watershed in the development of learning. It signaled not only the advent of mass 
education and the spread of popular literacy but also the origins of ‘state schooling’ –  
the system which has come to predominate in the educational development of all 
modern societies in the twentieth century (Green 2013: 11).   
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In this paper we trace the nineteenth-century origins of the contemporary forms 
or organization of secondary and higher education, which have by now spread 
all over the world. With respect to secondary education, the authors consider the 
development and spread of the so-called ‘humanistic schools’. As for the univer-
sities, we pay attention to the emergence of the two models of modern university 
in Europe (in France and in Germany) and to the global spread of these models. 
Keywords: education, 19th century, secondary education, humanistic schools, 
university, French university model, German university model, von Humboldt. 
Secondary Education in the Nineteenth Century:  
Diffusion of Humanistic Schools 
In the nineteenth century, the form and content of secondary education drastically 
changed. Meanwhile, one can speak about the reformation of secondary education system 
already starting from the 16th and 17th centuries, when the new types of schools emerged 
including lyceums, gymnasiums, scientific schools etc. (Brockhaus and Efron categorize 
these schools as ‘humanistic schools’), which substituted for monastic and order schools. 
However, the content of education mainly consisted of Latin and the Law of God, as it 
used to be in the medieval times. Some changes occured at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, when German and French were included into the secondary schools' curricula. Later, 
in the 18th–19th centuries curricula were expanded by adding math (including arithmetic, 
algebra, geometry, and trigonometry) and natural sciences (including geography, botany, 
zoology, and mineralogy). 
The first gymnasiums of modern type were established in Prussia during the reign of 
Frederick the First. Their main goal was to prepare students for university education. The 
Prussian gymnasiums set a new objective at the beginning of the 19th century, when the 
successful passing of maturity exams became obligatory not only to continue education at 
university, but also to get a job as a civil servant (Brockhaus and Efron). 
By the end of the 19th century humanistic schools were established almost all over Eu-
rope: gymnasiums in Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Russia, lyceums and 
colleges in France, grammar schools and high schools in England and the USA; peculiar 
types of humanistic schools (functionally similar to the above-mentioned ones) existed in 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Scandinavian countries etc. (Brockhaus and Efron). 
                                                          
 This study has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 15-18-30063). 
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Higher Education in the 19th Century 
Formation and the beginning of global diffusion of the model of European university  
At the beginning of the 19th century as a result of Napoleon's campaign which eliminated  
a large number of small and underdeveloped higher education institutions throughout the 
conquered territory the number of universities in Europe was quite small. It was a positive 
outcome to some extent, since new forms of higher education institutions developed. Some 
of them exist until present. The most significant form was the model of the university.  
In this section we would like to examine the differences between university and pre-
existing higher education institutions. 
Anderson (2004) points out that medieval traditions were a common sight in universi-
ties up to the 18th century. Special teachers' and students' corporations existed under sur-
veillance of the government and church although having substantial autonomy. Universi-
ties were responsible for preparing ministers, lawyers, and doctors. A university diploma 
was mandatory to take on those jobs. These objectives defined the university structure: its 
main divisions were the faculties of law, medicine, and theology along with the faculty of 
philosophy, which provided general knowledge for all the above-mentioned faculties (An-
derson 2004: 5). 
At the beginning of the 19th century the situation changed dramatically. Two new uni-
versity models were formed – the French one, created by Napoleon Bonaparte, and the 
German one, connected with Wilhelm von Humboldt in the first place (as well as with 
Kant, Fichte, and Schleiermacher).  
A new university was established at the very beginning of the 19th century. It was a 
very large state corporation with separate faculties. Formalities and the operation of each 
division, including the teaching methods, students' books and even teachers' private life 
were under strict control and regulations. This represented a new French model of the uni-
versity (Brockhaus and Efron, Anderson 2004: 43, 58; Charle 2004: 44–47). According to 
this model the main objective of the new university was to prepare qualified civil servants. 
It turned to produce a crucial effect on social and political stability through limiting the 
spread of freethinking. The implementation of this model had slowed down the establish-
ment of contemporary-type universities, which appeared only at the end of the 19th centu-
ry. However, this model spread throughout Europe (mostly throughout the conquered terri-
tory). Many its elements, such as centralization and strict control over the content of uni-
versity education, were incorporated in Italian and Spanish education systems, and later 
spread from Spain to Latin-American countries (Charle 2004: 44–47; Shils and Roberts 
2004: 178–179). 
Along with the above-mentioned outcome Napoleon's reform created another type of 
educational institutions – higher education technological institutions, the so-called Ecole 
Polytechnique. Their main goal was to prepare engineers and artillerymen. The basis for 
such institutions was developed in the 18th century in Germany, Russia, Austria, and Hun-
gary, where mining and engineering schools had been common. The French model added 
new math and physics courses of higher level to the curricula (Ruegg 2004: 10). In the 
nineteenth century such institutions became widespread all over the world, including Latin 
America, Middle East, South and Eastern Asia etc.  
The German model had a number of significant differences from the French one. 
Some of them reflected the structural differences of the countries themselves – centralized 
Bonaparte's France versus fragmented Germany. Contrary to the unique French university 
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Germany had 35 universities in 1789 (Charle 2004: 33) where the German model devel-
oped. 
Having its roots in the 18th century (universities of Gottingen and Halle) this model 
had been fully formed by the beginning of the 19th century and started to actively spread 
during the second half of the 19th century. Humboldt's ideas of the strong interconnection 
between scientific research and teaching became the basis for this model. According to 
Humboldt, teachers were to carry out scientific research whose results were to become the 
basis for their lectures. Narrowly specialized teachers substituted for professors with ency-
clopedic knowledge (say, law teachers were substituted with international law teachers, 
Roman law teachers etc.). The content of the classes coincided with particular topics of 
scientific research. 
In other words, professors could choose the topics of their lectures depending on the 
sphere of their scientific research. The students were obliged to engage in scientific work 
coached by their professors. Faculty of philosophy was a transitional stage between the 
gymnasiums and professional faculties. Seminars became a brand new form of teaching in 
the universities. During such classes students could join in scientific work. One should 
also point that students were to a large extent free to choose the courses according to their 
inclinations. The end-of-course assessment helped them to choose suitable courses. In order 
to get a doctor's degree students had to present the results of their individual research. The 
final qualification exams for the intended doctors, lawyers, and ministers were carried out by 
the government (Anderson 2004: 51–58; Charle 2004: 47–51; Brockhaus and Efron, Ruegg 
2004: 4–5). The role of the government in Humboldt's model was limited to two functions 
only – to the preservation of the freedom and to appointments of professors (Ruegg 2004: 5). 
Humboldt's ideas were brought to life for the first time and to a great extent in the 
University of Berlin which wasfounded in 1810. By the twentieth century the corporations 
of teachers and students, working to search for the scientific truth, became orthodox (An-
derson 2004: 56).  
We would like to pay major attention to the spread of contemporary European univer-
sity model throughout the world. It is necessary to point out that this process had started 
much earlier. By the end of the nineteenth century some countries of Latin America adopt-
ed many university features from Spain. The USA also adopted some features, but from 
the Great Britain (Shils and Roberts 2004: 163). Russia was one of the first to adopt the 
German model. A number of universities were founded at the very beginning of the nine-
teenth century (in Vilnius in 1803, in Kharkov and Kazan in 1804, in Saint Petersburg in 
1819) (Charle 2004: 35, 48). German model widely spread in such European countries as 
Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Greece, Bulgaria, Scandinavian countries, etc. (Charle 
2004: 36–44, 64–68). It also influenced the education system in the Great Britain, where 
by the end of the nineteenth century the research work developed and the number of 
courses was enlarged to foreign languages and natural science (Charle 2004: 61–62).  
During the second half of the nineteenth century some features of the German model 
(in particular the principle of interconnection of scientific research and teaching, as well as 
seminars) penetrated the USA education system, which previously had used to follow the 
tradition of British model with its autonomous colleges. It is important to point out that 
different universities of the USA adopted the elements of the Humboldt's model to differ-
ent extent. The universities which reflected this model to the greatest extent were the Uni-
versity of Chicago, John Hopkins University in Baltimore, and Harvard University. Many 
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of the universities that had been established earlier preserved the traditions of the British 
model, especially the ones related to the university management. For example, many of 
them had a position of the President of the University (Shils and Roberts 2004: 164–175).  
As mentioned above, the French model influenced the Latin-American countries and 
French colonies for a long period of time. Some features of the French model also spread 
across the Middle East and North Africa including Egypt. However, the latter adopted the 
policy of establishing specialized colleges (medical, polytechnic, law or humanitarian sci-
ences) rather than centralized universities (Shils and Roberts 2004: 186–191). In 1857, the 
British government established three modern universities in India, in particular, in Calcut-
ta, Bombay, and Madras, applying the model of the University of London (Ibid.: 200). In 
1877 the University of Tokyo in Japan was established by the example of the American 
universities. The University of Beijing was opened in 1898 and adopted the pattern of 
some European universities. Finally, in 1911 the University of Hong-Kong was opened 
using the examples of British Universities (Ibid.: 216–223). 
Global Spread of the European Education Model  
in the 19th Century 
By the beginning of World War I the educational institutions of the European type were 
widespread all over the world (with the only exception of the countries of Arabian Penin-
sula) and they included the following education patterns. 
1) Anglo-Saxon Immigrant colonies and the USA represented the nearest periphery of 
the Great Britain. Contemporary formal education developed following the Western Euro-
pean model and by the beginning of World War I the spread of primary education was 
comparable to the leading countries of Western Europe. 
2) South Europe during the first part of the second millennium was a center of estab-
lishment of modern European education system. However, in the early Modern Era it 
lagged behind Western Europe; thus, in the nineteenth century a contemporary education 
system was spreading in South Europe with a delay. 
3) Eastern Europe was comparable to South Europe in the spread of contemporary 
education by the beginning of World War I. All the levels of education were widespread 
here; however, it was still considerably lagging behind North and Western Europe. 
4) Very similar conditions were in the majority of countries of Latin America by the 
beginning of World War I, which were slightly lagging behind their South-European me-
tropolises. However, the gap between Latin America and North America and North-
Western Europe was significant.  
5) The Ottoman Empire was establishing its education system even more slowly and 
was lagging behind even more. Some features of modern education appeared here in  
the eidghteenth century, however, only in the sphere of military education. In the first half 
of the nineteenth century some elements of European education were incorporated by Mu-
hammad Ali in Egypt. However, the real establishment of modern education system start-
ed during the Tanzimat reforms, when in 1847 the Ministry of Education was established 
(Mekatib-i Umumiye Nezareti), and in 1848 the first modern universities (darülfünun) and 
teacher training colleges (darülmuallimin) were established.  
6) There was a peculiar model of the spread of modern education in the conquered 
colonies of the European countries. The process of establishing contemporary education 
institutions proceeded rather rapidly and had started after the conquering, since the me-
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tropolises needed qualified personnel from the locals (non-commissioned officers, admin-
istrative clerks) to exploit the colonies effectively. However, modern education was 
spreading very slowly in contrast to resettlement colonies. 
7) There was a special model of the spread of the modern European education in East 
Asia. At the early Modern Era there occurred a so-called closing of all East Asian coun-
tries. Foreign contacts were restricted and the countries were kept under strict state surveil-
lance. Under such conditions it was impossible to borrow any experience from the Euro-
pean countries. After the opening of these countries by the Europeans a successful educa-
tion system modernization was carried out in Japan. Moreover, when Japan occupied Ko-
rea and Taiwan, its education system was spread there too. The establishment of modern 
education institutions in China started in 1862 within the framework of the Self-
Strengthening Movement. However, the modernization of education system lagged in 
comparison with that of Japan. 
8) Other Asian and African countries, which preserved their independency until World 
War I (Iran, Thailand, and Ethiopia), developed different models of education systems. 
The spread of modern education in Iran started in the 1880s and associated with Haji-
Mirza Hassan Roshdieh's activity. Remarkably, he adopted the model of contemporary 
education not from Western Europe, but from the Ottoman Empire. This decision was 
probably defined by his studies at the Beirut Teachers Training Institute. Thailand fol-
lowed the East-Asian path since the country was closed in the early Modern Era as well. 
The modernization of its education system took place when it was reopened in the 1870s. 
Afghanistan and Ethiopia were developing the education systems even more slowly and 
opened their first European-type educational institutions at the very beginning of the twen-
tieth century at the reign of Khabibulla-khan and Menelik II. 
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Third Level Education is in many respects increasingly changing in the light of two 
general developments: internationalistaiton and globalisation on the ine hand, 
marketisation and commodification on the other hand. Whereas the first is appar-
ently taking up on an intrinsic value of education (‘universality of knowledge’), the 
second can be seen as opposing its values (‘knowledge cannot be bought and sold 
as any other good'). However, the discussion of this contribution shows that in re-
ality we find that on the side of implementation big business has a standing that 
finds its way much easier to the stage of implementation. 
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Third Level Education is increasingly concerned with distinct, though mutually influenc-
ing aspects – they can be aligned along two dimensions: the first spans between develop-
ment of personality and defining ones' place in professional terms; the other is about grow-
ing up in a new global scientific community. What had been for centuries a very privileged 
area for a few outstanding and lucky scholars, is becoming a field that is increasingly open 
for many, ready to engage at different levels, beginning with the bachelors degrees. Let us 
take Bangor College China as an example.  
Bangor College China is a joint venture between Bangor University in the UK and the 
Central University of Forestry and Technology (CSUFT) in China. It was established with 
the approval of the Chinese Education Ministry in 2014 as an advanced model to facilitate 
the internationalization of Chinese higher education. A dedicated Bangor College China 
offers full degrees in China which is the first for a British university. It offers four pro-
grammes including BSc in Banking and Finance; BSc in Accounting and Finance; BSc in 
Electronic Engineering; and BSc in Forestry and Environment Management with more 
than 600 students in their first and second year studies. A team of dedicated and experi-
enced staff of teaching and administration from both Bangor University and CSUFT were 
in interaction. Over the last two years Bangor University has invested heavily on Bangor 
College China. It is responsible for the quality of the programmes and ensures that the 
teaching standards, assessments and student experience are equivalent to those at the Ban-
gor home campus.  
                                                          
* This article goes back to the work of the authors in Connection with a Presentation to Conference in Shanghai, Octo-
ber 2016. The conference theme was about higher education in an international setting in which presentation includ-
ed a wide range of progresses made and challenges met within the joint-venture programmes between western uni-
versities and their Chinese counterparts. 
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 Although the running of the joint school in general goes smoothly with good in-
tention from both universities in the UK and China, some major challenges lie ahead in the 
areas of the merger of different administrative cultures; the search for professional stand-
ards; the work towards a common professional understanding, making reference to wealth 
of different traditions; and the development of new ways learning. 
 Remarkable new opportunities go hand in hand with grave challenges: as much as 
we find the strive for excellence as major field of competitive concern, at the very same 
time we find the incredible opportunities for smaller projects, such as Bangor College 
China, is an example that locates the challenge of development of personality and defining 
ones' place in professional terms in the context of a collaborative setting globally. 
Defining the Field 
International education – as matter of ranking and also cooperation and as matter of the 
excitement to explore new shores – experiences a kind of hype, easily overlooking the in-
herent contradiction. But can we really speak of an inherent contradiction? If we take 
things at the level of appearance, we find, of course, – and very valid – the feature of cut-
throat competition – the winner gets all, at least the cherries of qualified staff and students 
and also the relevant resources.1 
Although this is undeniably a strong force, we can take as well a more optimistic view – 
optimistic for those that are not in any relevant top-league, and – importantly – who are 
actually not seriously striving to gain entrance. Though it is often said that we do stand on 
the shoulders of giants, we also – and increasingly – are part of an overall team game – not 
least looking at the ancient Western cultures, claimed to be the crèche of today's enlight-
ened cultures in the east and west, we know that the understanding was very much one of 
discourse – a discourse between ‘experts’ and between ‘experts’ and ‘pupils’. The term 
‘scholar’, referring to the learned person and the student alike, may give a hint, as does the 
term ‘scientific community’ – and it is worthwhile to mention in parenthesis that these 
terms are paradoxically loosing meaning at a time when scientific work can only be imag-
ined as part of an undertaking that is social in terms of time and content – without denying 
the greatness, for instance of Isaac Newton. It did not require much more than a well-
studied individual mind and the observation of an apple falling from the tree to find out 
about the law of gravity. However, using this law as crucial basic knowledge to the under-
taking of flying to the moon or exploring other planets, requires the genius of many people 
collaborating, as also the academic labour is divided and a huge amount of resources. And 
let us be honest, and a bit German, by referring to the poet Goethe who states in his mas-
terpiece: 
Two souls alas! are dwelling in my breast; 
And each is fain to leave its brother. 
The one, fast clinging, to the world adheres 
With clutching organs, in love's sturdy lust; 
The other strongly lifts itself from dust 
To yonder high, ancestral spheres (von Goethe 1808). 
Approaching things sine ira et studio (Tacitus), we are today caught in a structural 
condition that turns easily out as a potential deadlock. One important point is, however, if 
we truly ask the correct question. 
                                                          
1 Of course, such general statement needs to be qualified as it is not necessarily clear what exactly this qualification is 
about (see Holmquist and Sundin 2010; Frey 2003). And it is also frequently discussed to which extent the finance 
that are relevant here are actually based on specific anticipated ‘censorship’. 
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The perspectives at stake are predominantly based on four principles: 
 the globalisation of institutional education/educational standards; 
 the globalisation of knowledge and its application; 
 the limitation and also ‘streaming/steering’ of resources; 
 the increasing renaissance of personal contacts as part of the establishment of net-
works as functional basis of the system – not least as matter of ‘new princedoms’ – of 
course, another issue that requires self-critique and kind of critical avowals. 
Importantly, this structuration of the field allows us to gain a clearer understanding of 
the common denominator that defines a substantial perspective, going much beyond the 
formal and institutional dimensions of education in an international setting. 
Underlying is an advanced understanding of standardised knowledge and education 
that is both, condition and result of a specific form of massification. Leaving the economic 
dimensions aside, the present focuses on the continuation of the eclipse of reason. Leaving 
the economic dimension of utilitarianisation and realisation of value again aside, we see the 
abstract issue that had been expressed in the words ‘Economy of time, to this all economy 
ultimately reduces itself’ (Marx). This is a point that had been made by Marx in the quoted 
form, but actually in a different way already in 1848 by J. S. Mills when he noted in his 
Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy 
about the Stationary state and later by J. M. Keynes when envisaging the 15-hour-week, 
writing in 1930 about the Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren. All such state-
ments are, besides their central economic concern, focusing indirectly on education, to be 
precise: the purpose of education. Later, this will be taken up by exploring some aspects of 
legitimacy and legitimation. 
It is easy to see that at least one version of such stationary society is the one where 
high degree of material wealth and wealth of general knowledge is achieved. Though soci-
ety may then be still growing, the growth is based on a reflexive mechanism joining the 
many classifications of society under a single term, we may speak of an autopietic algo-
rithm society: ones set in motion, the entire machine works independently. This is surely 
not happening independently from human beings – even on the contrary, it depends on the 
ongoing supply of functioning, i.e. executing actors. Already the wording should make us 
aware of what happens: the confirmation of the dominance of executive bodies within the 
system of third-level education. Thus, it will not come as a surprise that in some universi-
ties today income is not increasing for the cadres that are performing educational duties – 
dealing with students and content; instead, the flows are advantageous especially for per-
sonnel working in other areas of the same institutions (Grove 2016). So, we are not least 
facing a twofold shift. 
The one is about the search for new borders. If we see globalisation as something real, 
i.e. also real in terms of reaching a qualitatively new stage, we are confronted with renew-
ing the marks and standards, allowing orientation. The easiest way of doing so is, of 
course, the strict orientation on manageable, administrable yardsticks. 
The other is about the need of finding a way of redefining the object of standardisa-
tion – here we are confronted with a contradictory pattern. While, on the one hand, expec-
tations are rising and many areas are increasingly professionalised, the formal transfer of 
training to third-level institutions of Higher Education does not necessarily mean that we 
witness a real academisation – actually we may well state the opposite, speaking of a pro-
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cess of delimiting professional ‘areas’, and undermining the orientation put forward by 
Tagore, commending that ‘[t]he highest education is that which does not merely give us 
information but makes our life in harmony with all existence’ (Tagore 2003: 76). Thus, we 
have to answer as well the question how the meaning of professional standards themselves 
changed in history: from a purely reflexive assessment, being caught in an autopoietic cir-
cle, to a self-assessment according to praxis orientation, further to a self-assessment based 
on professional standards as matter of subordination under praxis requirements. 
Methodological Considerations 
One of the major analytical problems is finding a suitable methodological instrument that 
allows (a) developing a clear analytical perspective and that furthermore opens (b) a way 
for elaborating a strategic move forward. This will be described very briefly in the follow-
ing, suggesting that a system-theoretical approach and the theory of social quality offer a 
promising reference for such analysis. 
Autopoiesis 
One core aspect of systems theory – and this refers to some discussions in the 1960s–
1970s, undertaken by Georg Klaus (1965) and the version that is linked with the work by 
Niklas Luhmann2 – is the process of self-referential reproduction and even production 
which became especially known under the term of autopoiesis. The launch of this perspec-
tive opened a clearer understanding of the openness and closure of systems. This can be 
described as generally open systems, sealing themselves off by defining the criteria of ref-
erential demarcation. The system itself cannot decide about the environment and which 
requests and requirements come from there. However, it does decide what it allows to 
cross the demarcation line and how it processes the intake.3 We can also speak of a specif-
ic language that avails of a hegemonic position, considering that language, once estab-
lished, is always a matter of structural thinking. This is in line with the concept of general 
media in systems theory – though there is a permanent development, this is in its mainstay 
following a once defined path, and faces the difficulty of translation. Or to be more pre-
cise: any translation will be specifically defined by that ‘tone’ that gained dominance. We 
may say that the language of international administration faces a similar fate as that of 
mathematics about which Hannah Arendt wrote, ‘If we followed the advice, so frequently 
urged upon us, to adjust our cultural attitudes to the present status of scientific achieve-
ment, we would in all earnest adopt a way of life in which speech is no longer meaningful. 
For the sciences today have been forced to adopt a ‘language’ of mathematical symbols 
which, though it was originally meant only as an abbreviation for spoken statements, now 
contains statements that in no way can be translated back into speech’ (Arendt 1958: 23f.) 
In other words, although the language of administration of international education 
emerged as a tool to foster educational academic needs, it emerged as language that is now 
requiring educational and other academic activities to adapt to it. 
Social Quality Thinking 
Social quality thinking (van der Maesen and Walker 2012) can be packaged for the present 
context as means that allows establishing ‘indications’ serving as a kind of general gate-
                                                          
2 For example, see Luhmann 1984 and the reference to the work of Maturana and Varela about cognitive biology. 
3 And even ignorance and insensitivity is a way of processing. 
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ways for both, the process of demarcation of the system and the processing within the sys-
tem. For our purpose, these indications are only taken in very loose terms, more on a for-
mal level, or we may say: the level of a framework of which the substantial definition is at 
the heart of the processes of actual negotiations. The relevant parameters are, first, the two 
lines of dialectical tensions along which the international setting is established, presented 
in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. 
A more detailed and slightly substantial orientation is based on three sets of factors which 
had been systematically compiled as core of the social quality approach. This is presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 
CONDITIONAL  
(OPPORTUNITIES) 
CONSTITUTIONAL  
(PROCESSES) 
NORMATIVE  
(OUTCOMES) 
Socio-economic security Personal Security Social Justice (including Equity) 
Social Cohesion Social Recognition Solidarity 
Social Inclusion Social Responsiveness Equal value 
Social Empowerment Personal Capacity Human dignity 
Legitimacy 
The fact that the determinants of traditional structures of authority and government 
changed to an important extent makes legitimacy peculiar today. We can see a similar de-
velopment as Karl Polanyi described it for the economy, contending ‘[f]or once the eco-
nomic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives and confer-
ring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to 
function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a 
market economy can function only in a market society’ (Polányi 1944: 57). 
Cum grano salis, this can be directly applied to the present context as matter grasping 
the detachment of educational processes, reflecting the hegemonic position of the market 
economy and the subsequent establishment of a market university, or in more commonly 
used terminology, the market of third-level education. The wider meaning, particularly 
geared to the question of legitimacy, is looking at the process of detachment, i.e. the emer-
Herrmann et al. • Challenges for Education in an International Setting 81
gence and consolidation of a systemic rule, colonialising the lifeworld (Lockwood 1964; 
Habermas 1981). 
In any case, however, we should not forget that the fundamental parameters, as they 
had been systematically elaborated by Max Weber, are very much in place also today. So 
we are still dealing with the three patterns of charismatic, traditional and legal authority 
and legitimacy. It makes sense to qualify legal authority as matter of legitimation by pro-
cedure (Luhmann 1983), this terminology underlining the detachment from ‘real social 
process’. 
Paradoxically, detachment and alienation make legitimacy today even more an issue 
of political authority (understood in the widest sense), lurking around every corner, though 
veiled by market and procedural rules. Referring to William Connolly (1984), Jacqueline 
Best states that ‘[l]egitimacy … while not an exclusively modern concept, became a more 
pressing problem in the modern age as tradition lost its hold on political life and the con-
ventional character of social institutions became apparent. Political authority no longer 
appeared natural or divine but revealed its flawed, human face. People began to ask why 
they should obey …’ (Best 2007: 471). An overly ambitious venture strategy may well be 
in danger of overwriting this paradox in a one-sided way. 
A New Scientific Community? 
Although we may say that many of the problems are not fundamentally different from 
those that are issued at least since the emergence of modern social science and its sub-
disciplines including sociology and political science, the secular challenge these disci-
plines actually try to answer is the relationship between ‘Community and Society’.4 And 
this leads to the present core argument: education in an international setting, and ventures 
like that of BCC have to be understood in the perspective of an emerging new scientific 
community. As such they are a gateway which has in particular two tasks. The first is con-
cerned with the ‘translation’ from the side of the mode of living of communities into the pat-
terns of society. The second is about the translation of societal conditions into specific life 
regimes of communities.5 This process involves the elaboration of (i) a new understanding of 
the meaning of national interests, (ii) a reconsideration of the role of the different agencies, 
not least the role of students, and (iii) a reflection of the position of mass education on the 
third level in the overall setting of education. All this requires a commonly accepted task to 
take the actual definition of the ‘criteria’ for what a scientific community is today. 
Part of this is surely a systematic scan not of the implementation of accountability, but 
the systematic sophistication of their elaboration. The debate of Washington versus Bei-
jing consensus finds surely its place in this context.6 
The Legitimacy Trap 
Of course, talking about a strategic move forward is hampered by the very fact of the con-
stellation in question. Already from what had been said, it is obvious that the core prob-
                                                          
4  Referring to Tönnies' work on Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Toሷnnies 1887; Darmstadt 1988 (based on the edition 
from 1935)); in the English translation we find initially the edition Tönnies, Ferdinand: Community and association; 
translated and supplemented by Charles P. Loomis; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955; later it had been trans-
lated as ‘Community and Society’. 
5  See for mode of living and life regime Herrmann, forthcoming. 
6 See the brief paragraph ̒Education in an International Setting – Part of and Contribution to Changing the Global 
Agenda’ at the end of the present contribution. 
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lematique is the juxtaposition of different agendas. The juxtaposition is characterised in 
different ways, of which at least the following need to be highlighted: the relationship can 
be (i) mutually supportive (‘cross-fertilising’), (ii) hegemonically exclusive, (iii) hegemon-
ically competitive, (iv) pushing towards border-crossing confederation and (v) neutral. In 
other words, it is about different interests for which the way of working together has to be 
fathomed. 
1) Interests marking the legitimacy trap 
Major relevant interest groups and interests respectively are those of traditional aca-
demics in the Weberian sense of science as vocation, those we may juxtapose as pursuing 
science as profession, the institutional agents, directly employed by providing the setting 
for teaching and research, the political agents that are determinant, students and parents, 
the various funding bodies, including the representatives of vested interests as industrial 
and professional bodies.7 
It should be clear that this is not an exhaustive list, and also that the groupings are not 
homogenous and that they have different powers and means of making themselves heard. 
Leaving these qualifications aside, the list allows at least having a glance at some major 
forces that mark the poles between which legitimacy is trapped. This can only be under-
stood if we recognise that these interests are ‘real’, i.e. part of an overall hegemonic setting 
that exists in practice. 
2) Legitimacy between elitist and mass education 
One important aspect can be seen in the fact of the convergence around the issue of 
competencies/skills/aptitude/fitness – an orientation that is very much geared towards an 
extrinsic and instrumentalist understanding of acquiring knowledge. This is not meant to 
present a simple negative stance, though it surely is about a development that is represent-
ing a strong ambiguity: Science/academia is not only since recently a closed area, being 
sealed off by different, though always more or less strict gatekeepers. The discussion to-
day, referring to suicide and prostitution as it had been mentioned earlier (see footnote 1), 
is surely pointing to important issues. However, it is equally important to understand the 
underlying mechanism. We suggest that it is not a structural closure, requiring an increas-
ingly adaptive behaviour and moreover psychologically anticipating self-control according 
to the expectation of expectations. Instead, it is a mix of at least three core issues: (mass) 
reproducibility of results/focusing on evidence (‘empiricism’); exact measurement of per-
formance (‘metrics-assessment’); and de-academisation/professionalisation of third-level 
education (‘Bolognaisation’/’massification’). A decisive aspect of this is the continued 
split between a relatively small innovative and creative academic elite and a relative large 
number of foot soldiers – silent pathfinders and implementers – as much as they stand on 
the shoulders of giants, the later giants walk on the carpets they roll out before them. What 
really changed are two things: there is a stronger and more immediate link to applied sci-
ence requirements and the overall increased number of academics. 
3) Practice requirement as challenge for defining legitimacy  
Many of today's complains are in some way an inversion of earlier complains – those 
by which the detached character of academia in ivory towers had been reprimanded. Aca-
demia itself, however, changed today also in its very own terms and emerged as immediate 
                                                          
7  In this context see, for example, Universities UK, 2010; Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst/Institut der deut-
schen Wirtschaft Koሷln 2016. 
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productive force. Amongst other things this means that academics and academia are stand-
ing more than before in the limelight. This, taken together with the fact of an increasing 
number of academics, academic institutions and the increased competition taking the form 
of contracts instead of being openly pursued by status,8 we still see very much a replica-
tion of the old patterns – apparent as a small elite and elite institutions (the widespread 
excellence initiatives) being the agenda setters, while the others are striving to follow. In 
some way we may summarise this cynically by saying that today, with the immediacy of 
the imperative publish or perish (immediately done, immediately seen) things are known 
before we are dead. Scanning publications and works of giants of earlier academics for 
plagiarism and self-plagiarism may not have shown so different results as what we find in 
academia today, if we relate them properly to the overall numbers of publications, etc. 
This is also important in the context of international cooperation and ventures as we find 
today very much the replication of education as matter of vocation versus education as 
matter of professions. However, with science being now an immediate productive force, 
the bandwidth for manoeuvre is tightened. In this context it is interesting that we find to-
day apparently very much the same patterns as we know them from earlier times: the aca-
demic giants of then and now have frequently a wide educational background, they are in 
many cases not narrowly professionalised and are often not pursuing the work in the areas 
which would today be seen as their ‘major’ – at least this can be said on an anecdotal basis 
for many. The difference, however, is that today many of these giants are more likely mak-
ing a career in business and politics, remaining to a lesser extent in academia. 
4) The time constraint 
Talking about legitimacy, means not least to return to the definitive matter of social 
production, i.e. the production of society of which we know that ‘[e]conomy of time, to 
this all economy ultimately reduces itself. Society likewise has to distribute its time in a 
purposeful way, in order to achieve a production adequate to its overall needs; just as the 
individual has to distribute his time correctly in order to achieve knowledge in proper pro-
portions or in order to satisfy the various demands on his activity. Thus, economy of time, 
along with the planned distribution of labour time among the various branches of produc-
tion, remains the first economic law on the basis of communal production. It becomes law, 
there, to an even higher degree’ (Marx N.d: Chapter 3). 
With the change of the productive forces, the patterns of work and consumption, soci-
etal structures and visions, it is also necessary to consciously consider this in the outline of 
third level education. This is a challenge that is faced also nationally, but on the level here 
under consideration it is even more virulent as challenge for structuring the processes. 
Conclusions 
At the early stage of European institutionalisation reference was frequently made to the 
Monnet method, namely, ‘a concept that calls for small steps on the way forward in Eu-
rope, dealing specifically with the integration of Europe’. 
 The concept is characterised by the fact that there is no defined end goal in ad-
vance but that the EU should act open mind and situation-specific reactive. 
 After the Monnet method Europe must let actions speak for and represent the 
de facto solidarity through policy statements. In addition, large institutional pro-
                                                          
8  Alluding to Maine's statement of development being characterised as one from status to contract (see Maine 1861). 
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jects and political progress must be considered together. Because they generally 
apply economics as an instrument of policy. The focus is on peace, whose ob-
servance is more important than securing prosperity in Europe. 
 Especially France and Germany must therefore work together as a European 
core. Decisions should be made by elites rather than democratically what is often 
criticized. The European states should get more expertise to a limited extent’.9 
Cum grano salis, we can apply this also in the given context as a model for further 
discussion. Presumptions are: 1) we are witnessing a given, automatic push towards inte-
gration – against the odds of counteracting factors, emerging from varied10 systemic forc-
es, and as result of centripetal forces; 2) we are dealing with a secular development that 
still is opening a playing field for different substantial interests that will be finally defining 
the concrete course. 
Taken as question of a process of building a specific community, we face the problem 
of properly determining the point of reference of these communities which surely are not 
anymore the old ‘ivory academic world’ but also not (yet?) the world of polytechniques in 
the known sense. 
This shift goes hand in hand with the emergence of functional conglomerations. 
The expectation is that everybody is responsible of everything and has to fill the various 
roles: the academic as fundraiser, as top-researcher, as secretary, manager and HR-expert 
to name but a few of the required roles. 
Of course, a clear solution to this constellation by way of internal conflict resolution 
cannot exist as the interests and the contradictions between them are located in different 
fields. Thus, the actual solution is hegemony of a specific ‘economy of time’ as it had been 
said to be ultimately characterising the societal mode of production. 
This means that community building, because it is a matter of building an incomplete 
and imagined community, is even more essential as matter of striving for a broad ap-
proach. Coming back to the Monnet method, one factor that is only barely mentioned in 
the quoted characterisation, is the supposition that the elitist character was not limited to 
decision making but concerned as well Europe as space of business elites, suggesting that 
from such centre a social space would emerge in the form of concentric cycles: the elites, 
bringing their interpreters with them, gathering the experts of the different fields, joined by 
the various support staff, etc., finally ending in the Ryanairisation of travel and the birth of 
the ‘generation easyjet’. Several parts of that ‘European programme’ failed – and they 
were doomed to fail. As questionable as the overall approach to ‘state building’ is from the 
perspective of any political theory of legitimacy, one surely valid point is the implicit ac-
knowledgment that any strategy that aims at integration is anchored in the actual need to 
educate its own populace to be experts on their own concerns. A political project like that 
of the EU would have required the development of a European demos – the European 
elites did know this and indeed they did fear it (see Herrmann 2006). 
This is as well the challenge for a new global teaching and research agenda. So far 
such agenda is very much driven by (a) specific and mostly narrowly defined interests 
and/or by (b) highly individualist attitudes, teachers and researchers seeing themselves 
very much as artistic performers and creators. 
                                                          
9 URL: http://www.fondations.net/monnet-method-definition/. Accessed 02/10/16. 
10  Economic, political, juridical, cultural, in part in parallel, in part contradictory. 
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Tertium non datur? Part of the difficulty is that overcoming the particularist stances is 
caught in a quandary: the first agenda may be able to overcome the individualist orienta-
tion by narrowing the substantial scope as everything has to be geared towards realisation 
of the particular interest; in the second case, it is too frequent to sacrifice collaboration by 
subordination under the ‘leader’ – not allowing the profound emergence of a demos which 
would not least call for evoking to be criticised. In case one agrees with the statement that 
‘[f]reedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently’ (Luxem-
burg 1918), it means one also has to agree to self-critique as fundamental; moreover, one 
has to establish mechanisms that structurally evoke such criticism. Admittedly difficult, 
though exactly this is a huge potential for success of joint ventures. As such they would go 
beyond an orientation on comparative advantage in a market setting, aiming at developing 
collaborative advantage in an open, innovation driven development of mindsets. Of 
course, the problem may well begin here, many easily agreeing and still, not allowing the 
self-critique being publicly stated. As much as freedom is always the freedom of the dis-
senter,11 as much the limitations of freedom are usually seen as coming from ‘the other 
side’. Still, difficulties should not stop from pushing things further. One of the reasons for 
some optimism is the fact that traditional patterns of both education and employment are 
increasingly barred. 
The challenge in the light of legitimacy is multilayered – and actually the first issue 
that needs to be tackled is that of creating an open debate that explicitly starts from differ-
ence instead of taking a supposed harmony as central point. It is suggested here that differ-
ence is not as such problematic – inept is denying it. 
Finally, we have to locate difference of interest in terms of ‘substance’ along the dif-
ferent lines presented in the section 1) Interests marking the legitimacy trap’ of this contri-
bution. 
One important – and especially challenging – issue is linked to the vital aspect of 
community building. The concept of community is essentially based on dimensions as 
commonality/mutuality, public and nearness. This, of course, is somewhat a misnomer in 
the context of international cooperation and even bears some danger. Although these fac-
tors surely play an ongoing role, there is some danger of a deadlock emerging: only a 
small number of people are involved in the process, and/or the contacts are completely 
technicalised. However, in particular smaller venture projects offer perspectives to act in 
an intermediary function, linking involved staff in exchange on subject matters and into a 
wider field – an open question is if staff of both sides is ready and has the capacities, 
which includes personal commitment and sufficient institutional backing.  
The New Normal 
International and even global education is by no means new. Leaving a detailed survey 
aside, we can see at least five phases. 
 In very early years we find a predominantly western based inter- and globalisation, 
based on the missionary ambitions of the church and also in the church's search for univer-
sal knowledge.12 
                                                          
11  This is another translation of the words used by Luxemburg whose text was written in German language. 
12  Even if it had been in fact the search for the universal justification of Christianity and the hegemonic role of the 
Catholic Church. 
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 In the middle years the emergence of network that evolved around global exchange 
of interest and questions – not detached from practical interest, and even on the contrary: 
founded in the interest of change, of fathoming options of more fundamental change.13 
 Still Western, the business and intellectual elite had been a foundation for a new 
stage of internationalisation of education – although saying Western is not quite right as it 
had been in its substantial gist strongly dominated by the Anglo-American orientation – 
aiming at gaining from the at the time undisputed and undisputable centre, modelling the 
world along the Rostowian model (Rostow 1960, 1990; see also Frank and Gills 
1993/1996). One could take it as sublation and supersession of the previous stage, main-
taining the idea of internationalisation, gearing it even towards globalisation, however, 
subordinating it now under the ‘law of the new business cycle’, understood as specifically 
Anglo-Saxon model (see Aglietta 1976). Those who studied abroad had been very much 
early skills-searchers: learning from the advanced centre, aiming at applying the acquired 
skills ‘back home’. 
 The knowledge-searchers and acquirers can be seen as a new generation – in part 
emerging from the previously mentioned group; and in part standing even in opposition; 
the new explorers of the ‘easy riders’, the late-coming heirs of Columbus, depending on 
the monies of those whom they wanted (in part) overthrow. Characterising this generation 
is that ‘crossing borders’ meant as well leaving the ancestral cultural spaces. 
 The fifth phase is the one in the middle of which we find ourselves now. In some 
respect it is the academic branch of the ‘generation easyjet’: open, thirsting for knowledge 
and, of course, privileged. In some respect it is a new generation, eager to settle, eager to 
acquire skills and facing a new and unknown world, competitive, and very similar to those 
we found at stage three: aiming at gaining from the centre. However, this centre had now 
not been entirely undisputed and undisputable. The situation is now different as many 
members of this group are (initially only?) committed to learn and return. The develop-
ment is full of contradictions – part thereof is the self-confident orientation of young peo-
ple, coming from countries from which the perspective that ‘The World is Flat’ (Friedman 
2005) appears to be true. Finally, the Beijing consensus is not only a ‘Chinese issue’ but 
can at least be seen as well in the perspective from the other capitals of the BRICS-
countries: Brasilia, Cape Town/Pretoria/Bloemfontein, Moscow, and New Delhi. On the 
other hand, we find a tendency to stick in many instances to the ‘fascination by the exotic 
and the evangelistic’ as much as without any doubt a significant part of the material re-
sources are still very much mirroring the traditional patterns of the distribution of power, 
we find a certain reflection of this distribution across the entire range of behaviour. 
Cum grano salis all this applies to students and teaching staff alike – and indeed one 
of the problems is at this stage the extreme ‘concentration’ and pre-selection: the fact that 
there are limited numbers of students and staff involved, and that they are more or less 
only involved in the ‘implementation of programmes within a new framework’ means not 
least that major potentials to achieve a new agenda are missed. The fact of frequently in-
                                                          
13  Looking at the timing, this phase overlaps to a large extent with the phase mentioned before. To some extent we also 
find a substantial overlap as the church could only maintain its hegemonic position by radically changing some of 
the basic parameters – the attitude and role of pope Urban VIII in the dispute with Galileo Galilei has to be men-
tioned here, indeed saying much about the in part existing acknowledgement of fundamental change and the need for 
opening towards a new understanding of science within the church. 
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sufficient communication surely does not help.14 The latter is part due to the fact that the 
running of the programmes and the work in the subject areas are not sufficiently welded 
together. 
Education and Research 
In a short article in the guardian Nigel Carrington looks at six myths about how universi-
ties spend their tuition fee income (Carrington 2015). He highlights a point that has to be 
crucial for any considerations on further development; we read that ‘[i]t is possible to pro-
vide high quality education without doing research’. Qualifying this he continues that 
‘[t]his might be true if we see the primary role of higher education as simply producing 
undergraduates to go straight into employment. It works well, for instance, if your goal is 
to produce law or accountancy graduates who will go directly into professional careers. 
But where does the new knowledge come from that is driving the economy of this coun-
try? Largely from the postgraduate community.’ This qualification should be driven a bit 
further though, actually touching at core of the present debate. We can easily read it as 
statement raising the question of academic education. Taking place at a third level institu-
tion does not automatically grant academic orientation. And indeed, we may speak of a 
tendency to erode a certain kind of scholarly work. This is a multifaceted development that 
cannot be discussed in the present contribution. However, the fact of the existence of the 
conflictual field needs to be spelled out. Questions as for instance the following have to be 
addressed: Should more subjects be academised by way of teaching them in a very narrow 
sense of advanced skills training? Can academisation offer an opportunity to enhance 
skills training by offering it at institutions of Third Level Education, enforcing this way the 
integration of non-academic disciplines into a wider academic framework (‘de-
academisation of specific functionalities and academisation of general education’)? 
Should there be a return to an explicitly multilayered system of third level education in-
stead of its implicit maintenance as it had been issued by the ‘Bologna-sation’? In which 
way, if at all, can and should students be more involved in developing at an early stage a 
research strategy, also preparing them for a more academic orientation in their search of 
their further careers? 
Universities for Students, Society, and Economy 
Experiences are important stepping stone for further studies. 
On the basis of analysing personal experiences and some – yet not fully explored 
realm of international education – be that of a student (short or long term abroad), staff 
(administration/academic, visiting or based in relevant places of employment) and with 
connection to previously discussed legitimacy trap a certain but still blurry picture starts to 
(re)appear. 
Firstly and in accordance with a small research conveyed15 and own experiences pro-
vided some insight on how the process of students' choice from a very beginning is being 
                                                          
14  In this brief reflection two issues had not been discussed – and indeed they do not fit into any of such typology. 
(Talking of a typology means as well to admit that the presentation is massively neglecting the fact of a much more 
quaint and contradictory reality.) Somewhere along the line we find, at times hugely relevant in quantitative terms, 
and importantly also influential in terms of ‘school building’ the emigrants and refugees, establishing a new platform 
for the old thinking, being allowed to carry on their traditions, and feeling secure enough not to submit (entirely) un-
der the new conditions – of course, often also standing outside of the main competition for funding. Another, though 
most important, point is the issue of ‘brain drain’ – its exact causes, meaning and understanding. 
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formed. Starting with a very sobering but yet increasingly troubling ‘parental guidance’ 
that is based on government policies that promote certain degrees (usually the ones con-
tributing instantly towards the job market) which offers predominantly business-orientated 
higher education on bachelors level such as Finance, Banking, Accounting and Admin-
istration and Management or IT, Software Engineering, Computer Science, etc. This is in a 
sense is a mirror image of the statistical data collected by the US National Centre for Edu-
cational Statistics (NCES) or UK (British Council 2012) and enhance the notion that it is 
the market that is dictating (hegemon) in a top bottom process on what/how and when to 
study to quickly and almost effortlessly finish degrees to enter the world of 9–5 work. 
Paradoxically, the current globalisation processes also brought forth the incredible op-
portunities for universities, students (possibly it is more correct to speak of the ambitions 
of their parents) and businesses all around the globe. The staggering growth of internation-
al joint-venture universities – that in contrast with a ‘stand-alone’ universities with huge 
financial backing from governments and/or private sources that provide high-end educa-
tion for the elites and none for the masses that further disturbs the fragile equilibrium 
(Ferreira 2006). In this way it transcends the cultural and political boundaries and with 
setting up of business orientated degrees as its core joint-ventures with an affordable tui-
tions paves a solid ground for future, diverse degrees and promote the international educa-
tion due to a number of multinational corporations with high profile seeking future em-
ployees (Belyavina, Li, and Bhandari 2013) with such qualities like mobility/languages/ 
cultural awareness and not necessarily educated in top 10 universities. 
Finally, this brings us to the character of a student (person) (educated domestically or 
internationally does not matter) and what he/she really wants. Right within the previously 
mentioned statements on subject academisation (further understanding) or job specialisa-
tion (focus training) lies the reception of experiences that the education offers to the stu-
dents. Within it (internationally educated matters), we could be able to observe how stu-
dents from different cultural backgrounds are affected for example on the matter of partic-
ipation within this different cultural backgrounds. Due to different ways to educate – the 
international students might differ in reception and engagement; however, it does not de-
fine a ‘better or worse’ but rather deepens our understanding of one and allow being flexi-
ble that further the understanding thus quality of teaching that student receives. On the 
whole we could argue that there are more positives to be taken out of international educa-
tion experiences but some negatives are being overlooked and neglected – especially the 
troubles of students coming back from studying abroad and their hardships in ‘reconnect-
ing’ with the old or the new (depending on the length) which is often described as post 
study abroad depression.16 
To sum up,the dominance of business programme orientated joint-venture brings forth 
the notion of market dictating the future generation of workers with governments and uni-
versities following trends and promoting certain degrees on expanse of others (which is a 
global issue, not only related to China) due to wide range of pressures coming from a mix 
of different stakeholders such as market and its current needs that are portrayed by gov-
ernments which want to fill the gap in the labour market and want students to contribute as 
                                                                                                                                                         
15 Conducted as a series of informal yet annonymous interviews with heads of joint-venture universitites in China for a 
conference in Shanghai on October, 2016. 
16 URL: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dan-baker-studentuniverse-/post-study-abroad-depress_b_8698630.html; 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jun/04/students-post-year-abroad-blues; https://www.gooverseas.com/ 
blog/post-study-abroad-depression; accessed 6/11/2016. 
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soon as possible and most crucially – parents and peers paradoxical pressure on ‘climbing 
a ladder’ and at the same time having steady, stress free job. 
Education in an International Setting – Part of and Contribution 
to a Changing the Global Agenda 
Joshua Cooper Ramo states in a recent interview in The Diplomat, from August 2016, that 
‘[t]he idea of the Beijing Consensus is less that every nation will follow China's develop-
ment model, but that it legitimizes the notion of particularity as opposed to the universality 
of a Washington model’ (Elen 2016). Furthermore he contends that  
[t]oday, we live in a world in deep crisis. And much of this comes from the over-
simple assumptions baked into universalizing ideas about political and economic 
structure. What works in the financial markets of London, we now all see, is not 
such an easy match after all for the puzzles of Greek finance. The political solu-
tions that have buttressed several hundred years of European history cannot be 
installed as easily as a McDonald's in the countries of the Middle East (Ibid.). 
Indeed, for instance for areas like teaching economics and related topics there is the 
need to acknowledge change in a more profound way than it is usually done – more or less 
randomly chosen a report on ‘Meeting China's productivity challenge’ may point in a rele-
vant direction (McKinsey & Company, August 2016). 
Taking this as serious issue on board is also relevant in the present context – only by 
recognising difference, it will be possible to reach a new and higher consensus – we can 
learn from the book of Zhuangzi. We find the little story of the butterfly: 
Once upon a time, I, Chuang Chou, dreamt I was a butterfly, fluttering hither 
and thither, to all intents and purposes a butterfly. I was conscious only of 
my happiness as a butterfly, unaware that I was Chou. Soon I awaked, and 
there I was, veritably myself again. Now I do not know whether I was then a 
man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming  
I am a man. Between a man and a butterfly there is necessarily a distinction. 
The transition is called the transformation of material things.17 
Taking this seriously, the condition of success of joint ventures depends on recognis-
ing them as part of such process of transformation – importantly it will only be workable if 
it is recognised as one of both sides, namely both sides in terms of national interests – in 
the given case of China and the UK; and in terms of substantial interests of academia, i.e. 
the scientific community and a business oriented university administration, led by increas-
ingly inadequate resource requirements. 
Developing here a perspective in the light of globalistics18 and Big and Global History 
(see Rodrigue, Grinin, and Korotayev 2015) two issues are worthwhile to be added, put-
ting things into the perspective of such wider approach to development – and thus as well 
into the perspective of economic development. 
The escalating distancing of the developmental process from the very fundamental ba-
sis – Colin Clark's analysis sector (see Clark 1940; for a short contemporary critique see 
Rothbarth 1941). and its later extension (including a quarternary and quinary sector) and 
                                                          
17  Zhūangzi; URL:  https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Zhuangzi; 03/10/16. 
18  See in this context Grinin, Korotayev, and Herrmann, in this volume: ‘Introduction. How Global can be Global Fu-
ture?’ 
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also the perspective of Kondratief Waves (Grinin, Devezas, and Korotayev 2014) offer 
important insights: at an ‘initial stage’ we find existence and development as highly ‘na-
ture bound’, an important aspect of development is, however, the emergence of an increas-
ing distance. Looking more at the psychological and anthropological side, we may speak 
of artificiality or also of sublimation. Taking these two perspectives – developmental eco-
nomics and psychological/anthropological – together we see in the narrower perspective of 
political economy and economics the quasi-separation of use value and exchange value 
and the emergence of exchange as quasi-independent area of production and exchange. 
Paradoxically this leads to re-emphasising the orientation of education to the process of 
production: science – and with this education – is established as immediate productive 
force. This has major implications for the global and Big History. Artificial Intelligence as 
governor of the new epoch is often used as general spectre, painting the fearful picture of 
complete alienation. 
This – and the search for a more positive outlook – brings us to David Ricardo. It can 
be said that the idea of competitive advantage as dominant issue in economics is going 
mainly back to his work. However, an important aspect is frequently forgotten: he empha-
sised that such ‘law of comparative advantage depends on one stable currency underlying 
the relationship of actors as unified reference’ (Ricardo 1821: 72 ff.). Cum grani salis we 
can apply this to the context of international education. As long as education looks for a 
new role in the emerging international setting, the move is very much about gaining and 
maintaining comparative advantage – using one strong currency as lead currency. This 
may also explain the ease with which a specific ‘administrative hegemony could be gained 
and still can be in large parts maintained: quarrels concerned with the organisation of 
flights and the eligibility for the different standards as well as formal QA-matters are over-
shadowing substantial discourses on the different subject areas. And it is, of course, easier 
to push things forward in the business-related disciplines. However, at the end such system 
will remain limited to competitive strategies. Moving towards global education, the cur-
rency has to be changed, a language of professional standards then returns to the meaning 
of the standards of the profession, dealing with the discourses and disputes of the various 
disciplines. The various economic and political dilemmas of the EU show how difficult it 
is – its foundation was determined by the old language, not daring to admit that the EU 
would have to be a new currency. The challenge for the future is to find ways that guaran-
tee the variety and specificity of disciplines and national traditions, and still fosters the 
common exchange. Looking another time at the EU-integration clearly shows that the 
needed currency has to be one that focuses positively on the realities of people's life (gen-
eral character of being educated) and the reality of a use-value, social quality oriented so-
cieties instead of functioning economies. 
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The present article analyzes the world order in the past, present and future as well 
as the main factors, foundations and ideas underlying the maintaining and change 
of the international and global order. The first two sections investigate the evolu-
tion of the world order starting from the ancient times up to the late twentieth cen-
tury. The third section analyzes the origin and decline of the world order based on 
the American hegemony. The authors reveal the contradictions of the current uni-
polar world and explain in what way globalization has become more profitable for 
the developing countries but not for the developed ones. The authors also explain 
the strengthening belief that the US leading status will inevitably weaken. In this 
connection we discuss the alternatives of the American strategy and the possibility 
of the renaissance of the American leadership. The last section presents a factor 
analysis which allows stating that the world is shifting toward a new balance of 
power and is likely to become the world without a leader. The new world order 
will consist of a number of large blocks, coalitions and countries acting within a 
framework of rules and mutual responsibility. However, the transition to a new 
world order will take certain time (about two decades). This period, which we de-
note as the epoch of new coalitions, will involve a reconfiguration of the World 
System and bring an increasing turbulence and conflict intensity. 
Keywords: world order, American hegemony, global leader, balance of power, 
reconfiguration of the world order. 
Introduction 
Soon after World War I and in connection with the formation of the League of Nations the 
American president Woodrow Wilson coined the term ‘new world order’, hoping that it 
would finally become possible to create a system for maintaining international peace and 
security; meanwhile, the political order had already existed in the Western world for sev-
eral centuries. In historical terms it would be more precise to speak about the international 
order when the European order transformed into the global one. Moreover, prior to the 
European order the inchoate international order could be found in other regions of  
the World System (the most famous here being the Pax Romania). Thus, with respect to 
globalization, the search for the origins of the world order leads back to the ancient times. 
Yet, in historical terms the notion of the world order seems rather amorphous. The human-
ity has passed a long and perilous way to the establishment of certain international rules 
and foundations of co-existence. It is worth analyzing them just in terms of the formation 
(and development) of the world order and the way in which the obtained experience can be 
employed for making predictions on the forthcoming transformations. 
The notions of globalization and world order have become rather closely connected 
today. The countries' mutual influence as well as the impact of global processes on nations 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 94
and states are evident today (Ilyin and Leonova 2015). Within the political realm globali-
zation considerably affects the transformation of the states' sovereign prerogatives since it 
contributes to the change and reduction of the scope of the states' sovereign powers (Grin-
in 2009, 2012a, 2012b). All this gradually creates the foundations for the world order 
whose outlines (although discussed since the end of the Cold War) are actually just being 
formed. It is obvious that the unfolding globalization cannot but complete with some insti-
tutionalizing of the relations in the foreign policy sphere although this path is difficult and 
ambiguous.  
The present article is devoted to the analysis of the world order and this is appropriate-
ly manifested in its structure. 
Prehistory of the World-order Formation 
Politics as a realm of relations connected with distribution of power (Smelser 1988) seems 
to have appeared around the age of the Upper Paleolithic Revolution. The political sphere 
had started to separate already before the emergence of the state at the level of complex 
societies (see Grinin and Korotayev 2009; Grinin 2012a). Moreover, the foreign policy, 
which implies relations between individual states, is virtually older than the domestic one.1 
However, it is evident that the relations between states could only emerge after a certain 
system of states had been established, and this happened only in the third millennium BC. 
Starting from the third millennium BCE one could observe the upswing and downswing 
cycles of political hegemony (Frank and Gills 1993; see also Chase-Dunn et al. 2010).  
The most famous episodes of the struggle for hegemony in the core of the Afroeurasian 
world-system (in the Near East) are associated with the rises and falls of the Old Babylo-
nian and Old Assyrian Kingdom (the first half of the second millennium BCE),  
a clash between the New Kingdom of Egypt and the Hittite Empire (the second half of the 
second millennium BCE), New Babylonian and Neo-Assyrian Empire (the first half of  
the first millennium BCE). At the time, the region was actually the most advanced (and the 
largest) part of the cultural oecumene. Thus, the clashes within its realm can be considered 
ancestorial for the struggle for the global order. This struggle undoubtedly enhanced  
the links within the World System and supported its unity despite the discord among the 
ancient states (see Andreev, Ilyin, and Zinkina 2015b; Grinin and Korotayev 2013, 
2014b). It also contributed to a quick diffusion of innovations, in particular, of iron metal-
lurgy in the late second and first millennia BCE. Unfortunately, from ancient times until 
the present the violent fights at external arenas remain the triggers for technological ad-
vances.  
The struggle between nomadic and sedentary polities was one of the most important 
phenomena which defined the outlines of the World System political landscape; yet, in the 
present article we will not concern this issue as well as the period of the formation of  
the world empires in the Middle East, and history of the Roman and Chinese Empires 
(Qin, and later Han) (see Grinin and Korotayev 2013, 2014b). It is widely known that by 
the end of the Middle Ages and beginning of the Age of Discoveries (when globalization 
had started its new powerful expansion) the political landscape of the forming World Sys-
tem had experienced numerous transformations. Here one should note that the latter con-
tributed to the initial development of certain ideas, principles, trends, and patterns which 
later would play an important role (and some still remain crucial) in the establishment of 
the global political order. Thus, the comprehension of these phenomena is extremely im-
                                                          
1 War used to be an important element of foreign policy (about primitive warfare see e.g., Keeley 1996). 
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portant for the analysis of the processes under study. First, with respect to long periods of 
time one can hardly ignore the fluctuations connected with the establishment or disrupting 
of a certain balance of power which could launch significant transformations. Such fluctu-
ations are still present.  
One can agree or disagree with Henry Kissinger's statement that the system of power 
balance has hardly ever existed in the human history (Kissinger 1994), but the notion itself 
of the balance of power is extremely significant (and Kissinger pays much attention to it). 
Second, one can distinguish some factors particularly influential for changing the balance. 
Along with the above-mentioned technological factor, the ideological factor also has a 
certain impact. For a long time the struggle for hegemony lacked an ideological constitu-
ent and simply indicated a ruler's success and might.  
Starting from the Greco-Persian wars, there appeared the ideas of confronting between 
Asia and Europe (and of the ideological pattern of the struggle between cultural center and 
barbarian periphery; the latter resembling the ideology of colonialism). In the Middle Ages, 
as a result of contradictions between Islam and Christianity, the ideological factor would 
make an important and permanent contribution to the formation of international order (see 
also below). Even today it persistently shows itself although it is not the primary source of 
conflict in the post-Cold War world, as they often interpret Samuel P. Huntington's ideas 
(1993, 1996). Speaking about ancient and medieval political ideas, one should mark the de-
velopment of the idea of a legitimate political order within a state which can partially ex-
plain foreign policy. These and other principles gradually become institutionalized and dur-
ing the Modern Age they start to form the basis of political order. This allows a more active 
interference into the international political processes which by their nature are weakly sub-
ject to control. And at present this trend is strengthening although with some fluctuations.  
The Age of Discoveries introduced new vectors into the global order. First, the arena 
had actually expanded to a world-wide scale. Second, the started establishment and redis-
tribution of colonial possessions would define the global policy during the following four 
or more centuries. Third, the started formation of the World-System core and periphery 
meant the development of the pattern which is still operating within the current international 
realm. With respect to Europe of the second half of the fifteenth century one can convention-
ally speak about a certain unstable balance after a number of devastating and long-lasting 
wars. However, as a result of the Age of Discoveries and especially of the started Refor-
mation that balance was undermined for more than a century. 
The Creation of the World Order  
The international order as a system of relations and ideas about the foundations that should 
underpin the relations between states and generally in the world, started to form in the six-
teenth century when diplomatic relations were established alongside with future contours of 
the system of ‘great powers’ in Europe. The prototype of legal principles of international 
relation system emerged as a result of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which finished the dev-
astating Thirty Years war in Central Europe. Those principles had been developing for more 
than two hundred years (about the Westphalian system see, e.g., Spruyt 2000). In this respect 
one should mark in the first place the ‘sovereignty’ concept which is manifested both in do-
mestic and foreign policy primarily in the right of war and peace (see Grinin 2012b) and in 
the legitimate supreme power. It came to the forefront after the French revolution in 1789. 
The Thirty Years war was the legacy of the sixteenth-century European tradition of re-
ligious wars. But at the same time, it introduced two new foreign policy principles, which 
later would be actively employed by the politicians, namely: 1) the maintenance of  
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the international ‘balance of power’ through supporting the weaker coalition against the 
stronger one; and 2) the priority of national interests over other (religious, ideological, 
etc.) ones. For example, Richelieu formulated and actively implemented both these ap-
proaches (Kissinger 1994). As a result, although being a catholic state, France supported 
the weaker coalition of the Protestant states in their war against Habsburg Empire that 
strove for the world supremacy. At that time it was the diminished Habsburgs and disunit-
ed Germany which Richelieu (and later Louis XIV) considered as France's major national 
objective which would allow control over tiny German principalities. Given the fact that 
Richelieu was a Catholic cardinal, it was a bold step which had made foreign policy even 
more cynical than before. Since that time one observes a trend when the foreign policy start-
ed to develop according to certain stratagems and principles. 
The Main Factors Influencing the Formation  
of the European/World Order  
As already mentioned, within international relations framework the issue of the balance of 
power and its disruption is crucial for the perception of the states' foreign policy, as well as 
for the general pattern of the European and global relations. Deliberate foreign policy of 
some states (such as France, and later Britain) aimed at creating a number of military-
political alliances enabled them to maintain and control the balance in their favor.2 Bearing 
this in mind, one can better understand the peculiarities of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries' military alliances as well as the reasons of interchanges within them. 
Undoubtedly, it was the geopolitical factor that laid the basis for such an order com-
prising multiple states and several strong powers and lacking a hegemon. In contrast, the 
Chinese geopolitical environment with China (the Celestial Empire) inevitably playing a 
central role in the region hampered the development of modern diplomacy based on a com-
plex system of international relations with almost equal powers. The fundamental principles 
of the Chinese foreign policy evolved around such major issues as the protection of the state 
from the nomads through setting barbarians on each other and launching successful cam-
paigns against nomads, etc. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was the European and not 
the Chinese model of international relations that was to a certain degree expanded to the 
global level. 
The balance between powers could change due to a number of factors, including in-
ternal rebellions, fall of dynasties, etc. Among the long-term factors one should mention 
different growth rates of population, territory, wealth, industry, and commerce.3 But all 
this should be converted into military power. The gunpowder and military revolutions 
(Downing 1992) led to the formation of advanced armies (McNeill 1982), which also con-
tributed to state-building and formation of the new-type states (mature in our terms [see 
Grinin 2012a]). The results of the development of military technologies became evident in 
the course of successful Swedish (in the seventeenth century), Prussian, and Russian  
(in the eighteenth century) military campaigns. For our study, it is of particular importance 
to distinguish the technological innovations convertible into military advantages, because 
this factor became increasingly influential with time. For instance, France and Britain won 
the Crimean war (1853–1856) due to their technological superiority over Russia. 
                                                          
2 This is reflected in Lord Palmerston's claim that England has no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Its interests 
are eternal and perpetual. 
3 Thus, in the sixteenth century the Portuguese and Spanish came to the front after their colonial success and enormous 
wealth got from there while similar discoveries caused a gradual decline of the Italian trading states. 
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With the emergence of large-scale armies and completed transition to industrial produc-
tion principle (Grinin 2007) the state's overall economic power and supply with resources 
became the main determining factor. It was the total economic power of the anti-German 
coalition that led to Germany's defeat in both World Wars. Nowadays, different economic 
(and financial) indicators can help to define the trends of shifting balance of power. 
Finally, the balance of power could be significantly although irregularly disrupted by a 
changing ideological paradigm. Since the latter significantly changed the perception  
of legitimacy of government and its actions, it also inevitably led to the exacerbation of in-
ternational relations and wars between ideological enemies. The results of such violations 
manifested in the Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious wars and 
later in the division of Europe into the Protestants and Catholics. The French Revolution  
(in the late eighteenth century) caused a new ideological crisis which undermined the sancti-
ty of monarchy and aristocracy. 
This was followed by a quarter-of-a-century-long chain of endless wars, coalitions, the 
triumph and fall of Napoleon's Empire and restoration of monarchies. The new ideological 
turn began after the First World War as a result of the deep crisis of the world order, and 
after the Second World War the ideological gap between socialism and capitalism became 
a determining factor for the new world order. 
Although the performed factor analysis of the establishment and changes in the world 
order is far from being complete, it can explain the causes and results of the evolution of 
the world order, and can be employed to make predictions on the directions of the future 
world order development. 
From a Concert of Europe to the World Wars 
The concert of great powers existed from the seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century and 
according to Kissinger, it was a model of the world order which to some extent remains 
relevant even today (Kissinger 1994, 2014). Of course, the powers in the list alternated, 
and each change was associated with the shifts in the established world order. In the sev-
enteenth century, Sweden could have gained the ‘great power’ status if not for  
the defeat in the Great Northern War with Russia, while Russia, on the contrary, joined  
the ‘great powers concert’. Prussia joined this ‘club’ under Frederick II the Great in the 
eighteenth century. Then, the number of the great European powers remained the same 
(five – France, England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia) for about a century, until the unifi-
cation of Germany and Italy, and later the rise of the USA and Japan. The shift in  
the European balance of power occurred mainly due to (a) a successful public administra-
tion reform and army reorganizations (Russia and Prussia in the eighteenth century are 
good examples here); (b) growing trade flows and wealth; and (c) a breakthrough in tech-
no-economic sphere (made, e.g., by Britain as a result of the so-called Agrarian revolution 
and the final phase of the Industrial revolution in the eighteenth century). Thus, in the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century it was Britain that controlled the balance of power in 
Europe, uniting in different alliance and joining or destroying coalitions. Meanwhile, the lag 
in socio-political transformations caused the decline of the former leading powers like Spain 
and Portugal, and left Genoa and Venice on the sidelines. The Austrian Empire and France 
had also considerably lost their positions; and the technological backwardness of Holland, 
which used to be ‘favorite’ in the seventeenth century (Arrighi 1994), together with its 
defeat in the war, led to the loss of political status. 
The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 and the Holy Alliance of the Russian, Austrian, 
and Prussian monarchs were significant thresholds in the development of principles and 
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forms of control over international relations. The monarchs sought to maintain Europe's 
status quo and cooperated to undermine revolutions. This new ideological turn marked a 
return to the principle of legitimate (monarchical) power. Then, the concept and an effective 
system of the ‘concert of Europe’ emerged which involved the above-mentioned five great 
powers and was designated to maintain equilibrium and balance of power and to escape 
wars.4 It implied a multilateral diplomacy and opportunities of regular international confer-
ences and existed until the Crimean war of 1853. 
The increasing colonial activity involved the Asian countries (China, Japan, Burma, 
etc.) into the global affairs; meanwhile, many new states emerged in Latin America. That 
was the way how the world order originated with Europe still remaining the main arena. 
The desire to preserve legitimate governments persisted in the European policy for 
three decades, at times running counter the countries' national interests. However, the revo-
lutionary wave of 1848–1849, industrialization in Europe and the change of regime in France 
had undermined this ideology. It was replaced by a much more direct and cynical one, associ-
ated with political maneuvering in search for a combination of alliances, which would allow 
getting profits regardless the ideological proximity or dislikes. In Bismarck's Germany, this 
policy was called ‘Realpolitik’. This disappearance of the ideological bias explains to a cer-
tain extent the existence of various and rather unstable alliances and coalitions of the great 
powers in the period between the 1870s and early 1900s. Generally recognized as a master 
of combinations and compromises, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck initiated the 
creation of such unions. 
As to the causes of tensions and conflicts between powers, they were mostly observed 
at the final stage of the division of colonial possessions and spheres of influence. 
The German Confederation was established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (to re-
place the Holy Roman Empire destroyed by Napoleon). Although the number of German 
States reduced from three hundred to three dozens, Central Europe generally remained 
weak. Meanwhile, this was considered an essential part of the balance of power and such 
situation with Germany was the major objective of the national policy of France, Britain, 
and other powers. The rivalry for the influence in this part of Germany determined the 
policy of Prussia and Austria. 
That is why the unification of Germany under the Prussian rule became the major 
change in Europe of the early 1870s, resulting from several victorious wars, Bismarck's 
shrewd policy and a number of mistakes made by Austria and France. This drastically 
changed the balance of power, since in the center of Europe a new state emerged which 
was stronger than any other power in Europe. Thus, France got an urgent necessity to find 
an ally, since after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian war it dreamed of revenge, but re-
mained weaker than Germany. Bismarck in his turn was afraid of the war on two fronts, 
and therefore sought an alliance with Russia. But finally, after Bismarck's resignation, the 
conflict between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkans led to the Dual 
Alliance (1892) signed by Russia and France against Germany, and then there was the 
agreement between France and Britain (the Entente cordiale) in 1904 which transformed into 
triple Entente with Russia in 1907. Germany's military and economic strengthening made 
Britain take its favorite strategy of joining the less powerful group in order to weaken the 
leading continental power that is Germany. The rapid industrial development in all coun-
tries, the explosive technological innovations, a considerable change of war means – all 
                                                          
4 One should note here that since the contemporary world divergence from the unipolarity, it is rather probable that the 
future world system will be a kind of such ‘concert’ of some leading coalitions. 
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these pushed rivals (especially Germany) to change the balance of power by means of a 
military victory. 
From the Balance of Power to Bipolarity 
Thus, the new military-political alliances emerged in Europe and divided it into two op-
posing blocks. Eventually, this led to the First World War, which changed the global polit-
ical landscape and the balance of power. Then, there was established the first international 
institution – the League of Nations – which attempted to influence the formation of new 
principles of international relations, and besides, the system of international conventions 
continued to develop. Nevertheless, after the World War II the new stable world order had 
existed for quite a short period. The powerful changes that occurred, including the emer-
gence of the USSR, the development of new weapons and the great depression, the reluc-
tance of Germany to recognize the imposed limits and other factors exacerbated the rela-
tions and unleashed another war. 
The order established after World War II differed significantly from the previously ex-
isting one. First, there were only two strong powers (the USA and the USSR), in other 
words, the world became bipolar with two military blocks (NATO and the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization). The military core of this balance was nuclear equations and deterrence 
strategy. Secondly, it was based on ideological foundations which the previous world or-
der had lacked. It is possible that it was ideological bias that supported a rather long exist-
ence of the post-war world order. 
Generally speaking, a stable world order recognized and supported by the leading ac-
tors usually endured from three to four decades, or even less. Thus, the system that had 
existed before the French revolution (1789) had worked for less than 30 years. It was es-
tablished after the Seven Years' War (i.e., after 1763) and destroyed in 1790–1791.  
The Order established after the Napoleonic wars and the Congress of Vienna was de-
stroyed by the revolutions of 1848–1849 and the Crimean war, and had existed for less 
than thirty-five years. The subsequent system of world order began to form after the emer-
gence of the German Empire (1871), but developed only by the early 1890s and was de-
stroyed by the First World War; therefore it endured for less than two decades.  
The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was violated by Germany in 1935. Thus, the world order 
established after the Second World War existed from 1945 to 1990 that is for 45 years, and 
that was an achievement. 
The Issues of the Current World Order  
The late twentieth-century shift to Pax Americana.  
Globalization and the crisis of the unipolar world 
The collapse of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union destroyed the previous bipolar world 
order and led to the establishment of a unipolar world. Obviously, the ideas about the new 
world order that began to develop right in the late 1980s and early 1990s, often reflected 
the belief in the absolute domination of the Western economies, institutions and ideas (see, 
e.g., Attali 1991) and became almost synonymous to the idea of Pax Americana (see, e.g., 
Brzezinski 1998). Thus, Henry Kissinger's views (Kissinger 1994, 2001) on the new bal-
ance of power were no exception.  
However, while the unipolar order was formed and developed the world balance shift-
ed once again. This was caused by the countries' uneven economic and technological devel-
opment. Over the last three or four decades, globalization has been constantly and signifi-
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cantly effecting the changes in the world order. It eventually shifted the balance of economic 
power towards the developing world. One of the main reasons was the so-called ‘deindustri-
alization’ which meant a transition of a significant part of production, economy and technol-
ogy from developed to developing countries (for more details see Grinin and Korotayev 
2014a, 2015). The result is the Western countries' weakening economic growth and their 
diminishing role in the global arena, while the rest of the world (developing countries) in-
creases the influence (see Fig. 1). 
Thus, during the two decades starting from 1991, at the background of weakening Eu-
rope and continuing stagnation in Japan one observed the rise of economic giants in Asia 
(China and India) as well as the emergence of a number of rapidly developing states (from 
Mexico to Malaysia and Ethiopia) which preserve their growth rates (although with some 
difficulties) and are likely to take the leading positions in the world in the quite nearest 
future. 
 
Fig. 1. Dynamics of the share of the West and the rest of the world (‘the Rest’) in 
the global GDP after 1980 (based on the World Bank data on the GDP calcu-
lated in 2005 purchasing power parity international dollars) 
Source: World Bank 2014: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD (Grinin and Korotayev 2015). 
World order in the past, present and future 
The decline of the American and Western leadership. Is the revival possible? By the 
1990s, the USA, unlike the former world leaders, had concentrated a wide range of leader-
ship aspects: from technological, financial and military to scientific and cultural. That was 
the first (and probably, the last) case in world history. But in 2001, being at the peak of 
their might, the USA was stricken by unexpected 9/11 events. That was a turning point 
after which many characteristics and patterns of domestic and foreign policy have become 
excessive. The USA abandons their own principles of freedom and start surveillance over 
their own citizens, as well as the leaders and population of other countries. It starts to ig-
nore the international law and principle of sovereignty (Herland 2014).  
Pretty soon, during the financial and economic crisis of 2006–2010, it became quite 
evident that the USA had been losing their leading positions. However, the talks about an 
inevitable decline of the American might began already in the 1970–1980s (see, e.g., Vo-
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gel 1979; Kennedy 1987). Since the 1990s, one observes an increasing number of political 
forecasts predicting an imminent decline of the American supremacy and simultaneous 
coming to the front of Asian economies (Attali 1991; Colson and Eckerd 1991; Arrighi 
1994; Frank 1997; Buchanan 2002; Kupchan 2002; Todd 2003; Wallerstein 2003; Man-
delbaum 2005; NIC 2008, 2012; see also: Grinin 2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2010a, 
2010b, 2015). The increasing negative phenomena in America at the background of the 
Asian countries' success, made the idea of the American decline more feasible, causing 
either a feeling of triumph or a concern depending on one's preferences. Since 2008, there 
have appeared more publications arguing that America's power is decreasing, that it is no 
longer an absolute leader and that the unipolar world is being transformed, etc. (see, e.g., 
Milne 2008; Zakaria 2008; Haass 2008). Many of such articles had rather striking head-
lines, for instance: ‘America's Fall is a Dangerous Opportunity for its Enemies’ (Tisdall 
2008); ‘America's Power Cracks and is Broken into Pieces’ (Gray 2008); ‘Sun Setting on 
the American Century’ (Reid 2008); ‘Is it the End of the American Era?’ (Kennedy 2008). 
Such articles appeared and still appear on a rather regular basis (see, e.g., Bremmer 2015; 
Klare 2015). Sooner or later the United States of America will no longer be able to lead 
the world in its common way, and it can result in a drastic change of the geopolitical land-
scape (for more details see Grinin 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 
2010b, 2011, 2015). 
In 2008, Farid Zakaria, a famous political expert and editor of the Newsweek Interna-
tional, called for the USA to become a global mediator and develop, in cooperation with 
other countries, new rules for the world order. He wrote that the USA had two alternatives. 
Either it can reinforce the existing world order via cooperation with new great powers. 
However, it should compromise on some of its power and privileges, and agree that future 
world will have variety of opinions and different points of view. Otherwise, America may 
just passively observe how ‘the rise of the rest’ will rip to shreds of the world order that 
have been built for the latest 60 years (Zakaria 2008). But he was wrong. The USA, hav-
ing hardly recovered from the crisis, chose the third way – to undermine the power of its 
competitors and thus, preserve their position of the only superpower in the world. These 
‘efforts’ have been increasing turbulence in the world in recent years (Heuvel 2015). All 
this means that we will face much more difficulties than we could on the way to a new 
world order (not American), which will be established sooner or later.  
But still the question of whether the ‘sunset’ of the USA can probably turn into its 
new ‘sunrise’ remains open for discussions because many Americans will hardly put up 
with such a situation. That is why it is worth considering the arguments of those who be-
lieve that the USA can restore its power again.  
First of all, the stabilization of the American economy after the crisis supports the ide-
as that the American age will last a long way down the road. Also, many people hope for a 
technological or other miracle which will revive the American power, or for the US ability 
to control the rivals (see also Milne 2008; Kennedy 2008; Bremmer 2015). Technology, as 
well as a breakthrough in innovations, has quite a strong influence on changing the power 
balance and formation of a new balance. We have already stated our hypotheses that a new 
powerful technological wave will start in the 2030–2040s (see Grinin 2007; Grinin A. and 
Grinin L. 2015). The model of the new world order will strongly depend on who will lead 
this new technological pattern, especially if these innovations are converted into the mili-
tary supremacy. Today's developing world invests more and more into technology and has 
achieved much in some spheres – for example, India is the world leader in Earth's remote 
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sensing. Quite recently, it has become the first to put a satellite into orbit, which is created 
for stereo photography of the Earth surface at the height of 618 kilometers.  
But it is quite clear that the USA holds the leading position as a claimant upon this 
technological lead, and thus it has an opportunity to preserve its world leadership. Moreo-
ver, today the USA has much more financial resources for this,5 not mentioning the re-
maining control over the global financial and information flows. There is, however, an 
important trend that should be marked out. During the last decades the American transna-
tional corporations have shown more and more separation from the native state, where 
they feel cramped, thus involuntarily playing into the hands of developing countries.  
The USA's new economic partnerships (see below) can strengthen this trend, which is a 
great deal. The same way, the English technology and funds caused the rise of the USA, 
India, Canada, and Australia in the nineteenth century, while Britain itself ceased to be the 
world leader.  
On the one hand, the world financial elite has become quite mobile, and the world be-
comes global and ‘digitalized’ to the extent that boarders and territories will be of no ac-
count for big money and its owners. So it seems that one more reset of the world order will 
hardly destabilize the position of the World-System center. But on the other hand, if the 
companies are predominantly active outside the USA, then the American population can 
get poorer, and while the inequality in the country is growing, the internal social tension 
can increase.  
On the one hand, the US population is getting older, and very soon white population 
among young people will be overgrown by the non-white. All this may aggravate social 
conflicts. On the other hand, the USA is still attractive for immigrants, which bring human 
capital of high quality to the country (scientists, analysts, and engineers). In short, the pro-
cesses will be rather complicated, and as any future processes, they may reveal quite unex-
pected phenomena. 
Problems of the decline of the American leadership with regard to the 
World System and thes of the ‘global disorder’ 
The burden of the only superpower turns out to be beyond America's strength (Klare 
2015). It should be taken into account that the USA will face not only other nations' wish-
es but also regional and sometimes world-scale interests. One can hardly admit that the 
USA interests are the interests of the world; besides, it is inconceivable to carry this bur-
den of a superpower for indeterminate amount of time, interfering into everything. It is no 
wonder that even claims for this are becoming overwhelming and the reaction to the lack 
of power – more and more nervous.  
At the same time, some political analysts and economists' hopes for a prompt and ava-
lanching failure of the USA are groundless: it probably will proceed gradually while ob-
jective circumstances, including the growth of peripheral countries, promote it. As the 
connoisseur of great powers, Paul Kennedy notes this departure will be long (Kennedy 
                                                          
5 In spite of the fact, that many developing countries headed by China quite confidently catch up with the USA in 
the number (but not in the quality) of scientific publications in Scopus and Web of Science, an overwhelming part 
of the market of patents and technology selling belongs to the developed countries, with the USA having a one-
third of the sales volume of licenses on technology. ‘The transfer of technology to foreign countries brings big 
revenues to the USA, exceeding in volume the cash inflow of all other countries-exporters of scientific and tech-
nological knowledge’ (Zimenkov 2014). 
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2008; see also: NIC 2008; Zakaria 2008). Besides, we should note that the world is still 
interested in the US leadership (see, e.g., Barber 2014).  
Indeed, the weakening of the US leadership brings a bunch of problems with it. It is 
widely suggested that the USA place will be occupied by the EU, China or someone else 
(from India to Russia; more often they talk about China). But it is a big mistake, as it will 
not be just a simple change of the leader.6 When the USA loses its status of the leader, it 
will lead to the fundamental change of the whole structure of the world economic and po-
litical order, as the USA concentrates too many aspects of the leadership. It means that the 
USA's position in the World-System will remain the same since no other country is able to 
concentrate as many leader's functions simultaneously. And that is why (as well as consid-
ering many other reasons) when the USA loses the leadership position, it means a deep 
and rather difficult and critical transformation of the World-System itself, when even the 
nearest consequences are quite unclear (for more details see Grinin 2009, 2011, 2013; Grinin 
and Korotayev 2010b, 2014a, 2015). That is why it is necessary to analyze the whole range 
of consequences.  
Thus, according to some analysts, the unipolar period is close to its end today. How-
ever, it has not yet been replaced by a new global order, since there are multiple opposing 
principles that operate in the world today and thus, it looks more like a disorder  
(Le Monde 2008). This disorder is supported by the activities of many, if not all global 
players, but in recent years a considerable disorder has been particularly caused by the US 
actions, which is not surprising. On the one hand, the USA declines without being substi-
tuted by any equivalent leader. Moreover, there is an ever-growing number of supporters 
of reducing the US presence in the world in the very United States (see Bremmer 2015; 
Heuvel 2015). On the other hand, the United States still has power which allows preserv-
ing its position in the world. However, the hegemon's clumsy actions evoke opposition in 
many countries worldwide. On the whole, the decline of the US leading positions together 
with the attempts of a number of states to change the global rules (e.g., in relation to the 
dollar's status, etc.), as well as America's absolute unwillingness to concede any of its in-
formal prerogatives, increase tensions in the world.  
The Prolegomena to the Outlines of the New World Order  
The need for a new order, problems of the transition period  
and the balance of power 
Our assumptions about the principles of a new world order are based on the following 
findings. First, no hegemon has the same range of leadership benefits as the United States 
to replace it today (for more details, see Grinin 2011, 2012a, 2012b). Second, the weaken-
ing of the US leadership is inevitable and becomes more and more noticeable. However, 
the US will preserve a number of advantages for a long time (see e.g., Bremmer 2015; Za-
karia 2008). Third, the world is to some extent interested in the American soft leadership but 
without dictatorial ambitions to undermine the opponents' power. Fourth, the transition to  
                                                          
6 About the Chinese economic, environmental and population problems, which can prevent its further economic expan-
sion see Grinin 2011, 2013; Grinin, Tsirel, and Korotayev 2014. We should note that despite the enormous progress, 
China still lags behind not only the USA, but also Russia (e.g., the PRC space program has been largely ‘copied’ 
from the Soviet one) in the most advanced technological areas, as well as in the military sphere. China's falling into 
Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap is also evident. And the way out could be delayed since their causes 
are fundamental and hard to overcome for any country of the geopolitical Onshore, including all of the BRICS coun-
tries. 
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a new world order requires a random search for forms, principles, and conditions to create 
precedents and the desired combinations. Therefore, it will be a long and difficult search. 
Fifth, the transition to the new world order will temporarily increase turbulence and strife, as 
well as the lack of stability and struggle between different patterns of the new order. 
Thus, today there are ever clearly visible trends towards the fact that the new world 
order will be different, it will be the world without hegemon but with some centers of 
power and influence, among which the United States is likely to be the most important. 
But it can only claim the title of the ‘first among equals’, rather than the title of superpow-
er and hegemon (NIC 2008). Accordingly, one can suggest the following two scenarios  
of the US withdrawal: 1) meaningful and the most profitable path of a new world order in 
the long-term with maximum possible preservation of its influence, but not a dictate; and 
2) a bitter struggle of the United States to maintain the status quo, including various actions 
to undermine and weaken the opponents. This will inevitably create permanent tension and 
strife. Meanwhile, the United States seems to choose the second pattern (although a big de-
lay of another economic crisis could make them resort to the first one). But even when fol-
lowing the second path the United States will be increasingly forced to seek new alliances 
and allies.7 Anyway, it is the struggle for the American hegemony and its position in relation 
to the large and fast-growing countries that keep the main intrigue of the contemporary glob-
al contradiction.  
Why is the increasing ‘disorder’ more probable, if not inevitable, than a smooth transi-
tion? First of all, a move towards a new order requires common wisdom and compromise, 
but this is particularly so with the United States. But the political elite have always lacked 
wisdom. However, there are also deeper reasons. The revolutionary change in the global 
balance of economic power which we mentioned above (see Fig. 1) creates objective con-
ditions for the revision of the existing world order. However, it does not entail an automat-
ic change in military and political balances. Figuratively speaking, this requires pulling the 
political component of global change (political globalization) to the economic one (for 
definitions and paradigms of globalization, see Andreev, Ilyin, and Zinkina 2015a). Obvi-
ously, the latter is far ahead of the former. And further development would be difficult 
without such pulling. Yet, the narrowing of the gap between economic and political glob-
alization is inevitable and we denote this process as a reconfiguration of the World System 
(see Grinin 2013; Grinin and Korotayev 2012). 
The major vectors of this reconfiguration include weakening of the former core of the 
World System (the USA and the West), and simultaneous strengthening of the positions of 
a number of peripheral countries and generally increasing role of the developing countries. 
However, one should bear in mind that the ‘catching up’ (between the political and eco-
nomic components of globalization) will also bring severe political and geopolitical crises 
in different regions. Elsewhere we have considered the crises and turmoils in the Middle 
                                                          
7 In October 2015, the signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact was announced. Also, the negotiations 
are going on with respect to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA). Their implementation (although the recent signing of two agreements, as well as the ratification 
and operation of the former remain rather doubtful) will mean significant changes and aggravation of economic 
struggle. After all, all these economic alliances combined can represent two-thirds of the world GDP (at face value). 
Thus, the United States put at stake their domination in major economic associations. However, we agree with some 
observers (e.g., Hedges 2015) that these agreements would be more profitable for the American TNCs than for the 
US economy in general. On the contrary, the latter may weaken due to the expanded import and further transfer of 
the US production abroad. 
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East after 2010, as well as the Ukrainian crisis as both ‘reconfiguring’ and geopolitical 
crises which require transformations in the world order. At the same time, grave and prob-
ably unexpected crises in other societies or regions seem rather possible. The abruptness 
may be akin to earthquakes. And if to continue the geological metaphor, one should note 
that just like the tectonic shifts occur under the most mobile Earth's crust and at the bound-
aries of tectonic plates, the reconfiguring crises occur in the least stable regions and socie-
ties which are situated at the junction of geopolitical ‘plates.’ Both the Middle East and the 
Ukraine are the regions of this kind.8 
We also argue that stability or instability of the world order depends on the stable or 
mobile character of the balance of power. The current balance of power obviously under-
goes some transformations. If the idea of the weakening United State is right, what would 
be the shift towards a new balance? We assume that one of probable scenarios is the crea-
tion of various alliances between countries to strengthen their positions and increase op-
portunities. As we have seen, this process has even involved the United States, who is usu-
ally reluctant in taking over different commitments. Thus, the search for a new balance of 
power has already started and it will be manifested in a more active creation of various 
alliances and coalitions of countries and their associations. We denote this process as an 
epoch of new coalitions (Grinin 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2013; Grinin and Korotayev 2010b; 
2011, 2012, 2014a, 2015).  
We can find similar ideas in some other analysts' works (e.g., Bremmer 2015). Thus, 
for example, Michael Klare suggests quite a pragmatic scenario. In his opinion, one should 
accept the obvious facts on the ground that the United States shares the planet with other 
major powers: none matches the power of the United States, and is weak enough to be in-
timidated by the threat of the US military intervention. Having taken a more realistic as-
sessment of the US opportunities, Washington should focus on how to co-exist with such 
powers as Russia, Iran and China, and how to settle the differences with them without in-
creasing tension (Klare 2015).  
The Epoch of New Coalitions and the Outlines  
of the New World Order 
Thus, the search for a new balance has brought us to the period which we call the epoch of 
new coalitions. The alliances can emerge accidentally and due to unexpected reasons 
which can be exemplified by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). 
First introduced in 2001 by an American analyst Jim O'Neil as an appropriate acronym, 
BRICS during the last six years has become quite a real, dynamic, and multilinear alliance.  
It is the most important strategic direction of the Russian foreign policy, and its 
hope for an alternative center of power. Within the BRICS framework trade with 
the partners tends to increase, and China plays especially important role in this 
regard. Unfortunately, there is an insufficient cooperation between the BRICS 
partners in cultural, scientific, educational and technological spheres; also  
the member-states' intellectual influence on the global processes is far from the 
American influence. To implement the idea of the rise of BRICS and related de-
                                                          
8 The societies found to be at the intersection are situated in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Western China (Ti-
bet and Xiang Jiang), West Africa (at the intersection of Islamic and Tropical Africa), and in some regions of South 
America. These regions are quite unstable, with already manifested occasional or possible signs of a crisis (but this 
does not necessarily mean that it will take place). 
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veloping countries (recently introduced by a group of the Russian scholars; see 
Sadovnichiy, Yakovetz, and Akaev 2014), there should be developed an ideolo-
gy which will attract ‘intellectual masses.’ This has been the case with the coun-
tries which had been leaders for long periods of time. But there are no attractive 
ideas about it yet. The communist ideology underpinning the rise of the USSR 
and still implemented in China is outdated. The noospheric and humanistic ideas 
developed by the Russian scientific school (and perceived with interest in China 
and India) still lacks romanticism that can drive the masses. Therefore, the de-
velopment of such an ideology as well as setting the leadership objectives and 
movement to the projected goals remains an urgent task for the BRICS group. An 
effective solution of the problems can consist in a complex methodology which 
should include global and regional forecasting and defining the dynamics of inter-
connected world and regional development; understanding of globalization and ac-
companying transformation of the world order as objective processes that can be 
controlled. It also implies mathematical modelling to define an optimal world order 
based on sustainable development. Such an interdisciplinary approach is fully em-
ployed in the project in which the authors of the present article participate and 
which is aimed at revealing a reasonable alternative to the current world order al-
so within the common global trend of the BRICS rise. 
Thus, we see that the Earth has become rather tightly connected for cooperation even 
at a distance. Thus, there appear different geopolitical fantasies, some of which are likely 
to come true as it happened with BRICS. However, the flexibility of partnerships within 
the World-System framework will probably increase for some time, but some of the 
emerging alliances and coalitions can turn chimeric, ephemeral or fantastic. 
The above-mentioned coming turbulence together with the formation of different alli-
ances and combinations may last for some time. But along with probable increase of con-
flicts and political transformations in different regions there will increase the vector aimed 
at the formation of common frame for the states' interests. We hope that after a certain pe-
riod of ‘the game without rules’ (during one or two decades) the global arena will never-
theless be considered as a common field of interests with acceptable and profitable rules of 
the game for everyone to follow. The completed catching up of the political component  
of globalization can create a trend when more and more states will start to develop their 
policy with the account of global interests. 
Certainly, the above-mentioned ideas can seem utopian especially because of the self-
centered approaches and double standards that have recently intensified. But probably this 
shows that the world is in the search for the foundations of a new world order. Probably,  
this will require passing through certain cataclysms (e.g., new economic crisis) since just  
the critical events bring dramatic changes. 
The search for the most stable, advantageous and appropriate supranational organiza-
tional forms can bring to life different and rapidly changing intermediate forms, while the 
players at the global and regional stages will search for more effective and convenient coa-
litions and agreements. But finally, some of the new alliances and coalitions will transform 
from temporary into permanent ones and become effective supranational forms. During 
this process some new norms of international law will be developed whose necessity has 
already been much spoken about for some decades.  
Thus, the foundations of the future world order must undergo certain transformations. 
Besides, the countries that continue to roughly and selfishly defend their national interests 
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will lose in the final count. The largest states' policy aimed at their forceful global and re-
gional dominance (including the most independent and selfish sovereign – the USA) will 
also undergo radical changes. The national selfishness will hardly disappear; however, any 
international action should be both relevant and ideologically justified. That is why there is 
a hope and perception that the concept of foreign policy will change and there will gradually 
increase the claims for common (regional, world, and group) well-being; yet, the formula-
tions like ‘the best representative of the world interests’ can often conceal selfish goals. But 
anyway such transformation will lead to significant and mostly positive changes. 
The new world order will call for: 1) a rather solid balance of power and interests;  
2) new models of the supranational government and coordination of the global processes; 
and 3) new ideologies. To solve the first task one should recognize the principle of plural-
ism of political regimes when any regime (including the democratic one) has its advantages 
and drawbacks. The refusal from imposing democracy at all accounts can become a crucial 
constituent in creating a common frame of interests and rules. To solve the second task one 
should reject the idea of the universal democracy at all levels. The European Union's experi-
ence has shown that at the supranational scale the democratic procedures work rather im-
properly. Thus, one needs a comprehensive search for new patterns which would lack an 
ideological bias. Perhaps, here one could employ international expert organizations co-opted 
by different countries and coalitions as well as a certain quota system for them at the interna-
tional level. As for a universal ideology, it seems it can emerge only on the basis of the 
search for new cooperation patterns. 
Thus, although we anticipate rather turbulent times of an emerging balance between 
different countries and coalitions, the humanity will have rather good chances to use glob-
alization to create the foundations of the new world order. 
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Part II. GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHY 
 
 
Population Ageing and  
Global Economic Growth 
 
Jack A. Goldstone 
 
 
The author develops a simple model to examine the impact of population ageing – 
including reduced productivity and declining labor forces – on global economic 
growth. 
Keywords: global economic growth, labor force, population ageing, demographic 
bonus, demographic onus. 
What will be the impact of population ageing on global economic output? How fast will 
Africa or other regions have to grow to make up for slowing growth in China? Which 
countries or regions will likely be the prime drivers of global economic growth in the  
future? 
To answer these questions, we can develop a simple model of productivity gains and 
losses from population growth and population ageing, and apply it to projections of labor 
force growth (or decline) in various regions. The results provide a set of simulations that 
allow us to grasp the rough contours of likely global economic growth under various sce-
narios. 
Productivity Gains: From Good to Gone 
In theory, productivity gains are easy to come by, with several major routes all contrib-
uting significant increases in output per employed worker. First is urbanization; simply 
shifting workers from lower productivity rural work (mainly agriculture and home produc-
tion or handicrafts) to urban work (services and machine-aided manufacture) provides ma-
jor gains. Second is sectoral shifts; the transfer of workers from lower productivity labor-
intensive manufacturing and unskilled services (food preparation, janitorial, retail, tour-
ism) to capital intensive manufacturing and professional services provides additional 
boosts to productivity. The education of the labor force, in regard to both secondary and 
tertiary education, is a requirement for, and hence is associated with, this kind of sectoral 
change. Finally, the information/communications revolution, by networking workers and 
linking them to information, can also provide increases in their productivity; but to be sure 
our current measurements do not do a very good job of showing those gains in practice 
(Triplett 1999). 
Yet in recent years many scholars have argued that the easy gains from the first two 
factors are over, at least in the mature industrial economies (Cowen 2011; Gordon 2012). 
And indeed, the data on productivity in these economies shows a marked decline in the 
increase in GDP per person employed. As Fig. 1 shows, since the mid-1970s the growth in 
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this measure of productivity has declined markedly and remained low for the last 30 years. 
The only exception is South Korea, which experienced strong productivity gains up 
through the mid-1990s; but since that period South Korea has joined the other advanced 
economies in regression to a mean annual productivity increase of 2 per cent. 
 
Fig. 1. Productivity decline in the advanced industrial economies, 1960–2005 
Source: BLS 2009. 
From Demographic Bonus to Demographic Onus 
One reason for this widespread decline in productivity may lie in shifting demography. 
Ogawa, Kondo, and Matsukura (2005), writing about Japan in particular, described the 
process of population ageing as taking an economy from enjoying a demographic bonus to 
facing the burden of a demographic onus. The demographic bonus, or demographic divi-
dend (Lee and Mason 2006), is a result of reaching a middling stage in the demographic 
transition. In that transition, the initial stage is a decline in mortality rates concentrated in 
the youngest years, while fertility rates remain moderately high. In this stage societies ex-
perience a sharp increase in population growth but also a rapid rise in the dependency ra-
tio, as the number of young people aged 1–14 expands very fast relative to the number of 
working age people (those 15 and older). In this stage, societies have to invest a great deal 
in clothing, feeding, caring for, and educating the young. 
In the middle phase of the transition, fertility rates decline as well. This causes a sig-
nificant slowdown in the growth of younger age cohorts; but the past growth in the young 
population now shows up as a rapid expansion of the labor force. Since the younger popu-
lation is no longer surging, but the past growth has not yet produced a large number of 
older (over 65) people, the ratio of workers in the prime working years to those who are 
dependent surges. Moreover, since fewer resources are needed for feeding, clothing, car-
ing for, and educating the young, more capital is available to invest in raising the produc-
tivity of those of working age. In addition, the benefits of investing in the health and edu-
cation of the very young cohorts in the first phase can now begin to pay off, as younger 
workers are healthier and better educated, and thus more productive, than the workers they 
replaced. 
Of course, this bonus is not automatic. It will fail altogether if the larger labor force can-
not find employment; and it will be reduced if the younger workers did not receive more 
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education and more capital per worker than the older workers that preceded them. Still, in 
most of today's mature industrial economies, the demographic bonus played a substantial 
role in boosting their economies and their productivity growth in the 1950s and 1960s; 
and it also played a similar role in boosting productivity in South Korea in the 1980s and 
1990s and in China from the 1980s to the early 2000s (Bloom et al. 2003; Cai 2009). 
In the third phase of the demographic transition, these positive trends go into reverse. 
With still diminishing mortality, though now concentrated in the later years of life, much 
of the enlarged workforce now moves into its senior years (population ageing) and the 
dependency ratio again increases. Moreover, a larger portion of the workforce will be in 
the later stages of their careers, from age 40–65. This is a period of general stagnant or 
declining productivity, compared to workers age 20–40, whose productivity generally rises 
rapidly with gains in experience and education (Lee and Mason 2011). If the fertility rate 
declines very sharply, the size of the labor force may experience an overall contraction as 
well. To some degree, these trends may be offset by rising education and capital invest-
ment of the smaller workforce, aided by the savings accumulated by late career workers as 
they save for retirement, providing a ‘second demographic bonus’ (Idem 2006). Yet as 
more and more workers enter their 60s, 70s, and 80s, and draw down their savings, more 
resources will be diverted to providing medical care and retirement support (savings and 
government pensions) for the elderly. Moreover, unlike the investments in school-age 
children and younger workers, which produce large payoffs 20 years hence when those 
workers enter the labor force and their prime productive years, the investments in main-
taining the lives, health, mobility, and entertainment of the elderly are a dead-weight loss, 
buried with the elderly a decade or two hence when they pass. These negative trends create 
a demographic ‘onus’ that, other things equal, will eventually lower the rate of productivi-
ty growth in ageing societies. 
Estimating the Effects of Ageing and Regional Differences  
in the Global Economy 
We can create a rough estimate of how much ageing and population growth in different 
regions will contribute to global economic growth in the next 25 years (2015–2040) by 
looking at likely rates of productivity growth (in terms of gains in output per employed 
persons) in various regions, and multiplying that by the projected increase in the labor 
force (population aged 15–64) in those regions. Of course, the actual percentage employed 
will depend on labor force participation and rates of unemployment. But for simplicity we 
assume that labor force participation will not change dramatically in the next 15 years and 
that unemployment will be cyclical around an equilibrium rate, so that fluctuations will 
cancel out over a 15-year period. These two assumptions ensure that the employed popula-
tion will be a constant proportion of the working age population (labor force), and so the 
growth rate in employed population over the period will be the same as the growth rate of 
the labor force. 
However, while the employed population may grow in line with labor force, if a popula-
tion is ageing then a larger proportion of those employed will be aged 40 or above, and 
hence will not contribute to increasing productivity. I have chosen to enter this effect in a 
very simple, but transparent and easy to calculate way, by reducing the rate of productivity 
growth as the median age of the population increases. If we assume (as is the likely equi-
librium for advanced industrial societies) an age pyramid in which all cohorts are the same 
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size, then the number of workers aged 20–39 will be the same for each age. If a one-year 
increase in the median age pushes the last cohort to age 40, that will reduce the number of 
workers aged 20–39 by .05 per cent. So I approximate the impact of ageing on productivi-
ty growth by reducing the gains in productivity per employed worker (which are assumed 
to be provided entirely by gains to experience and education in those under 40) by .05 per 
cent for every year increase in the population median age from 2015 to 2040. 
For example, for Europe – as for the other mature industrial economies – I assume that 
productivity per employed person will continue to grow at a basic rate, driven by capital 
investment and education growth, at the same level that has prevailed for the last 30 years, 
namely 2 per cent per annum. However, I reduce this by a quarter, as the median age in 
Europe is projected to grow by 4.9 years from 2015 to 2040 (UN Population Division 
2012), and 4.9 x .05 = .245. In addition, the labor force in Europe is expected to shrink 
significantly, by .51 per cent per year, for a total reduction of 12 per cent in 2015–2040. 
Multiplying these figures produces an expected economic growth rate, taking account of 
productivity growth, labor force change, and population ageing, of 1.23 per cent per year 
for this period. Starting from Europe's GDP in 2014, and using this growth rate to project 
GDP in 2040, and repeating these calculations for every other region, allows us to calcu-
late Europe's expected contribution to total global GDP increase over this quarter century. 
I have divided the world into a variety of economic regions. Europe, the USA and Can-
ada, Japan, and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) are assumed to be mature industrial 
economies with base productivity growth rates of 2 per cent per year. Russia and the Former 
Soviet Union Countries, however, are seen as likely to grow more slowly, due to the con-
straints that centralized authority and strict information controls will put on their ability to 
transition to innovation and knowledge-based economies. I assume their base productivity 
growth rate will be 1 per cent per year. (If Russia continues to be afflicted by ultra-low oil 
prices and international sanctions, as it is currently, even that may be optimistic.) 
Other regions are assumed to still have much higher growth rates, as they are still ben-
efitting from the first or second demographic bonus. Thus, I assume that China will still 
enjoy annual gains in productivity per employed person of 6 per cent, due to continued 
shifts to employment requiring higher education, greater investments of capital per work-
er, and further urbanization. I assume India will have productivity gains almost as high, of 
5.5 per cent (representing its most recent rate). Sub-Saharan Africa is also assumed to have 
a productivity growth rate of at least 5 per cent, as it enters the first demographic dividend 
(although that will depend on its currently stalled fertility starting to decline [Guengant 
and May 2013]). 
For other regions that are not yet mature industrial economies, but no longer low-
development countries, I assume an annual rate of productivity increase of 4 per cent (4.2 per 
cent for Indonesia as that is its most recent rate); these areas include Latin America and Asia 
outside of China, India, Indonesia and Japan. For the Middle East and North Africa, I as-
sume a slightly lower rate of productivity growth, given the ravages of the Arab Revolu-
tions of 2011 and the ongoing civil wars still plaguing the region. 
Most of these areas will still enjoy a rapid growth of their labor forces in this period 
(UN Population Division). Using the UN's medium estimates, these rates range from  
a high of 2.75 per cent per year in sub-Saharan Africa to just 0.32 per cent per year in the 
US and Canada. However, every region on earth is now experiencing some measure of 
population ageing. Interestingly, the fastest rises in median age are not in the ‘already old’ 
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areas of Europe or Japan. The rate of ageing is highest in China and Latin America, fol-
lowed by other areas of Asia. Ageing is lowest in areas of still relatively high population 
growth (sub-Saharan Africa) or areas of high immigration (US and Canada, and Oceania). 
With these estimates, the overall rate of growth of the world's economy is 3.1 per cent; 
about the same as the world experienced from 1990 to 2012 (World Bank 2014). However, 
some people may find a sustained productivity growth rate for sub-Saharan Africa of 5 per 
cent excessively optimistic (Rodrik 2014). Given the increase in population and minimal 
ageing, SS Africa's economy is projected to grow at 7.7 per cent per year in this model, the 
highest of any region. While growth has been strong recently, this is still well above  
the level of growth in most African nations. And as there is no sign that Africa's fertility is 
declining (Guengant and May 2013), the projected demographic bonus may not arise. We 
can run the model again with assumed lower productivity growth rates for sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
The results are interesting, even dropping Africa's annual productivity increase to 2 per 
cent only drops its growth rate to 4.63 per cent; this implies that much of Africa's recent 
5 per cent per year growth rates are due to labor force gains rather than productivity im-
provements (World Bank 2014). What is more, the impact on global economic growth is 
minimal, dropping from 3.1 to 2.96 per cent. This is because Africa's contribution to glob-
al GDP is so small, changes in its growth rate have a minimal impact on total global 
growth rates. But that means Africa cannot play the role of the ‘next China’ anytime soon. 
Perhaps after 2040; but in the next 15 years if there is a major slowdown in China's output, 
there is no way that growth in Africa can compensate. 
We can see that by running the model with changes in China's growth rate. In the base pro-
jection, China's productivity is set to grow at 6 per cent per year, but rapid ageing and a sharp 
decline in the labor force, second only to Japan, reduce the net expected growth rate to only 
4.92 per cent per year. If China's productivity grows instead by 5 per cent a year, its new 
growth falls to 3.93 per cent per year. That has a modest impact on global economic 
growth, which declines only from 3.1 per cent to 2.94 per cent. But for growth in Africa to 
offset that decline and restore global growth rates to 3.1 per cent, African productivity per 
person would have to increase by 7 per cent per year, leading to sustained annual growth 
rates of 9.75 per cent. In other words, Africa can offset a growth decline in China, but only 
if it grows just as rapidly as China did during its boom years. 
The same is true of India. If China's productivity growth averages only 5 per cent in 
this period, India's productivity would have to increase by 7.5 per cent per annum (a net 
growth rate of 8 per cent per year) to keep global economic growth at 3 per cent. 
The biggest gains to the world economy would, naturally, come from boosting output 
in the biggest regional economies, namely those of Europe and North America. If Europe 
or the US/Canada increased their annual productivity gains to 3 per cent per year, the 
world economy would grow by about 3.3 per cent per year. If both could achieve such 
productivity gains, the world growth rate would be 3.5 per cent, despite demographic age-
ing and work force changes. 
At the same time, this simulation shows how difficult it will be to achieve a 4 per cent 
rate of global economic growth, a rate commonly seen or exceeded prior to 1980. In order 
to boost global growth rates to 4 per cent per year in 2015–2040, given global demograph-
ic trends, here is what must happen: annual productivity gains per employed worker of 
3 per cent in both Europe and North America; of 7 per cent per annum in China; of 8 per 
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cnt per annum in India, of 5 per cent per annum in Latin American and other Asia, and 
6 per cent per year in sub-Saharan Africa. Is this possible? Perhaps – with optimum educa-
tion and investment in Africa and India, China's economy stabilizing at an overall growth 
rate of 6 per cent for the next 25 years, and Latin America boosting its growth rate to ‘mir-
acle’ levels of sustained 5+ per cent growth. In addition, new technological marvels (3D-
printing, driverless cars, commercial drones, etc.) would have to boost productivity gains 
in Europe and North America back to the 3 per cent per year levels not seen for several 
decades.  
The Future will be Different 
These projections seem highly optimistic. It is more likely that we are simply entering  
a wholly different world than we experienced prior to 1980. In the immediate post-WWII 
decades, several factors strongly promoted global growth. First, population growth was 
rapid in the largest and most productivity-advancing regions, namely Europe and the Unit-
ed States. Second, movements of population out of agriculture to the cities and into manu-
facturing were easy and widespread in Asia and Latin America (and in China after 1980, 
where urbanization and growth had previously been suppressed under Mao Zedong's strict 
communist regime). Third, the development of globalized production and trade stimulated 
markets around the world and created greater efficiencies in the distribution of capital and 
production. But these advances have now spread to most of the world, and their potential 
for further rapid growth is diminished. In addition, the world's largest economies – the USA 
and Europe – are now experiencing much reduced labor force growth or even decline, in 
addition to slower productivity increases. Global growth of 3 per cent per year may be the 
‘new normal’ as far as the next quarter century is concerned. 
Even Africa, despite its enormous potential for a demographic dividend and increased 
movement of population from rural work to urban manufacturing, will not be able to boost 
global economic growth back to 4 per cent on its numerous shoulders. At best, growth in 
Africa should just offset declining growth rates in China. If we use the model to ask – 
what growth rate in Africa would be necessary to raise the global growth rate to 4 per cent, 
if all other regions experience the baseline growth rate, the answer is that sub-Saharan Af-
rica would have to enjoy 25 years of sustained growth of 15 per cent per year, based on 
productivity gains of 12 per cent per year. That is a rate never sustained even by China 
with its strong government, internal peace, excellent education, and access to rapidly ex-
panding export markets in 1980–2010; and is extremely unlikely to be reached by a divid-
ed, poorly governed, and under-educated Africa. Those who saw 4 per cent global eco-
nomic growth as ‘normal’ in the 1960s and 1970s are unlikely to see that return in their 
lifetimes. 
Still, 3 per cent annual growth need not be unpleasant. With global population growth 
slowing sharply, projected to increase only from 7.32 to 9.04 billion in this period, for an 
annual increase of under a per cent per year that still leaves plenty of room for per capita 
income growth. The real question will be how that net growth is distributed. If most of the 
world's population enjoys a real annual income increase of 2 cent per annum, the future 
may look bright, with real incomes doubling each generation. But if, as in recent years, 
most of those gains go to a small fraction of the global population (Piketty 2014), progress 
for most people will be minimal. The problem is that there is not enough growth to go 
around; concentrating gains at the same time that global growth is slowing will likely cre-
ate a new world politically, as well as economically, in the coming decades. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. A Simple Model of Contributions to Global Economic Growth, Adjusting for 
Labor Force Growth and Aging, 2015–2040 
 
Productivity 
Growth 
Labor Force 
Growth 
2015–2040 
Labor 
Force 
Aging 
Factor 
GDP 
Growth 
rate GDP 
2014 
Total 
Growth 
2015–
2040 
GDP 2040 
% per year 
for 25 years Avg.   Total 
(increase 
in median 
age*.05) 
2015–
2040 
Europe 2 1.640606 –0.51 % 0.88 –0.25 % 1.23 % 17891 1.357856 24293 
US+ 
Canada 
2 1.640606 0.32 % 1.083 –0.14 % 2.19 % 18022 1.717772 30958 
Japan 2 1.640606 –1.01 % 0.776 –0.33 % 0.64 % 5733 1.172135 6720 
Russia + 
FSU 
1 1.282432 –0.32 % 0.923 –0.24 % 0.44 % 2298 1.116069 2565 
China 6 4.291871 –0.52 % 0.877 –0.50 % 4.92 % 8062 3.324825 26805 
India 5.5 3.813392 0.86 % 1.24 –0.36 % 6.03 % 2097 4.320919 9061 
Indonesia 4.2 2.797003 0.66 % 1.18 –0.36 % 4.52 % 901 3.019693 2721 
Other  
Asia 
4 2.665836 0.70 % 1.19 –0.38 % 4.33 % 3973 2.887944 11474 
Latin 
America 
4 2.665836 0.56 % 1.15 –0.44 % 4.13 % 5970 2.749152 16412 
MENA 3 2.093778 1.24 % 1.36 –0.32 % 3.95 % 3767 2.63157 9913 
Oceania 2 1.640606 0.99 % 1.28 –0.16 % 2.85 % 1476 2.020097 2982 
SS Africa 5 3.386355 2.75 % 1.97 –0.17 % 7.70 % 1552 6.393306 9922 
          
WORLD      3.10 % 71742 2.144149 153826 
 
 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 2016 119–138 
 
 
Global Population Ageing, the Sixth  
Kondratieff Wave, and the Global  
Financial System* 
 
Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev 
 
 
The present paper analyzes some aspects of the population ageing and its im-
portant consequences for particular societies and the whole world. Basing on this 
analysis, we can draw a conclusion that the future technological breakthrough is 
likely to take place in the 2030s (which we define as the final phase of the Cyber-
netic Revolution). In the 2020s – 2030s we will expect the upswing of the forthcom-
ing sixth Kondratieff wave, which will introduce the sixth technological paradigm 
(system). All those revolutionary technological changes will be connected, first of 
all, with breakthroughs in medicine and related technologies. We also present our 
ideas about the financial instruments that can help to solve the problem of pension 
provision for an increasing elderly population in the developed countries. We think 
that a more purposeful use of pension funds' assets together with an allocation 
(with necessary guarantees) of the latter into education and upgrading skills of 
young people in developing countries, perhaps, can partially solve the indicated 
problem in the developed states. 
Keywords: the sixth Kondratieff wave, the sixth technological paradigm, Cybernet-
ic Revolution, population ageing, world finance, pension funds, human capital, de-
veloped countries, developing countries. 
Human capital is one of the most important drivers of economic development whose con-
tribution to the growth of production and innovations is constantly increasing. According 
to the OECD definition, human capital is ‘the knowledge, skills, competencies and attrib-
utes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic 
well-being’ (OECD 2001: 18; see also Kapelyushnikov 2012: 6–7). Human capital is central 
to debates about welfare, education, health care, and retirement. However, we think that the 
latter (i.e., retirement) is less frequently debated than it should be. Meanwhile, in the West 
the rapid population ageing actually devaluates the national human capital in every devel-
oped country. There are certain grounds to expect that if the ageing generation is not substi-
tuted by a more numerous generation of young specialists, the share of the elderly population 
will increase and the human capital is likely to decline. 
Thus, while the human capital as well as its contribution to the economic development 
is significantly larger in the developed countries than in the developing ones, the situation 
with demographic structure of human capital is different. The developing countries' situa-
tion is significantly better at this point, and this can increasingly contribute to the econom-
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ic competition between the First and Third worlds. We should also take into consideration 
the fact that the generation of highly educated pensioners in the developed states has in-
creased the demands on society and they play a more active political role than the genera-
tion of uneducated ‘old men’ in the developing countries. While the West has apparently 
depleted its demographic dividend, many developing countries, in fact, are only in the pro-
cess of its accumulation. And consequently, in this context they can get the most important 
advantage in the coming decades (see Fig. 1).  
This also confirms the idea of growing convergence between the developed and de-
veloping countries that we adhere to, as the current differences in the demographic struc-
ture and potentialities of the demographic dividend will contribute to the fact that at least 
in the next two decades the developing countries' growth rates will be on average higher 
than those of the developed countries, although this process can proceed with certain inter-
ruptions (see Grinin 2013а, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2015; Korotayev and Khaltourina 2009; 
Khaltourina and Korotayev 2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina, Malkov et al. 2010; Korotayev 
and Bozhevolnov 2010; Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2010; Malkov, Korotayev and Bozhevolnov 
2010; Malkov et al. 2010; Korotayev, Zinkina et al. 2011a; 2011b, 2012; Korotayev and 
de Munck 2013, 2014; Zinkina et al. 2014; Korotayev and Zinkina 2014; Korotayev, 
Goldstone, and Zinkina 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2014a, 2014b, 2015а).  
 
Fig. 1. The dynamics of the working age population percentage in the total popula-
tion, 1950–2015, according to the UN medium forecast to 2100 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
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Problems of Population Ageing and Their Possible Solutions  
The population ageing (and an increasing number of disabled people) as well as the 
change in the population age structure (see Figs 2–5) alongside with forthcoming progress 
in medicine, innovation technologies, and increasing life expectancy in the developed 
countries will also bring great problems associated with a) the scarcity of labor resources; 
and b) problems of pension support for the older population.  
In some countries they are rather acute already today, but they are to become much 
more pressing. 
 
Fig. 2. Dynamics of the expected lifetime at birth (years) in the developed and  
developing countries, 1950–2015, the UN medium forecast to 2050  
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Dynamics of the median age of population (years) in the developed and de-
veloping countries, 1950–2015, with the medium forecast of the UN till 
2030  
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
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We would like to remind that if the median age of population of a given country equals, 
for example, 40 years, it means that half of the population of this country is younger than 
40 years, and the other one is older.  
 
Fig. 4. Increasing number of persons of retirement age (over 65), 1950–2015, with 
the UN medium forecast till 2050 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
As is shown above, a rapid global increase in the number of retirement-age persons is ex-
pected just in the next 20 years when their number will actually double within a small his-
torical period, thus it will increase almost by 600 million and the total number will consid-
erably exceed a billion. 
However, a rapid acceleration will be observed in particular as regards the population 
of people aged 80 years or more. While by 2050 the number of persons of retirement age 
will approximately double, the number of elderly people aged 80 years or more will prac-
tically quadruple, and in comparison with 1950 their number by 2075 will increase almost 
by 50 times (see Fig. 5).  
 
Fig. 5. Increase of global number of elderly people (aged 80 years), 1950–2015, 
with the UN average forecast till 2075  
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
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The First World countries will face particular difficulties in the next 20–30 years due to  
a rapid increase in the number of retirement-age people accompanied with an accelerated 
reduction of the active working age population, and in 20 years the number of the former 
will exceed the number of the latter (see Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6. Dynamics of active working-age (25–49 years) population and number of 
persons of retirement age (aged over 60) in the more developed countries 
of the world,1 in millions, 2000–2015, with the medium forecast of the UN 
for the period till 2040 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
As one can notice, the number of older people per a working age adult will increase. This 
is very likely to lead to the decline in living standards and to the increasing tension be-
tween generations. 
One should keep in mind that the older population will form a major part of voters, 
thus making the politicians to follow their will. Besides, the highly educated generation of 
pensioners in the advanced countries has certain demanding social requirements and they 
are more politically active than the generation of uneducated old people in the developing 
states. The transition to such a sort of gerontocracy also poses many other threats to a so-
ciety and to its homogeneity because older people are more apt to conservatism and are 
less inclined to purchase expensive products, novelties and property, as well as to saving 
and this may reduce the focus on innovation and lead to considerable change of the con-
temporary economic model based on the expansion of consumerism. In particular, the 
population ageing in Japan is one of the reasons of the current deflationary trend (for more 
details see Grinin and Korotayev 2014c, 2015b). 
In theoretical terms, it is possible to distinguish the following possible solutions for 
the specified problems (here we suppose that all those solutions will be applied, whereas 
none of them can solve the problem comprehensively):  
1. To increase the number of immigrants in the developed countries. Still the opportu-
nities of this pattern are to a large extent depleted and besides, it leads to the erosion of the 
society's major ethno-cultural basis (today we face serious challenges in this direction). 
                                                          
1 More developed countries/regions according to the UN classification.  
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2. To raise the retirement age (together with active rehabilitation of the disabled peo-
ple). Against the background of the forthcoming revolution in medical and rehabilitating 
technologies this looks like an important (although insufficient) resource. 
3. The development of labor-saving technologies, in particular robot techniques for 
nursing, as well as elder and disabled people care (for more details see Grinin L. E. and 
Grinin A. L. 2015а, 2015b; Grinin A. L. and Grinin L. E. 2015b). This will allow a partial 
reduction of expenses for care and different services, but it can hardly bring a complete solu-
tion of the problem of scarce resources. 
4. Finally, the development of the financial system opens another path to the solution of 
problems with the pension system. The population ageing is directly related to the financial 
system not only within national systems, but within the global financial system as well. Due 
to the increasing number of retirees the pension savings have become not simply important, 
but essential to a certain extent. Besides, we should note that, on the one hand, today pension 
and other social funds are not isolated only within a framework of national system, but make 
an important component of the world finance in the long run. On the other hand, stable pen-
sion system substantially depends on the stable and efficient global financial system, even to 
a greater extent than on the national one.  
In the present article we will consider the second and the third directions in the solution 
of the problem of global population ageing which are closely interconnected, and then we 
will pass to consideration of the fourth (financial) one. 
Global Population Ageing and the Sixth Technological Paradigm  
The Cybernetic Revolution is a great breakthrough from industrial production to produc-
tion and services based on the operation of self-regulating systems. Its initial phase dates 
back to the 1950–1990s. The breakthroughs occurred in the spheres of automation, energy 
production, synthetic materials, space technologies, exploration of space and sea, agricul-
ture, and especially in the development of electronic control facilities, communication and 
information. We assume that the final phase will begin in the nearest decades, that is in the 
2030s or a bit later, and will last until the 2070s. 
We denote the initial phase of the Cybernetic Revolution as a scientific-information 
one, and the final – as a phase of self-regulating systems. So now we are in its moderniza-
tion phase which will probably last until the 2030s. This intermediate phase is a period of 
rapid diffusion and improvement of the innovations made at the previous phase (e.g., com-
puters, internet, cell phones, etc.). The technological and social conditions are also pre-
pared for the future breakthrough. We suppose that the final phase of the Cybernetic Revo-
lution will lead to the emergence of many various self-regulating systems (for more detail 
see Grinin 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013d; Grinin A. L. and Grinin L. E. 2013, 2015a, 2015c; 
Grinin L. E. and Grinin A. L. 2015a, 2015c).  
So we expect the beginning of the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution in the 
2030s and 2040s. We assume that this technological breakthrough at first will be connect-
ed with a breakthrough in the field of new medical (and related to them) technologies. 
Thus, the increasing process of population ageing (as we will show further) will become 
one of the most important reasons of development of the final phase of Cybernetic Revolu-
tion. 
This phase, according to our forecasts, will be imposed on the sixth Kondratieff wave 
(which will probably last from the 2020s to the 2060s). Therefore, the sixth technological 
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paradigm (known also as technological system or style)2 will be connected with major trans-
formations of the Cybernetic Revolution. We consider the widespread ideas that the basis of 
the sixth technological paradigm will be formed by the NBIC technologies (or NBIC-
convergence), which are nano-bio-information and cognitive technologies (see Lynch 2004; 
Dator 2006; Pride and Korotayev 2008; Akaev 2010, 2011; see also Fukuyama 2002)3 to 
be only partially true. We believe that the basis of the sixth technological paradigm will be 
significantly wider. In general medicine, bio- and nanotechnologies, robotics, information 
and cognitive technologies will become the leading technological trends. They will create a 
complex system of self-regulated production. We could define this complex as MBNRIC-
technologies, by the first letters of the listed technological directions. Thus, it makes sense to 
speak about medicine as the central element of the new technological system (see also 
Nefiodow 1996; Nefiodow L. and Nefiodow S. 2014). Medicine more than any other field 
has unique opportunities for merging all these new technologies into a single system. Be-
sides, a number of demographic and economic reasons explain why this is precisely medi-
cine that should start the transition to the new technological paradigm. 
This will be supported by particularly advantageous situation developing by 2030 in 
economy, demography, culture, a standard of living, etc. that will define a huge need for sci-
entific and technological breakthrough. By advantageous situation, we do not mean that eve-
rything will be perfectly good in economy; just on the contrary, everything will be not as 
good as it could be. Advantageous conditions will be created because reserves and resources 
for continuation of previous trends will be exhausted, and at the same time the requirements 
of currently developed and developing societies will increase. Consequently, one will search 
for new developmental patterns. 
Let us describe the background. 
• By this time the problem of population ageing will show up to the full (for more de-
tail see the previous section). Moreover, this issue can turn simply fatal for democracies in 
developed countries (because the main electorate will be represented by elderly cohorts, 
and also the generation gap will increase [see also Fukuyama 2002]). In addition, the prob-
lem of population ageing will become more acute in a number of developing countries, for 
example, in China and even in India to a certain extent (about ageing in Asia see contribu-
tions of Park and Shin to this volume). 
• The pension payments will become an urgent problem (as the number of retirees per 
an employee will increase) and at the same time the scarcity of labor resources will in-
crease, which is already felt rather strongly in a number of countries including Russia (for 
more details see Grinin and Korotayev 2015c, 2010; Korotayev and Bozhevolnov 2012; 
Korotayev, Khaltourina, and Bozhevolnov 2011; Arkhangelsky et al. 2014; Korotayev et 
al. 2015). Thus, the problem of scarce labor and pension contributions will have to be 
solved in such a way that people physically could work for ten, fifteen and even more years 
(certainly here we can also face a number of social problems). This also implies the disabled 
people's adaptation for their fuller involvement into labor process due to new technical 
means and achievements in medicine (for more details see Grinin L. E. and Grinin A. L. 
2015b).4 
                                                          
2 Within this approach every Kondratieff wave is associated with a certain leading sector (or leading sectors), techno-
logical system or technological style (see Korotayev and Grinin 2012; Perez 2002, 2010). For example, the third 
Kondratieff wave is sometimes characterized as ‘the age of steel, electricity, and heavy engineering. The fourth wave 
takes in the age of oil, the automobile and mass production. Finally, the current fifth wave is described as the age of 
information and telecommunications’ (Papenhausen 2008: 789).  
3 There are also researchers (Jotterand 2008) who consider GRAIN (Genomics, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Nano-
technology) to be the leading set of the technological directions in the future. 
4 About the influence of ageing on growth rates see the papers of Goldstone and Park and Shin in this volume. 
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• Simultaneously, by this time, the birth rate in many developing countries will signifi-
cantly drop (for example, such developing countries as China, Iran, or Thailand already ex-
perience below-replacement fertility). Therefore, the respective governments will begin (and 
some of them have already started) worrying generally not about the problem of restriction 
of population growth, but about promotion of population growth and population health. 
• A huge volume of medical services in the world makes about 10 per cent of the GDP 
(and in a number of developed countries it makes more than 10 per cent, as, for example, 
in the USA – 17 per cent [calculated on the basis of World Bank 2015 data]). The popula-
tion ageing will make these volumes grow rather significantly.5 
• The development in the Third World countries leads to the growth of a vast stratum 
of middle class, while poverty and illiteracy are reduced. As a result, the emphasis of these 
countries' efforts will shift from the elimination of unbearable living conditions to im-
provement of the quality of life, health care, etc. Thus, large opportunities open up for the 
development of medicine which will get additional funds.  
So by the 2030s, the number of middle-aged and elderly people will increase; econo-
my will desperately need additional labor resources while the state will be interested in 
increasing the working ability of elderly people, whereas the population of wealthy and 
educated people will grow in a rather significant way. In other words, the unique condi-
tions for the stimulation of business, science and the state to make a breakthrough in the 
field of medicine will emerge, and just these unique conditions are necessary to start the 
innovative phase of revolution! 
It is extremely important to note that enormous financial resources will be accumulated 
for the technological breakthrough, such as: the pension money whose volume will increase at 
high rates; spending of governments on medical and social needs; growing expenses of the 
ageing population on supporting health, and also on health of growing world middle-class. All 
this can provide initial large investments, high investment appeal of respective venture projects 
and long-term high demand for innovative products, that is, a full set of favorable conditions 
for a powerful technological breakthrough will become available.  
In the context of population ageing problem we will consider some characteristics of the 
global financial system. 
The Crisis and the Characteristics of the Financial System  
The 2008 crisis and subsequent years aggravated both financial and economic, as well as 
some global social problems. One of the most important problems among them is the 
problem of secure social guarantees for rapid ageing population of the World System core. 
In each country the security of these guarantees is connected with stability of the world 
financial system. 
Let us recollect some important reasons of the global financial economic crisis:  
 Random and extremely rapid development of new financial centers and financial flows;  
 Non-transparency of many financial instruments, which led to the actual conceal-
ment of risks and their global underestimation; 
 An excessive level of public debt in many developed and developing countries 
combined with ineffective use of credits.  
They often also say that modern financial technologies are fundamentally deleterious 
and only bring the world economy into various troubles and that they are only beneficial to 
                                                          
5 Some studies find that health care costs of patients aged 75–84 years are almost twice as large as the costs of 65– 
74 years old patients; and the expenses on patients of the 85+ age group increase by more than three times in compar-
ison with the latter (Alemayehu and Warner 2004; Fuchs 1998). The cost of home care and short-term stay in the 
hospital also to a large degree depends on the patients' age (Liang et al. 1996).  
Grinin and Korotayev • Global Population Ageing 127
the financiers and speculators. Thus, it would hardly be an exaggeration to maintain that 
the global crisis, as well as other events, has demonstrated, in an especially salient way, 
the necessity for major changes in the regulation of international economic activities and 
movements of world financial flows.  
Nevertheless, we believe that it is reasonable to speak not only about the negative role of 
the world financial flows. On the whole, new financial technologies decrease the risks in a 
rather effective way and expand opportunities to attract and accumulate enormous capitals, 
involve actors, and penetrate markets.  
The positive effects of the new financial technologies consist in the following: 
1. A powerful expansion of the range of financial instruments and products, which 
leads to the expanding opportunities to choose the most convenient financial instrument.  
2. The standardization of financial instruments and products provides a considerable 
time-saving for those who use financial instruments; it makes it possible to purchase fi-
nancial securities without a detailed analysis of particular stocks; this leads to an increase 
in the number of participants by an order of magnitude. 
3. The institutionalization of the ways to minimize individual risks. Some financial in-
novations and new regulations help to minimize both the individual risks of unfulfilled 
deals and also of bankruptcies in the framework of certain stock markets. 
4. The increase in the number of participants and centers for the trade of financial in-
struments. Modern financial instruments have made it possible to include a great number 
of people via various special programs, mediators, and structures.  
We also suppose that new financial technologies and modern financial sector have al-
so got such important positive functions as the ‘insurance’ of social guaranties at the glob-
al scale. The matter is that the rejection of the gold standard resulted in the movement of 
the function of the protection of savings from an ‘independent’ guarantor (i.e., precious 
metals) to the state. However, there was no state left for the capital owners to entirely rely 
on as on a perfectly secure guarantor. 
The absence of secure guarantees is especially important in terms of the ways to pre-
serve pension and other social funds.  
The sharp increase in the quantity of capitals, the necessity to preserve them from in-
flation and to find their profitable application objectively pushed the financial market ac-
tors to look for new forms of financial activities. Generally, the faster are the movements 
and transformations of financial objects, the better is the preservation of capitals.  
Another important point is the distribution of risks at the global scale. We observe grow-
ing opportunities to distribute risks among a larger number of participants and countries, to 
transform a relatively small number of initial financial objects into a very large number of 
financial products. This makes it possible to achieve the maximum diversification by allow-
ing people to choose convenient forms of financial products and to change them whenever 
necessary. 
The next point is the growth of financial specialization (including various forms of 
deposit insurance) that supports diversification and the possibilities for expansion.  
In 2010, there was one pensioner per four working-age adults, whereas in 2025, ac-
cording to the forecasts of the UN Population Division there will be less than three work-
ing-age adults per a pensioner in the developed countries, and there exist even more pes-
simistic forecasts (see Fig. 7). Who will fill the pension funds in the future? Who will ful-
fill the social obligations with respect to hundreds of millions of elderly voters?  
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Fig. 7. Dynamics of number of pensioners aged 65 and older, per 100 working age 
adults aged 25–64 years in developed countries, 1985–2050 with medium 
forecast of UN for the period till 2050 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
Here one should take into account that most pension funds are concentrated not in the state 
pension funds, but in thousands of private (non-state) pension funds (OECD 2014b) that 
rather actively search for the most secure and profitable investments. The amounts of 
money concentrated in pension and other funds are enormous: dozens trillion US dollars 
(see, e.g., Shtefan 2008; OECD 2014a; 2014b, 2015; see also Fig. 8).  
 
Fig. 8. Amounts of capital accumulated in the countries of OECD by 2013 by the 
main types of institutional investors (in trillions US Dollars)  
Source: OECD 2014b: 7.  
In 2012, the accumulations in pension funds of the OECD countries amounted 77.1 per cent 
of their GDP, but in 2013 this indicator grew to 84.2 per cent (OECD 2014b: 7).  
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Fig. 9. Assets under management of various types of funds 
Source: The Economist 2008.  
Meanwhile, in the developing countries we observe a huge number of young adults; and it 
is extremely difficult to provide all of them with jobs and education (see Fig. 10).  
  
Fig. 10. Young population (aged 15–24 years old) of more and less developed re-
gions, mlns, 1950–2015 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
It is difficult or even impossible to solve this task without active integration of the periph-
eral economies into the World System economy as well as without diffusion of capitals 
and technologies from the World System core; in its turn, such integration cannot be 
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achieved without the development of the world financial system. The situation favors this 
in some respects because the number of pensioners in the developing countries is still rela-
tively small, the social obligations with respect to them are relatively few, and only after a 
significant period of time the problem of the pensioners' support will become acute in 
those countries. 
Consequently, the point is to involve pension and other social funds in boosting the 
developing countries' economies more actively.6 It will assist the latter to provide jobs and 
education for the young people at present and will multiply the funds in the future. In this 
case under certain agreements between developed and developing countries it will be pos-
sible to achieve a situation when the rising economies will allocate some assets to support 
the growing layer of older people in the West, the latter will act as a rentier in this case 
(recently Joseph Stiglitz has expressed similar ideas [Stiglitz 2015]).  
Then, there will be no need in the direct migration of millions of young people from 
the Third World to the First one; thus, there could emerge a sort of solidarity between dif-
ferent generations of the global world. Of course, such a system will demand considerable 
measures with respect to security and reliability of such investments. But at the same time, 
it would provide a certain convergence of different countries' interests. 
Thus, we may say that: 
 The participation of pension and insurance funds in financial operations leads to the 
globalization of the social sphere.  
 The countries poor in capital, but with large cohorts of young population, are in-
volved more and more in a very important (though not quite apparent) process of support-
ing the elderly population in the West through the unification of the world financial sys-
tem, its standardization, and the search for the ways to make it more fair and socially ori-
ented. 
 Modern financial assets and flows became global and international; a considerable 
amount of money circulates within this system (though, of course, not all its participants 
make equal profits).  
 At the same time, one should realize that a considerable part of the circulating sums 
is the money from social funds (in particular from the pension ones) and their loss can lead 
to disasters with such consequences that are very difficult to predict.  
 Safe management of the global capital (in addition to its obvious economic and so-
cial merits) assures the safe future for the elderly and those who need social protection.  
 Therefore, the problem of institutional support of financial globalization becomes 
more and more important. 
Let us indicate some key points which clarify the opportunities and difficulties of 
the suggested scheme; besides, let us outline some of the most important institutional 
decisions which could help this scheme to function in practice. 
First. The pension monies play a certain role in the financial system and depend on 
well-being and normal functioning of the latter. Money from pension funds is still one of 
the major systemic components of national and world financial systems. Actually, this 
means that these are just pension funds that remain one of the leading traders buying gov-
ernment bonds, and also actively buying shares and other securities at stock markets. 
                                                          
6 It is worth noting that they already participate in this process. Thus, in the large private retirement funds surveyed in 
2014 by OECD staff, an average of 36.6 per cent of all capital were invested abroad (OECD 2014a: 15), whereas 
more than a half of the surveyed large pension funds invested a part of their capitals in developing economies (ОЕСD 
2014а: 13, 31, 43).  
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While the conservative investment policy of pension funds is quite reasonable in general, 
at the same time it makes them as well as many other subsystems of the financial system 
highly dependent on the manipulations of the Central Bank, rating agencies and other ac-
tors. Particularly, the income of pension funds has considerably decreased in recent years 
due to deflationary tendencies and low rates on the government debt securities (as the gov-
ernment pays low interests rates to pension funds on the most reliable debt bonds).  
Second. Mounting crisis phenomena in financial system are able to radically under-
mine the well-being of pension funds. The latter have actively invested in securities; there-
fore, the cost of their assets largely depends on the price of securities. On the one hand, the 
governmental authorities and exchange players wish to manipulate this cost and its artifi-
cial high price (e.g., the so-called buyback transaction of the securities by firms), and on 
the other hand, in case of crisis the assets' slump can be quite serious. For example, while 
in 2007 the asset value of US pension funds amounted to 78.0 per cent of the American 
GDP, during the crisis in 2008 it dropped to 59.6 per cent of GDP. The situation returned 
to pre-crisis level only in 2013 (OECD 2015: Funded Pensions Indicators: Occupational 
pension funds' assets as a per cent of GDP); in other words, pension contributions have 
become entirely dependent on the economic situation. Therefore, we need some mecha-
nisms of preserving accumulations, including the opportunity to lean on the world finan-
cial system. 
Third. As we have said earlier, today the secure preservation of the value of accumu-
lated funds depends on the speed of their circulation. However, finances do not exist by 
themselves, they can hardly break from the production base for a long time and has to rely 
on real production (the increasing separation of the financial system from production is 
one of the main problems of the current situation which is largely supported by the mone-
tary doctrine). Thus, we face the necessity of driving the finances (and pension money) be-
yond national borders. Especially at present, since the production is rather actively moved to 
the developing countries. Therefore, no wonder that many pension funds invest into emerg-
ing markets to increase their income (OECD 2014a: 15). Only few funds do not invest in 
foreign assets, while some, on the contrary, invest a large amount of their capital abroad 
(Ibid.). Certainly, the foreign investments do not always imply investments into develop-
ing countries. Nevertheless, some investments are made, and thus, the proposed scheme 
already functions in a certain way. But we can face several serious problems. First, this is 
most often ‘short’, in fact, speculative money, whereas generally these are long-term 
investments that can serve a real source of economic development and income. Second, 
this money is almost the first to leave the emerging markets because of their volatility 
(not least connected with the policy of FRS and ECB) and fully justified conservatism of 
pension funds; and this also increases the volatility. Third, the emerging markets certain-
ly offer less guarantees than the developed ones, and therefore, the cautiousness of the 
funds is fully justified. 
Fourth. For an effective functioning of the proposed scheme some high-level agree-
ments are necessary. Here various forms could be used, for example, investment of money 
of pension funds in the assets of such largest international financial institutions, as the 
IMF, WB, ADB, etc. These investments would be non-voting, but the money would be 
much securer there, and special obligations could guarantee that these funds would be al-
located to increase the level of education and qualification of young people in the develop-
ing countries. 
It would be quite reasonable to develop some global organizations for the sake of co-
operation between pension and other funds, as well as establishing common insurance 
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funds that will make it possible to support countries in case of a crisis. One could establish 
an International Pension Fund or something of the kind which would realize financial 
transfers so that the assets of the ‘older’ population of some countries could help to raise 
the economy in the countries with ‘young’ population and to accumulate funds for donor 
countries for the future. Some specific arrangements between countries with certain guar-
antees for safety of funds would seem rather appropriate. In brief, there could be many 
options. But the main problem is that despite the fast population ageing, the versions of 
global solution for the problem are poorly considered. 
The Russian philosopher, Alexander Zinoviev, deported to Germany in the 1970s, quite 
accurately described the Western society as a society of monetary totalitarianism (Zinoviev 
2003) where the mechanism, realizing and preserving it, had reached enormous scales and 
had become one of the most important pillars of the society. This mechanism had formed in 
the period of the gold standard and after its cancellation the scale of financial economy had 
grown tremendously, having spread all over the world. In fact, a new huge sector of financial 
services has emerged which in some countries amounts to 25–30 per cent of their GDP. But 
the importance of this sector will increase in almost all countries, and will also involve their 
most important social functions.  
Hence, the issue of the institutional support of the financial globalization becomes 
more and more important. We can speak about an extraordinary importance of the reliabil-
ity and controllability of this system. Its changes should include the increasing coordina-
tion between governments and unified international legislation which regulates financial 
activities and movements. Besides, one should take into account that today the developed 
countries generally get more benefits from this system and constantly use it to solve their 
national issues (thus, affecting the whole world) and also they willingly use it as a means 
to impact other countries' economies.   
We suppose that important guarantees for the future Western pensioners will consist 
in the development pattern of the global economy which should transform into a single 
organism. Thus, the global financial system would become strong but will be used neither 
to get the developing countries under control nor as a means to collapse the Third World 
countries' economies, nor as a means of unwarranted sanctions and suppression of socie-
ties and regimes which the West considers uneasy. There should occur some transfor-
mations in the global financial system that would take into account the growing econo-
mies' interests and thus allow the developing countries to more actively use the social 
funds accumulated by the West. And at the same time, this will prevent certain govern-
ments from expropriating the invested funds.   
Actually, the world needs a new system of financial-economic regulation at the global 
scale. 
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Russia is currently experiencing a financial crisis, due to international sanctions 
coupled with a decline in oil prices. The length and consequences of this period of 
turmoil are unpredictable, but it will surely have a visible negative impact on cru-
cial socio-demographic indicators. Recent demographic improvements have be-
come one of the most important indicators of the overall success of domestic policy 
for Vladimir Putin. In the next few years, however, Russia risks facing a repetition 
of the 1990s' demographic problems once again – with a new wave of mortality in-
creases and a new wave of fertility decline. Pressing economic issues are currently 
receiving much more attention from the Government; yet an effective anti-crisis 
strategy also requires paying attention to the seemingly ‛long-term’ demographic 
problems. Several threats to recent demographic gains have appeared with the cri-
sis. As inflation is rising, more of Russia's population is falling into poverty – and 
risks of impoverishment have traditionally been the highest for families with many 
children. As the resources available for families shrink, the recent upturn in fertili-
ty rates for second and third children may be reversed. When combined with the 
rapidly declining numbers of women in active reproductive ages (20–29 years) 
Russia is almost certain to experience a precipitous decline in fertility. In addition, 
a dramatic increase in the availability of alcohol is looming, reminiscent of the late 
1990s. In 1998 Russia experienced a very serious financial crisis accompanied by 
a jump in inflation (by 84 %) – however, the excise duty on spirits was increased 
only much more modestly, by 20 %. As a result, during a single year the relative 
value of excise duty fell by one-third, leading to dramatic cheapening of vodka and 
other spirits. Throughout the early 2000s this fall stayed uncompensated for,  
and the increases in vodka excise taxes frequently lagged behind the inflation rate. 
This caused an enormous increase in mortality in 1998–2005, when Russia 
‛additionally’ lost about two million lives. Today the recurrence of a mortality 
jump due to various initiatives on liberalizing the alcohol market is, unfortunately, 
a highly probable scenario. The Government has cancelled an earlier-planned in-
crease in the spirits excise tax, which – given the high and rising rate of inflation – 
actually means their remarkable decline. The minimum price of vodka has been 
significantly reduced since February 1, 2015. Beer is supposed to return to side-
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walk kiosks, the bans on alcohol advertising in mass media and on alcohol sales 
overnight are to be virtually lifted, etc. As a result, Russia may face a new round of 
population decline after all the recent claims of demographic victories. Even more 
sadly, this decline will probably be written off as the consequences of the economic 
difficulties, while in reality a new wave of depopulation could be averted – or, at 
least, substantially mitigated – by carefully designed and well-targeted social poli-
cy interventions (many of which are purely legislative and would not put any addi-
tional strain upon the budget). A new series of calculations performed by a team of 
researchers from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and 
Public Administration (RANEPA), the National Research University Higher 
School of Economics, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Moscow State 
University demonstrates that ‛alcohol liberalization’ coupled with the absence of  
a new set of effective family policies may provoke a new demographic collapse 
with catastrophic consequences. In order to avert this disastrous scenario, appro-
priate measures must be taken immediately. 
Keywords: demography, Russia, mathematical modeling, demographic forecasts, 
mortality, fertility, demographic policy. 
The results presented below are based on a new series of forecast estimates made in early 
2015 on the basis of the most recent data on mortality and fertility, applying the same 
method that was used for mathematical modeling of scenarios in the main text of our 
Demographic Report (Arkhangelsky et al. 2015; see also Korotayev et al. 2010; Koro-
tayev et al. 2011; Korotayev and Bogevolnov 2012; Sadovnichy et al. 2014; Arkhangelsky 
et al. 2014; Korotayev, Zinkina, and Bogevolnov 2014). 
Fig. 1 presents our population projections for Russia up to 2050 based on the inertial 
forecast scenario – i.e., with fertility and mortality rates held constant at their 2012 values, 
and with stable migration inflow at 300 thousand annually (the average rate of 
immigration in Russia according to the results of the National Population Census 2010). If 
the current rates of fertility, mortality and migration remain unchanged, Russian 
population is bound to decrease to 135–136 million by 2040 and to less than 130 million 
by 2050. At first the population decline will be relatively slow, but it will speed up after 
2025, as more women of the 1990s' ‘demographic collapse’ generation enter childbearing 
ages (Fig. 1). 
Korotayev et al. • Mathematical Modeling and Forecasting  141
 
Fig. 1. Population projection for Russia up to 2050 based on the inertial forecast 
scenario, millions  
The inertial scenario looks even grimmer when extrapolated up to 2100 (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Population projection for Russia up to 2100 based on the inertial forecast 
scenario, millions  
However, the picture is still not that bad compared to our first inertial forecast scenario, 
which we calculated in 2009 on the basis of mortality and fertility rates of mid-2000s (see, 
e.g., Korotayev et al. 2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina, and Bogevolnov 2012). Indeed, 
according to that inertial forecast Russia's population was to plunge to 111.2 million by 
2040 and to 99.5 million by 2050 (Fig. 3).  
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Fig. 3. Population projection for Russia up to 2050, millions. Based on the inertial 
forecast scenario with mid-2000s’ fertility and mortality rates  
Source: Korotayev et al. 2010: 248, Fig. 6.6. 
Thus, the latest inertial forecast projects Russia's population to be 24.5 million larger in 
2040 and 29.7 million larger in 2050 as compared to the first inertial forecast scenario. 
This higher trajectory should partially be attributed to annual net migration being revised 
from 186 to 300 thousand; however, its role is relatively modest. The main contribution to 
the difference between the two scenarios is made by very significant progress that Russia 
made in both fertility increase since 2006, and mortality reduction since 2005. 
As mentioned in the main report (Arkhangelsky et al. 2015), in 2007–2012 Russia 
enjoyed a very impressive TFR increase, from 1.3 to 1.691 children per woman (up by  
30 %), which was the fastest growth in Europe and the second fastest in the world. Russia 
moved up from the 35th to the 12th place in Europe in terms of TFR. In absolute terms, the 
number of births in 2012 was 1.902 million, exceeding the numbers of 2006 by 
422 thousand children (or 28 %). The crude birth rate for the period increased from 10.3 to 
13.3 per 1000. 
Forthcoming Demographic Catastrophe.  
‛Alco-pessimistic Scenario‛ 
The progress in mortality reduction achieved in our country since 2005 is quite significant. 
In 2005–2013 mortality went down from 2.304 million (Surinov 2013: Table 2.1) to 
1.872 million deaths per year1 (by 432 thousand deaths per year). The reduction of alcohol 
poisoning-related deaths was particularly considerable: the number of lethal intoxications 
fell from 36,000 in 2005 to 6,700 in 2014.2  
The crude death rate fell from 16.1 per thousand to 13.1 per thousand (by 19 ‰). It 
was the best performance not only in Europe, but among all the high and middle income 
countries of the world (World Bank 2015). Mortality reduction was achieved almost 
exclusively due to an increase in life expectancy in Russia, from 65.5 to 70.5 years (by  
5 years) in 2005–2012, which was again the best result among all the countries of Europe, 
                                                          
1 URL: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/demo21.xls.  
2 URL: http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1140086922125. 
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America, and Asia (World Bank 2015). Male life expectancy increased by almost six years 
(Surinov 2013: Table 2.9). The standardized mortality rate among working-age males 
decreased from 466.8 to 334.3 (almost by 30 %),3 again the best dynamics among all the 
high and middle income countries (World Bank 2015). 
These impressive results were achieved mainly through a reduction in the number of 
alcohol-related deaths, which had hugely contributed to mortality in the mid-2000s, before 
the first set of effective anti-alcohol measures was introduced in 2006.4 Alcohol caused 
excessive mortality in Russia in a variety of ways, of which fatal alcohol poisonings 
formed only a small proportion. In the mid-2000s 19 % of all deaths in Russia were caused 
by cardiovascular diseases (including heart attacks and strokes), 68 % of deaths from liver 
cirrhosis, 60 % deaths from pancreatitis, and 61 % of deaths from all external causes, 
including 67 % of murders and 50 % of suicides, were associated with alcohol (Nemtsov 
2003a, 2003b, 2009, 2011). A large proportion of deaths from pneumonia and tuberculosis 
are also alcohol-related (Son, Ten, and Pronina 2004: 41−44) because the alcohol abusers 
are more likely to contract infectious diseases and less likely to get proper treatment. In 
1998–1999 in the city of Izhevsk 62 % of males who died in the ages between 20 and 55 
had high blood alcohol content (Shkolnikov and Chervyakov 2000: 191) According to a 
large study conducted in the city of Barnaul in 1990–2004, 68 % of men and 61 % of 
women who died at the age of 15–34, as well as 60 % of men and 53 % of women who 
died at 35–69, had high blood alcohol content (Zaridze et al. 2009: 142–153). 
It is noteworthy that the mortality decrease in Russia after 2005 is very similar in its 
structure to the decline during Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign of the 1980s 
(Khaltourina and Korotayev 2006d, 2008b). 
In general, the research demonstrates an extremely close relationship between the 
production of ethyl alcohol from crops and mortality in Russia. A significant increase in 
production (and consumption) of alcohol leads to an immediate, significant increase in 
mortality – and vice versa (Figs 4, 5). 
                                                          
3 We use the World Bank indicator of Adult Male Mortality Rate (per 1,000 male adults), which is essentially a stand-
ardized mortality coefficient for working-age males. It shows how many 15-year-old males are bound to die before 
reaching age of 60 if current age-specific mortality rates persist. It reflects much better the situation with mortality in 
this age-gender group in comparison with the number of deaths per 1,000 working-age men, since the latter figure is 
too dependent on the age structure. The values of the standardized mortality rate among working-age men in Russia 
for the period up to 2010 (inclusive) have been taken from the World Bank database (World Bank 2014); as regards 
the values for 2011 and 2012, we have calculated them on the basis of the data on the age-specific mortality coeffi-
cients published in the Russian Fertility and Mortality Database (RusFMD) prepared by the New Economic School in 
Moscow (http://demogr.nes.ru/en/demogr_indicat/data). 
4 See, e.g., Khaltourina and Korotayev 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2008a, 2008c, 2015; Korotayev 2006; Korotayev 
and Khaltourina 2005, 2006, 2008; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2005.   
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Fig. 4. Production of ethyl alcohol from crops and number of deaths in Russia 
Source: URL: http://www.gks.ru. 
 
Fig. 5. Correlation between production of ethyl alcohol from crops and the number 
of deaths in Russia, scatterplot with a fitted regression line 
Let us provide some statistical characteristics of the correlation depicted in the last graph. 
Routinely, the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is used as a standard measure of the 
strength of a correlation. In this case its value is greater than 0.9, which means that we are 
dealing with an extremely strong relationship. It is useful to square 0.9 in order to under-
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stand how close the relation is in this case. The square of 0.9 is 0.81 (i.e. 81 %), which is 
the coefficient of determination (R2). In fact, its value suggests that Russian mortality dy-
namics of the recent years was predominantly determined by the alcohol factor. Thus, we 
have a reason to maintain that the record mortality decline observed in Russia after 2005 
was more than 80 % determined by a reduction in alcohol consumption, i.e. by the effect 
of the measures aimed at restricting the availability of alcohol.  
 
Fig. 6. Relative dynamics of mortality, production of ethyl alcohol from food raw 
materials, and sales of alcoholic beverages in Russia after 2005 (100 = 
level of 2005)  
Thus, we have strong grounds to believe that Russia's impressive success in reducing 
mortality after 2005 was achieved mainly due to the state policy of limiting alcohol 
consumption. These policies were implemented in line with complex evidence-based anti-
alcohol measures recommended by the World Health Organization, including higher 
prices and excise taxes on alcoholic beverages, as well as limitation of the spatial and 
temporal availability of alcohol. In addition, significant progress was achieved in reducing 
the consumption of illegal alcohol, marked by the dramatic reduction of alcohol 
poisonings, including lethal ones.  
Yet Russia may lose all these achievements in the near future – if measures are not 
taken to prevent the looming threats engendered by the initiatives of the alcohol lobby. 
Hundreds of thousands of ‛additional’ deaths may follow, especially among working-age 
males, if a return to the days of easy access to alcohol is not averted. Unfortunately, 
similar reversals have already occurred in recent Russian history: after some growth, 
fertility would collapse even below its pre-growth level, while significant mortality 
reduction would be followed by a catastrophic upsurge (Fig. 7).  
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Fig. 7. Dynamics of total fertility rate (births per woman) and life expectancy in 
Russia. ‘Alcohol collapses’ of the 1990s and early 2000s 
Sources: Rosstat 2015; World Bank 2015; UNICEF 2004: 73. 
The current situation bears a striking resemblance to the late 1990s. In the midst of an 
acute financial and economic crisis, the priority of demographic issues declines in favor of 
solving more immediately pressing financial and economic problems. Meanwhile, 
measures are adopted that have the effect of dramatically increasing the availability of 
alcohol. The situation is similar to that of 1998, when Russia experienced a financial crisis 
accompanied by a jump in inflation (by 84 %) – however, the excise duty on spirits was 
increased much more modestly, by 20 %. As a result, during a single year the relative 
value of excise duty fell by one-third. In 2000 the excise tax was increased slightly above 
the rate of inflation; during the next several years, its annual increase hovered around the 
inflation rate or slightly below it, so the huge fall of 1998 was left uncompensated for. 
This fall of the excise tax on vodka was followed by rising income and purchasing power 
of the population, which caused a huge increase in alcohol consumption (and, hence, 
mortality) in 1998–2005 leading to the loss of more than a million lives in Russia (see, 
e.g., Treisman 2008: 9; 2010: 296–297; Nemtsov 2009, 2011; Khaltourina and Korotayev 
2006d: 30; 2008b: 28–29). On the contrary, the 2008–2009 economic crisis was not 
accompanied in Russia by any mortality increase, as it occurred against the background of 
a strict anti-alcohol policy.  
Notably, the acute crisis of the early 1990s led to a catastrophic increase in mortality 
only in the post-Soviet countries where a sharp increase in alcohol consumption was 
observed (accompanied by all kinds of the negative social phenomena, such as homicide, 
suicide, abandoned children, etc.) while in the countries where alcohol consumption 
remained flat mortality did not increase (as well as the number of murders, suicides, 
abandoned children, etc.) (Dyomin, Korotayev, and Khaltourina 2009). The current 
financial and economic crisis is occurring at a time when a set of measures aimed to 
Total fertility rate (births per woman) 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
Life expectancy at birth, males (years) 
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increase the availability of alcohol has been planned or already taken, so hundreds of 
thousands of lives are now under a very serious threat. These measures include: 
1. Freezing and actual reduction in excise taxes on alcoholic beverages. According to 
a recently passed law on changes in excise rates,5 actual vodka prices are to be lowered in 
the next two years – instead of a formerly planned increase. According to the previous 
version of the Tax Code, excise taxes were to be increased from 500 to 600 roubles per 
liter of anhydrous ethanol. The increase was to come in force on January 1, 2015. 
However, a law passed in November 2014 annulled this planned increase and set the 
excise tax to continue at the previous level. With the rocketing inflation this means a 
substantial reduction in the actual excise tax.  
We should note here that the increase in excise duties on spirits in previous years led 
to a significant reduction in mortality, on the one hand, and to a simultaneous increase in 
budget revenues, on the other (see Fig. 8).  
The prospects for raising excise taxes on alcohol are further threatened by a draft 
‘Agreement on the Principles of tax policy in the field of excise duties on alcohol and 
tobacco products of the Eurasian Economic Union’. This draft was designed to slow down 
the increase of excise taxes on tobacco products, but it also has already led to a decrease in 
excise taxes on alcoholic beverages in Russia. 
2. Reduction of the minimum vodka price. On December 29, 2014, the Federal Service 
for Alcohol Market Regulation set the new minimum retail price (MRP) on strong alcohol 
(more than 28 % alcohol content) to come in force on February 1, 2015. For the first time 
in its whole history, MRP was decreased, not increased. The price for a 0.5-liter bottle of 
40 % vodka dropped from 220 rubles to 185 rubles (thus getting 16 % cheaper).  
3. Russia's capacity to implement independent anti-alcohol policy is being 
undermined. This threat arises from the draft agreement ‘On regulation of the alcohol 
market in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union’ which implies an actual loss of 
Russia's sovereignty in the issues related to alcohol policy regulation, which will lead to 
the ‘harmonization’ of liquor prices with Belarus and Kazakhstan (where they are much 
lower) and, hence, to their further significant reduction, and, consequently, to the further 
growth of alcohol availability and mortality in Russia.  
4. Alcohol ‘liberalization’ in Russian regions. Regional authorities now frequently try 
to sell alcohol for the longest possible hours under the pretext of combatting illegal sales. 
For example, last December, the Moscow Region Duma passed an amendment to the law 
limiting the hours of retail alcohol sales, expanding them to 08.00 – 23.00 from the 
previous 11.00 to 21.00. 
5. Lifting spatial restrictions on alcohol sales. The Federal Service for Alcohol 
Market Regulation has put forward a law project which permits the sale of alcohol in some 
educational, medical and cultural institutions. The bill is already undergoing the process of 
inter-ministerial coordination in the Government. 
6. Lifting the ban on remote sales of alcoholic beverages. The Government is 
discussing lifting the ban on remote sales of alcohol, which will dramatically increase its 
spatial availability and may lead to mass violations in terms of alcohol sales to minors, as 
well as illegal alcohol sales in general.  
 
                                                          
5 Federal Law № 366-FZ of November 24, 2014, ‘On Amendments to Part II of the Russian Tax Code and Certain 
Legal Acts of the Russian Federation’. 
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Excise duty on spirits, rubles per liter of 
ethanol  
Budget revenues from excise taxes on spirits, 
billions of rubles 
  
  
Deaths from all causes per 1,000  Deaths from alcohol poisoning, per 100,000 
Fig. 8. Dynamics of excise tax on spirits, budget revenues and mortality in 2011–
2014  
7. Lifting the ban on selling beer in kiosks. The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) 
has proposed to lift the ban on selling beer in street stalls. The Ministry of Industry and 
Trade has created a working group to consider this proposal. Meanwhile, the prohibition 
of street beer sales played a key role in the recent reduction of alcohol consumption by 
Russian teenagers. The implementation of the FAS initiatives will lead to a new wave of 
alcohol availability to Russian youth.  
8. Legalization of alcohol advertising on television. The State Duma of the Russian 
Federation has passed laws allowing beer advertising on TV (including the sport channels) 
and advertising of wine after 23.00, despite the fact that alcohol advertising is one of the 
most effective ways to accustom youths and adolescents to alcohol consumption. 
Projected Effects of State Alcohol Policy Relaxation 
The calculations carried out by an expert group of the Russian Presidential Academy of 
National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), the National Research 
University Higher School of Economics (HSE), Russian Academy of Sciences, and 
Moscow State University have shown that the forthcoming full-scale relaxation of the state 
anti-alcohol policy may lead to a total of 5.5 million additional deaths by 2030 (see Fig. 9 
and Table 1).  
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Fig. 9. Population projections for Russia under the ‘alcohol-pessimistic’ and inertial 
forecast scenarios, millions, 2015–2030 
Table 1. Population projections for Russia under the ‘alcohol-pessimistic’ and inertial 
forecast scenarios, millions, 2015–2030 
Year 
Projected population of Russia, millions ‘Alcohol-pessimistic’ 
scenario ‘price’ in the 
number of ‘additional’ 
deaths as compared to the 
inertial  
scenario 
Inertial 
scenario 
Alcohol-pessimistic  
scenario  
2020 146,3 144,0 2,3
2030 142,0 136,5 5,5
The number of working-age males will be particularly affected (Fig. 10). 
Fig. 10. Population projections for working-age males in Russia under the ‘alcohol-
pessimistic’ and inertial forecast scenarios, millions, 2015–2030 
Thus, the changes in legislation proposed by the alcohol lobby may lead to a significant 
increase in alcohol consumption and therefore to an increase in alcohol-related mortali-
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ty, morbidity and social problems. Such consequences are extremely likely to seriously 
undermine Russian progress to goals set forth in the Presidential Decree № 606 of May 
7, 2012 ‛On measures for implementation of demographic policy of the Russian Federa-
tion’, particularly as regards reaching the target value of 74 years of total life expectancy 
by 2018. Moreover, their overall demographic consequences for our country may be 
disastrous; so urgent measures must be taken to avert the upsurge of population loss. 
How to Prevent the Demographic Catastrophe 
Even if the pending ‘pro-alcohol’ legislative initiatives are simply blocked, life expectancy 
will not go beyond the current value of 71 years. A simple preservation of the state anti-
alcohol policy in itself will not suffice to increase the Russian life expectancies up to 74. 
For this, we need additional limitations on the availability of alcohol, both in time, in space, 
and economically. Price availability of alcohol must be seriously curbed. It would no longer 
suffice to return to the initially planned (starting from January 1, 2015) increase of the excise 
tax on spirits from 500 to 600 rubles6 (which was derailed by the alcohol lobby). Due to the 
dramatic inflation jump, the new law should raise the excises not to 600 rubles but at least up 
to 650 rubles. The ban on the sales of alcohol between 11 p.m. and 8 a.m. should be 
extended to a bigger time interval between 8 p.m. and 11 a.m. Banning morning alcohol 
sales has proved highly effective in Nordic countries as this blocks the opportunity to have a 
morning drink after a hangover (which may often lead to prolonged drinking bouts). 
Sales of alcoholic beverages stronger than 15 % are advised to be prohibited in 
department stores unless separated from other departments with a special entrance. This 
cuts down on spontaneous purchases, i.e. ‛once entering a shop to buy some bread, one is 
provoked to purchase some alcohol by seeing it exposed on the shelves’ (Dyomin, 
Korotayev and Khaltourina 2009: 47). 
We should not exclude the possibility of returning to the state monopoly on retail sales 
of the strong drinks in Russia. This measure has proven to be a very effective tool for 
reducing alcohol problems and mortality in Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Canada, 
etc. In the USA 19 states also have some form of monopoly on the sale of liquor. In these 
states alcohol consumption is 14.5 % lower for those aged 14–18, and the frequency of 
abuse of alcohol by this age group (intake of more than 70 g of ethanol at one time) is 
16.7 % lower than in the states without such a monopoly. There is a 9.3 % lower alcohol-
impaired driving death rate under age 21 in the monopoly states versus the non-monopoly 
states (Holder 2007). In the Scandinavian countries such a monopoly allows the sale of 
alcoholic beverages (usually stronger than 4.7–5 %) only in state stores (except for bar 
service). In addition such a monopoly helps to fill the state budget. The monopoly 
countries enjoy higher revenue from the sale of alcoholic beverages than the non-
monopoly countries with the same level of economic development (Rehm et al. 2001).  
A major advantage of the state monopoly on the retail sale of alcoholic beverages is that it 
minimizes the private interest in maximizing alcohol sales, which in this area often 
confronts the public interest. An employee of a store belonging to the state has no interest 
in selling alcohol to minors because his salary does not depend on the store's revenue – 
while the owner of a private shop may capitalize on it (Ugland 2000). 
International experience shows that to maximize health and longevity, national alcohol 
policy should be regulated by the social branch of the Government, as is done in the 
Scandinavian countries, not by the economic branch. The Ministry of Health, the Federal 
Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being and the 
                                                          
6 Per liter of anhydrous ethanol. 
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Federal Service for Alcohol Market Regulation must take control over this policy to fight 
the alcohol black market.  
The Worst-Case (Pessimistic) Scenario  
However, it is obvious that the alcohol-pessimistic inertial scenario is by no means the 
worst possible case. The worst (‘pessimistic’, ‘pessimal’) demographic scenario will be 
realized only if a radical surge in mortality coincides with an avalanche-like collapse in 
fertility. Unfortunately, this scenario is not entirely improbable. First, a certain decline  
in crude birth rates is virtually inevitable in the forthcoming decade due to the reduction in 
the number of women aged 20–29, who mother more than 60 % of all births in Russia. 
This is given by Russia's age structure and the very small cohorts born in the 1990s who 
are now entering their prime child-bearing years. Second, most respondents explain their 
reluctance to have more children by referring to material difficulties and feeling uncertain 
about future (Rosstat 2013). Rising insecurity almost inevitably leads to a decrease in birth 
rates – this is particularly true for financial and economic crises (Fig. 11).  
 
Fig. 11. Birth rate slump in the United States during the Great Depression (1929–
1933) 
Source: Campbell et al. 1966: 4; World Bank 2015. 
The stimulating role of the maternal capital policy in boosting fertility is bound to 
decrease, as 97 per cent of the families used to spend its benefits for improving their living 
conditions, which will become much harder during the current economic crisis. Strong 
measures are required to prevent a severe birthrate collapse. The financial and economic 
crisis of 2008–2009 in Russia did not lead to the collapse in fertility rates due to strong 
and effective family policy measures launched before and during the crisis. The crises of 
the late 1980s – early 1990s and the late 1990s were accompanied by a decline in fertility 
because no such measures were taken. For example, on the eve of 1998 crisis fertility was 
already very low (1.24 children per woman) but during the crisis it dropped to an 
unprecedented level of 1.17 children per woman. In the late 1980s, as the starting point of 
fertility was already fairly high (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina and 
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Bogevolnov 2012: 96–219), the decline in response to the economic distress of the early 
1990s was much steeper. In fact, it collapsed so deep that the consequences of the 
‘demographic hole of the 1990s’ are still present (see above the main text of the report).  
Most likely some decline in the birth rate of Russia in 2015 is inevitable. The positive 
trend of recent years could be kept only if the proper measures had been introduced in 
2014. For example, there were about an additional 100 thousand newborns in 2012 due to 
the policies of free distribution of lands and allowances for the third child. If the maternal 
capital program is to be cancelled after 2016 (followed by cuts in other family support 
programs), this will result in catastrophic demographic consequences.  
The ‘most pessimistic’ scenario presents the population projections in a situation when 
a victory of the alcohol and tobacco lobby is combined with cuts in the family support 
programs, leading to a retreat to the worse values of mortality and fertility of the mid-
2000s. 
The results of the calculation of this scenario are as follows (Fig. 12).  
 
Fig. 12. Pessimistic and inertial scenarios of the Russian population dynamics for 
the period till 2100, millions  
Thus, if no strategic priority is given to socio-demographic policy, this result may well 
lead to the end of geopolitical career of Russia by the end of the century.  
Possible Demographic Effect of a Full-Scale Family Policy Con-
suming Not Less than 3 Per Cent of GDP 
It is also possible to model the effect of developing a high-priority demographic policy 
structure that would aim to reach Western European levels of fertility, closer to the 
replacement rate of two children per woman. This effect was modeled by a smooth (for  
10 years) transition of age-specific fertility rates by 2020 in Russia to the level of France 
in 2012 (corresponding to TFR = 2.0), while preserving Russia's age-specific mortality at 
the level of 2012.  
Korotayev et al. • Mathematical Modeling and Forecasting  153
According to international studies and best practice, the most effective measures to 
improve fertility include a combination of allowances, tax benefits, programs and 
legislation supporting parents in combining parenting and employment, including access 
to kindergartens, nurseries, nannies and flexible schedules for employees with family 
responsibilities. During a crisis the measures stimulating economic activity of parents may 
be more effective in boosting fertility than cash transfers. An effective system of care for 
children is also one of the most effective policy measures to support the birth rate. Of all 
the types of expenditures in OECD the costs of services for child care (namely 
kindergartens, nursery nurses and payment) correlate the best with the level of fertility. It 
is extremely important for the child care system to develop a network of services for the 
care of the youngest children (under 3 years). Comparative analysis shows that all of  
the most demographically successful countries in Europe have built a wide covering 
system of free or subsidized services for the care of children under 3 years old. There are 
not enough kindergartens in Russia and the youngest children are not a priority group. 
Only 58 per cent of Russian children under six had access to preschool education facilities 
in contrast with 90 per cent in France. A set of housing support measures such as 
subsidized rental housing for young and large families, development of housing and 
savings cooperatives, as well as substantial subsidies of mortgage rates for families with 
children may also improve fertility.  
The corresponding ‘high demographic priority’ forecast of population of the Russian 
Federation (as compared to the inertial scenario) is as follows (Fig. 13). 
 
Fig. 13. Scenario of full-scale measures of fertility support in comparison with the 
inertial and pessimistic scenarios for the Russian population dynamics, 
millions, 2015–2050 
As we can see, measures to support the birth rates can give a significant long-term 
demographic effect (especially if we can prevent the growth of mortality in our country), 
but these measures alone are insufficient to prevent Russian depopulation, due to Russia's 
persistent mortality rates. 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 154
Potential Effect of the Anti-Alcohol Policy 
If a full-scale alcohol control policy is consistently implemented in Russia, our 
calculations demonstrate that such a deliberate anti-alcohol policy still has an immense 
demographic potential and will have a very significant long-term demographic impact (see 
Fig. 14 and Table 2).  
Fig. 14. Scenario of full-scale anti-alcohol policy in comparison with the inertial and 
alcohol-pessimistic scenarios of the Russian population dynamics, till 
2040, millions 
Table 2. Population projections for Russia under the ‘alcohol-pessimistic’ and ‘full-
scale alcohol policy’ scenarios, millions, for 2015–2040 (‘Issue price’ in 
human lives)  
Year 
Projected population of Russia, millions ‘Alcohol-pessimistic’ scenar-
io ‘price’ in the number of 
‘additional’ deaths as com-
pared to the full-scale alco-
holic policy scenario 
Alcohol-pessimistic scenario 
(millions) 
Full-scale alcoholic policy scenario 
(millions) 
2020 147.6 144.0 3.6
2030 136.5 149.2 12.7
2040 128.5 147.4 18.9
These estimates demonstrate the enormous demographic potential of standard alcohol 
control measures recommended by the World Health Organization for the future of our 
country (Dyomin et al. 2009). 
Implementation of these affordable and even profitable measures (such as increasing 
excise duties on spirits or the introduction of a state monopoly on retail sales of alcohol) 
may save up to 19 million lives by 2040.7 Thus, in the short and medium term the alcohol 
7 In comparison with the scenario of the victory of the alcohol lobby. In comparison with the inertial scenario, the 
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control policy may have an even greater demographic impact than the policy of supporting 
the birth rate (though in a long run the fertility support policy is significantly more 
effective).  
The Forecast Effect of Complete Elimination  
of Russian Excess Mortality 
Total elimination of Russian excess mortality would have an especially significant long-
term demographic effect. Such results may be achieved through policies including anti-
alcohol and anti-tobacco measures, as well as radical improvement of the Russian health 
care system by increasing the financial allocation for health care to at least 10 % of GDP.  
This effect was modeled by a smooth (for 10 years) transition of the age-specific 
mortality rates in Russia to reach the corresponding values of Norway in 2009 (this 
scenario does not imply that by 2020 Russia will overtake Norway; it only starts with the 
assumption that Russia will be converging to Norway, reaching by 2020 the Norwegian 
level of 2009, so this scenario is not excessively optimistic).8 
As we can see the complete elimination of Russia's excessive mortality may provide a 
more significant effect in the short and medium term than fertility support. Nonetheless, 
because of the small birth cohorts of the 1990s, whose effect will be magnified over time 
if they too give birth to small cohorts the elimination of Russia's high mortality cannot, by 
itself, prevent an eventual return to population decline. If extreme mortality is eliminated, 
but fertility is preserved as it was in 2012, the Russian population will keep growing only 
until the mid-2030s. It would then start shrinking in the late 2030s, and this decline would 
accelerate thereafter.  
 
Fig. 15. Scenario of complete elimination of Russian excess mortality in comparison 
with the inertial and pessimistic scenarios of the Russian population 
dynamics, till 2040, millions 
                                                                                                                                                         
scenario of the complete elimination of the alcohol excessive mortality in Russia will save by 2040 lives of more than 
11.5 million Russians. 
8 On the other hand, it is based on the assumption of maintaining the gender and age-specific fertility rates at the level 
of 2012, and at present this assumption may already be considered fairly optimistic. 
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The Combination of Measures that Can Prevent Depopulation. 
The ‘Most Optimistic’ Scenario 
Only the combination of an effective fertility support system and the elimination of 
Russia's excessively high mortality (‘the best case scenario’) may fully avert the looming 
threat of depopulation. It is worth noting that even under the optimum scenario the effects 
of the demographic hole of the 1990s will be felt in the 2040s as the small generation of 
the children born to the mothers born in the 1990s will reach their reproductive age. 
Nevertheless, in the most optimistic scenario future population decline would be averted, 
and in the future the population of Russia will stabilize at a level slightly higher than 
today's (Fig. 16). 
 
Fig. 16. Optimum demographic scenario of the dynamics of the Russian population 
(combination of an effective system of fertility support measures and the 
elimination of the Russian excess mortality), millions, 2015–2100 
It is time to compare the optimistic forecast with the other scenarios of Russia's 
demographic future (Fig. 17). 
 
Fig. 17. Forecast scenarios of the demographic future of Russia, projected 
dynamics of the population of the Russian Federation in 2015–2100, 
millions 
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As we can see in Fig. 17, there is a huge gap between the ‘lower’ (‘pessimistic’) and the 
‘upper’ (‘optimistic’) scenarios. This is a gap of over 100 million human lives. This 
estimate gives an idea of the price of decisions made today. The forecast calculations for 
the period up to 2100 show that the birth support measures have the highest impact on the 
demographic future in the long run. However, in the short and medium term, the anti-
mortality measures are the most effective (in particularly, the measures targeting alcohol-
related mortality). As a whole, according to our forecast calculations, the demographic 
future of Russia can be secured only with both the elimination of excessive mortality and 
with continued improvement in fertility toward full replacement rates (e.g., fertility 2.0 or 
higher).  
For this to occur, current attitudes must be changed. Today the availability of alcohol 
is increasing instead of being curbed. At the same time the country is facing a new crisis 
while no new measures to provide stronger support for fertility support are expected. 
A Demographic Maneuver: Additional Revenues from Alcohol 
and Tobacco Can Stimulate the Reduction in Mortality and  
the Growth of Fertility  
There is a demographic maneuver than can be undertaken to reduce mortality and 
stimulate fertility, and at the same time reduce smoking and alcohol consumption, save 
300–400 thousand lives a year and ensure the growth of budget revenues. An increase in 
excise duties, by itself an unpopular measure, should be linked with measures to support 
families with children. It is recommended to create a Trust Fund, funded by higher excise 
taxes on alcohol and tobacco, to support family and health. 
The Fund should provide funding for the following areas: 
– to secure the opportunity for families to purchase housing with mortgage loans at
5 % interest rate after the 2nd birth (through the already existing Agency for Housing 
Mortgage Lending);  
– to secure the opportunity for families to purchase housing with mortgage loans at
zero interest rate after the 3rd birth (through the Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending); 
– to ensure 100 % availability of pre-school education and childcare for children from
1 to 7; 
– co-financing of regional programs for prevention and reduction of cardiovascular
disease in areas with a high mortality rate in their working age population; 
– co-financing of regional programs of housing rent subsidies for families with
children; 
– additional social support for families with children in regions with unfavorable
demographic situations.  
During the economic crisis the Foundation of Family and Health Support could ensure 
the implementation of additional measures of supportive demographic policy, and 
contribute to ensuring sustainable growth of population after the crisis. 
There are no ‘magic bullets’ to easily solve Russia's demographic problems, which are 
the result of decades of economic ups and downs and shifts in policy. However, 
establishing a Trust Fund for family support and national health, increasing taxes on 
alcohol and tobacco, and using those funds for pro-fertility programs, is a policy that 
would achieve several goals at once without imposing additional cost on the current 
budget. It would also focus attention on long-term planning to resolve the problems that 
threaten Russia's demographic future. 
As the earlier sections of the present article have shown, Russia enjoyed great success 
with its policies to promote fertility and reduce mortality in the last seven years. However, 
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it would be a foolish and costly mistake to believe those successes had ‘solved’ Russia's 
long-term demographic problems. Quite the reverse; they were only a promising ‘down 
payment’ on the policies needed to truly put Russia's long-term demographic future on a 
secure course. Without continuing and expanding the present policies, that future security 
will dissolve. Worse yet, the policies currently being considered to boost access to alcohol 
will almost certainly reverse recent progress and set Russia back upon a path of inevitable 
demographic decay. 
Appendix. Calculation Methodology 
We have based our population projections on the standard methodology of building 
demographic forecasts (see, e.g., Andreev and Vishnevsky 2008: 265–288; Belotelov et al. 
2001: 43–51; Pavlovsky et al. 2005). The calculations were made on an annual basis.  
At step one, an equation (1) is used to calculate the number of the dead based on annual 
mortality ratios and migration inflow. The age structure was modified in accordance with 
the calculation. At step two (equations (2F) and (2M)), the number of infants is calculated 
based on childbirths and infant survival rate and migrations (migrants with infants). Based 
on the current age structure, the number of women is calculated for each 5-year group.  
The number of babies is calculated for each group using age fertility ratios and then 
summed up. We assumed that 100 girls are born per 105 boys. Then the age structure is 
moved ‘down’ to the previous year and the number of babies is recorded at the very 
beginning. The time calculator is increased by one year and then the calculation is 
repeated (step one and then step two). 
Preparation of source data. Source data for birthrates were calculated based on age 
(5-year groups) fertility ratios and target values (Rosstat 2015) by linear interpolation.  
A similar procedure (Human Mortality Database)9 was performed for mortality and 
migration. 10 
We took as source data the age and sex structure for 2010 (Rosstat). The calculation 
started from 2010. 
The drawback of the Demographic Concept is that mortality is recorded in relative 
units. We used age and sex mortality per 1,000 people as a demographic indicator for 
actual calculations. 
Equations used for calculations are as follows:  
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where 
t – time variable (in this case one year);
τ – lower band of the age group;
                                                          
9 URL: http://www.mortality.org/hmd/RUS/STATS/Mx_1x1.txt. 
10 Our calculations are based on estimates of the demographic structure of migration flow kindly provided to us by 
Andreev; it is similar to the ones used by Andreev and Vishnevsky in their projections of the demographic develop-
ment of Russia until 2050. 
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uM, F (τ, t) 
 
– number of persons (hereinafter lower indices mean M – men, F – wom-
en) aged from τ to τ + 1 years at the moment of time t; 
,M Fu (τ, t) 
 
– annual average number of persons (hereinafter lower indices mean M – 
men, F – women) aged from τ to τ + 1 years at the moment of time t;  
b(τ, t) – age specific birth rates, women, age from τ to τ + 4 (i. е. by 5-year 
groups) at the moment of time t;
dM, F (τ, t) 
 
– age specific mortality rate, age from τ to τ + 1 at the moment of time t;  
mM, F (τ, t) 
 
– number of migrants (arrived in the country), this number (generally) 
may be negative in case of population outflow from the country; 
LM0, F0 (t) – infants survival function at time t.
 
Equation (1) describes shift of the age structure by one year (due to mortality and 
migration), equations (2F) and (2M) describe the ‘source’ (i.e. number of babies).  
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The author analyzes the impact of globalization on the transformation of interna-
tional migration flows. The author considers the characteristics of the global 
trends within international migration, namely: a growing scale of the international 
migration, a geographic expansion of international migration, qualitative shifts in 
the structure of migration flows, determining role of economic migration, perma-
nent growth and structural intricacy of irregular migration, increase of forced mi-
gration, increasing role of international migration in demographic development, 
and a dual character of migration policy. The author also points out that only  
a reasonable migration policy can provide a legitimate field for international mi-
gration and rational use of migrants' skills. 
Keywords: international migration, globalization, labour migration, irregular 
migration, forced migration, demographic development, migration policy. 
In the second half of the twentieth century the humankind experienced an insurmount-
able and irreversible power of globalization processes, which influenced all spheres of 
social life and created a global system of interdependency between countries and nations.  
This growing interdependency is related to: 
• development of integration processes and expanding economic interdependency be-
tween national economies; 
• growing gap in the levels of economic development between developing and devel-
oped countries caused, inter alia, by the demographic factor; 
• improvement of communication facilities and the transport system, which allows in-
formation, goods and people to move freely and quickly even between territories that are 
located very distantly from each other; 
• activities of international institutes and transnational corporations that engage em-
ployees from different countries and promote their movements across the borders; 
• social connections that develop as a result of international migration and interracial 
marriages, in particular, and promote formation of the global system of mutual aid. 
Globalization processes within impetuous changes in global political and economic 
systems have abruptly intensified global migration flows and have led to dramatic shifts in 
global migration trends that are resulting in the formation of a new stage of migration his-
tory of the mankind. 
We summarized those trends in our works in the 1990s and 2000s (see Iontsev 1999; 
Aleshkovski and Iontsev 2008; 2015; Aleshkovski 2016) and by now, they have become 
well-formed. The most significant among them are the follows: 
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– an unprecedented growth of the international migration flows and formation of ‘na-
tion of migrants’; 
– a geographic expansion of international migration flows due to involvement of prac-
tically every country of the world in migration flows; 
– qualitative changes in the structure of international migration flows in compliance 
with the requirements of globalizing labor market; 
– determinant role of economic migration, primarily labour migration; 
– sufficient growth and structural intricacy of illegal migration; 
– a growing scale and geographic expansion of forced migration; 
– growing importance of international migration for the demographic development 
of the world, countries of origin and destination; 
– dual character of migration policy at global, regional and national levels. 
Growth of the International Migration Scale 
The collapse of the USSR and emergence of separate independent states in its place, im-
portant political and social changes in the Eastern Europe, the collapse of Yugoslavia and 
prolonged conflict between the Serbians and Albanians, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, civil 
wars in Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan, conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria – all 
these and other events of the 1990s and 2000s set in motion vast and often uncontrolled 
international migration flows and made the international migration become one of the 
most important global phenomena, which had an influence on the world economy and, 
respectively, on globalization. 
The scale of international migration allows us to define it as a phenomenon with a 
global impact. According to the United Nations Population Division estimates in 2015, 
more than 244 million people live outside their country of birth, 57 per cent of the total 
number of international migrants live in more developed regions. Currently, international 
migrants make up nearly one of every 32 people in the world, almost one of every eight 
people in the developed regions and nearly one of every 65 people in developing regions. 
Collectively, international migrants could now constitute the world's fifth most populous 
nation if they all lived in the same place – after China, India, the United States, and Indo-
nesia (UN 2015b, UN 2015c). 
One should note that these figures do not include illegal immigrants whose number 
according to different estimates amounts from 10 to 15 per cent of all international mi-
grants (from 24 to 36 million people) and international tourists whose number exceeded 
1,200 million. If we add together 150 million labour migrants with their family members, 
more than 10 million seasonal and frontier workers, and no less than 65 million forced 
migrants (refugees, displaced people, asylum seekers, ‘ecological refugees’, etc.), we will 
have the total number of people who are involved in international migration in this or that 
form which amounts to over 1.5 billion people. If we add together all the categories of 
migrants then every fifth Earth's inhabitant appears to be an international migrant. This 
brings up the idea of the so-called ‘nations of migrants’ that can be compared by its num-
ber with the population of the largest nations of the world (Aleshkovski 2016). 
In fact, the fate of the ‘everlasting exile’ mythical Ahasverus is not just a myth but a 
real destiny of many people wandering over the world in search for better life, knowledge, 
for the world's progress in culture and science, for the rest and cure etc. 
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As it can be seen from Table 1, in the last half a century there have been significant 
changes in the regional distribution of international migration flows. If in 1960 the majori-
ty of international migrants (57.2 %) located in the developing regions, now more than 
57.6 % of international migrants have settled in the developed regions. The most percepti-
ble changes have been observed in Europe and North America where over the period from 
1960 to 2015 the number of international migrants has increased by 5.3 times and 4.3 
times respectively. Currently, the region with the largest number of international migrants 
is Europe (more than 76.15 million people in 2015), followed by Asia (75.08 million peo-
ple) and North America (54.49 million people) (UN 2015с).  
Table 1. International migrant stock at mid-year by major area, region  
Major Area, 
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 
World 75.46 81.34 99.28 152.56 172.70 191.27 221.71 243.70 
Developed 
 regions 32.31 38.36 47.46 82.38 103.38 117.18 132.56 140.48 
Developing 
regions 43.15 42.97 51.82 70.18 69.32 74.09 89.15 103.22 
Europe 14.24 18.79 21.89 49.22 56.27 64.09 72.37 76.15 
Africa 9.13 9.94 14.10 15.69 14.80 15.19 16.84 20.65 
Asia 28.48 27.82 32.11 48.14 49.34 53.37 65.91 75.08 
Latin America 
and the Carib-
bean 
6.01 5.68 6.08 7.17 6.59 7.23 8.24 9.23 
Northern  
America 12.51 12.99 18.09 27.61 40.35 45.36 51.22 54.49 
Oceania 2.13 3.03 3.75 4.73 5.36 6.02 7.13 8.10 
Source: UN 2006b; 2015c. 
The important indicator reflecting the ratio of international migration, is the growing share 
of international migrants in the total population of the receiving states. In 1960, there were 
27 countries in the world where the percentage of international migrants was up to 10 %, 
while in 2015 the number of such countries reached 92, and in 16 countries the share of 
international migrants in total population exceeded 50 % (UN 2015c).  
Between 1960 and 2015 the share of migrants in the total population increased most 
significantly in the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf: in Bahrain from 17.1 % to 
51.1 %, in Kuwait from 32.6 % to 73.6 %, in Qatar from 32.0 % to 75.5 %, in the UAE 
from 2.4 % to 88.4 %, in Saudi Arabia from 1.6 % to 32.3 % (UN 2015c). 
Thus, international migration flows in the contemporary world became global phe-
nomena and this affects all spheres of life of the global community, and international mi-
gration became one of the key factors of social and economic development of states. 
Geographic Expansion of International Migration Flows  
Nowadays, migrants live almost in every country of the world (UN 2016). Even such 
‘closed’ states as Northern Korea or Cuba are getting more and more proactive in the mi-
gration processes considering that emigration is much more strictly controlled there than 
immigration, as opposed to many other countries. 
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It should be noted that in spite of the fact that the majority of international migrants 
originate from developing countries, the contemporary migration flows do not have only 
‘South-North’ or ‘East-West’ vectors. Nearly half of all reported migrants move from one 
developing country to another and approximately the same amount move from developing 
countries to the developed ones. In other words, the number of migrants who move from 
‘south to south’ approximately balances the number of migrants who move from ‘south to 
north’. 
In the 21st century, all countries and territories of the world are, in one way or another, 
countries of destination for some migrants. The era of fast transportation throughout the 
world affects every country, and international migrants appear everywhere. According to 
the UN Population Division, in 2015 the only sovereign state in the world, where the 
number of international migrants was less than 1,000 people, was the Republic Tuvalu (its 
population is less than 10.5 thousand people) (UN 2015c). 
In 1965 there were 41 countries with the number of migrants exceeding 300 thousand 
people, while in 2000 the number of such countries grew to 66, and by 2015 it reached 81; 
moreover, in 37 countries the number of international migrants exceeded 1 million per-
sons, while in ten countries it was more than 5 million persons. At the top of the list are 
the USA (46.6 mln persons), Germany (12.0 mln persons) and Russia (11.6 mln persons) 
(see Table 2). 
Table 2. Countries hosting the largest numbers of international migrants, millions 
country 2000  country 2015 
USA 34.81 USA 46.63 
Russia 11.90 Germany 12.01 
Germany 8.99 Russia 11.64 
India 6.41 Saudi Arabia 10.19 
France 6.28 United Kingdom 8.54 
Ukraine 5.23 UAE 8.10 
Canada 5.51 Canada 7.84 
Saudi Arabia 5.26 France 7.78 
United Kingdom 4.73 Australia 6.76 
Australia 4.39 Spain 5.85 
Source: UN 2006b, 2015c. 
 
Thus, over the last 60 years the shifts in the global migration situation were primarily re-
lated to considerable changes in geography of international migrant flows as well as to the 
increasing number of countries involved in international migration processes.  
Qualitative Shifts in the Structure of Migration Flows  
The profound changes that happened in the world in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury are rooted in the development of the post-industrial sector of economy and associated 
transformation of the demands at global labor market, as well as liberal reforms and dem-
ocratic shifts in the post-communist and developing countries. This encouraged a qualita-
tively new stage in the development of international migration. In what follows we point 
out the key changes in the patterns of international migration. 
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Shift from Permanent to Temporary Migration 
The existing data do not provide reliable information on temporary migration flows and 
for the most part temporary movements are not recorded in the statistics, whereas detailed 
information on temporary migrants is not regular. Meanwhile, surveys conducted in some 
countries of destination and statistics on travelers prove that in the recent five decades the 
number of permanent (or long-term) migrants has been gradually increasing, however, the 
number and frequency of short-term movements were growing much faster. 
Among all the forms and types of international migration, the labor migration has 
been growing most rapidly during the last decades. This happens due to the spreading and 
greater availability of transport which facilities migration and ‘reduces’ the distance be-
tween countries and continents. In this situation a temporary work abroad is more prefera-
ble than emigration since it incurs fewer material and non-material costs. 
On the other hand, globalization of the world labor market demands a more flexible 
behavior from migrants and this can be partially guaranteed by labor migration. The in-
volvement of foreign workers on a temporary basis also corresponds to the goals of immi-
gration policy in developed countries which are the ‘globalization elite’ and in many re-
spects define the terms for other countries to participate in globalization. 
Shifts in the Qualitative Structure of Migration Flows 
In developed countries' labor markets which determine the direction and intensity of inter-
national labor migration flows, a constant demand for foreign labor is observed at two 
qualification ‘poles’: low-level workers and labors skilled in technologically advanced 
jobs. At the same time, the demand for foreign labor in countries of destination tend to 
evolve towards more qualified labor force, while the receiving countries strenuously en-
courage qualified immigrants in the branches and sectors of a national economy that face 
labor deficit. 
The shifts in the qualitative structure of migration flows mean, first of all, an increas-
ing number of skilled professionals among international migrants. This trend is closely 
related to the probably most painful phenomenon in international migration known as 
‘brain drain’ which is a non-return migration of highly skilled specialists – scientists, en-
gineers, physicians, etc. (including potential intellectuals such as students, post-graduate 
students, and trainees). The policy specifically aimed at attracting skilled personnel from 
other countries is widely used by developed countries, especially by the USA. 
On the other hand, low- and non-skilled migrants face new barriers that hamper their 
access to the countries of final destination. Thus, there simultaneously operate the still pre-
served push factors in less developed states and the pull factors in receiving countries. As 
a result, the receiving states have to develop guest workers programs for temporary attrac-
tion of low-skilled migrants (ILO 2004: 127–151). 
Feminization of Migration Flows 
It is traditionally considered that males constitute the major part of international migrants. 
Females, if they took part in international migrations, used to be the male migrants' family 
members. But starting from the early 1990s the researchers noticed that currently more and 
more women migrate not in order to join their partners, but in the search for the jobs in 
countries where they hope to be better paid in comparison to their home country.  
In 2015, the share of women among international migrants in the developed countries ex-
ceeded 51 per cent (totally in the world – 48 per cent). The share of female migrants is the 
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largest in Nepal (69 per cent), Moldova (65 per cent), and Latvia (60 per cent) (UN 
2015b). 
In many respects, the above-mentioned fact is connected with structural modifications 
in the global economy, which accompany globalization processes. The development of the 
services economy encourage the increasing role of this sector in the structure of the devel-
oped countries' labor market (textile industry, leisure industry, social service, sex services, 
etc.) and constantly growing need in female migrants including those occupied in unquali-
fied jobs. 
The Determining Role of Economic Migration 
The international migration flows emerge under the influence of different factors, among 
which economic factors are of primary importance. The growing role and scale of eco-
nomic migration (first of all, of labor migration) is the most stable and long-lasting trend 
of international migration. It gained a crucial impetus from the expansion of capitalist 
economy and commercialization of labor. In terms of global economic globalization the 
most important issue consists in the formation of the global labor market which operates 
via export and import of labor resources and has developed to an unprecedented scale. 
Despite the fact that one can hardly estimate the general scale of international labor 
migration flows since far from all the countries monitor the labor migration and a consid-
erable number of labor migrants are illegal; thus, the international labor migration appears 
to be of a considerable scale indeed and moreover, it turns to be a growing trend.  
Table 3. Distribution of migrant workers, by broad sub-region, 2013 
Broad sub-region Millions % 
World 150.3 100 
Northern, Southern and Western Europe 35.8 23.8 
Eastern Europe 13.8 7.0 
Northern America 37.1 24.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean  4.3 2.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.9 5.3 
Northern Africa 0.8 0.5 
Central and Western Asia 7.0 4.7 
Arab States 17.6 11.7 
Eastern Asia 5.4 3.6 
South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific 11.7 7.8 
Southern Asia 8.7 5.8 
Source: ILO 2015a: 16. 
 
According to recent ILO estimates, in 2013 there were 150.3 million migrant workers in the 
world compared to 86 million in 2000 and 3.2 million in 1960. Almost half of migrant work-
ers (48.5 per cent) are concentrated in two broad sub-regions: Northern America and North-
ern, Southern and Western Europe. These sub-regions together make up 52.9 per cent of all 
female migrant workers and 45.1 per cent of all male migrant workers (ILO 2015). 
Despite the fact that migrant-workers make up less than 4.2 per cent of the total num-
ber of economically active population of the developed countries, the role of labor migra-
tion for many receiving countries is much more significant. It is necessary to note that 
many countries are simultaneously host and home countries. For example, Canada is a 
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traditional country of destination for migrants, but it also sends a great number of workers, 
especially high-skilled, to the USA (ILO 2004).  
We define the following three key factors determining the expansion of international 
labor migration and the latter's increasing role (IOM 2006: 18): 
– the pressure of the changing demographic situation (first of all, the population age-
ing) and labor market needs in developed countries; 
– the pushing demographic factors in developing countries and growing differences of 
income and opportunities between developing and developed regions, along with an in-
creasing gap between the most dynamically developed countries and other developing 
world; 
– established inter-country networks based on family, culture and history. 
Remittances are the immediate and tangible benefit of international labor migration. 
The receiving countries financially benefit from labor migration mainly via receiving tax 
payments, while for sending countries the financial inflow from migrant workers is more 
diverse. 
Thus, labor migration as a global transference of human capital has become an im-
portant factor of development of the global economy and at the same time it is a result and 
source of increasing interdependence between countries and regions of the world. Consid-
ering that people's international mobility in search for jobs will definitely increase in the 
globalizing world, it is necessary for countries of origin and countries of destination of 
migrant-workers to develop an efficient and fair management of labor migration (ILO 
2006). 
Permanent Growth and Structural Intricacy of Irregular  
Migration 
Labor migration is closely related to another contemporary trend in the international mi-
gration – to a permanently growing irregular immigration. 
There are no reliable data on irregular migrants in the world. According to different 
estimations, from 10 to 15 per cent of all international migrants stay in the countries of 
destination in violation of the law. In other words, irregular immigrants are about half  
of legal migrant-workers, and their number is not reducing despite the restrictive immigra-
tion rules and special laws directed against irregular immigration. Moreover, countries 
where the use of labor of irregular migrants is widely practiced are replenished with de-
veloping countries. For example, Mexico, the largest supplier of irregular immigrants in 
the world, is at the same time a receiving society for about one million irregular immi-
grants from the countries of Latin America and Caribbean. It should be noted that the de-
velopment of irregular immigration brings the emergence of new categories and groups of 
migrants who violate the law (migration laws, labor codes, etc.), both in destination coun-
tries and in transit countries (Aleshkovski and Iontsev 2008). 
Whatever the routes and means migrants use to enter a destination country and what-
ever measures are taken to prevent this flow, we think that it is hardly possible to effec-
tively counteract irregular immigration under the existing predomination of capitalistic 
norms when in receiving countries the employers benefit from the cheap and rightless la-
bor of irregular migrants, so that illegal migrants become ‘pure taxpayers’ beneficial for 
employers and receiving state. In combination with demographic pressure and economic 
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pushing factors in sending countries, these circumstances make irregular migration in the 
contemporary world structurally insurmountable. 
However, this does not mean that we are unable to restrain the scale of irregular im-
migration. In particular, this can be achieved via a more effective management of legal 
migration flows. The most important issue for receiving governments is to realize that ir-
regular immigration is neither a form of terrorism or criminality to fight with by all means, 
nor should they run to another extreme and open the doors wide for migrants, so that the 
citizens will have to defend their indigenous rights against undesirable invasion (Alesh-
kovski and Iontsev 2015). 
Increasing Scale and Geographic Expansion of Forced Migration 
Forced migration is a full range of spatial movements related to permanent or temporary 
changes in place of residence caused by extreme factors not depending on people's will 
(political and ethnically based persecutions, natural disasters, technological accidents, eco-
logical catastrophes, armed conflicts, etc.). Forced migrants include: refugees, internally 
displaced people, asylum-seekers, ecological refugees, stateless people and others. For 
most of them, emergency and life-threat push factors are determinative. 
Increase in the scale and geography of forced migration is related to the current stage 
of international relations filled with political tension, wars, ethnic conflicts, and ecological 
disasters (after Second World War, over 150 global and regional conflicts happened in the 
world). According to the UNHCR date, by the end of 2015 the global figure of forced mi-
grants was at 55 million, of which 13.7 million were refugees, 32.3 mln internally dis-
placed people, around 1.8 million asylum-seekers and 3.5 million stateless people  
(UNHCR 2015). 
Table 4. Estimated forced migration stock at mid-year by major area, region, 
1960–2015, millions 
Major area or region 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 2015 
World 10.7 14.9 27.25 21.8 32.86 54.96 
Europe 0.7 0.1 6.5 5.58 3.43 3.90 
Africa 3.0 4.6 11.8 6.06 9.75 17.76 
Asia 5.1 6.8 7.9 8.45 14.91 25.94 
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.4 1.2 0.1 0.58 3.54 6.67 
Northern America 1.4 1.4 0.9 1.05 1.14 0.62 
Oceania 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 
Source: UNHCR 2015. 
 
Therefore, the forced migration as one of essential contemporary international migration 
trends has gained a global scale. 
The Increasing Role of International Migration 
in Demographic Development  
During the major part of the human history the population number primarily changed due 
to a natural increase of population. The mortality and fertility rates, growing gap in demo-
graphic potentials between less developed and more developed nations, as well as globali-
zation of the world economy have resulted in the growing role of international migration 
in the demographic development of the globe. 
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Nowadays, international migration is one of the major factors of stabilization of the 
world population. As for developed states, it is the principal (and in some countries –  
the only one) determinant of the population growth, while in the developing states it con-
tributes to the decrease in the population growth rate and alleviates ‘population pressure’. 
Thus, net migration from less developed regions to more developed regions exceeded 
100 million persons during the period from 1950 to 2015 (UN 2015b). 
Table 5. Indicators of Demographic Development of More Developed Regions, 
1950-2015 
time periods Average annual rate 
of population change 
Average annual rate
of natural increase 
Average annual rate 
of migration increase 
1950–1955 11.9 11.8 0.1 
1955–1960 11.7 11.7 0.0 
1960–1965 10.8 10.3 0.5 
1965–1970 8.5 7.8 0.7 
1970–1975 7.7 6.5 1.2 
1975–1980 6.5 5.2 1.3 
1980–1985 5.8 4.7 1.1 
1985–1990 5.5 4.2 1.3 
1990–1995 4.4 2.3 2.1 
1995–2000 3.2 1.0 2.2 
2000–2005 3.4 0.7 2.7 
2005–2010 4.0 1.3 2.7 
2010–2015 2.9 1.0 1.9 
Source: UN 2015a. 
 
Considering the global tendency of decreasing population growth rates developing regions 
are at the initial stage of this decrease while in developed countries the rate of natural popu-
lation growth is often negative. For this reason, the migration potential in developing coun-
tries remains high while developed countries are dependent on immigrants' inflow to with-
stand local population ageing. Between 1950 and 1955 the migration increase gains only  
1.7 per cent of total population increase in more developed regions, and between 2010 and 
2015 migration increase gains more than 65 per cent of total population increase (Table 5). 
It is important to highlight that international migration is not only a way to increase the 
whole population number but it also has a positive impact on its age and gender structure, 
bringing higher reproductive standards. 
In the 1990s the latter argument was applied within the ‘replacement migration’ concept 
which emphasized the potential of international migration from ‘demographically younger 
regions’ to compensate for negative demographic trends in the ‘older’ receiving states (UN 
2000). Whether ‘replacement migration’ is able to solve problems of population ageing in 
developed countries is a scientific problem which requires further discussion. Taking into 
account constant negative trends in demographic development (first of all, population age-
ing) in developed countries, the number of immigrants required to replace them seems too 
large. There are forecasts that the EU countries, in order to ‘compensate’ for ageing of their 
labor-active groups, are to ‘import’ annually 12.7 million immigrants until 2050. Russia, in 
order, to provide a stable number of the labor-age population, is to admit annually (up to 
median forecast) about 700,000 – 800,000 migrants (net migration) and gradually increase 
this number up to 1.5 – 1.7 million migrants by 2025 (UN 2000). 
Aleshkovski • International Migration and Globalization 173
In the 21st century the depopulation trends along with population ageing will make in-
ternational migration a non-alternative factor of the population growth in the majority of 
developed countries. In this context, one should consider not only the impact of immigration 
on the population size in receiving countries but the fundamental shifts in reproductive be-
havior, gender, age, and ethnic structure of the receiving countries' populations due to inflow 
of immigrants from distant regions. 
The Dual Character of Migration Policy 
The transformation of migratory streams into a global phenomenon has aroused a signifi-
cant interest of scientists, officials, politicians, international public organizations and pub-
lic in the issues of international migration. In its turn, there emerged a necessity to im-
prove the management tools for migratory processes (in particular, to prevent and reduce 
illegal immigration as well as to protect the refugees and others in need of protection) and 
to create a system of multi-level governance of international migration (GCIM 2005). 
At the present stage the following three levels of international migration management 
can be distinguished: 
– the global (world) level associates with a set of international treaties, agreements 
and other bilateral and multilateral normative legal acts on regulation of interstate territori-
al movements of population, and which pursues social, economic, demographic, geopoliti-
cal purposes, etc.; 
– the regional (interregional) level which is a set of agreements and other multilateral 
normative legal acts of integration associations, regional consultative processes and fo-
rums on migration on regulation of interstate territorial movements of population; 
– the national level (level of individual states) which is a set of measures and general 
principles to guide a government in managing the international territorial movements of 
population. 
The results of our analysis showed that one of the established measures system  char-
acteristics in the field of interstate territorial movements of population management be-
came its dual character. 
At the current stage of globalization the dual character of migration policy is distinctly 
noticeable at three levels (Aleshkovski, Iontsev 2015): 
– the global (world) level associates with contradictions between interests of various 
agents of international relations system (developed and developing countries, international 
organizations and certain states); 
– the regional level (level of integration associations) associates with existing counter-
active trends for liberalization of migration regime within integration associations and simul-
taneous toughening of migration policy towards citizens of third countries; 
– the national level (level of individual states) represents a contradiction between so-
cial, demographic, and economic interests, on the one hand, and national security, on the 
other hand. 
At the same time, the contradiction between migrants and host states as well as be-
tween businessmen and society in general, gains a particular meaning. It is especially im-
portant to keep this fact in mind since in recent years, in the developed countries the inte-
grating policy for migrants can be implemented both at the regional and national levels. 
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Global Level of Migration Policy 
The core of the international normative framework on international migration is constituted 
by agreements, recommendations and others legislative acts, which are adopted at different 
meetings and conferences, conducted under the auspices of the largest international organi-
zations, mainly the United Nations and its agencies (UNFPA, UNCTAD, UNHCR), Interna-
tional Organization for Migration (IOM) and International Labour Organization (ILO). 
The Compendium of Recommendations on International Migration and Development, 
published in 2006by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat, de-
fines to what extent the adopted documents should provide guidance to the governments to 
promote co-development initiatives in international migration management (see UN 2006a: 
95–98). 
Thus, the conducted analysis showed that resulting documents of conferences and sum-
mits contain various recommendations for improving the migration policy. At the same time, 
one can define the dual character of the approaches to managing the migratory processes 
at the global level. The duality at the global level proceeds, first of all, from the differing 
interests of various actors of the international relations system which are often in conflict 
with each other. For example, there are contradictions between the major countries of em-
igration and countries of immigration. As a result, many documents and agreements signed 
at international conferences remain for many years non-consummated or are applied in a 
limited number of countries since they have been ratified by an insignificant number of 
countries. 
A typical example here is the situation with ratification of international conventions 
dealing with migrant workers and affecting economic interests of receiving states. For ex-
ample, by the present time only 26 per cent of countries has ratified the 1949 Convention 
No. 97 ‘On migrant workers’ of the International Labor Organization, and as many as  
12 per cent of countries has ratified the 1975 ILO Convention No. 143 ‘Concerning Mi-
grations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treat-
ment of Migrant Workers’. In its turn, the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was adopted in 1990, 
came into force only in 2003, and has been ratified so far only in 24 per cent of countries 
(UN 2015a; ILO 2015b). 
Regional Level of Migration Policy 
Regional cooperation for the management of labor migration can be divided into formal mech-
anisms of regional integration (migration policy as a component of regional integration), re-
gional inter-state agreements (migration policy in the framework of inter-state agreements 
within a region) and less formal mechanisms, such as regional consultative processes and other 
informal arrangements. 
The dual character of the migration policy is expressed in two aspects. First, under the 
conditions of actively developing processes of the regional integration in the modern 
world, we witness liberalization of migration policy, the appearance of ‘transparent bor-
ders’ in the framework of regional unions, and freedom of movement for the population 
and labor force among the member countries across the internal state borders of those un-
ions. On the other hand, many countries adopt increasingly strict measures towards mi-
grants from ‘the third countries’, caused by different aspects of the national security  
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(including a fight against the threats of international terrorism and protection of the na-
tional labor markets). 
The second aspect is that the interests and goals of integration association, in general, 
cannot coincide or can even contradict the interests of individual member states. For ex-
ample, the position of the United Kingdom from the very beginning of its accession into 
the EU (1973) had a somewhat special limiting character which, afterwards, found its re-
flection in that it refused to sign the Schengen agreement. Another example is the North-
American Free Trade Agreement (USA, Canada and Mexico), giving a lot of a freedom of 
movement to citizens, including labor migrants between USA and Canada; however, the 
possibilities of labor migration from Mexico to those countries are significantly limited. 
National Level of Migration Policy 
In different periods of history, various components of the government migration policy 
(emigration or immigration) predominate and define the migration policy for a certain  
period. 
In the special periodical UN publication on demographic policy (World Population 
Polices Database), there is a special chapter on different national government views and 
state policy on international migration. Currently only 13 per cent of sovereign states do 
not regulate the scale of immigration, while 45 per cent of countries do not pursue any 
emigration policy (UN 2013a). At the same time, all developed countries have their immi-
gration policies. Thus, the immigration component prevails in the modern migration poli-
cy. Within the framework of this prevailing immigration policy the governments are inter-
ested to learn, who the arriving migrants are: the nationality, profession, qualification, age, 
family status, etc. These characteristics receive special attention taking into consideration 
the labor market situation, demographic tendencies, as well as national security aspects. 
The dual character of the migration policy is expressed in the contradictions of eco-
nomic, demographic and geopolitical nature. For example, the economic development 
usually requires liberalization of migration policy, while the interests of national security 
often require stricter policy, which could be vividly observed after the 9/11 events in the 
United States. 
In conclusion it is necessary to note that we believe that in order to overcome the dual 
character of migration policy and to benefit and use opportunities provided by safe, orderly 
and regular international migration as a resource of development one should apply a strategi-
cally adjusted approach to international migration management. 
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Global Migration: 
A Transnational Problem* 
 
Miriam Farhi-Rodrig 
 
 
In the present paper I search for a tentative compromise which would be practical 
and ethical or simply decent in order to contain the problem of global migration. 
The compromise I suggest is, as much as possible, to take into account the princi-
ple or criteria of mutual interest between migrants and native citizens at the mu-
nicipal level and, to a lesser extent, at the national level and beyond. The regula-
tion of immigration is a national prerogative by national consent, but it is con-
trolled also by regional and global agencies. Here I examine to what extent the 
formulation of the problem of global migration is conditioned on the model of 
globalization? In other words, I examine in what way the issues of global migra-
tion change with our dynamic concept of globalization. The traditional model of 
globalization is national, and national government controlled, effectively or not, 
migration. This means that government regulated the limits of their citizenry.  
The global problem of immigration and their solutions were formed with regard to 
national government and the power of global policies (such as those by the UN) 
was measured with respect to national policies. National policies were the target 
of evaluation – normatively or effectively. The new model of globalization admits 
that decisions are effectively made also beyond the national level, that is also both 
at the municipal and global levels. This model limits the power of government to 
regulate citizenry. In fact, as this model gets more acknowledgment, cooperation 
among different levels are enhanced. As a result, the problem of migration may 
eventually gain more effective recognition as well as enhance the resiliency of one 
of the new challenges of philosophy, namely the examination of the social, political 
and economic conflicts global migration creates. 
Keywords: migration, liberalism, citizenry, decent society, global problems, mutu-
ality of interest, urban techno citadels, global cities. 
Introduction 
Our times are enchanting and distorted: we have lost the audacity of the Renaissance, the 
naivety of the Enlightenment, but, I hope, we have overcome the despair of Post-
Modernism as well. We are bravely experimenting with new models in different fields and 
fearlessly adopting hybrids, multidisciplinary processes and new forms that transcend the 
existing ones in art, architecture, literature and not least in everyday social life. However,  
I have not only reservations, but downright dissatisfaction as well, regarding the workings 
of national and global political economy (on which global migration spreads its loose net). 
                                                          
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the 23rd World Congress of Philosophy, Athens, August 4–10, 2013. 
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As a result of my dissatisfaction regarding the workings of national and global political 
economy, I looked for a tentative solution to the problem of global migration. To my sur-
prise, I discovered that global cities, in general, offered workable social and economic so-
lutions to the problem of migration in their cities. 
My aim here is to design a conceptual framework for society in conjunction with the 
problem of global migration. Migrants are the weakest group of the population of any re-
gion. The author of the much debated book, Capital in the 21st Century, Thomas Picketty 
(2013), examines the relation between growing wealth and income inequality and finds 
that immigration boosts growth and, to some extent, reduces the economic gap between 
the rich and the poor because, he says, there is more income to share and distribute in a 
growing economy than in a shrinking one. As such, Picketty dissolves the consensus that 
the problem of global migration is degenerative. In other words, Picketty interprets global 
migration as a force that expands the economy and acts against plutocracy that creates and 
widens income inequality. 
I look for a robust yet flexible modus Vivendi for a decent society of migrants and citi-
zens. My proposition for a modus Vivendi is on two levels: political and municipal. On the 
political level, I propose the implementation of a new form of citizenry within the new 
limited cosmopolitan space. On the municipal level, I find that the municipalities of global 
cities to some extent accommodate the problem of the degrading quality of services they 
offer to their residents that arise as a result of global migration to their cities. I propose that 
governments of nation-states, as much as possible, adopt the working procedures of the 
municipalities of global cities where migration is dense. Such procedures may pave  
the way to decently accommodate social and economic networks for the survival and even 
flourishing of the legal and illegal residents of global cities in spite of the current reduced 
and rigid concept of citizenry. I, then, conclude that, just like in the case with home com-
puters, when children taught their parents how to master this new ghost that intruded into 
their private space, municipalities of global cities have to teach their governments how to 
deal with the problem of migration that intrudes into the public space. Then, governments 
would issue more flexible laws of citizenry in the newly transformed public spaces with 
respect to global migration.  
Global migration is a global problem to which global politics should provide solu-
tions.1 By the term ‘global politics’ I mean global cooperation and coordination backed up 
and supported by global legislation and, as much as possible, jurisdiction and enforcement. 
We observe, however, that solutions offered both at global and national levels do not work 
well. Saskia Sassen (2005: 35), a Dutch-American sociologist from Columbia University, 
in her article ‘Regulating Immigration in a Global Age: A New Policy Landscape’ writes, 
‘yet immigration policy in most of the highly developed countries has not been marked by 
major innovation as we have seen in other policy realm’. 
However, the solutions devised in global cities where migration is dense, work rela-
tively well, and somewhat better than existing solutions provided at national and global 
levels (Khanna and Maniam 2011). This is not surprising: global politics is not institution-
alized and global coordination of migration is not high on the agenda of global institutions, 
strong governments and globally influential decision makers. Yet, it is generally argued 
that global migration puts pressure both on economically advanced democratic states and 
                                                          
1 Regarding estimates on internal migration, cf. UNDP 2009: 21, and also World Bank 2013: 2–13. 
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on global cities where migration is dense. Sassen suggests that the solutions devised by 
individual states to control existing borders may not be workable any more: 
What is now experienced as a crisis in the control of the state over its borders 
may well be the sign that we need to redraw the map within which we confront 
the difficult question of how to regulate and govern immigration flows in an in-
creasingly interdependent world (Sassen 2005: 37). 
At the national scale, national political institutions such as political parties, agonize 
over the pressure from immigration on their electorate and suggest tailor made rules to 
protect the existing legal status of citizenry, without too much concern for the legal status 
of migrants. In global cities, the situation is somewhat different: for example, the right of 
residency and the freedom of settlement are elaborated according to the urgent needs  
of the residents, both citizens and migrants (see e.g., Acuto and Khanna 2013; Ong 2003).  
While exploring the existing solutions to alleviate the problem of global migration in 
particular within urban spaces hosting migration, I discovered the almost unnoticed and 
unspectacular contributions of municipalities to accommodate the way migrants are incor-
porated in urban techno citadels or global cities. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: first, I briefly describe the phenomenon of migra-
tion. Second, I dwell on the characteristics of a decent society prior to the contemporary 
era of globalization. Third, I examine a few policies to accommodate global migration. 
Fourth, I discuss the future of global cities as a hope for transforming the problem of glob-
al migration into a sustainable problem waiting to be attended to, at a global level. I, then, 
wrap up my discussion in three main points and present my modest and tentative solution 
to the problem of global migration. For example, smart cities, one of the latest develop-
ments of the advancement in the communication technology, namely the Internet, accom-
modate for the adoption of such solutions.2 
1. What is Migration? 
In the modern period of development of nationalism, migration was simply the movement 
of people over national borders (Benhabib 2006; Gellner 1983; Beck 2007). It can also be 
further divided into legal and recorded or illegal and unrecorded migration or according to 
purpose (family reunion, tourism, work etc.) or according to migration being voluntary or 
involuntary (refugees, asylum seekers and modern slave trades). The rights and the recog-
nition of each group differ. But this does not mean that the problem of global migration 
may be solved by tailor-made rules since we have to remember that migration is an inte-
gral part of global transformations (see e.g., Stiglitz 2010; Krugman 2007).  
Today migration is a trend that reshapes society in general and has already triggered 
contentious debate over policies affecting liberal institutions such as those protecting hu-
man rights, group rights, women's rights, freedom of expression, freedom in university 
education, the relation between state and religion in the sense of extending freedom of 
worship and reducing the role of the government in social and economic life (Beck 2009; 
Bauman 1998, 2000). Indeed the spectrum of influence of global migration on all facets of 
life is wide and ambiguous. 
                                                          
2 I develop this point in a forthcoming article called ‘Smart Cities and Global Migration’. 
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2. A Decent Society 
Originally, that is in the modern period of nationalism, prior to the era of contemporary 
globalization, the accepted building blocks of a decent society were based on the tradition-
al political model based on the hard-line approach characterized by a clear cut and rigid 
perspective. This perspective included, among others, the following principles:  
(1) the motto which calls to find the migrants, arrest them and throw them out;  
(2) rigid and reduced citizenry laws which delineate citizens from migrants; 
(3) a traditional model which reflects a commitment to law and to equality of rights of 
citizens only.  
Global transformations today are thinning this ethos, baring the concept of citizenry to 
the extent of making it skin deep only, to declining the unique sovereignty of the states 
over their citizens and to denuding borders of their original raison d'ètre (to prevent infil-
tration). In other words, the trend is that borders are less of a barrier to the free movement 
of people and that there are many more cosmopolitans scattered globally with fewer and 
weaker attachment to nation-states (Habermas 1998, 2001; Benhabib 2006). The cosmopoli-
tans and the progressive liberals within nation-states create a global community with rela-
tively new traits such as global consciousness and global or regional political solidarity 
(Habermas 2013). Already a century ago, Dewey was the harbinger of this community. 
As a matter of fact, a modern society is many societies more or less loosely con-
nected. Each household with its immediate extension of friends makes a society; 
the village or street group of playmates is a community; each business group, 
each club, is another. Passing beyond these more intimate groups, there is in a 
country like our own a variety of races, religious affiliations, economic divisions. 
Inside the modern city, in spite of its nominal unity, are probably more communi-
ties, more differing customs, traditions, aspirations and forms of control, than ex-
isted in an entire continent at an earlier epoch (Dewey 2016 [1916]: 12, – italics 
mine, MFR). 
The global community today, however new, virtual and with almost no judiciary status, is 
not marginal though not fully mainstream. This community is in the process of developing the 
global consciousness and solidarity that are needed to support human rights and ecological 
sustainability. They request a revision in the building blocks of a decent society in the tradi-
tional model, in particular regarding its rigid and reduced citizenry laws. This request is met 
differently by governments of nation-states and municipalities of urban citadels. We even 
see a divergence in the goals and incentives of national and urban legislation and jurisdic-
tions. In particular, there is pressure from the citizen residents to the national authorities to 
issue the laws from which clear and stable policies may be devised in order to alleviate the 
problem of global migration or, more specifically, non-citizen residents, in what concerns 
their resilience and quality of life (Benhabib 2006; Baubock 2005). 
Within this divergence in goals, we find that the criteria of mutuality of interest are 
more salient and remarkable in urban policy making within the limits of municipal legisla-
tion than in national legislation. An example of the way the criteria of mutual interest may 
be applied is found in the allocation of greater urban spaces to informal economies and to 
unfamiliar lifestyles in urban citadels with extensive immigration participation (with the 
aim of extracting the much needed revenues). Nevertheless, the allocation, to some extent, 
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reduces the marginalization of immigrants and helps monitor a feasible modus Vivendi of 
residents, both migrants and citizens. As such, policy makers in urban citadels maneuver 
between respecting national legislation and agreements concerning migrants in these 
urban citadels and protecting the criteria for the mutuality of interest within their area of 
jurisdiction (Benhabib 2006; Baubock 2005). This maneuvering, on the one hand, 
touches sensitivities regarding sovereignty and, on the other, only partially alleviates the 
problem of global migration both for citizens and migrants.  
Mutuality of interest dwells on the grounds of mutuality of benefits. This goes hand 
in hand with the principles of liberalism and the enhancement of existing institutions 
which I mentioned earlier and that protect liberalism. In fact, to ignore the principle of 
mutuality of interest as criteria for policy construction may rebuke migrants. The rebuke 
would immediately harm human rights and thus harm liberal institutions and the current 
understanding of democracy and liberalism, the pillars of economically advanced modern 
states. The economically advanced modern states inherited these pillars from the era of 
Modernity (sometimes also named First Modernity) at the turn of the previous century 
(see, e.g., Gellner 1983; Farhi-Rodrig 2011). Nevertheless, in spite of these pillars, global 
migration remains to be an ambiguous and multi-level problem (economic, political, social 
and communitarian). 
In short, the framework for society and space in conjunction with global migration in-
to urban techno citadels is characterized by open, complex and self-organizing systems 
such as observed in urban spaces: in urban spaces, the self-organizing systems are heavily 
dependent on economic and socio-cultural global and local processes or briefly, the geo-
political transformations. These transformations put pressure on the framework in which 
global cities develop in a way that it becomes more open, more dynamic and more exten-
sively self-organizing. In addition to that, the lack of clear legislation and jurisdiction leaves 
to both migrants and citizens the leeway for maneuvering and promoting their respective 
interests. In other words, the resilience of migrants and citizens is enhanced as the current 
geo-political transformations challenge the stability and status quo of global cities. As a 
result, the lifestyle entitlements of the growing population of migrants are, to some extent, 
accommodated. Migrants, even though they are non-citizen residents, become active par-
ticipants in establishing policies in urban architecture (such as in parks, in cheap housing, 
in settlements and in space allowed for informal economies). Migrants, also, act as a trig-
ger in developing policies regarding functional eco-systems such as kindergartens, grocery 
stores, social clubs and non-profit organizations informed by their lifestyle entitlements 
and leisure opportunities and preferences. It is these changing policies in urban spaces ra-
ther than national jurisdiction that provide freedom of circulation and rights of residency 
and settlement for migrants while their aspirations for more flexible citizenship rights 
gradually fade away. 
3. Policies to Accommodate Global Migration 
Within this framework and viewing the problem of global migration broadly, I find that 
the new challenge is to design stable policies that are more sensitive to the needs and re-
quirements of migrant minorities and to find a workable modus Vivendi which, on the one 
hand, as much as possible, contains migration and, on the other, harbors migrants with the 
aim of supporting and sustaining a decent society of migrants and citizens.  
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Upfront, I acknowledge that if an economically advanced nation-state, such as the 
USA, would, unconditionally, open the gates to migration (allowing free passage into her 
territory), its economy would collapse immediately. In other words, though I am a liberal,  
I do not advocate the unconditional free movement of people. Instead, this acknow-
ledgement, in my view, is rational thinking in interaction with changing socio-economic 
and cultural processes that are part of the self-organizing systems in the framework of urban 
spaces. Or put it simply, it is rational thinking given the current framework or situational 
logic or context. Popper (1979, 1999) coined the term piecemeal engineering to denote 
this attempt to reach reasonable outcomes. 
According to Popper, given a problem, say global migration, policies devised are chal-
lenged by the interaction between the dynamic social environment (global trans-
formations) and the problem itself (global migration). As a result of the implementation of 
the devised policies, errors are discovered and better appropriated new policies are de-
vised. Eventually, new problems arise and the process starts again. This is piecemeal engi-
neering that may serve as a construct for small interventions and not for ultimate solutions. 
Small interventions make, to some extent, practical ethics possible and accommodate prac-
tical social life as much as possible. 
Habermas (1998, 2013), on a similar note proposes the enhancement of com-municative 
rationality between citizens and migrants expecting to achieve intervention on a wider scale. 
According to him, solidarity (political) among those with similar ideals (faith in democracy, 
in siblinghood of humanity) is required in order to reach reasonable outcomes. Habermas 
differentiates between political solidarity and human solidarity (pity, religious principles, 
paternalism, etc.). He emphasizes that communicative rationality is achieved by the devel-
opment of the new kind of solidarity (political solidarity) as he described. 
Still, I find that a massive investment in the economies of the most desolate regions of 
the world may, in the first place, trigger hope for a better future and then act as a booster 
to accelerate the desolate economies. This development may immediately contain or delay 
migration and, to some extent, even invert the direction of migration (Rosenstein-Rodan 
1943; Sassower 1995). I mean migrants may go back to their native states and even some 
citizens of the hosting states may become migrants in the developing states. (When the 
Mexican economy somewhat improved in the aftermath of the 2008 global mortgage and 
financial crisis, many would-be migrants in Mexico delayed their immigration to the USA. 
As the 2008 crisis deepened in the European Union, the flow of immigration from Brazil 
to Spain slowed down and in some cases the flow of immigration reversed). In other 
words, by moderating migration and allocating massive investment to desolate regions, 
also may to some extent, serve as a policy that takes into account the criteria of the mutu-
ality of interest. Next, I wrap up my discussion in three points and, then, make my con-
cluding remarks.  
4. A Quick Wrap up 
First, on an economic level, it is not clear to what extent global migration is an economic 
problem for the hosting states. On the one hand, the part of the world, which attracts mi-
gration, is economically advanced and democratic and, incidentally, this part of the world 
saves much less than is required to meet the demands of its aging population.  
In other words, the hosting states spend more than they can afford to, given their social 
agreements, say with pension funds. Migrants, on the other hand, produce more income 
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than they consume in the hosting states making a positive contribution to the GNP of the 
hosting states. Thus, migrants contribute to increasing savings which may assist natives to 
honor, at least, parts of their social commitments. This is not all. In the hosting states, the 
private sector in general and industrialists in particular are for migrants as well, since it is no 
secret that they like cheap and abundant labor. So global migration is not only a burden to 
the hosting states, but it is also a blessing for their economy. Picketty (2013) also shows that 
migrants contribute to the reduction of the income gap in the hosting country, by expanding 
its gross national product and thus increasing the volume of wealth to be distributed. 
Actually, despite episodic efforts to control migration, national governments are gen-
erally unable to withstand private sector influences favoring migration and unable to sys-
tematically track and regulate individual migration. For example, in Israel, African refu-
gees and asylum seekers make up almost half per cent of the population in the territory and 
many are currently employed in formal and informal economies, many of them, without 
any legal status.3 
Second, on a political level, on the one hand, migrants put pressure for obtaining more 
flexible citizenship and residency rights that may lead to greater liberalization with en-
hanced global, national and civil rights. On the other hand, greater liberalization may 
threaten political stability in the hosting country and signal to many would-be migrants to 
leave their countries of origin which would further contribute to the political instability. 
Third, on a social and communitarian level, social practices and lifestyle entitlements 
of migrants are often rejected by citizens, on account that these practices are harmful to 
their society to the extent of abusing rights and powers that the hosting states extend  
to their citizens, for example, minimum wages and real estate prices in regions where mi-
grants dwell, generally, in clusters. This is a problem that requires new legislation and pol-
icies that reallocate funds to areas and groups most affected by the pressure of migration. 
Governments of democratic nation states are expected to attend to these problems (Balibar 
2006; Mouffe 1991, 2005).  
Yet, no matter to what extent these problems will be attended, the urge for survival in 
desolate areas will motivate many to move, despite marginalization of refugees in the host-
ing destination states. For example, according to Cowell and Bilefsky (2014)   
Frontex, the [European] union's border agency, also said the number of migrants 
from outside Europe known to have entered Europe illicitly this year was already 
close to the total for all of 2013 and was likely to rise as summer weather brings 
calmer seas, benefiting migrants crossing the Mediterranean from northern Africa. 
So, the framework in global cities which is open, dynamic and self-organizing will 
continue to be more open, dynamic and self-organizing, no matter how much antagonism 
global migration creates within the native population. 
5. Conclusion. The Future of Global Cities: A Possible Solution? 
Harnessed by the criteria of the mutuality of interest, the open, changing and self-ordering 
frameworks of the political, social and economic spheres in global cities meet, to some 
                                                          
3 The current number, according to PIBA's (immigration authority) most recent report is 46,437 (33,999 Eritreans, 
8,772 Sudanese and 3,049 other Africans). There has never been any formal clarification whether this includes births 
in Israel, but the assumption is that it does not, since births are not formally registered. More information may be 
found on PIBA's website: http://www.piba.gov.il/publicationandtender/foreignworkersstat/pages/default.aspx. 
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extent, the new needs of the legal and illegal residents: Khanna (2010), a geo-strategist at 
the New America Foundation, maintains that ‘cities rather than states are becoming the 
islands of governance on which the future world order will be built’. 
This perspective is rather new. In urban techno citadels, this perspective of cities as 
centers of governance originates, to a great extent, from both the impact of global trans-
formations and of global migration. Following this line of thought, it may be that, eventu-
ally, global cities will offer services and solutions to other cities in fields such as global 
migration, on line identity of their residents and regulatory oversight of national decrees in 
most aspects of life, social, economic and even political. In other words, cities may be-
come platform managers and curators of ecosystems giving democracy a new turn, trans-
parent, decentralized and organic. The bottom line is that global cities become the locomo-
tive of future changes not only for other cities and for accommodating global migration, 
but also for corporations, countries and even unions.   
As a matter of fact, already today, in urban techno citadels the reduced and limited 
concept of citizenry is not anymore the unequivocal guard of sovereignty and of the so-
called, social glue of society. In such spaces, the reduced concept of citizenry serves a new 
and weakened purpose: it, simply, serves as a standard of assessment, a tool for inquiring 
and understanding the changing processes in the framework of urban citadels and beyond 
(Ong 2003). 
Such transformations sharpen sensitivities of certain members of national govern-
ments: for example, citizens may discover that their governments contain a ministry of 
interior more attentive to the economic value of migrants, a ministry of housing more at-
tentive to the loss of value of the real estate in areas where migration is dense, a ministry of 
education more attentive to the changing needs of the migrant and non-migrant young chil-
dren and students, a ministry of welfare more attentive to the needs and requirements of 
the migrant minority. In other words, citizens of these global cities may discover that their 
governments have become more optimal. 
Against all odds and in view of my exploration of the almost organic transfor-
mations in global cities, I find that a new world order is evolving in which new politi-
cal partners will, gradually, pair up to increase resiliency worldwide. The Russian 
scholar, Leonid E. Grinin expands this point beyond global cities. According to him, 
global cities would be an intermediary form towards shaping a new political order that 
is more optimal as well. 
During the struggle for a role in organizing and operation of the new world order, 
an epoch of new coalitions will come, which will outline the contours of a new po-
litical landscape for a considerably long period... In searching for the most stable 
and adequate supranational systems various intermediary forms may develop, 
where the players of the world and regional political arenas will search for the most 
favorable and convenient blocks and agreements (Grinin 2012: 226–227). 
To repeat, in line with the predictions made by Leonid Grinin, I propose that national 
and municipal policy makers consider the principle of mutuality of interest between them-
selves, as well as, the mutuality of interest between migrants and non-migrants and thus, 
loosen both the hierarchy set by the political system and the already scarred sensitivities 
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regarding national sovereignty. In other words, cities must be empowered rather than 
restrained by national governments to become more active agents in solving the problem 
of migration within their municipal territory. Then, national and local legislation and 
jurisdiction may cooperate instead of act hierarchically. The hierarchy will gradually 
dissolve within the dynamic public space, eroding sovereignty and gradual transcend-
ence of nationhood. The hierarchy will, then, dissolve into an ideal of global citizenry 
and of global coordination in which cities are weaved together into a new form of cos-
mopolitanism and the most desolate regions of the planet are invited to join the band-
wagon of the global economy. Migration will, then, gradually become a solution to 
problems rather than a problem or a burden. The resulting society would be more demo-
cratic as well as more human and its economy would be more inclusive. 
The question is what can go wrong? Old and new problems may arise in different in-
tensities and dimensions that require the implementation of old and new solutions which 
will be replaced or reformed as mistakes and new problems are discovered. As long as 
decision makers stick to democratic procedures and learn from their mistakes, the worst 
scenarios may be avoided and philosophy may, then, take a short break. 
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Part III. ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND  
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
 
 
Transnational Labor Relations in SADC:  
Regional Integration or Regional Globalization? 
 
Paul A. Smit 
 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a transnational organi-
zation that has 15 member states and total population of about 280 million people. 
One of the aims of SADC, as founded in Article 5 of its Treaty, is to strive towards 
regional integration. SADC has adopted certain basic norms and standards in its 
Treaty, Charter on Fundamental Social Rights, and various protocols that are ap-
plicable to all citizens within SADC. In this paper the concept of a Transnational 
Legal Process (TLP) and regional labor standards are reviewed. Attention is given 
to the establishment and original aims of SADC. The SADC Charter is analyzed 
and the institutional architecture of SADC is discussed. The link between the ILO 
core conventions and the SADC Charter is also shown. The author argues that re-
gional integration and a Transnational Labor Relations system within SADC is 
possible and that the SADC Charter and the ILO core conventions can be used as 
the basis of regional labor standards within SADC which in turn will lead to the 
achievement of social justice. The author also evaluates the link between regional 
integration as a SADC strategy and globalization and argues that regional inte-
gration is not necessarily regional globalization. 
Keywords: Transnational Labor Relations (TNLR), social rights, labor rights, re-
gional labor standards, international law, regional integration, globalization. 
Introduction 
John Donne's famous saying ‘no man is an island upon himself’ is even more relevant to-
day than it was in 1624 especially in the world of international trade, globalization, inter-
national treaties and the United Nations. We live in an age of transnationalism, where 
transnational legal norms move around the globe Globalization and the increasing move-
ment of capital and labor across international borders, with the exception of migrant work-
ers who are facing major obstacles by immigration laws, are creating a situation where 
laws in general and labor laws in particular are obtaining an international character. Inter-
nationally the problem of movement of labor is the asymmetric structure between capital 
and labor in reference to the freedom of movement. In view of increasing globalization, 
the Conventions of the International Labor Organization (hereafter the ILO) have assumed 
greater prominence in recent years. Internationalization and globalization have had a 
growing impact in many areas especially in legal and economic relations (Smit 2010). 
There has been a rapid growth in the role of international agreements and supranation-
al authority over the past 40 years that regulate economic, social, communications, envi-
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ronmental and human rights behavior (Simmons 1998). Transnational relations influence 
world politics in almost every issue-area. Many multi-national corporations with subsidiar-
ies in other countries have annual financial turnovers larger than the gross national product 
(GNP) of several countries, and create adaptation problems for the foreign economic poli-
cies of many states (Risse-Kappen 1995). The original concept of transnational relations 
encompasses almost everything in world politics, except inter-state relations. This has led 
to a situation where many sovereign nation-states were forced to choose a side in estab-
lishing their political, economic, social, and cultural relations and operations, which, in 
itself, again led to regionalism. 
The SADC Region has a total population of about 280 million and is considered to be 
one of the most promising developing regions in the world in terms of economic potential 
(Mukuka 2013). Almost 40 per cent of the region's population still lives in conditions of 
abject poverty which translates to a need of a sustained economic growth in the region of 
around six per cent per annum. This paper is premised on the conviction that the success-
ful implementation of SADC policies, objectives as found in the SADC Treaty, Charter 
and protocols through appropriate employment and labor policies as well as strategies can 
contribute towards regional integration, regional labor standards, improvement in the qual-
ity of life of millions of people and the attainment of sustained growth that are required to 
alleviate and subsequently eradicate the unacceptably high levels of poverty in many 
SADC member states, it is, therefore, not necessary to re-invent the wheel. Unfortunately, 
the average citizen within SADC does not see or experience in practical benefit in all these 
policy documents (Smit 2014). 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to analyze the theoretical framework of trans-
national labor relations and regional labor standards and what motivates countries to ad-
here or not adhere to transnational law. An overview of SADC and its institutional archi-
tecture is also provided. The SADC Charter, its origins and link to ILO core conventions 
are analyzed and the author illustrates how these instruments can contribute towards 
SADC regional integration and the establishment of a transnational labor relations system 
within SADC. The author suggests that a transnational labor relations system within 
SADC is attainable by just adhering to the ILO core conventions and the SADC Charter 
but that the practical problem lies with compliance and monitoring such. An overview of 
the concept of globalization is provided and the author argues that in the greater scheme of 
things the transnational labor relations can contribute towards regional integration and this 
in turn creates a framework for regional globalization. The possibilities for further re-
search are also indicated.  
Conceptualizing Transnational Labor Relations and Regional  
Labor Standards 
Hyman defined labor relations as the regulation of work and employment and it involves 
different forms of collective regulation which refract and transform the merely monetary 
dynamics of the employment relationship (Hyman 2001). The living and working condi-
tions of most working people and thus of society as a whole are determined by the nature 
and quality of labor relations (Kohl and Platzer 2003). 
The development of a proficient labor relations system is as much an intrinsic part of  
a system change as it is a requirement for successful transformation seeing that they are 
primary components of civil society and can provide indispensable guidance for the reso-
lution of social conflict, forming harmonies, economic modernization and the stabilization 
of social equality.  
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Initially labor relations emerged on a confined or sectoral basis, but it became consol-
idated within a national institutional structure (Hyman 2001). It is important that national 
labor relations systems must not be understood in isolation, but within a framework or 
structure to understand a global labor relations framework that is growing and developing 
(Lillie and Lucio 2012). 
Transnationalism can be viewed as the shared, educational, political and economic asso-
ciations and interactions that take place between people and institutions. Labor markets on 
the other side become transnational if they involve activities and occupations that require 
regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementa-
tion (Horvath 2012). Transnationalism can also be seen as an escalating, deepening process 
in which innovative social practices, systems of symbols and objects come about through 
increasing international movement of goods, information and people. New transnational 
forces of capital and labor have surfaced as important actors as a result of the transnationali-
zation of production and funding in times of global restructuring (Bieler 2005). 
Transnationalism and all its different facets have a major influence on all the different 
role players in Transnational Companies (TNCs) and especially the employment relation-
ship. Not only does a TNC need to integrate various human resource principles and poli-
cies to create cohesion (Dickmann, Müller-Camen, and Kelliher 2008), but also have to 
implement transnational human resource management (THRM) practices (Gennard 2008).  
It becomes problematic where employment or labor decisions that are taken in one ar-
ea of the world have an effect on employment relations somewhere else in the world. It is 
apparent that transnational relationships of actors have become so intertwined that it is al-
most impossible to understand the strategies of actors within one country without referring 
to the events and strategies of actors in other countries (Lillie and Greer 2007). It would 
seem as if transnational capital plays national environments of against each other but at the 
same time attempts to create a genuinely global business environment (Lillie and Lucio 
2012). The globalization of markets and firms has had a profound impact on labor rela-
tions (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008) and defined Labor transnationalism as ‘The spatial 
extension of trade unionism through the intensification of co-operation between trade un-
ionists across countries using transnational tools and structures’. 
Research on labor transnationalism is becoming more important due to the rapid 
growth in TNCs. Political entrepreneurs can play a vital role in the development of labor 
transnationalism. Political entrepreneurs should have the vision to look at transnational strat-
egies and the leadership skills to impact on their own constituencies. International (or global) 
framework agreement (IFA) which is an instrument negotiated between a multinational en-
terprise and a Global Union Federation (GUF) in order to establish an on-going relationship 
between the parties and ensure that the company respects the same standards in all the 
countries where it operates also impacted on the research on labor transnationalism. 
Helfen and Fichter are of the opinion that ‘academic research is only beginning to 
deal with what we would define as an emerging arena of transnational labor relations’ 
(Helfen and Fichter 2013). 
The rise and growth of the EU are the landmarks of a development process that in-
volved the globalization of capital and trade that resulted in the establishment of a new 
transnational regulations system as well as the reformation of general economies and wel-
fare states. It is on this basis that different forms of transnational labor relations and or re-
gional labor standards have emerged (Horvath 2012). 
It would appear that transnational labor relations are still in an emerging, formative 
phase considering institutionalization, projecting a very fragmented, diverse and mixed 
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picture of development even though certain processes and institutions. European Works 
Councils have emerged within the EU that strongly suggests that the EU is on the way to 
the establishment of the EU transnational labor relations regime or regional labor stand-
ards. Lillie and Lucio have identified that there are two dominant trends in transnational 
labor relations research; namely, the optimists who show how it can work in specific situa-
tions, and then there are pessimists who stress labor's vulnerability against management-
devised competitive frameworks (Lillie and Lucio 2012). 
The expansion of transnational labor relations and the establishment of regional labor 
standards would require trade unions to reassert their main objectives in a contemporary 
language so that they can effectively function in flexible labor markets and different 
workplaces (Taylor 1999). There are obvious obstacles that stand in the way of the devel-
opment of a realistic and permanent transnational labor relations system as transnational 
trade union federations must decide on strategies to confront the countless challenges from 
increasing globalization. The development of transnational labor relations and regional 
labor standards are of great importance as it can assist organized labor to mobilize and 
enhance its power through international agreements across national borders. 
Transnational Law  
To understand the general structure of the world's industrial relations system, the role of 
regional powers and transnational actors should be explained in order to perceive the in-
fluences of global challenges (Aliu 2012). 
One can, therefore, rightly ask: What is ‘transnational?’ The term would indicate that 
it is beyond what is considered to be national, in other words, across national borders. 
Transnational law is the term commonly used for referring to laws that govern the conduct 
of independent nations in their relationships with one another. It differs from other legal 
systems in that it primarily concerns states, rather than private citizens. In other words, it is 
that body of law that is composed of the greater part of the principles and rules of conduct 
which states feel themselves bound to observe and, therefore, do commonly observe in 
their relations with each other. These include: 
(a) The rules of law relating to the function of international institutions or organiza-
tions, their relations with each other, and their relations with states and individuals; and 
(b) Certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-state entities, so far as the 
rights and duties of such individuals and non-state entities are the concern of the interna-
tional community. 
Transnational law can be equated with a Transnational Legal Process (TLP) which 
provides the key to understand the issue of compliance with international law. This view 
immediately raises the following question: why do nation-states and other transnational 
actors obey international law, and why do they sometimes disobey it? (Koh 1996) In order 
to answer this very important question three very obvious questions come to light, namely: 
what is a transnational legal process, where did it come from and how does it assist in ex-
plaining why nations obey? 
Koh sees the transnational legal process as the manner in which theory and practice of 
public and private actors, nation-states, international organizations, multinational enter-
prises, NGO's and private individuals interact in a variety of private and public, interna-
tional and domestic spheres and also how they interpret, enforce and then ultimately inter-
nalize the rules of international law. A TLP has four very distinctive features: 
i. It is non-traditional. 
ii. It is non-statist as it also includes non-state actors. 
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iii. It is very dynamic and not static. 
iv. It is normative as it not only describes a process but also the normativity of that 
process (Koh 1996: 184).  
It would appear that democracies are more likely to comply with international legal 
obligations, as they share an affinity with international legal processes and institutions. 
Countries with independent judiciaries are more likely to trust and respect international 
judicial processes and political leaders that are accustomed to constitutional constraints on 
their power in a domestic context are more likely to accept principled legal limits on their 
international behavior (Simmons 1998: 83–84). A transnational labor relations ‘regime’ 
would be a set of structures and norms operating across national borders to buttress na-
tional law and practices by either reinforcing national norms or superseding them (Trubek, 
Mosher, and Rothstein 2000: 1194). Chayes and Chayes contend that states enter into in-
ternational agreements and that they will to a certain degree comply with those agreements 
on three propositions: 
i. The propensity to comply is more plausible and useful than the assumption that 
states will violate treaties whenever it is in their interest to do so; 
ii. Very often compliance problems do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate in-
ternational agreements; and 
iii. Complete or strict compliance of treaties is unnecessary and all that is required is 
an acceptable level of overall compliance to safeguard the interest of the treaty (Chayes 
and Chayes 1993).  
Efficiency, interests, and norms all favour treaty compliance. This is mainly because 
decisions are not free, there is a continuous recalculation of costs vs. benefits and also in-
ternational treaties are related to states interests as international law cannot bind states ex-
cept with their own consent. As national positions and interests evolve it will help to in-
duce compliance. The fundamental norm of international law is pacta sunt servanda – 
treaties are to be obeyed, the compliance with international treaties and law is, therefore, 
also a very important normative process. 
Noncomplying behaviour can be attributed to the following factors: 
i. Ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language as treaty language varies in its de-
terminacy. 
ii. Limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings. Apart from a 
political will to comply, the choice that must be made domestically requires scientific and 
technical judgment which states, especially developing countries, may be lacking. 
iii. All treaties require a period of transitions before mandated changes can be accom-
plished. Changing conditions and underlying circumstances require a shifting mix of regu-
latory instruments to which state behaviour cannot instantly respond. Treaties are not just 
‘aspirational’, the ultimate goal is to start a process that will over time bring states into 
greater congruence with treaty ideals (Chayes and Chayes 1993).  
The traditional model of industrial relations that are limited to the borders of nation-
states is increasingly becoming problematic, with the opening of and merging of labor mar-
kets, of which the European integration process is a very good example (Seifert 2012).  
The market freedoms enshrined in the TFEU have contributed to building up an internal 
market on the European scale. Transnational enterprises can easily relocate their activities 
from subsidiaries in one country to those located to another country (Seifert 2012). Trans-
national collective bargaining in European-scale companies has gained increasing rele-
vance over the last years due to the increasing number of European works councils 
(EWCs) that have been established. Jeremy Waddington describes EWCs as a Transna-
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tional Industrial Relations Institution in the making (Waddington 2012: 232). European 
trade unions are also trying to undertake transnational collective bargaining with Europe-
an-wide companies with European Framework Agreements (EFA) (Seifert 2012). EWCs 
and EFAs have given a transnational character to the labor relations in the EU.  
There seems to be an increasing support for the establishment of a legal framework for 
transnational collective bargaining within the EU. The use of international labor standards in 
domestic law must be based on the legal materials available to states under their domestic 
laws. These materials include international customary law, the manner in which a state's 
constitution articulates with international law. International labor standards provide a rich 
and authoritative source for the development of labor law and national level that can ensure 
consistency between the different systems of law and at the same time ensuring state com-
pliance with international obligations (Cheadle 2012). 
Establishment and Original Aims of SADC 
Current members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Leso-
tho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Republic of 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
SADC was originally founded in April 1980 as the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) by the leaders of the so-called Frontline States in 
Southern Africa. The original aim was to create a mechanism whereby member-states 
could formulate and implement projects of common interest in select area in order to re-
duce their economic dependence, particularly, but not only on the Republic of South Afri-
ca. It was conceived as an economic dimension of the struggle of liberation from colonial 
and white minority rule and the economic domination of the sub-region by the apartheid 
regime in South Africa (Ngongola 2012). 
The founders were clear that trade and market integration were not its priorities, the 
desire was for genuine and equitable regional integration. Trade liberalization and market 
integration became part of the SADC common agenda when SADCC became SADC un-
der the Windhoek Declaration and Treaty of 1992. This treaty provided for Regional Eco-
nomic Communities (RECs) for the different sub-regions of Africa and SADCC had to be 
repositioned as the REC for the Southern African sub region and by including South Afri-
ca as a member and prioritizing trade liberalization and market integration. A protocol on 
trade was signed by eleven member states, excluding Angola, in 1996, providing for the 
establishment of a free trade area (FTA). This protocol became into force in January 2000 
when it was ratified by two thirds of the members (Ibid.). 
SADC member states are encouraged to ensure the harmonization of political and socio-
economic plans, to develop economic, social and cultural ties, to participate fully in the im-
plementation of SADC projects, developing policies that can lead to the elimination of ob-
stacles to the free movement of people, labor, capital, goods and services and to promote the 
development of human resources and also the development, transfer and mastery of technol-
ogy. Eight areas of cooperation have been identified and each area is administered by a pro-
tocol. A protocol enters into force if it has been ratified by at least two thirds of the member 
states and a protocol is only binding on a member state that has ratified it (Ngongola 2008). 
The institutional architecture of SADC can be illustrated schematically as follows. 
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Fig. 1. The institutional architecture of SADC 
Source: Peters-Berries 2002. 
The main sections within the SADC institutional framework are described below. 
1. Summit 
The Summit is made up of all SADC Heads of States or Government and meets twice a 
year. The Summit is the ultimate policy- and decision-making body of SADC, responsible 
for policy direction and the SADC's overall control functions. 
2. Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers consists of Ministers from Foreign Affairs and Economic Plan-
ning or Finance of all member states. The Council oversees the functioning and develop-
ment of SADC and ensures that SADC's policies are properly implemented. It is the 
Council's responsibility to manage SADC's affairs and to advice the Summit on matters of 
overall policy. The Council is the second highest level of authority and the highest func-
tioning level in SADC and meets four times a year. 
3. Standing Committee of Officials 
The Standing Committee of Officials, a technical advisory committee to the Council of Min-
isters, meets twice a year. It consists of one Permanent/Principal Secretary, or an official of 
equivalent rank from each member state, preferably from a ministry responsible for eco-
nomic planning or finance.  
4. Secretariat 
This is the principal executive body of SADC. The Secretariat is responsible for the day-
to-day activities, co-ordination, strategic planning, and management.  
5. Tribunal 
The Tribunal, which is no longer functional, was established in Windhoek, Namibia with 
the signing of a protocol during the 2000 Ordinary Summit. The main aim for the estab-
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lishment of the Tribunal was to ensure adherence to and implementation of  
the provisions of the SADC Treaty and Contributory instruments. Article 15 of the Treaty 
states that the Tribunal also has jurisdiction over disputes. The Tribunal derives its power 
and legal status from the SADC Treaty.  
The institutional framework of the organization was previously oriented on a coopera-
tive, and not on an integration approach. For this reason institutional challenges remain. 
There is still a huge gap between SADC regional initiatives and the member states' nation-
al objectives. Regional integration is high on the priority list of SADC and the initial 
agenda was to establish a Free Trade Area in 2008, a Customs Union in 2010, a Common 
Market in 2015, a Monetary Union in 2016 and regional currency in 2018. This regional 
integration agenda is very ambitious under the current environment and it is clear that it is 
not achievable. Some progress has been made towards the establishment of a Free Trade 
Area and a Customs Union but there still major differences between member states regard-
ing the implementation. 
SADC Charter on Fundamental Social Rights 
The overall objective of the Fundamental Social rights in SADC Charter is to facilitate 
through close and active consultations amongst social partners, a spirit conducive to har-
monious labor relations within the region. 
The Southern Africa Trade Union Co-Ordination Council (SATUCC) played a major 
role in the drafting and eventual acceptance by the SADC Employment and Labor Sector 
(ELS) thereof in 2001. 
SATUCC represents all major trade union federations within the Southern African re-
gion and was initially launched in March 1983 in Gaborone, Botswana (LaRRI 2001). 
Some of the main aims of SATUCC were: 
i. to co-ordinate union activities in the region; 
ii. to contribute towards economic and social liberation of the region; 
iii. to develop democratic and free trade unions and to assist the oppressed black trade 
unions, at that stage in South Africa and Namibia; and 
iv. to intensify worker education on matters related to social security and internation-
al labor standards. 
In January 1995, the SADC Council of Ministers decided to create a new SADC Em-
ployment and Labor Sector (ELS) and SATUCC was recognized as the representative re-
gional trade union body. As time went by SATUCC became politically visible and were 
reporting on economic and employment conditions and were also making suggestions to 
SADC (LaRRI 2001). The trade union movements within SADC were concerned that the 
economic focus of SADC states had overridden the political aspirations of regional inte-
gration. Several workshops were organized by SATUCC to address amongst other issues, 
the following: 
i. the development of a plan to regulate the free movement of labor within SADC un-
til greater economic equality is achieved; 
ii. the role unions can play within SADC to ensure that minimum labor standards ap-
ply to all workers; 
iii. the need for an integrated policy of industrial and human resource development; and 
iv. the development of a Social Charter with minimum labor standards that should be 
applied to protect workers. 
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The Social Charter was adopted by SATUCC and presented to the Southern African 
Labor Commission (SALC) in Lusaka in March 1992 and was also further discussed at the 
SALC Conference in Maseru in 1995 (LaRRI 2001). The Charter was also discussed by 
the ELS of SADC over many years. Initially governments were reluctant to adopt the 
Charter and many disagreed with the idea of free movement of people in the region, em-
ployers also delayed the adoption and demanded that the right to lock-out should be en-
trenched as a basic right. In an effort to reach consensus amongst governments and em-
ployers the Charter went through several changes over the years. The Charter of Funda-
mental Social Rights in SADC was finally adopted at the ELS meeting of SADC in Wind-
hoek in February 2001. 
In 2003, the Council of Minister of SADC adopted the Charter on Fundamental Social 
Rights which amongst others seeks to provide a framework for regional labor standards. It 
obliges member states to create an enabling environment, consistent with ILO core con-
ventions, to prioritize ILO core conventions and take the necessary action to ratify and 
implement these standards. The Charter further requires member states to create an ena-
bling environment to ensure equal treatment for men and woman, and for the protection of 
children and young people (Van Niekerk et al. 2012). 
Unfortunately, the Charter cannot be enforced directly, and unlike ILO Conventions 
there is currently no independent supervisory mechanism to call members to account for 
any breach of the Charter.  
The main objectives of this Charter are to: 
1. Ensure the retention of the tripartite structure of the three social partners, namely: 
governments, organizations of employers, and organizations of workers. 
2. Promote the formulation and harmonization of legal, economic and social policies 
and programs, which contribute to the creation of productive employment opportunities 
and generation of incomes, in member states. 
3. Promote labor policies, practices and measures, which facilitate labor mobility, re-
move distortions in labor markets and enhance industrial harmony and increase productivi-
ty, in member states. 
4. Provide a framework for regional co-operation in the collection and dissemination 
of labor market information. 
5. Promote the establishment and harmonization of social security schemes. 
6. Harmonize regulations relating to health and safety standards at work places across 
the Region; and 
7. Promote the development of institutional capacities as well as vocational and tech-
nical skills in the Region. 
It is also important to pay attention to some of the most important articles of the char-
ter that relate directly to labor relations and labor standards. 
The article on universal and basic human rights as proclaimed by the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Constitu-
tion of the ILO and the Philadelphia declaration are to be observed (Art. 3). 
The article on Freedom of association and collective bargaining requires member states 
to create an enabling environment consistent with ILO Conventions on freedom of associa-
tion, and the right to organize and collective bargaining (Art. 4). SATUCC is of the 
opinion that this right should be entrenched in the Constitution of every individual 
member state of SADC.  
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The article on the Conventions of the International Labor Organization (Art. 5) re-
quires member States to establish a priority list of ILO Conventions which shall include 
Conventions on abolition of forced labor (Nos. 29 and 105), freedom of association and 
collective bargaining (Nos. 87 and 98), elimination of discrimination in employment (Nos. 
100 and 111), and the minimum age of entry into employment (No. 138). Member states 
must take the necessary steps, as a priority, to ratify and implement the core ILO Conven-
tions. 
The article on the Equal treatment of men and women requires that men and women 
must be treated as equals in all aspects of the work life (Art. 6). 
The Protection of children and young people in line with ILO Convention 138 deals 
with employment age, remuneration of children and young people and vocational training 
(Art. 7). 
The issues of Elderly people, retirement age and social benefits for elderly people who 
do not have a pension but have reached normal retirement age are also addressed (Art. 8). 
The treatment of Persons with disabilities in the work place and their access to train-
ing and social security are contained in Article 9 of the Charter.  
All employees will have access to Social protection and social security benefits and 
social assistance irrespective the type of employment (Art. 10). 
All member States must strive towards the Improvement of living and working condi-
tions of employees by addressing issues like working hours, rest periods, paid leave and 
maternity leave etc. (Art. 11). 
Every employee in SADC has the right to a healthy and safe working environment 
(Art. 12). 
Member States are also required to create an enabling environment so that industrial 
and workplace democracy is promoted (Art. 13). 
From the above it is clear that the Charter aims at creating or establishing a broad 
framework of basic labor and/or social rights and this can be interpreted as a Transnational 
Labor Relations framework for SADC. 
Member states are required to submit regular progress reports to the Secretariat re-
garding the implementation of the Charter. Unfortunately, the Charter does not specify 
what is meant by regular reports nor what steps can be taken against a member state that 
fails to implement the Charter.  
Status of ILO Core Conventions in Member States of SADC 
It is also important to establish the link between ILO Core Conventions and the SADC 
Charter as both these instruments can assist in the establishment of regional labor stand-
ards which ultimately can play a part in the process of regional integration. 
In 1998, the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work it is an expression of commitment by governments, employers' and workers' organi-
zations to uphold basic human values – values that are vital to our social and economic 
lives. The Declaration commits Member States to respect and promote principles and 
rights in four categories, whether or not they have ratified the relevant Conventions.  
These categories are: 
i. freedom of association including the right to collective bargaining; 
ii. the elimination and prohibition of forced or compulsory labor; 
iii. the abolition and prohibition of child labor; and  
iv. the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
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The ILO Declaration of 1998, thereby makes these core Conventions binding on 
member states irrespective if these Conventions have been ratified or not. There is current-
ly a discussion within the ILO to include the Conventions on health and safety as well as 
the Convention on a living wage as part of the core labor rights. 
Article 5 of the SADC Charter requires member States to establish a priority list of 
ILO Conventions and specifically to ratify and implement the core conventions of the ILO. 
The table below indicates the 15 member States of SADC and in which year a particu-
lar core convention of the ILO has been ratified. 
Table 1 
Member C29 C87 C98 C100 C105 C111 C138 C182 
Angola 2001 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 2001 2001 
Botswana 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 2000 
DRC 2001 1969 1960 2001 1969 2001 2001 2001 
Lesotho 1966 1966 1966 2001 1998 1998 2001 2001 
Madagascar 1960 1960 1998 1962 2007 1961 2000 2001 
Malawi 1999 1965 1999 1999 1965 1965 1999 1999 
Mauritius 2005 1969 1969 1969 2002 2002 1990 2000 
Mozambique 1996 1996 2003 1977 1977 1977 2003 2003 
Namibia 1995 1995 2000 2000 2010 2001 2000 2000 
Seychelles 1978 1999 1978 1978 1999 1999 2000 1999 
South Africa 1996 1996 1997 1997 2000 1997 2000 2000 
Swaziland 1978 1978 1978 1979 1981 1981 2002 2002 
Tanzania 2000 1962 1962 1962 2002 2002 1998 2001 
Zambia 1996 1996 1964 1965 1972 1979 1976 2001 
Zimbabwe 2002 1998 1998 1998 1989 1999 2000 2000 
It is argued that the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights and the seven core ILO 
conventions that have been ratified by all member states of SADC can form the basis of a 
Transnational Labor Relations system and or regional labor standards in SADC. The main 
aims of the SADC Charter will not be achieved in as far as it concerns the place of work 
and employees if these core ILO Conventions have no real impact on the shop floor and 
the life's of employees. It is also clear that when SATUCC started its campaign for the 
establishment of the SADC Charter that the core ILO conventions formed the basis of 
the proposed content of the SADC Charter. The core ILO conventions have created an 
international obligation on ILO member states and the SADC Charter aims to establish a 
further regional obligation on SADC member states. 
Regional Integration vs. Regional Globalization 
Is Regionalism just a different form of globalization, or are these two terms or ideas com-
patible? Globalization can be defined as a process by which the economies of the world 
become increasingly integrated leading to a global economy with global economic policy 
making, through such international agencies as the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Globalization is also viewed by many as a ‘global culture’ in which the world population 
consumes similar goods and services across countries and use a common business lan-
guage, English. This has led to an increase in the openness of economies to international 
trade, financial flows and direct foreign investment. Globalization can lead to an increase 
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in the mobility of factors of production mainly capital and labor (Kamau 2013). Many 
people view globalization as Americanization. 
Economic integration occurs whenever a group of nations in the same region join to-
gether to form an economic union or regional trading bloc by raising a common tariff wall 
against the products of non-member countries while freeing internal trade among mem-
bers. The integration provides an opportunity for industries to take the advantage of econ-
omies of large-scale production made possible by the expanded markets. A regional eco-
nomic bloc should, therefore, be conceptualized as an entity encompassing and transcend-
ing nation-states. The economic aspect of these may be described as, in the first instance, 
the efforts to form free-trade zones through the creation of common markets, and second-
ly, the co-ordination of economic policies and the implementation of joint economic poli-
cies to form even larger economic zones. Regionalism has had enormous impact on the 
environment of nation-states. It has, for instance, had a regulating impact on MNCs 
through measures such as corporate laws, competition policies, and labor policies. The 
very essence for the creation of a regional economic organization is to give them greater 
ability to protect regional and national interest in relation to other countries, transnational 
companies and international economic organizations. This contradicts globalization 
(Yeates 2005). 
Regional formations are an important manifestation of state strategies and integral to 
any analysis of the ways in which collective action is recast at a transnational level.  
The main of most regional formations are economic by nature. The almost exclusive 
preoccupation of these formations with economic issues has led to a reaction from inter-
national civil society organizations, which increasingly demand that social issues be ad-
dressed as well. Yet, civil society demands are articulated through the shadow summits 
and social forums that now regularly accompany intergovernmental meetings. This lays 
the groundwork for the development of an inclusive, democratic and developmental so-
cial policy at regional level; in this regard the SADC Charter is a very good example. 
Social welfare, social institutions and social relations have become entangled in mate-
rial processes that extend beyond national borders and their transformation now has a re-
gional character (Kamau 2013). These transnational elements and the dynamics that come 
with it must begin with an appreciation of the contemporary pluralistic global social gov-
ernance structure which is ‘multi-tiered’, ‘multi-sphered’ and ‘multi-actored’.  
The regional integration strategy of SADC and other regional formations can be found 
in transnational collaboration, which can include: exchange of information; identification 
of common issues and positions; collaborative action on specific issues; coordination of 
national laws, policies and practices; coordination of policy positions; and collective rep-
resentation at other regional or international forums. But is this regional globalization? 
Regional formations are an integral part of any critical assessment of the possibilities 
for transformative political agency in a globalization context. Regional formations are very 
often the result of political struggle and negotiations over the content and direction of a 
social policy that reflects the traditions, interests and needs of member countries and their 
populations. 
Regional agreements in actual fact discriminate against third countries outside the re-
gion and become protectionist blocs with their own sets of trade rules. Politically, regional 
formations can offer member countries a number of advantages. They facilitate govern-
ments in the achievement of their foreign policy objectives. Regional formations can also 
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act as a mechanism and a selective approach to the construction of political collaboration. 
Since regional formations often entail groups of countries with similar cultural, legal and 
political characteristics, agreement on the scope and nature of transnational collaboration 
is more feasible and progress can potentially proceed more quickly than multilateral nego-
tiations, this is, however, not the case with SADC. 
The proliferation of regional formations indicates a willingness on the part of govern-
ments to commit themselves to collaboration around trade issues, but these commitments 
have (so far) only in a limited capacity extended to collaboration around social welfare or 
developmental needs for the particular region. Most regional formations reflect the present 
preoccupation with narrow commercial objectives over broad social developmental needs. 
Phrases like ‘inclusion’, ‘democracy’ and ‘development’ can be found in some regional 
formations' social policy objectives.  
The formulation of policies that encourage intra-regional trade and offer barriers to 
external trade, as founded in most regional formations contradicts the view of the propo-
nents of globalization which are geared towards free movement of the factors of produc-
tion on a global scale not limited to regions. Regional formations can reduce global trade 
and obviously reduce efficiency in the market with trade tariffs and is seen by many to 
reduce competitiveness and renders market forces almost irrelevant which eventually lead 
to gross market inefficiencies (Yeates 2005). 
Regional integration restricts sovereignty of member states in economic policy formu-
lation to a certain degree but has a number of advantages including an increased speciali-
zation and realization of economies of scale through the pooling of resources and markets, 
increased choice through access to wider range of markets and increased competitiveness 
of goods and services in global markets following the development of intra-regional com-
petition. Regionalization can also lead to better opportunities for scientific and engineering 
exchange and joining efforts to develop science and technology as well as the creation of 
better infrastructure in transport, finance and communications (Ibid.). 
It is clear that there are certain similarities but also differences between globalization 
and regionalization. These two concepts are not completely compatible but neither are 
they totally incompatible. The apparent incompatibility of regionalism and globalization 
withstanding, it is impossible to see a globally integrated system with the ever increasing 
and stronger regional trading blocs, many with conflicting objectives, approaches and even 
mechanisms.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
If a system of regional labor standards is established for SADC, it must take cognizance of 
the differences between countries in terms of culture, language, history, the legal system, 
etc. The system that has been designed for the EU and that is currently in place is a 
uniquely European system and cannot be transferred to SADC as it is. SADC must not try 
to replicate the EU system of regional labor standards. The proposed system of transna-
tional labor relations for SADC should be a combination of the following: 
1. The SADC Treaty, certain SADC protocols, and the SADC Charter should be 
adapted, extended, and strengthened to make provision for minimum regional labor stand-
ards. This treaty on minimum regional labor standards should include, as a bare minimum, 
requirements of the ILO core standards, the UN declaration of Human Rights, and em-
ployees' rights at work. The domestic incorporation of the SADC Treaty, SADC Charter 
and SADC protocols into national laws can ensure ease of compliance by member states. 
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2. A code of best practices for TNCs should be established, providing minimum labor 
standards for any TNC that wants to establish business enterprises in any SADC member 
state. 
3. The local actors in all SADC member states should be empowered through a process of 
training, so as to provide them with the necessary skills, knowledge, and expertise to create 
public awareness of human rights, social rights, and labor rights. The local actors in each 
member state can play a significantly positive role in ensuring that governments adhere to 
the minimum regional labor standards. 
4. An independent monitoring system that brings governments, employers, TNCs to 
task for failure to comply with minimum regional standards should be established.  
The SADC Tribunal should become operational as soon as possible, and its mandate 
should be extended so that it can also act as a labor standards watchdog. The new Tribunal 
should have the power to take appropriate steps against not only employers or TNCs, but 
also against governments. These powers can include imposing fines on transgressors. 
A transnational labor relations system for SADC is for all practical purposes already 
in existence, and it can assist in providing certain minimum protections and labor rights 
for millions of people. The SADC Charter, which has been signed by all member states 
and the ILO core conventions that have been ratified by all member states, provides the 
basis of a TNLR system in SADC. For this system to be of any real value it is of the utmost 
importance to involve all role players from all the member states. These must include not 
only governments and politicians, but also employers' associations, trade unions, and other 
local actors. Rules are needed at the appropriate levels, so that economic principles and 
justice go hand in hand, and the standards and the issues at stake have a transnational or su-
pra national character. Thus, SADC must have its own, unique social policy and, conse-
quently, also its own fully fledged labor relations system. SADC must move away from  
a facilitating authority to an entity that will lead in creating standards and mechanisms that 
can be of benefit to all SADC citizens and become a truly transnational actor and in this re-
gard the SADC Charter must form the basis. 
The possibilities for further research are almost endless. The content, character and 
impact on grass root level of the labor laws within each member states can be evaluated 
and measured against the SADC charter as well as the ILO core conventions. It is also 
possible to establish a regional Labor Tribunal for SADC that specifically deals with labor 
relations issues and transnational collective bargaining; this in itself will require further 
research and will have to involve all member states as a political decision will have to be 
taken by the Summit of SADC. 
The regional integration strategy of SADC as founded in the Treaty and Charter as 
well as other protocols can only be achieved in the SADC region if there is closer co-
operation between member states on matters like social policy and labor standards. This 
will lead to the improvement of the work life of millions of people. Regional formations or 
regional integration schemes are not regional globalization. 
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Constructivity and Destructivity  
in Globalization, as a Background  
of the Current Problematic of Peace 
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Within international relationships the specific imperial relations can be distin-
guished via the principle of the mutually guided competition or rivalry among the 
diverse actor-states in the framework of a paramount global cooperation. If we 
take the universal global cooperation as a starting point (‘the first line’), it be-
comes then comprehensible, why this conflict can be conceived in the ‘second line’ 
also as a war of a new type. This basic situation (global cooperation and actually 
comprehensive rivalry and multiple competition of all against all in the second 
line) is inextricably linked, in our age with the reality of globalization. Simultane-
ously, the pure existence of these rivalries in the second line already means a fun-
damental change in the experience and interpretation of war and peace, for this 
competition personifies a permanent debate, which can much more easily go over 
to a symbolic or limited war problematic, as it seemed still possible in the past. 
The imperial conflicts of the second line (behind the global cooperation that con-
stitutes the first line) adopt in any of their constitutions always clear ideological-
philosophical forms. These ideologies and these philosophies of life adopt a gener-
ally ‘fundamentalist’ character, what can also be explained by this competition. 
This movement is also to explain with the rivalry of the individual global empires, 
in which leading ideologies anyway are often really very close to fundamentalism. 
This process carries in itself two dangers. Firstly the correspondence-relation of 
an ‘empire’ with a civilization/philosophy of life/religion represents a striking sim-
plification, which must be in itself identified directly as the highest danger. Another 
consequence of this danger of the link of the rivalry of the empires with the rivalry 
of the ideologies consists in the easily understandable fact, that on this basis the 
mechanisms of the positive feedback must work (see, e.g., Hardt and Negri 2000). 
While we have described the globalization as dialectic of the modernity, we must 
categorize the advance of the fundamentalism (as well vertically as also horizon-
tally) in this doubled rivalry as dialectic of the fundamentalism. While in the ‘West’ 
the anti-communism is the opposing fundamentalism number one, in the fundamen-
talist ‘East’ (i.e. in the concrete empires, we count there), the anti-liberalism is the 
concept of enemy number one. The role distribution has the common train, that 
neither in the ‘West’ nor in the ‘East’ (in the here concerned great actors) the fun-
damentalism is the concept of enemy N°1, this contributes to another acceleration 
of the dynamics, if not of the dialectic of the fundamentalism. 
Keywords: globalization, empire, civilization, peace, fundamentalism, philosophy, 
cooperation, war, competition. 
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Introduction 
Within international relationships, the specific imperial relations can be distinguished via 
the principle of the mutually guided competition or rivalry among the diverse actor-states in 
the framework of a paramount global cooperation. The attribute ‘imperial’ is neither a ran-
dom nor a traditional description which connects with each other the phenomena of similar 
character in a timeless manner and without any further qualification.  
In our context, ‘imperial’ means a specifically new relation and condition which are 
somewhat described in Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1996). One can 
also understand that current globalization can be characterized and treated not only 
through this relation, although its increasing importance can no longer be put into question 
especially somewhat after 2000. The visible validity, let alone the supremacy of the impe-
rial discourse is also therefore an excellent perspective on globalization, because the basic 
vulnerabilities of globalization do not define at all its significance from the beginning; on 
the contrary, the relevance of the order of magnitude of the imperial discourse is itself 
equivalent with an attribute of the respective state of globalization. 
Of course, the imperial dimensions can also change in the course of rapid develop-
ment, partly in their absolute conditions, partly in their relations to other forms of the 
global discourse, that is to the perspectives, from which globalization can be interpreted 
and understood also independently. Since the actorial dimensions, that is the action space 
of the diverse protagonists in the global processes remain of high importance, this actorial 
freedom can also on its part increase, in a striking way, the order of magnitude of the im-
perial dimension amongst the other dimensions. In the context of the imperial dimension, a 
mixture of objective and subjective action spaces is thus arising, whose constant inter-
weaving can be regarded as one of the major conditions of globalization. 
The rapid changes in the imperial dimensions of the process of globalization are very 
characteristic of this event from the beginning. It goes so far, that during the first years 
after 1989, the imperial dimension has not been at all thematized publicly, the euphoria of 
the ‘end of the history’ promised a world where traditional imperial relations have be-
come, as forever, obsolete. The conscious profiling of individual virtual or real global im-
perial actors is joining this starting situation, for finally the potential imperial role does not 
depend only on these actors' will. 
The Natural Necessity of the Imperial Dimension in the Global 
Identity Formation, which should not Become Fate  
Sometimes the introspection of the great global actors also means a search for identity. 
Thus, in the first decade of the new millennium China already belonged to the ‘empires’, 
this appurtenance revealed, however, as ‘virtual’, while the situation so quickly changed in 
the second decade, that now it costs China much effort to avert that impression, according 
to which the country would already be now the leading state of globalization (or one of the 
states willing to lead) or intend to become as such. Other categorizations can also remain 
unfixed, since the imperial major actors are by no means somewhat identical to the mem-
bers of the leading international organizations. One can say that it should be possible to 
enter the first leading circle of the global states (in our consciously chosen formulation: 
‘empires’) ‘through invitation’. 
The First Line and the Second Line: Cooperation versus  
Competition 
Our thought process is concerned with this new phenomenon of the competition among 
global ‘empires’. On the one hand, it bears repeating that it is about a competition which 
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realizes as a secondary phenomenon and as a background for a multi-strata global coopera-
tion in the first line (e.g., Sorokin 1928). But this phenomenon, also in the form of a compe-
tition of all against all, is revealing quite complex and multiple. We must again emphasize 
this rivalry, and at the same time we do not cast doubt on the validity of reality and rele-
vance of the primary global cooperation. This competition of the second line often takes 
some asymmetrical forms. This general situation (global cooperation combined with 
principally comprehensive rivalry and multiple competition of all against all in the sec-
ond line) is inextricably linked in our age with the reality of globalization.1 Every possi-
ble similarity to former world-historical or international relationships is basically mis-
leading and actively prevents an easy comprehension of these relationships.  
This competition of the second line is, in its true definitions, quite a new phenomenon. 
Conscious of this fact, our research approach might be selective since neither a temporal 
distance nor a sufficiently specific methodology is now available for a thorough study. 
Simultaneously, the pure existence of these rivalries in the second line already means a 
fundamental change in the experience and interpretation of war and peace, for this compe-
tition represents a permanent debate which can much more easily pass to a symbolic or 
limited war problematic, as it seemed still possible in the past. 
First, we concentrate on the question to whose expense this struggle of the second line 
is led. Now we can generally take the thesis, transmitted to us by the historical tradition 
that as a rule, the burdens and costs of wars and crises are transferred to the ‘society’. 
This rivalry on the second line results from conscious strategic reflections, that is 
from a decision, which can be certainly associated with this rivalry. It goes without saying 
that this decision is of crucial importance for our thought process. We can only develop 
and interpret this rivalry through facts. It follows, that we will have to deal with a huge 
number of facts. 
Do we take again the universal global cooperation as a starting point (‘the first 
line’), it becomes then clear, why in the ‘second line’ this conflict can be conceived also 
as a war of a new type. This rivalry is not characterized by clashes of armed forces or 
frontal clashes. This rivalry is rather determined by the idea of a possible weakening of 
the opponent (some opponents, all opponents), would it be about a concrete but also sym-
bolic or virtual weakening. 
If this expression has a current sense, in this new context and terrain having to be 
compared with no former context, we should then say that these conflicts in the second 
line are oriented against the competitors' hinterland. This means, however, that the indi-
vidual actors of the competition do not attack the other actors' elites or ruling class, rather 
their ‘hinterland’, or the everyday life and conditions of reproduction of those involved, 
also global ‘imperial’ participants. 
Would it be effectively the case (while we do not consider the designation ‘hinterland’ 
as an optimal designation), then the first purely theoretical question is whether this phe-
nomenon is distinguished from many similar phenomena of the world history, whether this 
phenomenon, which we have described as a rivalry and competition in the second line, is 
mainly a new phenomenon. 
Our answer is that this phenomenon must be also then necessarily considered as a 
genuinely new phenomenon through the prism of the reality of globalization and also 
through relevant universal cooperation (the ‘first’ line), although many of its forms 
strongly remind similar phenomena from the former world history. 
                                                          
1 For the concrete link of this description of global international relationships with the theoretical interpretation of globali-
zation see, e.g., Kiss 2003, 2010a, 2010b; Grinin 2009; Grinin and Korotayev 2010; Korotayev and de Munck 2013. 
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It is quite difficult to discuss the real empirical content of these conflicts. An econom-
ic success, changes in prices for raw materials, fluctuations at stock exchange and markets 
can improve an actor's positions at the expense of the other(s). These conflicts, we accept 
it now, do not disturb the global communication and cooperation (the ‘first line’), they are 
often not perceived as conflicts, while they can cause concrete and violent damages. Thus, 
this asymmetrical war is also simultaneously a silent war, whose victims or those damaged 
often do not know themselves whom they fell victim to.2 
Would this assumption be right, the Wiki-leaks opportunities and finally, the Snowden 
case would be considered as anything but exceptional phenomena or even astonishments. 
In reverse order, it would be precisely a surprise, if the individual involved actors would 
not listen to each other in this context. What is so disappointing in the public opinions fol-
lowing these scandals, is not necessarily the visible information on the state of business as 
usual, but the indescribable lack of claim of the arguments accompanying the declarations, 
that undertake no attempt to associate this conflict in the second line with that of the first 
member of the cooperation. In these opinions, we fail to find where the contours of the 
new global world order would become visible, what we see is only the attitudes of a poten-
tial war of all against all, which were characteristic of the pre-global world. The Snowden 
case underlines our hypothesis, but not only in the assumption of the ‘normality’ of mutual 
listening. Also the ‘silent’ war appears here, for it was also a fact, that we assumed, maybe 
Snowden would have even also been kidnapped under the peaceful circumstances of the 
global international life. 
Forms and Shapes of the Rivalry of the Second Line 
The assumption of this ‘imperial’ actors' mutual rivalry can be extended to a somewhat 
modified vision also on weapons production and commerce. However, this also leads fur-
ther into the experience that the global circumstances and relationships between politics 
and economy are changing again within a new context. For precisely the military sale 
(through its double rooting in the political and the economic spheres) must not be inter-
preted otherwise than as an element of this competition in the second line, even if it is car-
ried out from ‘purely economic’ objectives. The supposed and hypothetical role of victim 
of the hinterland is again sharply realized in this context: if these guns are needed then this 
role is clear (for no population can be today kept away from these conflicts), if not, then 
(and we remain now only with this single consequence) the expenses on the arms are taken 
from other sections of the budget. 
It is also similar with the concurrence of the representations! Events, such as the 
Olympics in China, winter Olympics in Russia or a football World Cup in Brazil, are cer-
tainly considered as rational steps (amongst the others) in the global actors' rivalry in the 
so-called second line of the international reality in the age of globalization. It is, however, 
just as clear, that the costs of these mega-events of global representations are ascribed to 
the account of the populations. These examples show also, that this competition of the 
second line reveals as a medium that can instrumentalize also events, emerging messages 
totally independent of their original meaning. We can confidently assume that if in Kuwait 
the civil population's discontent grows and is also manifested in the public declarations, 
                                                          
2 An interesting confirmation of this assumption of the mutual rivalry in the second line can be as follows: if inside the 
cooperating global structure of these imperial actors other coalitions are emerging, which feel themselves closer to 
each other than versus the others, for this consideration seems to have already taken into account the fact, that this 
rivalry causes damages to the others (with the closer approach, these can certainly be moderated). 
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this event can be admitted as a point of the mutual struggle between the global actors of 
imperial rank or is also just admitted. 
The problem of the energy resources and energy supply represents, however, also a 
type of events, in which the decisive (intentionally guided) or random (spontaneous) ac-
tions could hardly be definitely distinguished from each other. In these domains, we can 
literally make no step without having influence also on other actors, and this alone, auto-
poietically brings the state of competition of the second member in the scene. This type 
also always shows publicly the everyday reality of this rivalry, which then enhanced 
through digitalization and information society's approaches, strengthens the impression of 
the already existing mutual global rivalry at the expense of the global cooperation. 
In this mutual struggle some actors set certain limits which they decide to consider as 
pain threshold for the others! Thus, we can for example read in the Drone attacks that an-
other imperial actor wants to avoid the Chinese airspace because it assumes that China 
would not be tolerant of.  
Another aspect of the same dimension consists in the support to the civil, female and 
other social movements (social media!) on the sovereign territory of other imperial actors, 
in which some blurred borders of influence are also established. For us, this phenomenon 
is of particular importance since such steps and opinions can serve as indirect confirmation 
of our assumption. 
Mass communication and mass culture have a very particular place in this very con-
cretely conceived conflict of the global empires. Another important fundamental fact is 
that this rivalry of individual global protagonists takes place thousands of times.  
The difficulty and simultaneously the theoretical interest of this domain consist in its ex-
tensive infinity, in its confusion, but also not less in the considerable asymmetry, that exists 
among the individual global players, while the American mass culture clearly influences the 
other great empires as it is the case in reverse order, even if this effect can also not be con-
sidered as unlimited or unilateral. An independent complex in this context is, that a mass 
culture does not only mediate the own and the other ‘world’, but in several genres also 
‘works up’ and thematizes another world. On working up the essential problems of the other 
empire, several variations of interpretation can appear, every civilization is working on the 
fundamental problems of the other, like it was formerly the case in Charlie Chaplin's and 
Leslie Howard's films on the Third Reich or Andrzei Wajda's films on the Stalinism. 
In sign of the universal rivalry of the individual civilizations, multiple and very 
strange phenomena can also outgrow from this problematic. This is manifested in an 
interesting way (as one of many phenomena) in the reaction to an American film pres-
ently shot about Che Guevara, in which it was affirmed, ‘the others relate our history’. 
There are, however, examples for that, which one global ‘empire’ calls into question the 
other ‘empire's’ right to exist, like it often happens in an astonishing way between  
the USA and Europe (e.g., America = Mars, Europe = Venus). In this labels some real 
dimensions of this mutual conflict of individual empires are also thematical, like for ex-
ample in the matter of relationship between Europe and North-Africa, or in the discus-
sion about the extent the EU interventions should support the individual member-states 
in other parts of the world. 
Real Suffering Hinterlands 
In this analysis, a point is also visible, which would be unnoticeable from another starting 
point. If it is really about the responsibilities of the ‘hinterland’ (we still keep so problem-
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atically this description), it becomes then soon evident, that this concept means something 
quite different in Europe in comparison with all other great global units. Europe's ‘base’ 
consists of individual nation-states which partly protect their sovereignty, partly have 
abandoned it. This known fact can become relevant in the new context of the competi-
tion between the global empires in the second line. If we remain at the level of damages, 
it is then already quite natural to expect, that they can be unevenly distributed only be-
cause of this fact. Here, we want to mention briefly the European policy in education 
and schooling, when the university shows itself (quite understandable) as a territory 
where the rivalry of individual great players (behind the comprehensive global coopera-
tion) intensively goes on. 
At this point, let us leave aside whether the European politics of higher education is 
meaningful or not (for us it is not). The chosen strategy in the conflict, however, undoubt-
edly revealed as a strategy whose disadvantages and losses are distributed unevenly among 
the individual states. This difference can also be generalized. In Europe, therefore, the 
negative consequences of the rivalry of the second line are probably unequally redistribut-
ed among the individual member-states! 
New Rivalries and Old Ideologies 
Today we deal with a new phenomenon of globalization which is in many ways similar to 
the traditional competition of great powers but still one should regard it as a new phenom-
enon because of the new basic characteristics of globalization. Now, we put the question, 
whether one can associate this rivalry with the phenomenon which we usually denote as a 
conflict, or as a rivalry of great philosophies of life, religions or ideologies or what just 
after the advent of globalization Samuel S. Huntington called ‘the clash of the civiliza-
tions’. It is obviously an attempt, and we proceed from the fact that the global empires' 
rivalry in the second line and the clash of civilizations have different motives and origins. 
Huntington's concept, also as a self-fulfilling prophecy, plays an important role 
since today we must put just this very question of the rivalry relation between the global 
powers within large ideological or civilizational struggles. Huntington has reduced  
the very complex dimensions of the Modern Age to a fundamentalism as a basic world 
order. 
If we think of the rivalry of the philosophies of life, religions and ideologies (practi-
cally of all what Huntington described as clash of civilizations), we would suddenly real-
ize that only quite a few ideologies take part in this great competition. It is, however, not 
the case. In fact, there are many more ideologies in the globalized world, which are 
fighting each other and each of these ideologies has also a rich internal differentiation 
which also fights within certain ideology or religion. 
The convincing impression that Huntington's Clash of Civilizations was a self-
realizing prophecy (which in its way influenced the events) came mostly from the strange 
and somewhat fear-instilling experience that this ‘struggle’ came together with that situa-
tion when every ideology or philosophy of life ‘fundamentalized’ with consequences; in 
other words, every individual ideology gave rise to a more fundamentalist or the most fun-
damentalist variation. 
The Pluralism of Fundamentalisms 
Thus, fundamentalism entered a new phase of its history, which has also made necessary 
to develop a new history, a new sociology and also a new knowledge of the fundamental-
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ism. The development occurred, which in a peculiar way had also moved individual phi-
losophies of life or ideologies closer to each other. Simultaneously, some fundamentalist 
thought structures became so general, that larger groups and masses, in many countries 
and in many sociological circles, do no longer recognize exactly the fundamentalist color 
of their mode of thinking and just use the fundamentalism, like they applied formerly the 
constructive thought structures; now they even use the fundamentalist structures to solve 
actual problems. 
We can recognize that both universal struggles (empires + civilizations) of the great 
global actors are today on the way to merge. In the conflict between two empires, the ideo-
logical and civilizational clash can easily manifest itself. The difference between com-
munism and post-communism is not also made with sufficient care, while China is still 
classified sometimes communist, sometimes neo-liberal in these double-level becoming 
confrontations (in which the level of empire will be interconnected and so unified with the 
level of ideologies).  
Also the eventual differences between America and Europe are already looking for 
‘ideological’ marks, where one part must always stand above the other in ideological 
terms, even if the criteria of this civilizational superiority are absolutely relative and no 
longer show the unambiguity of the year 1989. 
The imperial conflicts of the second line (behind the global cooperation which consti-
tutes the first line) always adopt clear ideological-philosophical forms in any of their con-
stitutions. This event clearly reminds (as it has been declared so reluctantly in this attempt) 
of a state that Huntington described in 1992 and 1993. These ideologies and these philoso-
phies of life are adopting (as it has been pointed out) a generally ‘fundamentalist’ charac-
ter which can be also explained in terms of this competition. It is almost alarming that this 
process represents the counter-movement toward the development after 1945, while for-
merly the individual ideologies/philosophies of life became always more differentiated and 
demanding. No doubt, this movement is also to explain with the rivalry of individual glob-
al empires, in which the leading ideologies anyway are often really very close to funda-
mentalism; it is, however, to explain also the decreasing role that the really independent 
intellectuals play in the process of formation of these ideological concepts. 
Of course, one can hardly define at which stage this process of common growth of the 
imperial and ideological-philosophical competition stands; however, this tendency is al-
ready clearly visible today. 
The Path to a New Dialectics of Fundamentalism  
This common growth carries in itself two dangers which should be considered seriously. 
The first danger is apparently of purely intellectual nature. The correspondence and rela-
tion of an ‘empire’ with a ‘civilization/philosophy of life/religion’ represents such a strik-
ing (!) and amazing simplification of our hypercomplex post-modern world, which must 
be in itself identified, through the scale of this simplification, directly as the highest dan-
ger. This simplification is somewhat as if we would really think that the Roman Empire 
consisted of the Romans, who represented the civilization/philosophy of life/religion of the 
Roman Empire! 
This extreme simplification has operated until present and will most probably endure 
in the future, also working as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The concrete orientation of this 
prophecy is already a negative and self-destructive one. If an ‘empire’ interprets the plural, 
multi-strata, modern reality of the other as fundamentalism, it follows then necessarily, 
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that the own society considers itself also as fundamentalism, possibly emphasizes and 
supports in itself the own fundamentalist traits. From these virtual processes there often 
emerges a concept of the enemy. Two fundamentalistically shaped empires can perceive 
the others as ‘enemies’, depending on the intensity of formation of the concept of enemy 
in the own philosophy of life. Today no politician is to blame for the fact that within his 
fundamentalist basic ideology any other philosophy of life is considered an enemy; he is, 
so to speak, constrained to perceive the other as an enemy at a certain stage of the self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Another consequence of this dangerous association of the rivalry between empires 
with the rivalry between ideologies consists in the easily understandable fact that the 
mechanisms of the positive feedback must work on this basis. The perception of this now 
doubled rivalry leads necessarily to the acceleration and intensification of conflicts among 
individual great actors. Under some circumstances, this process can become rather swift-
flowing, to which we are not prepared and that possibly cannot be perceived in the normal 
everyday world. This doubling (if not political escalation) of the global rivalry is obvious-
ly also supported by many real processes.4 The unquestionable proportion of the real pro-
cesses cannot mislead us about the fact that at the stage when this doubling (if not poten-
tialization) of the rivalry is installing, the importance of the real moments to interpret the 
rationally decisively regresses. The own dynamics of the already fundamentistically col-
ored doubled rivalry takes excessive proportions and can highly diminish the control on 
this development in certain circumstances.  
In other words, it seems that in a positive feedback of the redoubled competition (on 
the level of empires and on the level of ‘civilizations’), the chances of the universal fun-
damentalists are always larger, for the solidarity, emancipation, individualization, infor-
mation or human rights are hardly able to compete with a fundamentalist competition of 
‘civilizations’ which could win at each concrete location already due to their scale and 
majority obtained in masses. 
The doubled competition in the second line (always under the universal cooperation 
within globalization of the first line) can transform into the ideological war. The question 
remains whether this war runs today or not yet. It is, however, certain, that now the dou-
bling of the rivalry already contains the danger of an ideological war of a new type. This 
danger brings a real risk of the launch of the civilizational struggle in the imperial rivalry 
which represents a critical, if not just an irreversible change. 
The universal rivalry of global ‘empires’ (at the moment when the imperial dimension 
became dominant in the history of the globalization) is, after all, a part of the real normal 
science of politics, is rational to interpret and might be even also addressed as a trivial 
event. It is, therefore, of socio-ontological nature, whether we like it or not. The truly trag-
ic consequences of the penetration of civilizational struggles consists in the fact, that the 
ideologies add new characteristics to the struggle of great empires, they make a new reality 
of this struggle and no longer controllable irrational world situation can arise from a po-
litically and socio-ontologically ‘normal’ situation. 
Forgotten Right-Wing Extremisms? 
The mutual rivalry in the second line of globalization can engage new ‘double antago-
nisms’ through this link which proceeds within every great empire, a confrontation be-
tween ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘true democracy’ arises from these double positions, and 
sometimes also democratic or social elements are to be found in ‘fundamentalism’  
and fundamentalist traits in a ‘true democracy’.  
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Apart from these new simplifications, we must here point out another problematic as-
pect: while in the ‘West’ the communism is the opposing fundamentalism Number One, in 
the fundamentalist ‘East’ (i.e. in certain empires, we count there), the liberalism is the en-
emy Number One.  
The juxtaposition of both these ‘fundamental’ facts poses considerable dangers for  
the further development. For, the role distribution has the common trait, that neither in the 
‘West’ (among the great actors concerned here), nor in the ‘East’ (among its great ac-
tors), the fundamentalism is the concept of enemy Number One, this contributes to another 
acceleration of the dynamics, if not of the dialectic of fundamentalism. 
In this relation between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, the West wanted mainly to influ-
ence with the attraction force of the occidental values, on the population of the East, and 
also to export democratic institutions. We cannot say that the endeavors have failed even 
these efforts were however highly hindered by the arising clash of civilizations, because 
they have been just fully politicized and even the clearest values of democracy and of 
emancipation could appear as imperial interests.  
Conclusion 
We came to the conclusion (temporary and in many ways quite hypothetical) that any fun-
damentalism is an organic component of the double global rivalry of the ‘empires’ that 
must act in the context of globalization. While elsewhere we have described globalization 
as the dialectic of modernity, we must distinguish the advance of fundamentalism (both in 
vertical and horizontal dimension) in this doubled rivalry as the dialectic of fundamental-
ism. It is precisely this dialectic of fundamentalism that appears on the scene also in the 
events in Syria, when we read that ‘like iron particles on the magnetic field, how  
the fighting groups are organizing on the confessional line’. It seems to us that this obser-
vation could characterize also many other situations within current globalization. An open 
confessional conflict or even a war would also bring an incalculable damage. This (global) 
confessional war (which is ultimately anything but confessional or civilizational) differs in 
nothing from the war of the crusaders. 
That we previously focused on the confrontation between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, 
does not at all mean that we have forgotten that there are quite a lot of ‘imperial’ and ‘civi-
lizational’ conflicts. The effective reality is constituted precisely of a multiplicity of these 
conflicts. 
In this ‘dialectic of fundamentalism’ (which, as noted above, is both temporary and 
hypothetical), we must emphasize the domain of ‘mutual affinities and attractions’ 
(Wahlverwandtschaften) between empires and ideologies. In the beginning of these pro-
cesses, the individual empires try to find their own (old or new) civilizational ideologies, 
while the same movement can also proceed from the other end: the organizing civiliza-
tional ideologies (that can already exist at this stage also as independent institutions) also 
try to find their ‘own’ empire which will allow them to play an ‘exclusive’ role in this 
concrete area. 
Has the ‘dialectic of the fundamentalism’ effectively somewhat advanced, it is then 
inevitable that the democracies would be disadvantaged in this competition. In other 
words, it is doubtful whether the attraction of democracy in a non-democratic society, or in 
a state of crisis, could rival the demagogy or aggressiveness of the well-organized funda-
mentalist pressure. 
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It seems to us that the assumption of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations was an histori-
cal error of the West, mainly of the USA, for the rapid identification with this conception 
(which in addition is intellectually poorly grounded) has prevented a more constructive, 
more communicative and, finally, more human development in the ‘global’ space of globali-
zation; already the absence of another way must be considered today as a serious mistake. 
The interpretation of terrorism is without any doubt a consequence of this politics. On 
the one hand, this approach hides the real state of affairs, at least in the sense, that this 
phenomenon is not justified by the doubling of imperial rivalries in the second line. Drawn 
from this context, the terrorism can already be multiply interpreted, even if these interpre-
tations can also contain numerous reasonable ideas. 
Thus, the terrorism has, on the one hand, immeasurably increased. On the other hand, 
the transformation of the so-called terrorism reveals also in a self-fulfilling prophecy, so that 
at the end we can hardly make the distinction between the ideological phantom and the reali-
ty, as it has been formerly the case with the Clash of Civilizations. The integration of the 
Clash of the Civilizations in the (almost obvious) rivalry of the empires within globalization 
can accelerate the conflicts in the globalization also thus unexpectedly and critically. 
Thus, a huge mutation of fundamentalism can be realized. It is apparently the conse-
quence, but in reality an unnecessary consequence of globalization itself, if not just its 
counterpart. It may no longer be called into question that this is a real danger.  
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Our research suggests that the relation between GDP per capita and sociopolitical 
destabilization is better described by an inversed U-shaped curve, rather than by  
a straightforward negative correlation, as is frequently believed. The highest risks 
are relevant for the countries with medium values of GDP per capita, not the high-
est or lowest values. Thus, until a certain value of GDP per capita is reached, the 
economic growth tends to lead to an increase in the risks of sociopolitical destabi-
lization. It is only with higher values of GDP per capita that the economic growth 
starts to reduce the risks of destabilization. Thus, the higher values of GDP per 
capita are characterized by a negative correlation with sociopolitical destabiliza-
tion risks, while its lower values demonstrate a positive correlation with this indi-
cator. 
Keywords: GDP per capita, sociopolitical destabilization, autocracy, democracy, 
intermediate political regimes, democratization, political development, economic 
development, anti-government demonstrations, education, middle-income trap. 
The impact of GDP per capita upon the level of sociopolitical instability has already been 
a subject of considerable research. Most papers are based on a seemingly plausible as-
sumption that the higher the level of a region's economic development, the lower the risks 
of a civil conflict, and the weaker the support for revolutionary ideas among the popula-
tion. Thus, MacCulloch (2004) investigates the impact of the level of economic develop-
ment upon the dissemination of revolutionary ideas in a society using the microdata ob-
tained from the surveys of revolutionary youth. On the basis of changes in the respondents' 
answers depending on the level of income a conclusion is made that GDP per capita 
growth by USD 1,600 (in prices of 2001) reduces the risk of the dissemination of revolu-
tionary ideas by 2.4 per cent, while the proportion of people who would like to make a 
revolution is reduced by 41 per cent (MacCulloch 2004). MacCuloch and Pezzini (2010) 
use the microdata of the surveys of revolutionary preferences of 130,000 people from 
61 countries betwen 1980 and 1997. In their paper they conclude that two indicators, 
namely, the increasing level of political freedom and economic growth, reduce the support 
of revolutionary ideas. On the contrary, a decrease in the authors' index of freedom by 
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a point increases the support for revolutions by 4 per cent. In order to neutralize this in-
crease, an increase in GDP growth rates shold amount to 14 per cent (MacCuloch and Pez-
zini 2010).  
Parvin (1973) makes similar conclusions on the basis of cross-section data on 
26 countries and states that both the level of income per capita and its changes exert nega-
tive influence on the level of political violence. 
Another paper reveals that assessing the impact of economic conditions on the risk of 
a civil conflict emergence is hindered due to the endogeneity of variables. Its authors use 
the change in the level of precipitation as an instrumental variable for economic growth in 
41 African countries between 1981 and 1999. This research also shows a strong negative 
relation between the economic growth and the risk of a civil conflict (Miguel, Satyanath, 
and Sergenti 2004).  
Research by Knutsen (2014) views the impact of economic growth and the level of in-
come on the attempts at revolutions and successful uprisings in a broad prospect from 
1919 to 2003 for 150 countries. This research reveals that a moderate and short-term 
growth enhances the probability of both attempts at revolutions and successful revolutions. 
There is also some evidence that higher levels of income are capable of mitigating the rev-
olutionary attempts, though this point remains disputable. 
Weede (1981) states that high average income is closely associated with less violence 
and lower death toll resulting from such violence.  
The relationship between sociopolitical destabilization and internal economic indica-
tors, such as international loans, credits etc., has also received much attention in academic 
community. Thus, it has been revealed that international capital increases the state's capac-
ity to react to the actions of the internal opposition, as benevolent conditions of crediting 
expand its capacity to limit and suppress the oppositional forces. Empirical data for 
141 countries for the period from 1981 to 2007 are used to confirm that the states with 
greater access to international credit indeed have lower probability of civil conflict emer-
gence (DiGiuseppe, Barry, and Frank 2012). Another paper covering this question con-
cludes that exogenous growth of the international capital price is closely connected with 
increasing probability of civil conflicts. Dependency on raw materials, low economic 
growth, and poverty can also increase the risk of civil conflicts through reducing the ac-
cess to foreign capital (Chapman and Reinhardt 2013). 
However, some research implies that in certain conditions economic development can 
rather increase sociopolitical instability. Thus, in his analysis of the global revolutionary 
wave of the first half of 2014, Goldstone (2014a) pays attention to the fact that the highest 
values of sociopolitical destabilization are observed in countries which are not character-
ized by either the highest or the lowest values of GDP per capita, namely Thailand, the 
Ukraine, Bosnia, and Venezuela. Goldstone supposes that this is not a mere coincidence.  
All four are ‘middle-income’ countries, among neither the world's richest nor poorest 
societies. According to the International Monetary Fund, they range from 73rd in per 
capita GDP (PPP adjusted) – Venezuela's global ranking – to 106th (Ukraine), with 
Thailand at 92nd and Bosnia 99th. In other words, of the 187 countries in the world 
ranked by the IMF, they are almost exactly in the middle. They have just arrived at the 
point where the vast majority of the population is literate, expects a government to 
provide a sound economy, jobs, and decent public services. Yet, they are not yet eco-
nomically comfortable and secure. That security, and a better future for themselves 
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and their children, depends very heavily on whether government leaders will work 
to provide greater opportunities and progress for the nation as a whole, or only to 
enrich and protect themselves and their cronies. They are at a point where limiting 
corruption and increasing accountability are crucial to whether their country will con-
tinue to catch up to the living standards of richer countries, or fall back to the stand-
ards of poorer ones (Goldstone 2014a).  
The implication that until a certain limit the correlation between GDP per capita and 
sociopolitical destabilization should be not negative, but rather positive, stems from the 
classic theory of modernization. Let us remember that as early as in 1959, Lipset put for-
ward a hypothesis that in the course of economic development citizens are increasingly 
less ready to tolerate repressive regimes, while in the course of per capita income growth 
the probability of a transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes goes up. Lipset's 
empirical tests supported this hypothesis (Lipset 1959). Later on, this hypothesis was test-
ed and supported by a number of other researchers (Cutright 1963; Moore 1966; Dahl 
1971; Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck 1987; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 
1992; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Londregan and Poole 1996; Epstein et al. 2006; 
Boix 2011).  
Lipset's hypothesis itself suggests that one should observe not a linear but an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and at least some types of sociopolitical 
destabilization. Indeed, as we will show below, a very high percentage of states with low 
GDP per capita have authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the growth of instability of au-
thoritarian regimes with the growth of GDP per capita must generate a positive correlation 
between the GDP per capita and sociopolitical instability within a certain interval. Mean-
while (as we will demonstrate below), the higher values of GDP per capita demonstrate 
a negative correlation with sociopolitical instability. This gives us grounds to expect that 
high levels of at least some forms of sociopolitical destabilization should be particularly 
typical for countries with medium values of GDP per capita.  
Let us note that our own empirical test of this hypothesis on the basis of data on 2013 
and 2014 destabilization wave has generally supported it. During these years a state's be-
longing to the medium quintile in GDP per capita proved to be a statistically significant 
predictor of sociopolitical destabilization of the ‘central collapse’ pattern (Korotayev, Is-
saev, and Zinkina 2015).  
In this paper we test this hypothesis on a much wider empirical basis.  
Data and Methods 
In order to test the hypothesis of GDP being a statistically significant factor of sociopoliti-
cal destabilization (within a certain interval) we choose GDP per capita PPP1 for the peri-
od from 1960 to 2016 as our independent variable and the system of indicators of sociopo-
litical destabilization from CNTS database as our dependent variables.  
Description and Methodology of Cross National Time Series 
(CNTS) 
The Cross National Time Series (CNTS) database is a result of data compilation and sys-
tematization started by Arthur Banks (Banks and Wilson 2015) in 1968 in the State Uni-
                                                          
1 In constant 2011 dollars. 
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versity of New York – Binghamton. The work was based on generalizing the archive of 
data from The Statesman's Yearbooks, published since 1864. The database contains ap-
proximately 200 indicators for more than 200 countries. The database contains yearly val-
ues of indicators starting from 1815 excluding the periods of World Wars I and II (1914–
1918 and 1939–1945).  
CNTS database is structured by sections, such as territory and population, technology, 
economic and electoral data, internal conflicts, energy use, industry, military expenditures, 
international trade, urbanization, education, employment, legislative activity, etc.  
In our paper we consider in detail the data describing internal conflicts (domestic). 
This section includes data starting from 1919 based on the analysis of events in 8 various 
subcategories, which are used for building the general Index of Sociopolitical Destabiliza-
tion (domestic9). In this process the compilers of CNTS database give each category a 
certain weight (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Weights of subcategories used at compiling the Index of Sociopolitical  
Destabilization  
Subcategory Variable name 
Weight in the Index  
of Sociopolitical  
Destabilization (domestic9) 
Assassinations domestic1 25 
General Strikes domestic2 20 
Guerrilla Warfare domestic3 100 
Government Crises domestic4 20 
Purges domestic5 20 
Riots domestic6 25 
‘Revolution’ 2 domestic7 150 
Anti-Government Demonstra-
tions) 
domestic8 10 
 
For calculating the Index of Sociopolitical Destabilization (Weighted Conflict Measure, 
domestic9) the numerical values of each subcategory are multiplied by the corresponding 
weights, the results of the multiplications are summed up, the sum is multiplied by 100 
and divided by 8 – see formula (1). 
݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ9 ൌ 	
		25 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ1 ൅ 	20	݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ2 ൅ 100 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ3 ൅ 20 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ4	 ൅
20 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ5	 ൅ 	25 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ6 ൅ 150 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ7 ൅ 10 ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ8
8 ∗ 100 
(1) 
Description and Methodology of Calculation of the Independent 
Factor  
Annual values of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2011 dollars) are used according to the 
World Bank database (World Bank 2016 n.d.a). In order to reconstruct the data series for 
the period between 1960 and 1990 we use the GDP per capita growth indicator (World 
Bank 2016 n.d.b). On the whole, data from 1960 to 2014 are used to test the hypotheses.  
                                                          
2 Note that the name of this variable (‘Revolutions’) is rather misleading since in reality in most cases the respective 
columns of the CNTS database register coups and coup attempts rather than revolutions proper as they understood in 
Political Science (see, e.g., Goldstone 2014b). Thus, below we will denote this variable as ‘Coups and Coup At-
tempts’ rather than ‘Revolutions’. 
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Tests  
A direct test generally confirmed the hypothesis on the presence of an inverted U-shaped 
curve between the GDP per capita and the level of sociopolitical destabilization. The pro-
portion of the average value of sociopolitical destabilization index according to three ter-
tiles of GDP per capita looks as follows (see Fig. 1).   
 
Fig. 1. The average value of sociopolitical destabilization index according to three 
tertiles of GDP per capita in USD, PPP, 1960–20143 4 
The U-shaped curve looks rather asymmetrical here. Indeed, the negative correlation be-
tween GDP per capita and sociopolitical destabilization index is much more pronounced 
for the second and third tertiles (t = 2.617, p = 0.00455) than for the first and second ter-
tiles (t = –1.775, p = 0.0386). Similar results are obtained through ANOVA analysis.  
Conclusion 
Our research suggests that the relation between GDP per capita and sociopolitical destabi-
lization is better described by an inversed U-shaped curve, rather than by a straightforward 
negative correlation, as is frequently believed. The highest risks are relevant for the coun-
tries with medium values of GDP per capita, not the highest or lowest values. Thus, until  
a certain value of GDP per capita is reached, the economic growth tends to lead to an in-
crease in the risks of sociopolitical destabilization. It is only with higher values of GDP 
per capita that the economic growth starts to reduce the risks of destabilization.  So, higher 
values of GDP per capita are characterized by a negative correlation with sociopolitical 
destabilization risks, while its lower values demonstrate a positive correlation with this 
indicator. 
                                                          
3 Note: F=5.109, p = 0.006. 
4 Statistical significance of the differences between categories (shown by different colors in the figure) is further de-
fined by a Tamhane's criterion (p < .05), and the procedure ANOVA. 
5 1-tailed.  
6 1-tailed.  
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Social and Economic Background of Blending 
 
Olga Kornienko 
 
 
The article studies the interconnections between new word-building processes in 
languages and social backgrounds of societies. Such an approach is quite im-
portant since it allows revealing the type of interrelations between the changes in 
social, political and economic spheres of life and new elements of the language 
that now emerge to reflect such changes. The basis of the analysis is the vocabu-
lary of contemporary English and Russian languages where a new phenomenon of 
coining new words through blending is actively developing. The shift from a stylis-
tic device towards an active word-formation model is closely connected with new 
conditions in socio-economic environment of modern societies. Attention is paid  
to connotational differences between blends in English and in Russian as well as to 
the innovative spheres where this vocabulary enrichment process is most topical.  
Keywords: blending, social communication, metaphorical and metonymical trans-
fer, socio-economic environment, evolution of technologies, connotations, imposed 
values, detest of the society. 
A language is a sort of computer, which reflects the changes in society. If a society exists 
in a closed environment the linguistic changes are petty and occur in a similar way to the 
invention of new things or phenomena. If a society exists in a less restricted environment 
or is actively integrating into global developments, we rather witness quick changes in 
language, such as borrowings and new word formation. If a society acheived outstanding 
results in its development, it starts using its own linguistic resources and even creates new 
patterns of enriching the vocabulary. Social, economic and political transformations cause 
substantial changes in the language of a society (Kornienko 2016: 182–274). The language 
fixes them in the vocabulary, maintains them for shorter or longer periods of time, and 
gives green light to the ones that correspond most properly to the people's mentality or the 
stage of historical development, while pushing others into oblivion. 
If a society preserves language only in the form of legends, myths, and ballads, then 
we can speak about the possibility of coining new words by means of comparison and ad-
aptation in the form of metaphorical or metonymical transfer. Such purely spoken lan-
guages of the past experienced their vocabulary 50-percent change within the period of 
25–30 years, since the above-mentioned process resulted in a continuous flow. For in-
stance, some Native Americans adopted special customs and traditions in naming which 
were specific to their tribe. Thus, the Californian tribes of the Miwok choose a baby name 
on the association of how a stream looked when the baby was born. The Lakota, Nakota, 
and Dakota tribes used the following comparative basis for choosing names: the character-
istic honors, nicknames, secret talents, peculiar deeds, and religious spirits. Furthermore, 
they used the associations with animals, physical abilities, the sky and clouds, day/light 
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and night as well as various birds. For instance, in the Ojibwe tribes people got such tem-
poral names as: Abitagijib (half a sky), Babibinesi (white bird), Macqwa (bear), Wagosu 
(fox), Babi-Manigo (white spirit), Anacquad (cloud), and Migisi (eagle) (Nicknames…). 
In the nineteenth century there was taken a picture of native American leaders with the 
following speaking names: Little Plume from Piegan, Buckskin Charley from Ute, Geron-
imo from Chiricahua Apache, Quanah Parker from Comanche, Hollow Horn Bear from 
Brulé Sioux, and American Horse from Oglala Sioux. In fact, during his lifetime a person 
could get several names.  
Later some of such names fused to form compound words. It often resulted in a shift 
towards the composition of languages, and we adhere to the opinion that compounds are 
characteristic of a simplified reflection of the phenomena at a definite period of time and 
are mainly used in situations within a quickly changing environment. On the other hand, in 
the global world any living language is characterized by a dynamic flow of spoken and 
written words and nonce-words. When people use the language, they start creating new 
meanings and patterns to express new or familiar notions, adapting them to their environ-
ment. Some of these adaptations turn out to be fruitful for the main bulk of the language, 
others represent a very fluid layer of the language which momentarily reflects the atmos-
phere in the society, entailing a specific stage of its development. 
At certain periods, a society is more concerned with domestic problems and challenges 
than at others. This focus on internal development is characteristic of societies at the stage of 
active economic development and at the linguistic level it results in the emergence of many 
words coined via blending, metaphorical and metonymical transfer or composition. 
Such processes took place in the British society at turning points of economic and so-
cial-political development which can be illustrated by the origin of blends in the sixteenth 
century when Great Britain started an active expansion associated with the period of the 
Great Geographical discoveries.  
‘The blends’ are new words that are formed from parts of two or more root-words, 
phonemes or morphemes. The classical example is the word ‘smog’ which is coined by 
blending ‘smoke + fog’. The blends reveal active social-political processes in the country 
trying to ‘digest’ new developmental realities and phenomena. Sometimes it is done with 
irony, sometimes – with serious attitude (but with evaluative connotations), and sometimes 
– with indignance. 
Blends started to actively appear in the language in the sixteenth century and some of 
them are still preserved in the English language: blatterature = blatter + literature (1512); 
niniversity = ninny + university (around 1590); foolosophy = fool + philosophy (1592); 
foolelosopher = fool + philosopher – (1549); knavigator = knave + navigator (the late six-
teenth – early seventeenth century); unisalphabeth = universal + alphabet (at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century). 
The second period that gave an impulse to blending was the nineteenth century, when 
Great Britain enperienced the technological revolution. It was the time when a new wave 
of blends was fixed in the Daniel Webster Dictionary (Webster 2010): squirl = squiggle + 
twirl or whirl (1843); flimmer = flicker + glimmer (1880); scribaceous = scribe + loqua-
cious – (1846); cablegram = cable + telegram (1868); catalo = cattle + buffalo (1889); 
squarson =squire + parson (1876); solemncholy = solemn + melancholy (1772); clantasti-
cal = clandestine + fantastical (1803); astronography = astronomy + geography (1856); 
wiglomeration = wig + conglomeration (1858). 
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This process of vocabulary enrichment started as a rhetorical device to create comical 
and a bit ambiguous impression which was favored by some writers and publishing hous-
es, for example: balloonacy = balloon + lunacy (Dickens 1864); needcessity = need + ne-
cessity (Scott 1818); ‘shamateur’ = sham + amateur (The Guardian 1896). The English 
Dialect Dictionary (EDD) fixed the following blends in 1898–1905: baffound = baffle + 
confound; smothercate = smother + suffocate; boldacious = bold + audacious; squirearchy 
= squire + hierarchy. A very interesting blend was ‘gerrymander’, which is a fusion of the 
Massachusetts governor's name (Elbridge Gerry) and ‘salamander’ (1811).  
One of the most popular examples, referring to the period, is the book by Lewis Car-
roll ‘Alice in Wonderland’ whose language is like an iceberg with implicit meanings sur-
passing in manifold ways the explicit meanings of the language. It was a perfect device to 
draw the readers' attention to connotations and not to explicit meaning via creating a very 
sophisticated context, for example: rocking-horse-fly = horse-fly + rocking-horse; bread-
and-butterfly = bread-and-butter + butterfly; snap-dragon-fly = Snapdragon + dragonfly; 
slithy = lithe + slimy.  
The third wave of popularity of blends started in the second part of the twentieth cen-
tury. And again it was prompted by a very dynamic evolution of technology and economy 
in the Anglo-Saxon world. This period witnessed a lot of discoveries and break-throughs 
which brought the necessity to somehow assess the phenomena of the world. As we know 
any blend means more than a combination of what its consistuent parts express and always 
contains an evaluating tint of meaning. A critical connotation is evident in the following 
blends: indigomania = indigo children + mania; cocacolonization = coca-cola + coloniza-
tion; videot = video + idiot; Euroshima = Europe + Hiroshima.  
Nevertheless, blends do not always express irony; they often imply sarcasm, disbelief, 
and cynical assessment as well. This is especially evident with respect to the references to 
new discoveries, especially of genetic engineering and new ambiguous inventions: electret 
= electricity + magnet; windoor = window + door; reprography = reproduce + photog-
raphy; stagflation = stagnation + inflation; glasphalt = glass + asphalt; liger = lion + tiger; 
leopon = leopard + lion; wholphin = whale + dolphin; tigon = tiger + lion or liger = lion + 
+ tiger; zorse = zebra + horse; horbra = horse + zebra; cattalo = cattle + buffalo; enor-
mouse = enormous + mouse; cockapoo = cocker spaniel + poodle.  
The language also fixes dubious discoveries in hybrid flora: potamo = potato + toma-
to; grapear = grape + pear; glutose = glucose + fructose; garlion = garlic+ onion; citrange 
= citron + orange; applemon = apple + lemon; sexting = sending text + sexual content; 
wall-jack = fraudulently access Facebook + posts to wall; complisult = compliment + in-
sult; globesity = global + obesity (from Twitter) (Cook 2016). The new blends include 
many phenomena that are socially equivocal: glamping = glamorous + camping; sleepiph-
any = sleep + epiphany; Movember = moustache + November; entreporneur = entrepre-
neur + porn; subtweet = subliminal + tweet (Dictionary 2016); carbage = car + garbage; 
chugger = charity + mugger, vortal = vertical + portal; glocal = global + local; jeggings = 
jeans + leggings; and staycation (stay-at-home + vacation); mockumentary = mock + 
+ documentary; simulcast =simultaneous + podcast; Blizzaster (blizzard + disaster); texto-
nym = text + antonym. It is obvious that the language is not ready to include all of them 
into the vocabulary but the blends make the speech very expressive and attract the readers' 
attention. One of such blends, namely, ‘prestitute’ was coined by Paul C. Robertson and as 
such it embodies all the connotations. 
Kornienko • Social and Economic Background of Blending 223
Blends often emerge during the periods of active integration of a given society into 
some new global environment. In the Russian language this process occurred in the nine-
teenth century when the Russian society made an effort to become a serf-free country and 
streamed to new democratic values. Nikolay Leskov in his novel ‘The Tale of Cross-eyed 
Lefty from Tula and the Steel Flea’ made an extensive use of blends: нимфозория =  
= нимфа + инфузория; мелкоскоп = микроскоп + мелкий; гувернянька = гувернантка +  
+ нянька; гульвар = бульвар + гулять; верояции = вариации + вероятность; долбица 
умножения = долбить + таблица умножения; преламут = перламутр + преломлять 
свет; бюстра = бюсты + люстра. In our opinion, in the Russian language the blends have 
a much more critical and sarcastic meaning than in English. 
The second wave corresponds to the period of Perestroika and the blends of this time 
are often verging on vulgar slang in desire to unmask the reality: дурократы = дураки + 
+ демократы; коммутанты = коммунисты + мутанты; крадоначальник = крадет +  
+ градоначальник (Khruscheva 2011: 143–145); базарник = базар + рыночник, 
дерьмократы = дерьмо + демократы; выходимец = выйти + проходимец; 
гениалиссимус = гений + генералиссимус; идеепродавец = идея + христопродавец; 
кемерунец = Кемерово + камерунец; нуворишки = нувориши + воришки; пропаганец =  
= пропагандист + поганец; трезвятники = трезвость + стервятники; мифописец = 
миф + летописец; фальшивонапитчик = фальшивомонетчик + напитки; западохуль-
ник = Запад + богохульник; кремледворец – Кремль + царедворец; крокодилер =  
= крокодил + дилер; паучеризаторы = от паучий + ваучер + приватизация +  
+ организаторы. 
From our point of view one can deduce a typical atmosphere in the society at the time 
when new big waves of blends emerge. For example, in terms of English blends of recent 
times, compiled with reference to the Neologisms Database of English Words and used in 
many courses of Rice University, one can present the American society in the following 
way: firstly, the public is absolutely scared of many things. One can prove this by a great 
number of blends formed from ‘Armageddon’: Auckgeddon = Auckland + Armageddon; 
Bramageddon = bra + donating + Armageddon; Farmageddon = farm + Armageddon (hor-
ror park in a countryside); Infogeddon = information + Armageddon (lots of frightening 
scandals because of mass media leaks); econogeddon/moneygeddon = economy/money +  
+ Armageddon (permanent scare of financial crises); jobageddon = job + Armageddon 
(scary of losing one's job); aquageddon = aqua + Armageddon; snowageddon = snow +  
+ Armageddon; starmageddon = star + Armageddon; stormageddon = storm + Armaged-
don (frights, connected with natural phenomena); stupid-geddon = stupid + Armageddon 
(low opinion about authorities); disastrophe = disaster + catastrophe; fempire = female +  
+ vampire. 
Another characteristic feature is the American public's significant dependence on so-
cial communication through mobiles and internet and a substantial number of dangers 
awaiting people in this sphere: sexting = sending text + sexual content; wall-jack = fraudu-
lently access Facebook + posts to wall; Neature = neat + nature (nature exploration 
through video); twatch = Twitter + watch and twatching = Twitter + watching; Mocial =  
= mobile + social (many-faced social media); (shift register error which can give a word 
‘good’ instead of 4663) (Carey 2016); Twiple = Twitter + people (parties for Twitter sub-
scribers, mainly, virtual ones): Twittership = Twitter + friendship/relationship; eppraise =  
= electronic + appraise (via Net assessment of real estate).  
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If we add new blends from innovative discoveries sphere (glasphalt, liger, leopon, 
wholphin, tigon, zorse, horbra, cattalo, enor-mouse, cockapoo, potamo, grapear, glutose, 
garlion, citrange, applemon, humalin, complimagra etc.) we will get quite a surrealistic 
picture, weighing on an average American (of 10–35 years old). 
The situation with Russian blends is quite different. There are no virtual otherworldly, 
or extramundane threats. Everything is realistic, imposed from outside world with the help 
of dishonest politicians and greatly detested by the society. First of all, people are disillu-
sioned and reject the so-called liberal values, forming new blends: попозиционерка =  
= поползновения + оппозиционер, либераст = либеральный + педераст; оппозаст =  
= оппозиционный + педераст; толераст = толерантный + педераст; майдауны =  
= майдан + дауны; крестоповал = повалить + кресты; секстремистки из FEMEN =  
= секс + экстремистки; гейропеец = гей + Европа; человолк = человек + волк; 
собакалипсис = собака + апокалипсис; экономикадзе = экономика + камикадзе; 
путанесса = путана + поэтесса; незагармоничный = заграничный + негармоничный.  
Secondly, people are quite cynical about the state of the Russian (former Soviet) soci-
ety. Alexander Zinoviev, an outstanding Russian philosopher and logician, created some 
very expressive blends, reflecting the emotions in the USSR and during the time of Pere-
stroyka as well as the reaction to the social and economic situation in the country. Let us 
give just a few examples: Гомо советикус (Homo Soveticus) = гомо сапиенс +  
+ советский; горбачевизм = Горбачев + капитализм; глобальный человейник =  
= человек + муравейник; катастройка = катастрофа + перестройка; «несовершенно-
взрослые» = несовершеннолетние + взрослые.  
Thirdly, they reflect the realities of a bleak period in the country's development in a 
very straightforward way: отсиденты = отсидеть + диссиденты; свободоносчик =  
= свободоно + доносчик; дурократы = дураки + бюрократы; мапулечка = мама +  
+ папулечка; хрущоба = Хрущев + трущоба; алконавт = алкоголик + космонавт; 
стрекозел = стрекоза + козел; выходимец = выйти + проходимец; трезвятники =  
= трезвость + стервятники; фальшивонапитчик = фальшивомонетчик + напитки; 
гомерзик = гомик + мерзкий; демозавр = демократ + динозавр; досидент = досидеть 
в тюрьме + диссидент. 
Taking into account the above-mentioned information we can conclude that the vo-
cabulary of a language reflects changes in social and economic environment. The new lin-
guistic word-building model, such as blending, reflects the shifts in the attitude towards 
modern values, laws, and social environment as well as the general atmosphere in the so-
ciety and the attitude towards imposed values and laws.  
Moreover, the changes in the vocabulary indirectly correspond to the cyclic pattern of 
changes in the technological and socio-political spheres of a country. The quick develop-
ment and integration into a new world environment gives an impulse to new word-
formation models as it is obvious in case of blends. 
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The Grand Theories of Integration Process  
and the Development of Global  
Communication Networks∗ 
Oleg Alekseenko and Ilya Ilyin 
The article considers the role and value of grand theories as a basis for the study 
of integration processes and global communication networks. The authors also 
consider the role of these theories in the study of globalization and regionalization. 
Keywords: integration, global networks, integration of theory, federalism, func-
tionalism, neo-federalism, neo-functionalism. 
In the first half of the twentieth century regional association of different levels consistently 
associated with military, political, and trade organizations, as evidenced by the activities 
of the League of Nations in the sphere of sovereignty and collective security, etc. 
However, after the Second World War the issues of economic cooperation came to the 
forefront and integration unions started to appear in the international arena along with free 
trade zones, regional banks, and the like, which primarily relied on the productive forces 
along with the simultaneous liberalization of economic relations. 
Meanwhile, in the developing countries the process was, on the contrary, protectionist 
in its nature, which expressed in the desire to protect the newly acquired independence and 
was manifested in the form of sub-regional cooperation (ASEAN1, ECOWAS2, etc.). 
The present stage of development of theoretical studies of integration processes is as-
sociated with events in the world politics between the second half of the 1980s and early 
1990s. The main reason for the intensified research activity was the collapse of the bipolar 
world order after the Soviet system disintegration. At the same time one also observed an 
accelerated economic growth in the periphery countries, with the result that China, India, 
and several other countries began to compete with the strongest economies of the world. 
Their amplification has led to increasing political ambitions and dissatisfaction with the 
policy implemented by the United States and brought the conviction of the need for an 
integration of blocks under the regional leaders in order to build a new balance of power in 
international relations. All this has significantly contributed to the expansion of the scope 
and a quantitative growth of research in the field of integration processes. 
Today the integration stands as one of the defining trends of current development of 
international relations system and of the world in general. ‘Integration’ (Latin integratio) 
means a ‘restoration’ and ‘uniting of individual parts into an entity’. The term ‘integration’ 
may have different meanings depending on the application and branch of knowledge. 
 This study has been supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 15-18-30063). 
1 Association of South-East Asia. 
2 The Economic Community of West African State. 
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In the present paper we focus on the term ‘political integration’ and define it as ‘a political 
process leading to the unification of various states and other political forces to coordinate 
and consolidate their activities’ (Kosov and Fokina 2009: 187). 
Political science investigates the processes of political integration from the viewpoint 
of different theories, which one can divide into three levels according to the level of speci-
ficity and concreteness of the concepts and propositions: grand, middle-range, and micro-
range theories. Each level is based on the development of alternative paradigms (e.g., real-
ism/neorealism, liberalism/neoliberalism, etc.). 
In order to understand the ideological foundations of the theoretical study of the pro-
cesses of integration, let us present an historical outline of the origin of two classic grand 
theories of federalism and functionalism since many new approaches contain theoretical 
foundations of federalism / functionalism yet are guided by small- or middle-range theo-
retical constructs oriented at the contemporary practice of political integration and global 
communication networks. 
The first attempts to study the phenomenon of political integration ideologically origi-
nate in Europe of the early 1920s. They are connected with the end of World War I in 
1918 which brought about the necessity, perceived both by societies and by the political 
elites, to develop new forms of peaceful coexistence. In that period, the need for theoreti-
cal understanding of the events as well as the political elites' urge for an expert advice led 
to the emergence of the pan-European movement characterized by a critical attitude to-
wards national statehood. The debate over the indicated issue and its scientific systemati-
zation gave birth to two theories: federalism and functionalism. 
Federalism 
The theory of federalism emerged in the situation of the crisis of nation-states after the 
events in the global political life and, in particular, on the European continent. The French 
political leader Jean Monnet together with the Italian politician Altiero Spinelli developed 
the theory of separation of power between the national and supranational level. Prominent 
politicians and top officials of the post-war European countries (French President Francois 
Mitterrand, the first German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and others) supported this idea. 
The federalists based their research on the ideas that the final stage of the political in-
tegration processes is the emergence of the state with federal structure. According to the 
theorists of federalism, such pattern of integration allows creating an efficient system of 
cooperation between federal subjects and central government. Thus, the two levels of gov-
ernment – central and administrative-territorial (national and territorial) – act as the basic 
elements of a federation. In this situation, the central government concentrates the powers 
for the solution of general problems, while the authorities of federal subjects have certain 
powers in the matters of local importance. 
The theory launched sharp debates in the scientific community regarding the issue of 
the degree of centralization within the federal framework. The discussion helped to define 
several types of federal structure, depending on the degree of interaction between the two 
levels of government. At the same time they took account of such factors as the level of 
democratic governance, the development of political pluralism, etc. that could contribute 
to the emergence of distinct types of federations: centralist, balanced, and decentralist. 
One should note that the centralist type of federal structure gained the largest support 
among the advocates and critics of the theory of federalism (Avdonin 2007: 3). 
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Another bright theory is the theory of neo-federalism. American political scientist 
John Pinder combined theoretical analysis on the issues of the European integration and 
prepared practical recommendations, thus laying the foundation of the theory (Pinder 
1991) which is based on the idea of moving towards supranational decisions. Another 
well-known representative of neo-federalism is Amitai Etzioni, who considers the for-
mation of the ‘political community’ as the main goal of integration. The ‘political commu-
nity’ must have the following components: the control over the means of coercion, the 
presence of the decision-making center, and a common orientation of the citizens of  
the community. 
Functionalism 
Functionalists also criticized the idea of the nation-state, but unlike their opponents, they 
considered as an alternative to the federation the system of international institutions whose 
form and content depend on the functions they fulfil. The main ideas of the functionalists 
were formulated in the 1940s by the creator of this approach, the English scientist Da- 
vid Mitrany, and referred rather to the principles of international co-operation than to the 
integration of the European continent (Pinder 1991). 
The proponents of functionalism determined the expansion of non-political tasks as a 
prerequisite for international cooperation. Thus, according to Mitrany's concept of ‘spill-
over’ interaction, initially states integrate in certain areas and then, these partially integrat-
ed states gain a necessity for further integration in related field, which in turn leads to the 
emergence of special supranational coordinating institutions and subsequent acceleration 
of political integration processes. 
Functionalism was instrumental for the creation and development of the United Na-
tions and a number of its specific institutions. Nevertheless, functionalism had a signifi-
cant disadvantage since it simplified the notion of political integration, which, according to 
this approach must simply follow the economic one. The political integration in the Euro-
pean Union has shown that actually the need for the transfer of sovereign powers to a su-
pranational body is the key to the process of integrative cooperation.  
The next step in the study of political integration became the neo-functionalist ap-
proach of the 1960 and 1970s. The most outstanding representatives of this approach are 
Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch, Leon N. Lindberg and others. The neofunctional theorists ad-
hered to the fundamental functionalist ideas which they further elaborated and expanded. 
Neo-functionalism became widespread in the USA and is manifested in two methodo-
logical alternatives. One of them is the communication theory of the American political 
scientist Karl Deutsch focuses on the analysis of the integrating communities within a 
broader context of international relations. Another theory, directly associated with the 
works of Ernst Haas, focuses on the analysis of regional political integration. 
Deutsch defined the social communication as a basis for integration which is the rela-
tionship between interdependent subjects co-producing a certain system product, which 
they will be deprived of if separated (Deutsch 1978: 198). From his point of view, the in-
ternational integration is accompanied by the convergence not only of the states but of the 
societies as well. The determining factor for the former is the legal implementation, while 
for the latter the most important is the emergence of ‘community feeling’ formed in the 
process of intensive communication as well as the existence of institutions and practical 
tools aimed at ensuring ‘peaceful change’ in the long term (Deutsch 1957: 5). 
Alekseenko and Ilyin • The Grand Theories of Integration Process 229
Thus, within the international integration one can find some legally arranged political 
organizations as well as the associations of states united by ‘a sense of community’, 
which, from Deutsch's point of view, are qualitatively at a higher developmental level than 
the treaty relations between states which are fragile by their nature. 
The neofunctional approach of Ernst Haas contained a more specific analysis of polit-
ical integration based not only on Mitrany's functionalism, but also on the analysis of po-
litical practice. He considered the specific actions of political actors of the integrating 
states as the main driving forces of integration. Haas determined political integration as the 
process when the political actors of several individual national systems tend to reorient their 
loyalty, goals, and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions have jurisdic-
tion or apply for its extension in relation to the existing national states’ (Haas 1958: 16). 
Thus, to ensure their interests the participants of this process can use the supranational 
political level, which is superior to the one of the nation-state. At the same time, there is a 
gradual transformation of national interests in the direction of supranational alliances. 
Another element of the neofunctional theory by Ernst Haas, is the concept of spill-
over process. This concept implies that a fruitful cooperation in one area inevitably has an 
impact on related areas and gradually expands its range, making the integrative interaction 
more stable and long-lasting. The neofunctional theory of political integration has gained a 
wide popularity while the ideas based on it served as the major analytical models of many 
research projects. However, optimism dynamic development of the neofunctional analysis 
was not combined with the actual political practice and the stagnation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), of the 1970s, because of the divergent policies primarily of 
the integrating states. All this has affected the occurrence of the neo-functionalism critics 
while reducing its impact on the views of researchers' integration processes. 
During the period of crisis of the neofunctional theory another representative of the 
American political science – Stanley Hoffman – became the main competitor for Ernst 
Haas and his followers and came up with the idea of inter-state approach to the study of 
political integration. 
Stanley Hoffman was critical of the neofunctionalist idea about the decisive signifi-
cance of supranational bodies in the process of political integration. He also emphasized 
that the supporters of neofunctional approach did not take into account the external factors 
and the impact of the national security interests of state members of the integration pro-
cess. Hoffman's idea relied on the basic theoretical concepts of international relations and 
considered the process of integration as a process of interaction between states to ensure 
their own national interests.  
According to Hoffman, the integration process depends on the states' willingness to 
delegate a part of their sovereignty to supranational bodies. This very factor is determinant 
for the development of positive dynamics of integration. Within the interstate approach 
one distinguishes two areas of integration cooperation: a ‘high’ level (foreign policy and 
security issues) and a ‘low’ one (economic, social, and humanitarian sphere, etc.) (Avdon-
in 2007: 5). The ‘low’ area of integration comprises the main areas of cooperation allow-
ing an intensive cooperation between states on mutually beneficial terms while the ‘high’ 
area of integration has certain limitations in the coordination of national interests and na-
tional security. 
*   *   * 
To summarize, we can say that the theories of federalism/neo-federalism and of func-
tionalism/neo-functionalism have become classic theories and served as the basis for fur-
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ther comprehension of integration. The origins of new theories associate with the emerg-
ing in the 1980s modern forms of cooperation among states at different levels as well as 
with changing international conditions and approaches in international cooperation and 
with the formation of new institutional relationships at all levels of regional integration. 
The emergence of supranational actors at the contemporary international geopolitic 
arena concentrating certain sovereign functions of national states and their increasing in-
fluence on the global political and economic environment brought the qualitative content 
of globalization to a new level. 
For a long period globalization has been considered the basis for the development of a 
modern system of international relations while the processes of regionalization have been 
regarded as secondary. However, finally, it turned out that the regionalization processes 
underlie the emergence of qualitatively new forms of institutional relations and thus, foster 
the origins of regional groupings, the latter being able to act as centres of power. Through 
the increasing cooperation in various spheres, the emerging regional systems become the 
centres of attraction in the region. The emerging association, gradually moving from eco-
nomic to political cooperation, can acquire a transnational nature of global network links. 
One should note that on the one hand, the emergence of global communication net-
works provides new opportunities for all actors of the international relations, on the other 
hand, the emerging dependence of the sovereign states on the trends and tendencies in in-
ternational affairs may adversely affect the national consciousness, first of all, of the small 
nations and states. 
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Many social scientists see Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa as emerg-
ing powers. Analyzing to what extent these countries have the size, the resources, 
and the will to achieve great power status they find that all these countries are the 
largest countries with the biggest economies in their regions and play an important 
role in the global polity. The effects of symbolic power accumulation, however, are 
frequently ignored and significantly underestimated. The paper contributes to the 
discussion on emerging powers by analyzing global symbolic power formation. 
Therefore, a field of global symbolism, namely the global field of sport is reviewed. 
Sport in general can be seen as a mechanism to strengthen the national identity of 
any country and its vision of itself. Hence, the paper argues that the investment in-
to sport is a useful strategy to improve citizens' self-perception as an emerging 
power and to gain support for their ‘expanding’ politics. Furthermore, it argues 
that the power status of emerging powers can be read off from the supply and suc-
cess in international and global sport events. Consequently, it is not of great sur-
prise that emerging countries have started hosing major sport event recently 
(Olympic Summer Games 2008 and Olympic Winter Games 2022 in China; Soccer 
World Championship 2010 in South Africa, Commonwealth Games 2010 and 
Cricket World Cup 2011 in India; Olympic Winter Games 2014 and the FIFA 
World Cup 2018 in Russia, FIFA World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Summer 
Games 2016 in Brazil). 
Keywords: globalization, international relations, emerging powers, collective 
identity, nation building, symbolic power, sport, Olympic Games, FIFA World 
Cup. 
1. Introduction 
The process of globalization is constantly changing the existing world order, namely, it 
transforms the status and the role of the nation-state crucially (Giddens 1985; Appadurai 
1996; Beck 2000; Kiss 2010). Consequently since the beginning of the 1990s the con-
sciousness of the world and therefore of other countries and other cultures has increased 
decisively. Nation-states nowadays are not only focused inwards by controlling the inter-
nal issues of national societies like national security or social welfare, more and more they 
face outwards to the distance and compete with other countries on every level of interac-
tion: not only in the sector of the world economy or global politics but also in the sector of 
transnational culture. Global sport events fashion among transnational cultures' symbolic 
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icons. Recently, hosting global sport events has become a symbolic not only of a strong 
national identity but also a symbol of the capability in acting globally (Senn 1999; Black 
2007; Cornelissen 2010; Jinxia 2010; Schaffer and Smith 2000). With the fact that a coun-
try is able to organize a sports mega-event like the Olympic Games or a FIFA World Cup 
it shows the world its power on several sectors: the economic and administrative power by 
providing an adequate infrastructure (stadiums, public transportation, and accommoda-
tion), the political power by providing security for a huge number of guests, the cultural 
power by presenting the nation itself as good and friendly hosts, etc. (Short 2008:  
323–324).  
Sport in general can be seen as a mechanism to strengthen the national identity of any 
country and its vision of itself (Tomlinson 1986; Bairner 2001). Hence, this paper argues 
that the investment into sport is a useful strategy to improve citizens' self-perception as an 
emerging power and to gain support for their ‘expanding’ politics. Furthermore, it argues 
that the power status of emerging powers can be read off from the supply and success in 
international and global sport events (Cornelissen 2010: 3014).  
Therefore, a field of global symbolism, namely the ‘field of sport’ (Schirato 2007) is 
reviewed. Traditionally, there are seven dimensions of power identified in international 
relations (Renard 2009: 24–26), divided into natural determinants (geography, population, 
and resources) and social factors (economy, military, diplomacy, and identity). However, 
most scholars mainly focus on the first six factors (domestic sociopolitical, international 
political, population, economic, agriculture, energy, technology, environmental resources 
and quality) (e.g., Kennedy 1987; Treverton and Jones 2005). The question of how to in-
fluence and strengthen strategic soft factors like the perception of national identity and 
what can be done to support the general image of an emerging power abroad and at home 
has been to minor interest in academia (e.g. Tomlinson 2000). To overcome the image of a 
regional power, the status as an emerging global power has somehow to be anchored in the 
general perception of their citizens and sport is one way to do so (Bairner 2001; Jinxia 
2010). 
To analyze the phenomenon of global symbolic power, the paper is structured as fol-
lows: in Section 2 the social functions of sport are highlighted. Section 3 then analyzes the 
internal perspective of sport while Section 4 focuses on the external perspective of sport. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Social Functions of Sport 
The image of building social cohesion through sports can be traced back to England in the 
eighteenth century (Hoberman 1993, 1997; Guttmann 1994; Standeven 1994: 241; Bairner 
2001: 13; Giulianotti and Robertson 2009). Although sport was based on the principles of 
physical capacity, competition, and the challenge of records, it was also conceptualized as 
a tool of education in the first English public schools. Following up on the notion that 
sport is an element of common activity with the potential of self-forming groups and group 
identities, it mediates social rules and the idea of respect towards other group members.  
At a later date sport was used in a related way for disciplinary issues of industrial workers 
and for socialization (respectively ‘civilization’) of postcolonial societies in India and Af-
rica (Schirato 2007: 63–70; Whannel 1998; Bose 2006: 47, 57; Guttmann 1994: 39, 63–
70). Thus, sport in general can be seen as a tool to overcome the barriers within national 
societies (Giulianotti and Robertson 2009: сh. 5). 
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Despite a number of different ideas of transnationalism and conceptions of transna-
tional communities across all borders of nation-states (Appadurai 1996), the traditional 
idea of nation-states as a container-model still is quite realistic for most countries (Giddens 
1985: 119). The modern idea of the nation-state which contains society must be regarded 
as the basic structure of the contemporary world (Beck 2000; Kiss 2010). In this national 
context it is widely accepted that sport can function as an element of uniting differences as 
well as for the transgression of local communalism (Maguire 2005; Tomlinson and Young 
2006b). 
Recognizing that sport is both connected to a uniting and bonding source of power be-
tween different peoples, social classes, religions, nations, etc., while being founded on the 
idea of competition and therefore linked to the idea of division and separation of people, it 
can be argued that sport seems to be a universal language, a cultural tool, for bridging the 
gaps of unequally developed states and continents.1 Major sport events like the world 
championships in football in Germany 2006 or in South Africa 2010 were enacted as big 
party events where different people should meet and get to know each other. 
Accordingly, those events are always accompanied by mottos linked to nations. For 
example the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany was themed ‘World Cup – A Time to 
Make Friends’ and the FIFA World Cup 2010 in South Africa ‘Ke Nako. Celebrate Afri-
ca's Humanity’. These events are presentations of the nation not only to their own citizens 
but especially to the rest of the world. The crucial points are not so much the real social 
problems in a society or the differences between different ethnic groups in a society but 
the idea of overcoming those differences and present a nation from two different perspec-
tives: A ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ national identity (often a national cliché) is presented on the 
one side. On the other side, the nation is shown as an open-minded, friendly and commu-
nicative entity. 
From such a point of view sport is seen as some kind of ‘lingua franca’ which can be 
decrypted by the poor and the rich, not depending on the color of the skin, the religious 
context or the national culture (for an overview on global inequality see Boatcă 2015; 
Lenger and Schumacher 2015). Sport events can be held across all national borders and 
beyond political systems because on the playing fields of sport every participant truly is 
equal since they all meet under the same objective rules and circumstances (Black 2007: 
266). Consequently, sport has a transnational, transgressing potential (Giulianotti and 
Robertson 2009: 134–147). 
In contrast, however, the instrumentalization of sport through nation-states is omni-
present. National success in global sport events conveys the people national pride and the 
faith in their national strength and national power. Since sport takes place on an assumed 
‘neutral’ ground, collective identities can be linked to it and polarizations can easily take 
place: You always have the ‘good us’ against the ‘bad others’ (Bairner 2001: 174–175).  
In this opposition it seems to be impossible to give a categorical statement about the phe-
                                                          
1 Accordingly, the United Nations (2003) highlight the potential of sport affecting the lives of individuals, nations, and 
civilizations across the globe: ‘The world of sport presents a natural partnership for the United Nations system. By 
its very nature sport is about participation. It is about inclusion and citizenship. Sport brings individuals and commu-
nities together, highlighting commonalties and bridging cultural or ethnic divides. Sport provides a forum to learn 
skills such as discipline, confidence and leadership and it teaches core principles such as tolerance, cooperation and 
respect. Sport teaches the value of effort and how to manage victory, as well as defeat. When these positive aspects 
of sport are emphasized, sport becomes a powerful vehicle through which the United Nations can work towards 
achieving its goals’. 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 234
nomenon of sport: depending on the specific context sport is linked to it can be disuniting 
on the one hand or universal on the other. Sport can be a factor of nationalism as well as a 
factor of transnationalism or globalization.  
The twofold function of sport as an element of uniting as well as an element of dissocia-
tion constitutes the theoretical background of this paper. In what follows the impacts of global 
sport events on two different directions will be described. These events cause a number of in-
ternal effects to national societies as well as on the international or intercultural level in the 
external or global relations between nation-states. On the internal level, sport contributes to 
social cohesion. On the external level, the competition is about gaining reputation in the exist-
ing international world order. Especially some rising nations of the Global South which are 
summarized with the conception of the emerging powers are more and more interested in the 
role of hosts for global sport events to show and underline their rising and growing status in 
the changing world order. 
The Internal Perspective: National Identity and Global Sport 
Events 
Being the host country of – for example – the Olympic Games or a FIFA World Cup does 
not only demonstrate the world the ability, the culture, and the power of the hosting nation, 
it also has effects on the national identity of the hosting society (Short 2008). 
In general, big sport events often are directly connected to nation-building processes 
and constructions of national identity (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Yu 
2010): The 1954 ‘Wunder von Bern’ often is seen as the emotional birth of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The South African triumph in the rugby world cup in 1995 when 
the white ‘Springboks’ carried their black president Nelson Mandela on their shoulders 
and Mandela vice versa put on the rugby dress can also be regarded as a symbol of nation-
al identity. 
Sport Events and the Social Construction of Imagined Communities 
Theoretically, two different concepts of the nation exist: From a subjective perspective, the 
belonging to a nation rests on the free will of an individual. Consequently, the nation is 
conceptualized as a community open to everyone (cf. Renan 1996 [1882]). While this vol-
untary concept is closely linked to the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, the objective 
perspective in contrast is linked to the idea of a cultural nation or people's nation (von 
Herder 1784–1791). An essential argument for this second view is the assumption that a 
designated group of people have a specific attribute in common given by nature. This is 
used as some kind of social substrate, in other words, a group of people can be organized 
as a collective subject. Accordingly, the national community does not result from a com-
mon subjective political idea of will but rather from objective attributes like a common 
history, a common culture, a common ethnicity or a common language (Hall 1991). 
In the twentieth century, concepts of the nations developed in front of Neo-Marxist 
theories (Poulantzas 1978; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991) as well as on the background of 
the process of modernization (Gellner 1983, 1997). Against the background of the post-
colonial nations in Africa and Asia, Benedict Anderson (1983) developed the concept of 
the ‘Imagined Communities’ which can be regarded as a change of paradigm. As the es-
tablished common criteria for communities like history, culture or language fail for these 
‘new’ nations, Anderson suggested a less dogmatic definition for the nation as an ‘imag-
ined community’. Instead of searching for a number of definitive criteria for the perma-
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nence of national communities, he let the nations define themselves endogenously. Hence 
for the multicultural, multiethnic and multilinguistic postcolonial nations, he does not try 
to identify a single collective criterion which can be regarded as the foundation of the na-
tion. Rather he asks the more general question of how communities as imaginations are 
constituted in the mind of their citizens. In contrast to European nations, postcolonial na-
tions are not established on a collective idea or common base. They are just founded on 
the existence of a former colonial territory. Consequently, the term ‘nation-building’ 
emerged in the theories of the nation-states (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This term de-
scribes the formation process of a nation-state resulting from nothing else than a commu-
nity feeling. If nations cannot be defined by a fundamental core, the criteria of affiliation 
can only be an imagined feeling of inclusion and exclusion. So the question of national 
identity becomes the crucial question at hand. If nations can be comprehended as cultural 
constructions of communality, they can only be viewed by their internal perspective of 
imagined collectivity. Thus, the analysis has to focus on the issue how the concept of the 
nation as an ‘imagined community’ is constructed and reproduced within big sport events.  
Collective Memory and the Lieux de Mémoire 
To approach this question Maurice Halbwachs' theory of the Collective Memory and espe-
cially the refined concept by the German archeologist Jan Assmann can be adapted to the 
question of national identification in sports (Halbwachs 1980, 1992; Assmann 2011). 
Assmann replaces the term of the ‘collective memory’ by the term of the ‘cultural 
memory’. His extension of the concept focuses on the aspect of the objectivity of culture 
which Halbwachs did not regard as a central point. So Assmann's extended concept is based 
on the trilogy memory, culture, and community. Starting from the idea of a cultural memory 
retention and memory are not so much seen as individual phenomena but rather are social, 
respectively collective phenomena. Collective patterns of thought and interpretation of 
social processes, events, memory and identity are essentially shaped through the context of 
societies. Thus, cultural and collective interpretations of the past, the present and the future 
are channeled to the collective memory of a group of people. Consequently, the entries to 
the collective memories of nations are directly linked to national identities. They evoke and 
generate common associations and emotions. The active constructive process of memory 
connects historical and current facts with statements and emotions and thus gives those facts 
social sense and social meanings. It is the task of the collective memory to explain the pre-
sent: to organize and define the nation to a collective mind. To put it into simple words: It 
is the task of the collective memory to create a collective identity. Thus, the collective 
identity of a nation can be regarded as the link between the individual and the society, be-
tween personal experience and collective knowledge, as well as between past and future. 
Resting on this concept, the French historian Pierre Nora (1999–2010) regards memo-
ries as real or imagined places, so-called Lieux de Mémoire. Lieux de Mémoire represents 
common national memories and emotions, triumphs and defeats, joy and sadness, overall 
the idea of the imagined nation. For the construction of communality and identity different 
items are useful: demonstrative images or meaningful events are important if we want to 
find out who we are and how we identify ourselves as a group. Specific national institu-
tions in a broader sense like schools, cultural institutes, national galleries, national muse-
ums as well as national teams in sports frequently are constructed as cultural symbols. 
Thereby national memorials, flags, hymns, popular traditional songs, literature, sport 
events and their insignia are widely used instruments to link individuals to a community 
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and generate a feeling of a common identity. The Lieux de Mémoire calls up and satisfies 
the social and the emotional needs for orientation and collectivity. To trigger the process 
of identity formation, national myths must be embodied in events and persons. They also 
must be connected to people's everyday life and must contain well known and positive 
messages of a society.  
Hence, sports allow for communication between social classes bridging social inequality 
and differences between different members of society. Such a function is of utmost im-
portance since emerging powers in particular struggle with the problem of social inequality 
and the problem of missing participation of lower classes. Thus, by recognizing the potential 
of sport to create social cohesion, global sport events must be analyzed in more detail. 
The External Perspective: Emerging Powers and the Global 
Competition of Nation States 
The second interest of the paper is the influence and significance spread out from the fact 
that global sport events are hosted by nation-states.2 This can be very clearly shown by a 
number of rising nations which are summarized as the emerging powers in the current 
world order (Cornelissen 2010; Jinxia 2010). These nations like Brazil, Russia, India, China 
or South Africa have shown up on the global sphere of sports since the 1990s and have start-
ed hosting global sport events just recently. Hereinafter the modified role of these states in 
the world order will be approached by outlining the theoretical conception of the emerging 
powers in a first step, focusing on the altered function of the nation-state in a second step, 
and highlighting the link between sports and international relations in a third step. 
The Emergence of New Powers: BRICSA 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the current world order has changed through the expecta-
tions of the process of globalization on all sectors of international relations and issues of so-
cieties (Renard 2009: 13–20; Grinin and Korotayev 2010; Tausch and Heshmati 2011). 
Hermann Schwengel (2008) outlines three basic steps in the history of the emerging powers 
since the 1970s which are closely linked to the power structure of the world and to the pro-
cess of globalization: In the 1970s, a new kind of flexible global capitalism emerged.  
The changes in the two decades until 1990 were limited to the economic sector. The eco-
nomic integration in the world system increased dramatically as well as the quotas of im-
port and export of products in a number of societies. Schwengel analyses this process as a 
process of quantity not so much as a process of quality because this change was mostly 
limited to the economic sector and can be regarded as a new dimension of the worldwide 
capitalism. In the sector of politics, however, the global landscape was clearly dominated 
by the two block system of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States 
of America. In this tight political situation the emergence of a third player on the global 
agenda was not possible. Nevertheless, some commercial city-states like Singapore and 
Hong Kong and some ‘Tiger States’ like Taiwan and South Korea arose. These tiger econ-
omies, however, were commercial centers ‘under the umbrella of American hegemony’ 
(Schwengel 2008).  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the decline of the Eastern Bloc the political situa-
tion changed completely. The USA until today must be regarded as the only remaining 
                                                          
2 Even though the Olympic Games are officially hosted by a town and not by a national state we assume a national 
dimension with every global sport event. 
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super power in the world but without any equivalent. Instead of the two-bloc-system now-
adays we are confronted with a number of regional centers of powers like Brazil, Russia, 
India or China simply called BRIC today (O'Neill 2001, 2009; Schwengel 2008; Renard 
2009; Martinez-Diaz and Woods 2009). Moreover, instead of the ‘stable’ system of the 
Cold War we are confronted with a diffuse and multipolar system including different and 
changing centers of powers today (Chase-Dunn 2014). In this context the role of the EU 
and of a number of other more or less emerging states like South Africa, South Korea, 
Thailand or Japan cannot be conclusively determined. In the current situation of globaliza-
tion, Eric Hobsbawm points out, it is the first time for two centuries that the world does 
neither have a working international system nor a stable international structure 
(Hobsbawm 1990).  
Thus, new global alliances are established following individual national economic and 
strategic interests in a multipolar world. The first-ever BRIC summit meeting of the leading 
emerging powers, held in June 2009 in Yekaterinburg, clearly represents the change in the 
world order (O'Neill 2009; for overviews on emerging powers see OECD 2008; Pieterse 
and Rehbein 2008, 2009; Renard 2009). Building new economic and strategic alliances the 
BRIC nations are economically catching up with the G-7 and are expected to overtake it in 
less than two decades and are likely to be the new driving forces in the global economy.  
A few years ago Goldman Sachs made the prediction that China will overtake the USA as 
the leading economy followed by India, Brazil, and Russia and that the combined economies 
of BRIC countries could outperform those six leading countries in monetary terms by 2050. 
A broad body of literature giving evidence that Brazil (Sotero and Armijo 2007; Lattimore 
and Kowalski 2008), Russia (Tarr 2008), India (Rusko and Sasikumar 2007; Grinin 2013), 
China (Liang 2007; Rusko and Sasikumar 2007; Cheng and Yang 2012; Grinin 2013), and 
South Africa (Kowalski, Lattimore, and Bottini 2008) will be very likely the leading glob-
al powers by the middle of the twenty-first century. Thus, we assume that those countries 
until today have reached enough economic, political, military and cultural power to play  
a major role in world politics. 
Globalization and the Altered Role of the Nation-State 
The current situation can be described as a third phase of globalization, that is as a period 
of inner globalization and the emergence of new powers (Schwengel 2008). Hence the 
national societies have to find their place in the processes of globalization which funda-
mentally affect their traditional ideas of local identities and global expectations (Ibid.:  
4–5). Under the impressions of worldwide changes caused by globalization in the last four 
decades, two contradictory positions have been pointed out: some authors hold the posi-
tion that the nation-state still must be viewed as the fundament of the world system and 
forecast the idea of the nation a great future (Mann 1986, 1993, 1997) while others expect 
the decline of a world constructed of nations and national societies (Hall 1991; Appadurai 
1996; Pieterse 2004; Grinin 2012). Appadurai, for example, argues that cultures today 
more and more transcend nation-states. In his concept of different kinds of ‘-scapes’ he 
does not only see the economic sector to be transnational but also social areas like tech-
nology through the internet, ethnology through migration and tourism or ideas and ideolo-
gies through the worldwide media. While in some globalization theories the dissolution of 
boundaries is posed as the end of the nation-state other more skeptical conceptions only 
expect the nation-state to change. Beck (2000) expects the traditional nation-states to 
transform into a single transnational entity which is dominated by the civil society. Other 
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authors like Hall (1991) or Pieterse (2004) consider the backside of globalization and con-
sequently identify a process of deglobalization. In opposition to the global ideas of trans-
gressions of boundaries in all sectors the reinforcement of local identities is recognized. 
Starting from these observations, Robertson (1995) developed the concept of ‘glocalisa-
tion’ which considers both aspects in the process of globalization: the side of the globality 
as well as the opposite side of locality. Regardless of whether the status of the nation-
states is weakened or strengthened in the process of globalization in this current situation 
of a multipolar world system with different emerging centers of power the role of the na-
tion state has definitely changed. 
Ernest Gellner (1983, 1997), in his famous conception of the nation-state and moder-
nity, traces the idea of the nation-state from agrarian societies to modern societies. He ar-
gues that modern societies are dominated by a capitalist economy which generates a need 
for a well-educated flexible workforce. The modern nation-state hence is based on well-
educated people and strong regulations of all social sectors by administrations. With these 
elements, the sovereign nation-state claims not only the dominance over its citizens but 
also over its territory. This dominance is not so much dominance of oppression but of in-
tegration. The state monopoly above all is bounded inward. The traditional role of the na-
tion-state consequently is found in the aspects like the regulation of the population by the 
establishment of a health system or in security issues like the undisputed power over legis-
lative (jurisdiction) and executive (police). 
With the changes of globalization at hand the domination of limited national territories 
or peoples not only become more and more difficult but also become basically insufficient. 
Nation-states successfully taking part in the global competition are not only able to control 
their own territory and their own people but also to shine outwards all over the globe. With 
the establishment of new information technologies like the internet and the existence of a 
global public sphere, the place of action has been transferred from a limited local point to 
a global sphere (with Appadurai it can be named a global mediascape). The sovereign na-
tion-state within the last two decades has been transformed from a national welfare state to 
a global competitive state. Thereby the radius of action for nation-states has been dramati-
cally enlarged. With every political action nation states today not only must be perceived 
as local players but also as global actors.  
It has been pointed out before that empirical data indicates that the BRICSAs are 
emerging powers (cf. Grinin and Korotayev 2010). A glance at the share of the global 
gross domestic product, for example, shows that in 1995 they accumulated approximately 
8 per cent of the global GDP; ten years later their share was already reaching 10 per cent, 
and in 2009 their share was hitting 15.5 per cent of global GDP, representing over 20 per 
cent of global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (Renard 2009; Wilson and Purushothaman 
2003). In fact, it is expected that China will catch up earlier with the United States. Ac-
cording to Jim O'Neill, the BRIC economies will reach equal real GDP levels with the EU 
by 2040 (O'Neill 2001). 
However, it is important to acknowledge that there is a fundamental distinction be-
tween an emerging economy and an emerging power. Unfortunately, a detailed description 
of the economic, political, militaristic, population developments of emerging powers is 
beyond the scope of the paper (for an excellent overview see Renard 2009; for indicators 
of globalization see Drener et al. 2010; Heshmati and Lee 2010). Here, we assume that 
there is enough empirical evidence to treat China, Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa 
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as emerging powers. There are many hard indicators that could be used to measure the 
power of countries like quantity of natural resources, level of urbanization or the level of 
technological advancement. However, to discover who the real emerging powers today are 
also the numerous non-traditional indicators of power, like soft power, the (self-)perception 
of power, or life satisfaction and happiness have to be included. Thus, it can be demonstrated 
that both India and China have been putting efforts into promoting its soft power in recent 
years, India through Bollywood Movies and China through hosting the Olympic Games. Thus, 
following this notion we want to highlight a development that seems to us as striking as ob-
vious at the same time. All emerging powers will host or are hosting major sport events 
recently demonstrating that the international competition among nations have reached the 
cultural sector as well. 
The Politics of Global Sport Events  
The importance of sports mega-events3 has been recognized increasingly in a globalized 
world (Tomlinson and Young 2006b; Miller et al. 2001). The cultural-political and eco-
nomic significance of such events has also been highlighted sufficiently (Simson and Jen-
nings 1992; Sugden and Tomlinson 1998; Tomlinson 1996, 2000; Roche 2001). Neverthe-
less, the function of sports in its form as a global media event – transporting symbolic val-
ues – has not been understood sufficiently (Giulianotti and Robertson 2009: 63–73, 92–95; 
Tomlinson and Young 2006a: 4). 
As pointed out before, the Yekaterinburg summit gives clear evidence that the BRIC na-
tions are already seeking a greater role in the global (financial) institutions and the interna-
tional monetary system (Khan and Roy 2011). To support their rising global status and to 
gain their citizens' support, those leading emerging powers have started to invest into sport 
and global sport events. Since there are high symbolic revenues it is not surprising that all 
rising nations compete intensively to host the next Olympic Games or FIFA World Cups. 
However, it is widely known that international sport is characterized by political and eco-
nomic inequalities, unbalanced relationships and persisting conflicts (Cornelissen 2010). 
Moreover, within the sociology of sport it has been argued that the symbolic importance 
and sportive power of nations is reflected by the success in winning medals and titles 
therefore represented by medal tables of the Olympic Games or number of world cup ti-
tles, nowadays called ‘sportive nationalism’ (Hoberman 1993, 2004). Pierre Coubertin, for 
example, explicitly claimed that triumphant athletes promote national prestige and states 
that winning medals is the global accepted symbolic indicator for success in sport 
(Hoberman 2004: 185). Stamm and Lamprecht (2000) provide empirical evidence that the 
power structure of nations correlates to success in Olympic Games. The sportive success 
then is readily seen as a symbolic power in the existing world order (Jütting 2001). However, 
it has seldom been recognized that hosting these major sport events actually represents a 
much more important indicator for the symbolic power of a nation (e.g., Schirato 2007: 75–
81). From the perspective of the organizers, the realization of a major sport event does not 
only represent the integration into the global community but also the competitive advantage 
of a country. Frequently, it can be argued that the independent observer might have the 
impression that the success within the field of sport correlates directly to political, cultural, 
and organizational resources of a society. 
                                                          
3 In line with Tomlinson and Young (2006a) global sport events are defined as ‘an event that has come to involve the 
majority of the nations of the world, that is transmitted globally, that foregrounds the sculptured and commodified 
body and orchestrates a physical display of the body politic, and that attracts large and regular followings of on-site 
spectators for the live contest or event’. 
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Accordingly, being much more than ‘propaganda for tourism’ (Krüger 2004) these 
motives emerge particularly apparent at the XI Olympic Games (Berlin 1936) before 
World War II and at the XXII (Moscow 1980) and XXIII (Los Angeles 1984) Olympic 
Games during the Cold War when the competition of social systems and cultures bore the 
markings of an arms race (for a detailed survey of the following see Hook 2002; Tomlin-
son and Young 2006a). However, the core of our argumentation says that even after the 
breakdown of socialism the competition of systems has not declined but rather persists 
represented, for example, in international sports (Das 2006; Palat 2008). Following up this 
argument the Olympic Games 1988 in Seoul represent the success of the rising Asian 
dragons and the Olympic Games 2008, 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2022 the increased im-
portance of emerging powers like China, Russia, Brazil and South Korea. 
Table 1. Host Cities and Countries of the Olympic Games 
Year Place Country 
1 2 3 
1896 Athens Greece 
1900 Paris France 
1904 Saint Louis USA 
1908 London UK 
1912 Stockholm Sweden 
1920 Antwerp Belgium 
1924 Paris France 
1924 Chamonix France 
1928 Amsterdam Netherlands 
1928 St. Moritz Switzerland 
1932 Los Angeles USA 
1932 Lake Placid USA 
1936 Berlin Germany 
1936 Garmisch-Part.enkirchen Germany 
1948 London UK 
1948 St. Moritz Switzerland 
1952 Helsinki Finland 
1952 Oslo Norway 
1956 Melbourne/Stockholm Australia/Sweden 
1956 Cortina d'Ampezzo Italy 
1960 Rome Italy 
1960 Squaw Valley  USA 
1964 Tokyo Japan 
1964 Innsbruck Austria 
1968 Mexico-City Mexico 
1968 Grenoble France 
1972 Munich Germany 
1972 Sapporo Japan 
1976 Montreal Canada 
1976 Innsbruck Austria 
1980 Moscow Soviet Union 
1980 Lake Placid USA 
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1 2 3 
1984 Los Angeles USA 
1984 Sarajevo Yugoslavia 
1988 Seoul Republic of Korea 
1988 Calgary Canada 
1992 Barcelona Spain 
1992 Albertville France 
1994 Lillehammer Norway 
1996 Atlanta USA 
1998 Nagano Japan 
2000 Sydney Australia 
2002 Salt Lake City USA 
2004 Athens Greece 
2006 Torino Italy 
2008 Beijing China 
2010 Vancouver Canada 
2012 London UK 
2014 Sochi Russia 
2016 Rio  Brazil 
2018 Pyeongchang South Korea 
2020 Tokyo Japan 
2022 Beijing China 
Source: http://www.olympic.org/en/content/Olympic-Games. 
Table 1 gives clear evidence of this phenomenon: While being a global event it has been 
hosted only in the Western World in the first half of the twentieth century. It was not be-
fore 1956 that the Games arrived in the Southern hemisphere for the first time. But even 
then beside Mexico in 1968 and South Korea in 1988 it has been only already industrial-
ized nations hosting the Summer Games. However, the emerging powers represented 
through China (2008) and Russia (2014) started hosting the Games (Jinxia 2010). More 
striking is that Brazil 2016, South Korea 2018, and China 2022 are the next hosts.  
Table 2. FIFA World Cup (1930–2022) 
1930 Uruguay 1982 Spain 
1934 Italy 1986 Mexico 
1938 France 1990 Italy 
1950 Brazil 1994 USA 
1954 Switzerland 1998 France 
1958 Sweden 2002 South Korea and Japan  
1962 Chile 2006 Germany  
1966 England 2010 South Africa 
1970 Mexico 2014 Brazil 
1974 Germany 2018 Russia 
1978 Argentina 2022 Qatar 
Source: www.fifa.org. 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 242
In contrast, hosting the FIFA World Cup frequently changed between the Global North 
and the Global South.4 There are two correlating reasons for this. First, soccer was less 
important, therefore, investments were not that profitable. More precisely since soccer is 
the sport of the poor and lower classes, the Olympic Games represent sports closely con-
nected to the upper classes, respectively elites. Accordingly, the ruling classes traditionally 
had more interest in the promotion of nationalism through the Olympic Games rather than 
through Soccer World Championships or other team sports events like basketball  
(the sport of the black), football, or handball. This perception, however, changed drastical-
ly during the second half of the twentieth century which is the reason why hosting a FIFA 
World Cup today represents a high symbolic value.5 Consequently, also nations not tradi-
tionally interested in soccer like the USA in 1994, South Korea and Japan in 2002, or Qa-
tar in 2022 started hosting the FIFA World Cup thereby representing the new importance 
of such an event.  
Table 3 shows the list of medals providing important information. First, the run for 
medals definitely represents the Cold War during the second half of the twentieth century. 
While the USA has won ten times after WWII, the USSR was successful seventeen times. 
Second there is a pretty clear correlation between hosting the Games and winning the 
Games. This, of course, can only be explained by the extraordinary efforts put into sports 
before such an event. A very good example again is China which only won its own Olym-
pic Games in 2008 and is ranking 8th in the all-time Olympic Games medal table. Third, 
relatively small countries like Germany and Norway are extremely successful in the 
Olympic Winter Games thus demonstrating that Winter Games are much less representa-
tive and symbolic than Summer Games.  
Table 3. All-time Olympic Games Medal Table 
1896 Athens USA/Greece 1968 Grenoble Norway 
1900 Paris France 1972 Munich USSR 
1904 Saint Louis USA 1972 Sapporo USSR 
1908 London UK 1976 Montreal USSR 
1912 Stockholm Sweden 1976 Innsbruck USSR 
1920 Antwerp USA 1980 Moscow USSR 
1924 Paris USA 1980 Lake Placid USSR/GDR 
1924 Chamonix Norway 1984 Los Angeles USA 
1928 Amsterdam USA 1984 Sarajevo USSR/GDR 
1928 St. Moritz Norway 1988 Seoul USSR 
1932 Los Angeles USA 1988 Calgary USSR 
1932 Lake Placid USA 1992 Barcelona CIS 
1936 Berlin Germany 1992 Albertville Germany 
1936 Garmisch-Partenkir. Norway 1994 Lillehammer Russia/Norway 
1948 London USA 1996 Atlanta USA 
1948 St. Moritz Norway/Sweden 1998 Nagano Germany 
1952 Helsinki USA 2000 Sydney USA 
                                                          
4 In fact, Richard Cashman (2004) argues that World Cup Football is perceived as European, South American and 
African while Olympic Games are perceived as truly global. 
5 For example even after winning the World Cup in 1966 neither the Mirror nor the Sun did mention it on the front-
page. In contrast, in 2006 every match England played was a front-page lead for the Mirror and the Sun and the 
Times ran a daily 16-page World Cup supplement (Lisle 2010). 
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1952 Oslo USSR 2002 Salt Lake City Germany/Norway 
1956 Melbourne/Stockholm USSR 2004 Athens USA 
1956 Cortina d'Ampezzo USSR 2006 Torino Germany 
1960 Rome USSR 2008 Beijing China/USA 
1960 Squaw Valley  USSR 2010 Vancouver Canada/USA 
1964 Tokyo USA/USSR 2012 London USA 
1964 Innsbruck USSR 2014 Sochi Russia 
1968 Mexico-City USA    
 
The effect of television was even more important for the external marketing function of 
global sport events (Lisle 2010). The 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin were the first 
Games to be broadcast on television (though only to a local audience). The 1956 Winter 
Games were the first internationally televised Olympic Games, and the 1960 Winter 
Games in Squaw Valley had their broadcasting rights sold for the first time to specialized 
television broadcasting networks CBS (paid US$ 394,000) and EBU (US$ 660,000). Con-
sequently, viewership increased exponentially from the 1960s until the end of the century. 
This was due to the use of satellites to broadcast live television worldwide in 1964, and the 
introduction of color television in 1968. Global audience estimates for the 1968 Mexico 
Games was 600 million, whereas at the Los Angeles Games of 1984, the audience num-
bers had increased to 900 million; that number swelled to 3.5 billion at the 1992 Summer 
Olympics in Barcelona.  
Conclusion 
It has been the goal of the paper to highlight a field of global competition and symbolism, 
namely the sphere of sport. Traditionally, in international relations there are seven dimen-
sions of power identified, divided into natural determinants (geography, population, and 
resources) and social factors (economy, military, diplomacy, and identity). However, 
while many scholars focus mainly on the hard factors of global power the symbolic di-
mension of power somehow has been of minor interest in academia. Therefore, the ques-
tion how to influence and strengthen the strategic soft factors like the perception of nation-
al identity and what can be done to support the general image of an emerging power 
abroad and at home has to be explored in more detail. Within the paper it has been argued 
that to overcome the image of a regional power, the status of an emerging global power 
has somehow to be anchored in the general perception of their citizens and shaping global 
sport events is a way to do so bearing low costs and high revenues. 
To clarify our central argument the twofold social function of sport has been high-
lighted first. It has been argued that sport has two overlapping social meanings. On the one 
hand it has an internal function to create social cohesion among society. On the other hand 
there is some kind of external function promoting and advertising the power of a nation abroad. 
Following up on the concept of emerging powers hosting global sport events has been ana-
lyzed to illustrate the symbolic dimension of sport within international relations. Moreover, 
we have given empirical evidence that global sport events represent the contemporary 
structure of international power.  
However, we are arguing that sport is much more than a ‘proxy war’ in international 
competition. Rather we want to highlight the fact that it plays a crucial role for establish-
ing, setting and modifying the self-perception of emerging powers and therefore become  
a substantial element of the modern globalization process. Due to the twofold social func-
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tion there are four reasons why global sport events matter: First, and paradoxically, because 
sport is not of any ‘vital importance’. Precisely because sport can function as an alternative 
for global competition without bearing the huge costs of a war, a space race, an economic 
embargo, etc., it is the ideal field for a proxy war about hierarchical positions in the world. 
Second, the field of sport is truly global and universal. That is to say it creates a global play-
ing field where international comparisons can take place easily. Third, sport operates under 
equal rules and is seemingly free of power asymmetries, in other words it assumes a fair 
competition indicating the real global position of nation-states. Finally, global sport events 
are global media events attracting the attention of the world without bearing additional 
costs.  
To sum up, global sport events are an important factor for shaping the emerging world 
order. This is possible because sport has two complementary effects. First, it creates a pos-
itive reputation of the power states against outer countries. Second, it creates social cohe-
sion among nations. Until there exists no other tool to delegate global competition on a 
symbolic level, global sport events will keep their function of creating and preserving in-
ternational symbolic power. 
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The Empirical Analysis of Voting Results 
in the UN General Assembly* 
 
Ilya Ilyin, Stanislav Bilyuga, and Sergey Malkov 
 
 
In this paper we present our quantitative data analysis of voting dynamics in the 
UN General Assembly within the period from 1946 to 2014. The obtained results 
reveal several phases in the development of relations between different countries. 
The analysis also shows that nowadays there are two key players on the world sce-
ne which are completey different to each other in every way. They are the USA and 
the group of BRICS nations (other countries' voting corresponds either with USA 
or with BRICS). The results can be used to identify the trends in the sphere of in-
ternational relations. 
Keywords: voting, the United Nations, consistency criterion, synchronization. 
Introduction 
Experts in the sphere of internation relations carefully study and analyze the dynamics of 
interstate interactions, intergration and disintegration processes, international tensions and 
interstate alliances.  
This analysis is mainly based on the study and interpretation of specific events in po-
litical history. The interpretation crucially depends on the researcher's political views. 
However, it is better to use hard data in order to increase the reliability of the analysis. 
One of the reliable quantitative information sources in international politics is statistical 
data and the UN General Assembly voting figures. Since the establishment of the United 
Nations in 1946, there have been held more than 5,393 voting procedures (with an average 
of 78 procedures per year). This data helps to determine patterns in the sphere of interna-
tional politics, and to identify the dynamics of integration and disintegration processes. In 
this article we present the aforementioned analysis. 
Sources of Information and Methods of Analysis 
E. Voeten's data was used to determine the voting patterns in the UN GA within the period 
of 1946–2014 (Voeten 2013). We also used the data collected by M. A. Bailey, A. Strezh-
nev, E. Voeten (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015). 
We also stuck to A. Lijphart's approach to identify the consistency criterion. The for-
mer is represented by the equation below: 
,                                                     (1) 
where IA is the consistency criterion in the observed period, t is the total number of votes, 
f is the number of the votes when the two countries voted in the same way, g is the number 
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of the votes when one country voted ‘yes’ or ‘no’, while the other countries abstained.  
The cases where the two countries voted in the opposite ways are not taken into account 
by the variable g. 
The Voting Dynamics in the UN General Assembly 
Figures 1–7 show the voting dynamics of the UN General Assembly members within the 
period from 1946 to 2014. Colored vertical charts show certain information about each 
vote. Top white section demonstrates the votes for the resolution, middle grey section 
demonstrates the ones abstained from voting, lower black section demonstrates the votes 
against the resolution. The charts follow one another in the order of voting procedures (to-
tal of 5,393 votes during 1946–2014). The x-axis contains the years when the voting pro-
cedures were held. 
 
Fig. 1. Voting dynamics in the UN General Assembly, 1946–2014, % 
 
On the basis of the data in Fig. 1, we can identify at least three periods, during which the 
relations between countries differed. 
 the first period (1948–1970) is characterized by strong antagonism in the voting 
(there are more countries which voted against than the countries which abstained). This 
antagonism is defined by high political tension between the two blocks on the world scene.  
 the second period (1970 – the end of the 1990s) is characterized by rather compro-
mising positions between the two international political blocks (détente between the 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact member states and Russian foreign policy changes after the 
collapse of the USSR);  
 the third period (from the beginning of 2000s) is characterized by growing confron-
tation between the USA and the BRICS nations regarding certain issues of global devel-
opment, which is most likely caused by sustainable and successful development of the 
latter. 
Figures 2–7 show the voting dynamics in the UN General Assembly. 
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Fig. 2. Voting dynamics regarding the issue of nuclear weapons, percent, 1946–
2014 
 
 
Fig. 3. Voting dynamics regarding the issue of arms control, percent, 1946–2014 
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Fig. 4. Voting dynamics regarding the Palestinian Conflict issue, percent, 1946–
2014 
 
 
Fig. 5. Voting dynamics regarding the issue of colonialism, percent, 1946–2014 
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Fig. 6. Voting dynamics regarding the issues of the human rights, percent, 1946–
2014 
 
 
Fig. 7. Voting dynamics regarding the issues of economic development, percent, 
1946–2014 
It is evident that voting dynamics regarding specific topics are similar to the main trends 
of voting dynamics in general. However, voting dynamics regarding the issues of the Pal-
estinian conflict are slightly different (see Fig. 4). In this case the second period mentioned 
above continues hitherto. 
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Voting Сonsistency Dynamics 
Available data on voting allows us to analyze the consistency dynamics. This analysis is 
based on the consistency criterion and the Lijphart's approach (Lijphart 1963).  
Figures 8–22 show the consisteny criterions (IA) reflecting the voting of the US, the 
Soviet Union/Russian Federation, China, India, Brazil votes (if IA equals to 1, the con-
sistency is absolute; if IA equals to 0, the countries vote in opposite ways). Consistency 
criterion was calculated for each year separately. 
Fig. 8 shows the consistency dynamics of each BRICS nation and the United States 
within the period from 1946 to 2014. 
Fig. 8. The consistency dynamics of the BRICS nations and the United States, 
1946–2014 
Fig. 8 shows that since the second half of the 1970s, the BRICS nations' positions have 
considerably differed from the US position. Hitherto BRICS nations had formed a political 
power opposing the US. 
Below one might find a detailed voting dynamics for each of the above-mentioned 
countries. 
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Despite the fact that in 1976, Brazil and the United States signed a ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’ (US considered Brazil to be a stronghold of their policy throughout Latin 
America), Brazil's voting in the GA has been changing dramatically since the 1970s and 
often coincided with the voting of the BRICS nations. Within the period of 1990–2000 
Brazil tried to distance itself from the US policy while supporting the regional initiatives 
such as MERCOSUR, the Union of South American Nations, Council of South American 
Defense and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Within the period of 
2000–2006 there was considerable disagreement between Brazil and the USA. During the 
last stage, however, the tensions have eased.  
China's voting corresponds with that of BRICS nations as opposed to the USA. 
After gaining its independence India was developing its own foreign policy maneuver-
ing between the BRICS nations' and the United States' interests. Shortly after the former 
synchronized its voting with that of the BRICS nations rather than the United States. 
South Africa is similar to India in terms of the foreign policy development: during 
apartheid RSA also maneouvered between the USA and the BRICS nations. South African 
post-apartheid foreign policy and voting corresponds with those of BRICS members  
(the lack of data within the period from 1975 to 1995 is due to expulsion of South Africa 
from the UN). 
Russian foreign policy has been uneven. Until 1976 there had been contradictions be-
tween the USSR and the USA and the USSR policy regarding BRICS nations was uneven 
as well. Within the period from 1976 to 1990 soviet policy synchronized with that of the 
BRICS nations and differed from that of the USA. After the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(1991–1995) the opposite trend prevailed: synchronization with the USA and political 
separation from other BRICS countries. Some time later the trend changed drastically, and 
Russian foreign policy aligned with that of the BRICS nations and there were rising ten-
sions with the US. One of the reasons for the latter might be the period of Medvedev's pol-
icy and negative image of Russia in mass media after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. 
The following figures show the level of political consistency of other coutries with ei-
ther the BRICS nations or the US.  
Figs. 9 and 10 show the consistency criterion dynamics of some countries of the for-
mer Third World. It is apparent that during the last decades all these countries synchro-
nized with the BRICS nations. Significant differences can be observed only within the 
period of 1946–1976: some countries, such as Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Venezuela 
and Côte d'Ivoire started supporting BRICS' position rather than the one of the US; posi-
tions of the coutries such as Indonesia, Afghanistan, Belarus, Libya and Qatar either dif-
fered from the one of the United States, or those countries maneuvered between the US 
position and that of the BRICS countries. 
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Fig. 9. Consistency criterion dynamics of some countries of the former Third world, 
1946–2014 
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Fig. 10. Consistency criterion dynamics of some countries of the former Third 
world, 1946–2014 
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Fig. 11. Consistency criterion dynamics of the countries of the EEU, 1946–2014 
Fig. 11 shows the consistency criterion dynamics of the Eurasian Economic Union 
member states. Since the collapse of the USSR a number of countries have tried to estab-
lish new integration unions: free trade zones, economic and political unions similar to the 
EU. From 2001 to 2014 there had been the Eurasian Economic Community (free-trade 
zone as a stage of economic integration). Eurasian Customs Union was established in 
2010, Eurasian Economic Space was established in 2012 (common market as a stage of 
economic integration); in 2015, all these unions evolved into one of the final stages  
of economic, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was established. 
According to the analysis of the voting in the UN General Assembly, the members of 
EAEC, stick to similar positions in voting, while the voting of some CIS countries signifi-
cantly differs (see Fig. 12). 
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Fig. 12. Consistency criterion dynamics of the CIS members, 1946–2014 
The two CIS members Moldova and Ukraine distance themselves from Russia. For more 
than two and a half decades there have been attempts to find balance between the position 
of the BRICS nations and that of the United States. Today there is a rising tension between 
the two CIS members (especially Ukraine) and Russia. 
In addition, all the EU member states and the ones who are eager to join the EU have 
pursued the policy which does not correspond with the policy conducted by the BRICS 
countries over the last 20 years (see Figs. 13–17). 
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Fig. 13. Consistency criterion dynamics of the EU member states, part 1, 1946–
2014 
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Fig. 14. Consistency criterion dynamics of the EU member states, part 2, 1946–
2014 
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Fig. 15. Consistency criterion dynamics of the EU member states, part 3, 1946–
2014 
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Fig. 16. Consistency criterion dynamics of the EU member states, part 4, 1946–
2014 
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Fig. 17. Consistency criterion dynamics of the EU member states, part 5, 1946–
2014 
Despite the fact that all the EU members analyzed in the graphs above have almost the 
same consistency criterion value (regarding consistency with the United States and with 
the BRICS nations), we can see the following patterns: 
 until the second half of the 1980s many EU member states had a high level of con-
sistency with the US and low level of consistency with the BRICS nations. However, dur-
ing the next period the situation changed drastically; 
 noteworthy is the fact that in 2008 when Barack Obama became the President, the 
USA started gaining its lost control. The reasons for the latter are, firstly, economic diffi-
culties encountered by the BRICS nations due to the global financial crisis, and secondly, 
deterioration of Russian political image after the Russo-Georgian War; 
 the UK is an outlier in the EU to some extent. Its consistency criterion regarding the 
consistency with the United States is significantly higher than that with the BRICS na-
tions. 
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Below one might find the data related to the analysis of synchronization between the 
NAFTA member states (see Fig. 18). 
 
Fig. 18. Consistency criterion dynamics of NAFTA member states, 1946–2014 
It is necessary to state that the North American Free Trade Zone, established in 1994, is an 
area of mutual interest for its member states. Thus, the member states are to demonstrate a 
high level of consistency while voting in the UN General Assembly. However, Canada 
and Mexico vote differently in the GA. Canada is a pro-American country and its voting 
aligns with that of the US, while Mexico's voting corresponds more with that of the 
BRICS nations. 
Fig. 19 shows the consistency criterion of MERCOSUR member states. 
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Fig. 19. Consistency criterion dynamics of MERCOSUR member states, 1946–2014 
It is evident that voting dynamics of the five MERCOSUR member states corresponds 
almost exactly. Until 1960 voting of MERCOSUR member states was similar to one of the 
USA. Since 1960 the state of affairs has changed, and voting of the former has corre-
sponded with the voting of the BRICS nations. 
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Fig. 20. Consistency criterion dynamics of the ASEAN countries, 1946–2014 
As for the Asian region it is necessary to focus on ASEAN countries (see Fig. 20). Voting 
of the ten ASEAN countries is close to the voting of the BRICS nations, while the level of 
synchronization with the United States is pretty low. 
Recently American establishment has tried to make global economic processes fit 
their interests. For example, the USA produced an idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
which is aimed at reducing the influence of Russia and China on the world trade. Twelve 
countries signed an agreement establishing the Partnership on February 4, 2016. Hence it 
is important to analyze member states' voting synchronization (see Fig. 21). 
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Fig. 21. Consistency criterion dynamics of the TRANS-Pacific partnership member 
states, 1946–2014 
It is important to outline there is no common position among the above-mentioned coun-
tries: 
 thus, Australia and Canada are pro-American and their positions are not close to the 
ones of the BRICS nations; 
 Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, on the contrary, have similar 
position to ones of the BRICS countries; 
 Japan and New Zealand's positions differ depending on a particular situation. 
In conclusion we analyze voting dynamics in the Group of Seven (G-7), which is con-
sidered one of the most important informal bodies on the world scene (see Fig. 22). 
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Fig. 22. Consistency criterion dynamics of the G-7 member states, 1946–2014 
Apparently, over the last decades all the countries voting in the UN GA divided into two 
groups, ones supporting the US' position more, and ones supporting the BRICS nations' 
position more. Thus, voting of Canada and the UK is closer to the USA, while voting of 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan is closer to BRICS nations. 
We can derive the following main points from the figures above: 
 after the World War II the political authority of the United States has been steadily 
declining (within the framework of the voting processes there is less G-7 member states 
alignment with the United States); 
 however, since 2008 the voting consistency of the G-7 member states and the Unit-
ed States started growing, which is caused by rising influence of the BRICS nations.  
The latter is definitely not hailed by the Western countries. 
Thus, on the basis of statistical data of voting in the UN General Assembly, at present 
we can define at least two key players on the world scene, which are the BRICS nations 
and the USA. Their positions are completely opposite to each other. And other countries 
align with either the BRICS nations or the USA while voting. 
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Voting dynamics show the following: 
 although BRICS as an association was established at the beginning of the 2000s, 
China, India, Brazil and the USSR voted very consistently in the UN GA within the period 
of the second half of the 1970s – the end of the 1980s; 
 until the mid-1970s, many UN member states voted in the same way as the United 
States, but then the US influence in the UN went gradually down. Since 2008 however, the 
US influence started to rise again due to confrontation with Russia and the BRICS nations 
as a whole. 
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Global Regionalization as a Phenomenon  
of Globalization 
 
Olga Leonova 
 
 
The article analyzes global regionalization as a developmental phenomenon in 
the global world. The author investigates this notion within the framework of Po-
litical Globalistics and interprets the global world in terms of a three-layer 
structure. Global regionalization is closely associated with the necessity for the 
subjects of the global relations to position themselves in the hierarchy of the 
emerging global world. Global regionalization with its peculiar features and 
complex character is an objective process: on the one hand, it constitutes global-
ization, and on the other hand, appears one of its consequences. In other words, 
global regionalization represents a new pattern of structuring the world society. 
Keywords: global regionalization, global regionalism, macroregion, structure of 
the global world, hierarchy of the global world. 
Recently, the terms ‘global regionalism’ and ‘global regionalization’ are frequently used in 
the scientific discourse to evaluate the general level of regionalization of international rela-
tions. However, since these phenomena have emerged in the course globalization one 
should consider them exactly within this context. 
As Zurab Marshania describes this current trend, ‘[g]lobalization… nowadays is char-
acterized by the establishment of regional alliances between the states with similar inter-
ests. This enables them to work together and efficintly achieve their goals’ (Marshania 
2011). 
We interpret ‘global regionalization’ as a regionalization (fragmentation, segmenta-
tion) of a hypothetically integrated global world, that is the formation of regions on both 
sub-level (within states) and macro level (planetary) of the global political structure.  
The macro-level processes shape the international relations ‘where the main interaction 
occurs between different regional groups, rather than between major individual powers or 
coalitions of states that are geographically distant from each other’ (Troitsky 2009: 36–
37). These processes change the whole system of international relations defined by the 
Westphalian Treaty, as well as reconstruct the global political order in geopolitical, geo-
strategic and geo-economic terms and form new global economic and political centers. 
In this context, a region obviously becomes a fundamental and cornerstone notion for 
the theoretical and methodological analysis of global regionalization. However, there is no 
universally accepted definition of a region in modern science since the interpretation de-
pends on the employed method of analysis, that is on the peculiar approach to the analysis 
of regional phenomena and the sphere of regional life the scholar focuses on. 
The Political Encyclopedia defines the region as ‘a unit independent in spatial and ge-
ographic, administrative and territorial, institutional and political, economic, social, histor-
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ical and cultural, ethnic and demographic terms’ (Political… 1999: 333–334). This defini-
tion is extremely ‘extensive’ since it can describe regions with greatly varying scale, for 
example, from the Vologda region of the Russian Federation to the USA, Western Europe 
and South-East Asia. On the one hand, a region can be interpreted as a territorial commu-
nity within administrative boundaries as a constituent entity of a Federation. This interpre-
tation of the region adopted in contemporary Russian academic discourse does not contra-
dict the interpretation employed in Western science and practice, for example, in the ‘Dec-
laration on Regionalism’ adopted by the European Parliament in 1988. On the other hand, 
‘a region’ can be considered as a relatively non-uniform area characterized by a set of uni-
form features including political, economic, cultural, sociological, ecological, geograph-
ical, linguistic and other aspects as well as natural environment. 
However, the Global Studies Encyclopedia gives the following definitions of a region: 
‘1) an area defined by physiographic, administrative or any other boundaries; 2) a large 
territorial formation covering several countries, or a country's large administrative division 
differing from other territories in its characteristics, including natural and (or) historical, 
relatively stable economic, geographic and other aspects...’ (Mazour, Chumakov 2003: 
882). 
Yuri Abramov and Vladimir Kuybar define region as ‘a scientific category indicat-
ing a concrete historical integrity and possessing properties of resource … technological 
and ethno-cultural self-sufficiency for expanded social reproduction’ (Abramov, Kuybar 
2008: 249). 
According to this definition, as well as the one from the Global Studies Encyclopedia 
which are both methodologically ‘wide’ one can attribute to this category the regions of 
different scales from sub-regions to macro regions. Moreover, any state can be considered 
as a region. Meanwhile, in contemporary scientific discourse the term ‘region’ is used ei-
ther to refer to a domestic administrative unit (sub-region within a state) or to describe  
a group of states (a macro-region). 
A ‘sub-region’ as a social, territorial, economic, and political entity has been already 
thoroughly investigated (see Busygina 2009; Dergachyov, Vardomsky 2009; Turovsky 
2009; Fundamentals… 2007; Barygin 2007; Kosov, Fokina 2009, etc.) while the nature 
and importance of regional macro-systems in the evolution of contemporary global politi-
cal sphere is still not properly examined. 
Macro-region, as a rule, has a number of uniform characteristics: common suprana-
tional authorities (the European Union, the CIS), sociocultural or linguistic boundaries 
(the Commonwealth Nations, the Atlantic community, the Arab world, the Eastern-Slavic 
area, etc.); confessional unity (the Islamic world, Christian Civilization); general socioec-
onomic development model (Liberal, Continental, Mediterranean, Scandinavian, etc.). 
Globalization is closely connected with regionalization of international relations and 
involves the transfer of some state functions either to an international or subnational level. 
Global regionalization has objective reasons; the main is the necessity for the actors of the 
global political arena to integrate into the emerging hierarchy. As we have already noted 
(Leonova 2013: 166–178), this hierarchy of political actors consists of the following tiers: 
1) centers of power, 2) contenders for the status ‘centers of power’, 3) economic, political, 
military and civilization poles, and 4) regional powers. Each of them has its own charac-
teristics defining their place in the hierarchy. 
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According to Mikhail Troitsky (2009: 46) ‘World policy increasingly takes on the at-
tributes of a competition between regional associations, each headed by a global or a large 
regional power or a center of power.’ 
On the one hand, global regionalization is an integral characteristic of globalization. 
But on the other hand, it is an opposite trend constituted by intensive processes of integra-
tion throughout the globe and resulting in the association of countries, establishing region-
al systems. Moreover, we observe the emergence of macroregions. In scientific literature 
they also often speak about ‘fragmentation of the world’, ‘territorialization of the world’, 
and ‘coalition strategy’ which reflect the emerging structuring of the world, which turns 
into a union of macro regions (poles, centres of power, and macro-regional systems).  
The leading macro regions (the EU, the Asian-Pacific Region, and the so-called ‘Southern 
Cone’ in Latin America) together with a global power (the USA) are the main driving 
forces of globalization; and to certain extent they draw other states into the orbit of their 
influence. It seems a macro-regional polycentric world and multilevel hierarchical struc-
ture is gradually replacing the Westphalian international order. 
Macroregions comprises large local areas of the world and represent the third (macro) 
tier of the global political order. At the macro level, a region is considered to be a socio-
economical and politically integrated unity which formally represents itself as a suprana-
tional and transnational actor. Thus, we can say that global regionalism is based on the 
concept of macro-region as an integrated socioeconomic and political system, which is 
integrated in geo-civilizational terms, is characterized by sociocultural proximity and rec-
ognized by a number of supranational political institutions. A peculiar feature of global 
regionalization is its complex character along with involvement in economic interstate 
cooperation or economic integration of adjunct countries. Global regionalization implies a 
whole range of processes and interactions in the political, diplomatic, social, cultural (e.g., 
establishment of common educational system), ecological and information spheres. Con-
sequently, for the purposes of our study of global regionalization we take into account the 
following aspects that define macro-regions: economy, geography, history, ethno-
confessional structure, social, cultural, demographic, educational and other aspects. 
Global regionalization and global regionalism are not completely identical terms. 
Global regionalization is regionalization of international relations at the global level. It is a 
process of fragmentation of the world, its virtual division into large self-sufficient eco-
nomic and political segments, followed by the integration of such segments into the global 
hierarchy. However, global regionalism is the result of global regionalization and a system 
of relations between major interstate associations of the global world and its actors. 
In theoretical and methodological terms the analysis of global regionalization is based 
on the perception of the macro-region as a structural unit of the global world or as a sub-
system of the global political space. 
Macro-region is a self-sufficient economic, political, military and strategic structural 
unit of the global world. On the one hand, a macro-region is a structural unit of the system 
of the global world since it is a social and natural integrity; on the other hand, a macro-
region is one of the subsystems of the global political space. The macro-region as a struc-
tural unit of the global system has three specific features. 
Firstly, macro-region, though being a self-sufficient system, is not a closed system. Its 
specific feature of openness is manifested in its ability to share resources, energy and in-
formation with the environment. Macro-regions actively exchange raw materials, goods, 
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human resources, funds, technologies, ideas, etc. with each other and with other actors of 
the global world. The communication and information exchange between a macro-region 
and its environment is particularly intensive.  
Secondly, a macro region is a non-equilibrium, i.e. unstable, system, which constantly 
undergoes rapid or slow changes of its main characteristics, including structure, number of 
elements, their quality, functions, and configuration. The balance of a macro-regional sys-
tem depends strongly on the environment. The global economic crisis with their particular-
ly severe impact on the situation in the European Union has proved this once again. 
Thirdly, macro regions are dynamic systems evolving with different dynamics. For 
example, macro regions can evolve from a free trade area, a Customs Union to a suprana-
tional formation with common corporate institutions. The scale of macro regions can also 
change. Thus, having been formed as regional groupings, in course of time they can ac-
quire more global features which can be exemplified by the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the 
APEC as well as  the SCO, the MERCOSUR, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf), the Southern African Customs Union, etc. 
The integration processes in macro regions occur in a non-synchronic manner. Thus, 
the economic integration is frequently far ahead of political integration. Most macro-
regional associations have been formed as a result of primarily economic integration: for 
example, the European Coal and Steel Community (which later evolved into the European 
Economic Community and eventually into the European Union), the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc. 
We can also speak about economic integration which has qualitative parameters that 
can be measured and evaluated. This type of integration is well studied and described both 
by the foreign and Russian scholars (Handerson 1999; Herst, Tompson 1999; Germain 
2000; Molle 2001; Held et al. 2004; Etzioni 2004; Globalization… 2002; Global… 2001; 
Lavut 2004; Liventsev, Kharlamova 2001, Chumakov 2005; Shishkov 2001). Here we can 
also mention Vladislav Inozemtsev, Nikolay Kosolapov, Ernest Kochetov, Vladimir Lap-
kin, Marat Cheshkov, Alexander Chumakov, etc. The economic integration is generally 
viewed as a process of creating of a complex entity at the level of national economic sys-
tems. The political integration can be interpreted as a process of establishing of an integral 
complex at the level of the national political systems of independent countries. At present, 
the political integration has reached its limits which threaten countries' national sovereign-
ty associated with integration, as well as with their desire to keep a certain political auton-
omy.  
There is a certain scale of economic integration consisting of the following successive 
stages: a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, and an economic and mone-
tary union. 
It seems impossible to work out an appropriate scale to define the degree of political 
integration, particularly due to the lack of quantitative indicators. Although the experience 
of empirical observations for the most successful integration associations, i.e. for those 
who moved from economic to political integration (the EU) or are in the process of such 
transition, enables us to single out the following stages of their evolution: 
– mutual information and coordination of internal and external policies of the member 
countries of an integrative association; 
– coordination of general policy; 
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– creation of a regional security system; 
– formation of supranational authorities (control, coordination, and later – administra-
tion); 
– adoption of a common Constitution. 
The global regionalization has the following characteristics: 
1. A planned positive feedback to all participants of a regional association, possible 
economic and political benefits from participation in a macro-regional project. 
2. This process is not natural; it is planned and organized and requires a lot of prepara-
tory work, while its participants should perceive it as an objective necessity. 
3. The created system is self-sufficient, unstable, and open. 
4. Asynchronous economic and political integration. 
5. The presence of a regional leader who initiates integration processes and is their 
main engine. 
6. Historical and ethno-confessional communities are not very important, but their ab-
sence can slow integration processes (due to certain conditions). Their availability can im-
prove the dynamics of ongoing integration. 
7. Coincidence of economic models of development, political systems and a dominant 
value system increases the chances of a successful regional integration. 
Global regionalization manifests itself in the following way. First, local communities 
integrate and merge into a macro region. This integration is based on both internal factors 
(economic partnership, similar political culture and institutions, social and cultural prox-
imity, e.g. an identical civilization matrix) and external factors (common reference points 
of external policy, interaction strategies with the global world and its actors, issues of mac-
ro-regional security, etc.). Second, there occurs a localization of a self-sufficient territorial 
economic, political, and sociocultural community with defined boundaries often coincid-
ing with the boundaries of an individual state. Third, on the basis of integration and locali-
zation there occurs a qualitatively new geopolitical and geo-economic entity whose mem-
bers (sovereign states) transfer some of its functions. The boundaries of such macro re-
gions may coincide with the boundaries of geo-civilizations (e.g., the EU) and they have 
close trade and investment flows within the system which increases self-sufficiency, inde-
pendence from the external environment, stability, and security. 
The temporary asynchronous formation of macro regions is a distinguishing character-
istic of global regionalism developing within the European Union, although with some 
contradictions. In other macro regions, like the Asian-Pacific, Eurasian or so-called 
‘Southern Cone’ of Latin America, one can observe a quite obvious lag between integra-
tion, localization, and transfer of states' functions to a supranational level. 
In general, the formation and development of the global political sphere is accompa-
nied by differentiation, fragmentation, and emergence of macro-regions. It is also charac-
terized by an instable development of the global world and its possible escalation into 
macro-regional conflicts within the main geopolitical axis (North-South, East-West). 
On the other hand, the increasing macro-regional integration and localization creates 
the flexible and efficient mechanisms for such communities to adapt to globalization. 
Global regionalization is an objective process, which should be regarded as an integral 
component of globalization. Globalization has led to a search for checks and balances, and 
attempts to create a geopolitical equilibrium via regionalization of international relations. 
The contemporary global world is not reduced to the real geographical space, but has be-
come multidimensional. Global regionalization is a consequence of globalization and leads 
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to fragmentation of the world into macro regions as well as formation of a hierarchical 
global political system consisting of poles, centers of power, contenders for the status of a 
‘center of power’ and regional systems of global world. 
Thus, the analysis of the global world social and territorial spheres and of the global 
political map allows defining the phenomenon of global regionalization, which clearly 
shows an emerging new structure of the global political order. 
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The Role of BRICS in Global Politics 
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BRICS has evolved from an abstract format into an influential forum in the inter-
national arena. BRICS framework is a new experience of collective leadership that 
civilization develops within globalization environment. In this article we highlight 
the issues addressed by various stakeholders within and outside BRICS. This, in 
turn, will feed the overarching aim of creating a stable operating framework for 
BRICS for the coming decades and simultaneously lead to expected cooperation 
and collaboration which can be developed within the BRICS framework.  
Keywords: BRICS, partnership, globalization, cooperation, leadership. 
BRIC, and now BRICS, has evolved from an abstract format into an influential forum in 
the international arena and it has become not just a manifestation of globalization, but in-
creasingly a key control lever of global processes. The idea of uniting the world largest 
developing economies under the term BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) belongs to 
James O'Neill, a well-known analyst in the field of global economic research from the 
leading US investment bank Goldman Sachs. In 2001, O'Neill wrote an article, ‘Building 
Better Global Economic BRICs’, in which he introduced a grouping acronym BRIC (by 
taking similarity to the English word ‘brick’ – brick). Following the logic of the abbrevia-
tion, Kazakhstan that possesses a huge growth potential could beсome a new member of 
the BRICs ‘to complete the whole picture’. But firstly the Republic of South Africa joined 
the alliance, giving the organization a transcontinental character. 
During the years of existence and development, BRICS is in a constant process of 
transformation. However, we must emphasize the essence of the creation of this format – 
the consolidation of the countries which are projected by leading analysts of the world to 
become the world most powerful economies in the 21st century. This also brings the un-
derstanding of the critical role of the BRICS in global processes of building a new world 
order through the consolidation of international efforts. Such format fulfils the function of 
an ‘architect of globalization’, laying the foundation for a new global consturction, made 
of ‘bricks’, whose strength will depend on how long our common planetary home will 
stand. Thus, the BRICS format cannot operate in the logic of isolation of the developing 
world from the developed Western countries. The power of the BRICS and its civilization-
al mission consists in tbringing the consolidated global efforts to a new level of ‘strong 
wave’ of rapidly growing economies.  
Collective leadership is a new experience that civilization realises within the BRICS 
framework in the face of globalization. The challenge for the BRICS consists in the devel-
opment of a new global model of governance which should not be unipolar but consolidat-
ed and constructive. The goal is also to avoid a negative scenario of unfolding globaliza-
tion and to start a complicated merging of the global growing economies without dis-
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torting or breaking the single financial and economic continuum of the world. It is im-
portant to continue following this path, and not to hamper the growing potential of the 
BRICS by the pole confrontation with the West.  
How can one characterize the contemporary world? In the recent decade there have 
been numerous debates in the international academic community about the contemporary 
world and current world order. Some experts believe that although the US power is declin-
ing the world order remains the same since the international order is a liberal one and is 
based on the US leadership which is still working well. It can assimilate the rising powers, 
such as China, India, and Brazil. Thus, the struggle among the existing and newly-rising 
powers is not for its fundamental principles but for more leadership advantages within its 
framework. Professor from Princeton John Ikenberry, one of the leading strategist in the 
West, is one of the major supporters of this idea (Ikenberry 2011). 
But some others believe that the world is in chaos, and anarchy is coming to Eurasia. 
Thus, Robert D. Kaplan, a leading figure of geopolitics in the USA, published the paper 
where he advises the USA and the West to get tough on China and Russia, and to prepare to 
engage anarchy in Eurasia. Mr. Kaplan believes that both China and Russia are revisionist 
powers, and they show their muscles not because they are powerful but because they are 
weak. At the same time, the social situation in Central Asia may bring a kind of an Arabic 
Spring in the near future. Thus, the Eurasian continent is in danger! (Kaplan 2016: 3–4) 
So what is actually happening in the world? 
1. The collapse of regional order in the Middle East and spread of terrorism all over 
the World. The lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unrest in Iraq and Syria, the rise of ISIS 
(an organization banned in Russia), the Middle East order is also collapsing and will be 
difficult to restore. There is no clear future over the longer term.  
2. The European counties are in troubles resulting from their domestic and interna-
tional policies. Europe has been the strong advocate of Arabic Spring but now is trapped in 
the refugee crisis. Besides, the Muslim population in Europe is growing and Europe sud-
denly turned the weakest region for terrorist attacks, which further worsens the economic 
recovery and challenges the European social system.  
3. The slowdown of world economy continues while the way out has not been found 
yet. This slowdown has spread from the developed world to emerging economies, and 
brings about numerous social upheavals. There is no means to stop the increasing chaos 
around the world in the future.  
4. Diverging of great powers' strategies for the world order. The USA has found that 
Europe is hardly the best partner, unlike Japan and others in Asia. The European countries 
have no will or ability to follow the USA who, in its turn, seems to have lost its grand 
strategy at the moment.  
5. The coming of a turning point for BRICS in the current situation. BRICS is no more 
a group in the original meaning and it needs to redefine its identity and objectives.  
On the surface, the five BRICS nations, as a multilateral grouping, seem to have little 
in common. They are essentially different and this fact must be taken into account before 
making an attempt to converge. The five countries represent largely differing political sys-
tems: China is a one-party state; Russia's governance is highly centralized; Brazil, India, 
and South Africa are democracies with significant corruption levels and/or ethnic strife 
still to deal with. They have also reached different levels of economic development; thus, 
China outpaces the group in economic terms, including trade. Furthermore, the member 
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states differ in terms of available resources, absolute consumption, and energy intensity 
and have different demographic trends. Brazil has a predominantly urban population, 
while India is still largely rural. Russia has an ageing population while India is relatively 
young. Yet, in general, the five nations will greatly contribute to the growth of the world's 
middle class. BRICS members have essentially different statuses within the current global 
order. Thus, Russia and China are established global powers and have permanent member-
ship on the UN Security Council, while India, Brazil, and South Africa only aspire to 
global influence and are currently qualified as regional powers. 
With account of different power and national interest, a certain geopolitical diver-
gence in a number of issues is not surprising. Thus, the broadly shared commitment of all 
BRICS members to the principle of non-interference has not translated into a uniform po-
sition on many international issues. For example, Russia and China oppose external inter-
vention in Syria. On the other hand, Brazil and India have taken more nuanced positions, 
including voting to condemn the Syrian government's violent crackdowns on protesters. 
BRICS possesses immense natural resources in some regions along with scarcity of 
resources in others, it also has diverse ecological environments, a large and young popula-
tion base and faces myriad of socio-economic challenges. Taken together, these factors 
emphasize the necessity of a sustainable and inclusive growth trajectory which must be 
implemented through focused efforts both at the domestic and external arenas. In this con-
text, two factors of particular relevance are globalization and climate change. Indeed, to 
effectively deal with both trends within the broader context of developmental challenges 
will require adequate and sustainable responses. At the Conference of Parties Summits, 
hosted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), one 
can observe trends which point to the necessity to re-think the multilateral frameworks for 
coordination and collaboration on climate change, sustainable development and inclusive 
growth. In fact, every member of the BRICS must cooperate within the BRICS format and 
beyond it in multilateral fora in order to better articulate the fundamental current require-
ments to enable the domestic socio-economic transformations. These steps will help effec-
tively cope with the critical interplay described above. In turn, equity must be central to 
the foundations of any new framework for change, rather than an afterthought. 
In an increasingly globalizing world, it is difficult for any nation to stay isolated. 
Some developments have cross-border ripple effects, as recently seen in both Libya and 
Syria. The BRICS members tend to share a apprehension of interventionist or hegemonic 
tendencies. Political intricacy is aggravated by the emerging important non-state actors 
threatening international security. A number of organizations, groups and even individuals 
start to significantly impact the world, and BRICS countries must position themselves as 
anchors of political conversations at the global high-level meetings. The political signifi-
cance of BRICS is reinforced by the active participation of its five members both in inter-
national organizations (including the UN, WTO, IMF and the World Bank), informal as-
sociations (like the Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77, G20 and APEC), and in region-
al organizations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Thus, there are objective op-
portunities for ‘co-participation’ with other countries in building a fair world order and 
exerting a systemic influence for setting the agenda on a wide range of issues – from glob-
al to regional, from the well-established to the relatively new.  
The BRICS nations should provide a viable leadership alternative for developing na-
tions. In order to move towards developing a meaningful role in world affairs and a more 
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active role in conflict resolution, BRICS should create a platform for appropriate policies 
and response mechanisms to address local, regional, and international political and social 
turbulence, as recently observed in the situation with the so called ‘Arab Spring’. While 
the emerging multi-polar world may place the developing and ‘Western’ nations against 
each other, BRICS members do not intend to ascend to leadership of an oppositional bloc. 
BRICS represents a collective aspiration to influence and manage institutions of global 
political and economic governance, so that they reflect demographic and economic reali-
ties and not merely post World War II agreements. In the sphere of international relations, 
this preference translates into a fundamentally different way of operating. The Western 
construct of ‘universal responsibility’ is sometimes interpreted in a very different way in 
non-Western parts of the world. The BRICS nations can use their collective voice to help 
preserve a respect for international sovereignty in international affairs. The desire of the 
developed world to intervene in the domestic domain of other nations can be restrained by 
the creation and fostering of regional cooperative networks, which may reduce conflict 
and quell crises. The urgent UN Security Counciil reforms must be prioritized on the 
BRICS agenda. 
In this article we highlight the issues addressed by various stakeholders within and 
outside BRICS which means that a substantial interest and momentum will be generated 
by the grouping. This, in turn, will feed the overarching aim of creating a stable operating 
framework for BRICS for the coming decades and simultaneously lead to expected coop-
eration and collaboration in other spheres of interest, which can be developed within the 
intra-BRICS cooperation. While these areas must not qualify the primary BRICS agenda, 
there must be an organically created momentum once the five focus areas as highlighted in 
the executive summary are addressed. Some of these spheres for cooperation are listed 
below.  
 Institutional flexibility  
While the BRICS nations may have different visions of the group's role and what it 
may mean to each of them, it stands to reason that any agreed upon agenda can best be 
realized if BRICS develops a coherent and sustained framework for continuous engage-
ment. At the same time, the mechanisms of policy formulation should be dynamic and 
inclusive. It is crucial that flexibility should be maintained and kept central to the very idea 
of BRICS. The role of nodal research organizations and think tanks is essential in this re-
spect.  
 Reviving traditional knowledge systems and practices 
Quite too often, the terms ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ are torn out of their 
strictly economic context and given an unjustifiably broad connotation. This bias is symp-
tomatic of a larger gap between Western knowledge and cognitive systems and the com-
plex realities of the developing world. It is critical for BRICS to focus on reviving indige-
nous knowledge and practices in a range of domains – such as traditional medicines, 
healthcare, agriculture and water management, and design and construction practices.  
 Sharing developmental knowledge and experience  
The knowledge and experience that BRICS accumulates in individual development 
journeys can be consolidated and better leveraged if actively shared and adapted through-
out the whole grouping. Formal knowledge sharing institutions could be put in place. This 
could occur through structured knowledge banks or mutual scholarships and training pro-
grams. More pervasive channels of communication at all levels should be developed. 
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 Sharing technologies and innovations  
BRICS should be more proactive in bolstering research and in, funding innovations 
and technology. Exchanging information on scientific and technological policies and pro-
grams, and formulating joint long-term problem oriented cooperation projects could be the 
first useful steps here. Joint research provide substantial opportunities in such priority 
fields as aeronautics and outer space research, high-speed vehicles, microelectronics and 
information technology, nanotechnologies, food security and sustainable agriculture, bio-
technologies, medicine, finance and insurance for hedging risks, exploration of mineral 
resources, remote sensing, climate change, water resources and water purification technol-
ogies. BRICS must collectively foster better organizational, legal, financial, and personnel 
support for scientific, technical, and innovation cooperation. Starting with establishing 
high-tech areas/science parks and incubators, creating common technological platforms, 
stimulating joint investments in the development of high technologies, research and inno-
vation centres, BRICS can create conditions to smooth the transfer of technologies to pro-
duction of advanced industrial goods. At a minimum, the BRICS members can mutually 
benefit from documenting, standardizing, and sharing information regarding innovative 
practices. Similarly, members can benefit from learning the efficacy of varying financial 
and non-financial policy instruments now used to incentivise innovation activity. At the 
same time, there are already significant inward flows of technology and expertise occur-
ring via the activities of multinational firms. The BRICS nations must collaborate in order 
to accelerate cross-border technology sharing and transfer. In addition to private R&D and 
innovation, BRICS nations can also share experiences of building links between industry 
and universities. They should exchange information regarding intellectual property laws, 
which protect IP and at the same time encourage the adoption and diffusion of new tech-
nologies. Apart from the economic benefits of such actions, BRICS can also leverage col-
laborative understanding and strength for shaping the TRIPS regime under the auspices of 
the WTO.  
 Relevant and bias-free benchmarks 
The BRICS nations need to contextualize the dominant benchmarking and ratings sys-
tems/agencies, which are Western in origin. These systems are geared towards products 
and services emanating from a particular context. The grouping needs to develop and pop-
ularize BRICS rating systems and benchmarks ranging from corporate governance per-
formance assessments to capital market standards. Such benchmarks and normative guide-
lines could also be applied in other spheres – such as agricultural production, pharmaceuti-
cals and corporate governance – in the context of developing economies.  
 Regional frameworks  
The BRICS nations are leaders within their own regions and surrounded by a cluster 
of smaller neighbours. At the geopolitical level, this discrepancy can sometimes lead to 
regional tensions. However, this also provides significant opportunities for the smaller 
neighbours to benefit from external growth and development. Synergistic regional eco-
nomic and developmental frameworks should be developed, which accommodate sover-
eignty within a broader growth paradigm. 
 Cultural exchange  
It is now widely accepted that BRICS needs to move beyond an annual leaders meet-
ing. This can be achieved by instituting a variety of events and people-to-people exchang-
es. These can be in the sphere of cultural exchanges and conducted either at the BRICS 
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platform or on larger international platforms, like UNESCO. In the slightly longer term, 
the BRICS nations need to collectively work towards a degree of standardization in educa-
tional programs and, if possible, to explore issues surrounding mutual recognition of each 
other's accreditation. The enhanced cooperation in sports could also provide avenues for 
improving cultural understanding. Formal engagement should be instituted with already 
existing leadership programs and bodies, like youth leadership programs and parliamen-
tary teams. BRICS must support multilateral projects of member states' youth organiza-
tions and attempt to establish a Young Leaders Forum with regular exchanges between 
parliamentarians. A similar forum for media professionals and journalists could also be 
envisaged. Attention should be paid to travel and tourism between the member countries. 
Visa and travel processes could be made easier and quicker. Over time, such actions could 
build ‘soft’ links between the BRICS nations that will help bolster cooperation and collec-
tive attainment of the long-term vision. 
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Part VI. ENERGY AND CLIMATE  
 
 
Energy, Kondratieff Waves,  
Lead Economies, and Their 
Evolutionary Implications 
 
William R. Thompson 
 
 
One way to look at the evolution of technological innovation is to develop ways 
to convert various types of matter into successively greater amounts of energy 
to fill sails, to spin cotton or to drive automobiles and air conditioners. One 
approach to interpreting Kondratieff waves (K-waves), associated with the lead-
ership long cycle research program, emphasizes the role of intermittent but clus-
tered technological innovations primarily pioneered by a lead economy, with 
various significant impacts on world politics. This approach is further distin-
guished by asserting that the K-wave pattern is discernible back to the tenth cen-
tury and the economic breakthrough of Sung Dynasty China. While K-wave be-
havior has many widespread manifestations, the question raised in this essay is 
whether explanatory power is improved by giving a greater role to energy and 
energy transitions in the K-wave process(es). Eight specific implications are 
traced, ranging from the interaction of technological innovations and energy to 
cosmological interpretations. Our argument reflects a general theory of the 
evolution of complexity in all processes predicated on energy consumption. All 
‘natural entities’, spanning physical, biological, and cultural phenomena, ex-
tract energy for survival, maintenance and reproductive purposes or, alterna-
tively, put for resisting entropy. 
Keywords: Kondratieff waves, long cycle, energy, energy transitions, technologi-
cal innovation, lead economy, evolutionary processes. 
One sign of a ‘progressive’ research program is whether its key assumptions are occa-
sionally re-examined and revised as seems appropriate. The leadership long cycle pro-
gram focuses on questions of informal governance in world politics but, unlike most 
other similar programs, emphasizes the role of technological innovation in lead econo-
mies, leading sectors, and Kondratieff waves. There is no need to jettison this emphasis. 
The lead economy-long wave should remain crucial to the program's explanatory infra-
structure. However, a case can be made for further elaborating how and why lead econ-
omies, technological innovation, and leading sectors are important and can best be inter-
preted. Elsewhere, I have argued (Thompson 2010) that technological innovation should 
not be divorced historically from interactions within a larger context of demographic 
changes, climate and disease factors. That is, technological innovation and the innova-
tors are embedded in a larger socioeconomic fabric to which it and they respond. New 
technology is not an isolated, stand-alone driver. I would like to elaborate this type of 
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argument further by incorporating energy considerations more explicitly as well. Rather 
than only emphasizing technological innovation in leader sectors per se, I suggest we 
consider the interactions of energy demands/consumption and technological innovation.  
It is not an either/or situation. Changes in energy sources need to be integrated with techno-
logical innovation and the technological innovation that is most important needs to be inter-
preted in terms of its significance for energy consumption (Goldstone 2002; Allen 2006; 
Griffin 2010). If we make this adjustment in core perspective, some things do not 
change. For instance, the indicators of technological innovation on which the research 
program has relied in the past do not need to change. But how they are viewed may re-
quire some adjustment. Moreover, there are also some interesting implications for 
speculating about future systemic leadership transitions. 
In this paper, eight implications are highlighted. First, it is possible to argue that in-
novations in energy convertors or fuels are fundamental to the clusters of economic  
innovation that have been critical to long wave processes. This argument does not mean 
that the clusters of innovation are exclusively about energy factors but that energy con-
siderations are closely linked to successive waves of innovation. A second implication 
pertains to the question of how far back in time one can trace K-waves. The leadership 
long cycle program finds evidence for K-waves activity back to the tenth century in the 
form of technological innovations in Sung Dynasty China. But it is clear that the evi-
dence is stronger after the late eighteenth century British industrial revolution than be-
fore. One good reason is the two energy transitions that took place between the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The consequences of combining clustered tech-
nological innovation with energy transitions led to economic changes that are even more 
pronounced than in earlier centuries. 
Third, one of the main foci of the leadership long cycle research program are long 
waves of economic growth which come in pairs or ‘twin peaks’ of clustered growth 
spikes. Energy considerations suggest reasons for these paired clusters of growth to be 
uneven in impact. The first peak should be less revolutionary in impact than the second 
because the first innovation wave must work within the prevailing economic landscape 
but the second wave has the advantage of building on the first wave's innovation set.  
Since the leadership long cycle research program has focused primarily on the ad-
vent of technological innovation, adding energy considerations to the mix encourages an 
expansion of the focus to encompass resource acquisition and transportation activities as 
a fourth implication. Another implication of giving more attention to energy is the dis-
tinction between relative decline in production and export shares and achieving steady 
states in energy consumption. The steady state focus, in which periods of non-expansion 
of energy consumption predominate, may be more useful than focusing on, and debat-
ing, relative decline questions. This observation leads to a sixth implication in underlin-
ing the role of lead economies in leading the way through periods of energy transition 
and the development of reliance on new fuels. Steady states in energy consumption sug-
gest that the gains from energy conversion processes have been maximized. New types 
of energy sources are needed to expand energy consumption. The next lead economy is 
likely to lead the way to the new types of energy sources. 
Interpreting these processes in terms of energy acquisition and consumption makes 
it possible to link systemic leadership to ancient processes of development which helps 
to generalize the nature of the activities being examined. Further help in this regard is 
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provided by a cosmological argument that energy consumption is the common denomi-
nator of the evolution of all natural processes. These last two implications reinforce the 
centrality of the processes focused upon and should help make the leadership long cycle 
research program seem less unorthodox overall – even while it proceeds from assump-
tions that are not widely accepted by scholars of world politics. 
Before elaborating these implications further, it is probably helpful to first outline 
the leadership long cycle's perspective on Kondratieff waves (K-waves) and the role 
they play in the research program. Since they are an integral component to the overall 
theory, some of the associated components need to be introduced as well. 
The K-Wave and the Leadership Long Cycle Argument1 
Forty to sixty year Kondratieff waves (K-waves) are said to be driven by a host of dif-
ferent factors, including prices, technological innovation, energy transitions, demo-
graphic change, war, generational changes, investment, profits, and wages.2 No doubt, 
there is something to be said for all of these claims in that the rhythms of long-term eco-
nomic growth tend to encompass multiple phenomena. We simply have failed to sort out 
all of the interrelationships adequately. Yet it is difficult to proceed from the assumption 
that everything is related to everything else (even if it is). The leadership long cycle ar-
gument makes a number of assertions about how hierarchy is established in global poli-
tics – one of which privileges clustered, radical innovations in technology as the princi-
pal driving force of the K-wave.3 This first set of assertions revolves around leading sec-
tors which are industries built on radical innovations which have some potential of revo-
lutionizing the way the economy is structured. Long-term growth is discontinuous and 
dependent on spurts in the development of these radical innovations. Radical innovations, 
in turn, generate new technology and industries characterized by high growth rates and 
alter the way old industries (characterized by slow growth rates) perform or, alternative-
ly lead to their disappearance through Schumpeter's ‘creative destruction’ processes. 
Rapid growth on the part of the aggregate economy depends, of course, on the new, high 
growth sectors outperforming and more than offsetting the drag of the older, slow 
growth sectors. 
It should be noted that these radical innovations are not simply a matter of the ap-
pearance of new hardware (Modelski 2001). Actors must learn how to cope with the im-
plications of new technology and this takes time. Eventually, however, the effects be-
come more routine as the new developments are assimilated, albeit unevenly around the 
world. Just how long this combination of hardware and perception process requires 
working itself out, no doubt, is somewhat variable but probably approximates a genera-
tion. One generation is first exposed to the new technology and the following generation 
increasingly regards it as a routine way of doing things.  
Initially, these leading sector trajectories were viewed as long waves or undulations 
of accelerated and slow economic growth. We have moved away from that conceptual-
ization and now embrace the notion of a sequence of S-shaped growth curves. New sec-
tors are introduced, grow quickly at first and then level off. Long-term economic growth 
is still subject to sequences of fast and slow growth but the underlying mechanism is the 
                                                          
1 This overview section draws to some extent on a portion of Thompson (2007b). 
2 See, for instance, Goldstein (1988) and Thompson (1990) for a discussion of the multiple Kondratieff wave interpre-
tations. More recent variations include Devezas and Corredine (2001), and Rennstich (2008). 
3 It shares the Schumpeterian emphasis on clustered, radical innovations with the Sussex school (Freeman and Louca 
2001; Freeman and Perez 1988; Freeman and Soete 1997; Perez 2002) and Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000). 
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iterative introduction of new industries to replace old ones. Each new cluster of radical 
technological changes possesses an S-shaped trajectory that gradually flattens as its ac-
tivities are perceived to become routine or even obsolete.  
The introduction of radical innovations is monopolized by a single lead economy 
situated at or near the top of a global technological gradient on which the world's econ-
omies are organized hierarchically. At the bottom of the gradient, subsistence activities 
predominate. At the top, pioneering innovations for a time produce efficiency, produc-
tivity, and monopoly profits. The very frontiers of technology are extended with each 
radical innovation in the ways in which commodities are produced. Technological inno-
vation, imitation, and highly uneven diffusion makes movement up and down the gradi-
ent conceivable, but not necessarily all that likely. But as some other economies catch 
up eventually in harnessing the new technologies, the lead economy loses its lead. 
Lead economies experience at least two waves of innovation in a process referred to 
as the ‘twin peaks’ phenomenon. The first wave (ascent) pushes a new economy to the 
top of the technological gradient. This highly destabilizing outcome encourages in-
creased conflict and global warfare fought primarily among the states with economies 
situated near the top of the gradient. Thanks in part to the surpluses gained in the ascent 
wave and the consequent ability to organize a winning coalition, the lead economy's vic-
tory in the ensuing conflict is made more probable. Its resources are applied to funding 
capabilities of global reach (naval power later supplemented by air and space power) 
and coalitions of land and sea powers to defeat the most threatening adversaries.  
The innovation lead in the first wave, intensive mobilization during the intensive 
conflict, and global war victory all combined to facilitate the lead economy's develop-
ment of a second wave of clustered innovations. Most allies and rivals that participated 
in the global warfare emerge exhausted. The exception is the lead economy that actually 
profits from the conflict and extend its predominance as the premiere commercial-
industrial and power with global reach. After the global war has ended, the coalition 
leadership in the global war has increasingly segued into something resembling systemic 
leadership. Yet, it is also in this immediate postwar era that other advanced economies 
narrow the gap with the economic leader's position. If the leader's first wave is one of 
ascent, the second wave of the pair is thus a catch up wave. As the system leader's capa-
bility foundation experiences relative decline after a few decades, so too does its oppor-
tunity to lead systemically. 
Two other distinctive assumptions of this Kondratieff wave interpretation are that: 
1) the perspective is evolutionary and 2) the K-wave pattern began to emerge faintly as 
early as the tenth century Sung China. No one argues that Kondratieff waves have been 
with us throughout recorded history. At some point, though, the long economic fluctua-
tions with 40–60 year periodicity emerged. Only gradually were such processes likely to 
assume a shape that became easier to identify. In this case, the argument is that the first 
appearance of a paired K-wave pattern in economic innovations is found in the 
10th century in Sung China which is sometimes credited with developing the first econ-
omy with modern, industrialized features. Most importantly, the expansion of maritime 
trade in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as the revived use of the Silk 
Roads on land, facilitated the transmission of long term, paired growth impulses to the 
other end of Eurasia via Venetian and Genoese intermediaries. Many of the economic in-
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novations that later characterized western commercial and industrialized successes can be 
traced back to Chinese practices (Modelski and Thompson 1996; Hobson 2004). It is possi-
ble, therefore, to analyze nine twin-peaked processes or eighteen K-waves encompassing 
some one thousand years between 930 and 1973 (Modelski and Thompson 1996). Obvious-
ly, the claim that there have been as many as nineteen K-waves, counting the one that still 
seems to be in progress, is a major departure from K-wave convention. But there is no 
insistence that each set was as fully manifested as more recent ones. The K-wave pro-
cess emerged only gradually and became most evident only in the past few centuries –  
a subject to which we will return.  
No assumption is made that either technological change or capitalism suddenly 
emerged after the British industrial revolution. Both were amply exhibited for thousands 
of years, especially in activities involving long-distance commerce. But it was necessary 
to break free of economies dominated by relatively slow-moving agricultural dynamics 
fixated on interactions between climate, resource endowments, and population size. Ear-
ly Chinese industrialism and commerce took a step in that direction. The process was 
aided and abetted subsequently by trading state behavior conducted by small Italian city-
states and Portugal after the early Chinese experiment had failed.4 Dutch, British, and 
U.S. innovations in commerce and industrialization of the past three to four centuries 
have contributed further to the increasing strength of long-term technological change 
rhythms. 
Table 1 lists the lead economy history. Two Chinese (Northern and Southern Sung), 
two Italian (Genoa and Venice), a Portuguese, a Dutch, two British, and at least one U.S. 
set of paired innovation spurts are claimed. The radical innovations initially were largely 
focused on the development of the Chinese ‘national’ economy but not exclusively be-
cause trade's significance rose in the Southern Sung era. Thereafter, the emphasis shifted 
to commercial innovations through the 14th K-wave and industrial innovation courtesy 
of the British Industrial Revolution. The intention of the table is not to capture compre-
hensively everything that changed in each iteration but to draw attention to some of the 
more illustrative and profound changes around which each K-wave was focused. 
Table 1. Leading sector timing and indicators, from the 15th to 21st centuries 
Lead Economy Leading Sector Indicators 
Start-up 
Phase 
High Growth 
Phase 
1 2 3 4 
Portugal  Guinea Gold 1430–1460 1460–1494 
 Indian Pepper 1494–1516 1516–1540 
    
Netherlands Baltic and Atlantic Trade 1540–1560 1560–1580 
 Eastern Trade 1580–1609 1609–1640 
    
Britain I Amerasian Trade 
(especially sugar) 
 
1640–1660 1660–1688 
                                                          
4 Part of China's problem was its distinctive threat environment and long struggle with nomadic attacks. The Mongols 
were able to defeat Sung China in part by using some of its technological innovations against the Chinese. 
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1 2 3 4 
 Amerasian Trade 1688–1713 1713–1740 
    
Britain II Cotton, Iron 1740–1763 1763–1792 
 Railroads, Steam 1792–1815 1815–1850 
    
United States I Steel, Chemicals, 
Electronics 
1850–1873 1873–1914 
 Motor Vehicles, Aviation, 
Electronics 
1914–1945 1945–1973 
    
United States II? Information Industries 1973–2000 2000–2030 
 ? 2030–2050 2050–2080 
One outcome of this pattern of economic leadership, seemingly new to the last millenni-
um, is the development of a global system increasingly focused on the operations and 
management of long distance or inter-regional trade. This global system, initially Eura-
sian in scope and eventually planetary wide, functioned simultaneously with the more 
delimited foci of various regional systems. At the head of the global system (but not 
necessarily any of the various regional systems) is the lead economy that surges ahead of 
its competitors and rivals in an ascent K-wave only to find itself in an intensive bout  
of global warfare of generation length. Interestingly, while periods of conflict are found 
in the earlier paired sets of K-waves, successive rounds of global warfare only emerged 
halfway through the millennium in the 1490s. Western Europe was both multipolar and 
characterized by repeated and unsuccessful attempts, unlike most other regions, to ac-
quire regional hegemony that was considered as being renewed in the 1490s.5 As a conse-
quence, global wars have combined and fused attempts of continental powers to assume the 
European hegemony with disputes over leadership at the global level. This process presuma-
bly ended in 1945 but could be transplanted to East Asia in the twenty-first century. 
Ultimately, the K-wave process does not establish the world hegemony for the state 
possessing the lead economy. Rather, it propels the lead economy into the status of be-
ing the leading political-military-economic actor of a global system focused on long dis-
tance transactions, in marked distinction to regional power structures and attempts at 
territorial expansion in the home region. There is no need to equate the systemic leader-
ship of Portugal in the sixteenth century with that of the United States in the second half 
of the twentieth century beyond the minimal standard that both states established them-
selves as the leaders in global (i.e. interregional) economic innovation in their respective 
eras. The U.S. lead in 1945 was much greater in scope than the lead established by Portu-
gal in 1517. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the United States had a much stronger 
impact on shaping the postwar institutions of world order (as symbolized by the Bretton 
Woods package of the Generalized Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [GATT], the Inter-
national Monetary Fund [IMF], and the United Nations [UN]) than did Portugal in the 
early sixteenth century.6 In neither case was the system leader hegemonic. In both cases, 
                                                          
5 Rome, of course, had successfully unified most of what later became Western Europe but this early success was more 
a product of Mediterranean politics than it was ‘European’ politics. That is, Rome conquered the Mediterranean 
world and, in the process, peripheralized much of Europe to its empire centered in Italy. 
6 Portugal essentially created a protection racket regime in the western end of the Indian Ocean in which traders paid 
taxes to the Portuguese to be allowed to trade. The Portuguese could aspire to little more since their technological 
edge resided in ocean-going ships with cannon, as opposed to commodities that could be exchanged for Asian goods. 
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the system leader had variable opportunities to shape the rules governing global system 
transactions. 
The tripartite systemic leadership platform – leading sector growth (growth rates of 
leading sectors in the lead economy), leading sector share concentration (the lead econ-
omy's share of leading sector production among global powers), and global reach capa-
bility concentration (naval capability share) – is interrelated reciprocally. Leading sector 
growth leads to leading sector share concentration and global reach capabilities. Higher 
levels of global reach capabilities facilitate leading sector growth and leading sector 
share concentration. Yet, leading sector growth and share concentration also lead to mil-
itary mobilization on land as well as at sea. 
We have shown empirically (Reuveny and Thompson 2001, 2004) that the system 
leader's leading sector growth has been a systematic driver of the system leader's aggre-
gate or national economic growth. Both of these variables, in turn, affect world econom-
ic growth positively while world economic growth influences the system leader's leading 
sector and national growth negatively. In some respects, then, the system leader is nega-
tively affected by its own success. Its innovations contribute to world economic growth 
but as other economies improve their technological development, the advantageous posi-
tion of the system leader is reduced.7 
Eight Implications 
Given the perspective outlined above, what might the increasing role of energy issues 
offer? Examining energy flows more closely should have payoffs for studying long eco-
nomic waves or, more accurately, successive S-shaped technological growth trajectories. 
This is the first implication of incorporating energy into the leadership long cycle per-
spective. Smil (1994; see also Marchetti 1977), for instance, observes a close corre-
spondence among Mensch's (1979) innovation cluster peaks, Schumpeter's peaks and 
troughs, and the introduction of new prime movers and fuels. Outlined in Table 2, Smil 
notes that each Kondratieff upswing was strongly influenced by the introduction of ei-
ther new engines and new fuels, or both. The timing of these same early adoptions 
match the peaks of Mensch's (1979) innovation clusters (i.e. 1828 vs. 1830, 1880 vs. 
1882, and 1937 vs. 1945) and the timing of Schumpeterian long wave trough center-
points (1827 vs. 1828 and 1830, 1883 vs. 1882 and 1880, 1937 vs. 1945 and 1937).  
The midpoints of the Schumpeterian upswings are also roughly the midpoints of the 
prime mover/fuel eras. Smil regards this particular correspondence as more support for 
Mensch's argument that economic depressions stimulate new innovation waves.8 
Finally, Smil also notes that a large number of the leading corporations in each 
prime mover era specialize in producing the new prime movers and associated fuels. 
Thus, the correspondences observed in Table 2 are hardly mysterious. Corporate activity 
                                                          
7 There are a number of other generalizations that can be made and that have been validated empirically about how the 
systemic leadership foundation influences other systemic processes, ranging from protectionism to the North-South 
cleavage (see Rasler and Thompson 1994; Reuveny and Thompson 2004; Thompson and Reuveny 2010). 
8 See as well Freeman's Sussex School emphasis (e.g., Freeman and Perez 1988) on the key ingredients that will drive 
successive long waves. Most have an energy basis. At the same time, it should be noted that there is no standardiza-
tion of K-wave periodicity as yet. Authors put forward approximations that sometimes overlap and sometimes do not. 
For instance, the Schumpeterian peaks in 1800 and 1856 in Table 2 do not exactly correspond to the relevant leader-
ship long cycle high growth phases of 1763–1792 and 1815–1850. The 1911 and 1962 Schumpeterian peaks, though, 
do correspond with the 1873–1914 and 1945–1973 phases. 
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provides the agency that links technological innovation and economic contraction and 
expansion. It is interesting to note, moreover, that Table 2 implicitly addresses the earlier 
implication about varied beats of the paired Kondratieffs. Focusing on the first column, 
the 1775–1830 period emphasized stationary steam engines while the 1830–1882 period 
stressed mobile steam engines, as found in trains and ships. The 1882–1945 period in-
troduced internal combustion engines and steam turbines while the 1945–1990 period 
ushered in gas turbines. Note that engine power is substantially greater in the second 
period as compared to the first period when we look at these four eras as two sets of 
paired upswings.9 
Table 2. Energy shifts and economic long waves, 1775–1990 
Mensch  
Innovative 
Clusters 
Peaks 
Schumpeterian 
Troughs New Prime Movers and Fuels 
Schumpeterian 
Peaks 
  Stationary Steam Engines 1775–
1830 (coal) 
1800 
1828 1827   
  Mobile Steam Engines  
1830–1882 (coal) 
1856 
1880 1883   
  Steam Turbines and Internal Com-
bustion Engines  
1882–1945 
(coal and crude oil) 
1911 
1937 1937   
  Gas Turbines 
1945–1990 
(coal, crude oil,  
and natural gas) 
1962 
 1990   
Source: Columns 1, 2, and 4 are based on Smil (1994: 240) who, in turn, drew on Mensch (1979) and 
Schumpeter (1939) for the peak and trough dates. 
Nakicenovic (1991) sees these shifts (see Table 3) as substitution waves, with new tech-
nologies initially emerging in one era and becoming dominant in the next only to be 
supplanted by something else in a subsequent period. Precisely what comes next remains 
unclear. Natural gas sources of energy seem the most likely candidate at present but 
some mix of different sources will no doubt prevail. Which ones (or which mix) are se-
lected, will depend ultimately on changes in technology that make these alternative 
sources more reliable, safer, and less expensive.  
The Smil and Nakicenovic tables, however, are suggestive about the role of energy 
transitions in the K-wave process. An energy transition is ongoing but not all that well 
advanced. It may take place later in the century and we think the hydrocarbon era is 
                                                          
9 Of course, each successive era also represents an expansion of engine power over the preceding era as well. 
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coming to an end but what will replace it remains vague. Substitution is ongoing slowly. 
No new fuels or engines (unless computers are seen as engines of a different kind) are 
yet evident either. If these generalizations are accurate, several possibilities are conceiv-
able. If energy shifts have become a necessary part of the Kondratieff wave and have 
stalled for various reasons, does that portend parallel distortions to the shape of the cur-
rent K-wave? The Sussex school (see, e.g., Freeman and Perez 1988) argues that eco-
nomic depressions result when there are delays in moving from one phase to the next 
due to the need to overcome resistance or obstacles to the next cluster of innovations. The 
current, protracted energy transition ultimately may come to be seen as such a delay. 
Table 3. Clusters of pervasive technologies and substitution waves 
Period 1750–1820 1800–1870 1850–1940 1920–2000 1980–2060 
Dominant 
Systems 
Water pow-
er, sails, 
turnpikes, 
iron cast-
ings,  
textiles 
Coal, ca-
nals, iron, 
steam 
power, 
mechanical 
equipment 
Railways, 
steam ships, 
heavy indus-
try, steel, dye-
stuff, tele-
graph 
Electric 
power, oil, 
cars, radio, 
TV, dura-
bles, petro-
chemicals 
Gas, nuclear, 
aircraft, tele-
comm., infor-
mation, photo-
electronics 
Emerging  
Systems 
Mechanical 
equipment, 
coal, sta-
tionary 
steam, ca-
nals 
Steel, city 
gas, indi-
go, tele-
graph, 
railways 
Electricity, 
cars, trucks, 
radio, roads, 
oil, telephone, 
petrochemi-
cals 
Nuclear 
power, com-
puters, gas, 
tele-
communica-
tion, aircraft 
Biotech., artifi-
cial intelligence, 
space industry 
and transport 
Source: based on Nakicenovic (1991: 486). 
Alternatively, it may be that two energy transitions (first to coal and then to petroleum) 
were part of the K-wave history with fairly profound implications but that did not mean 
that energy shifts, at least in terms of fuels and engines, has become absolutely neces-
sary to substitutions in clustered technology. Information technology, widely presumed 
to underlay contemporary technological changes, represents a different type of energy 
shift that may prove to be as difficult to assess while it is still ongoing as the shifts to 
coal and petroleum no doubt were.  
The second implication follows from the first one. We discern 19 K-waves going back 
to the 10th century and Sung China. Roughly, most of the first two-thirds of this process 
was caught up in making use of wind for long-distance oceanic voyages which were car-
ried out by relatively small states located on the fringe of Europe (Genoa, Venice, Por-
tugal, the Netherlands, Britain). The voyages were profitable but harnessing wind was 
hardly new. The real innovations were focused on ship building (Venice, the Nether-
lands), improving navigations skills, or finding new routes (the Netherlands) to the 
Spice Islands. As impressive, profitable, and revolutionary for their time as these Asian 
and American trade connections were, they still seem to suffer in comparison with the 
revolutionary implications of new ways to manufacture products that were developed in 
the second half of the 18th century. One obvious explanation for this disjuncture is that 
an energy transition began in the late 18th century that substantially reinforced the im-
pact of the Kondratieff process. From an evolutionary perspective, constant relationships 
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are unlikely. Instead, they evolve over time, with some growing stronger and others be-
coming weaker. In this case, major energy transitions in the late eighteenth through early 
twentieth centuries served to intensify the effects and consequences of clustered techno-
logical innovations.10 The technological frontier was extended even more radically than 
in the past. 
Another implication of giving more emphasis to the energy-technological innovation 
nexus is the nature of the twin peak phenomena. System leaders have tended to experi-
ence leads in innovation in sequential bursts of two upsurges, depicted in Table 4, that 
are separated by periods of global warfare. Hitherto, we have treated these paired inno-
vation upsurges as equal. But in the context of interactions with energy, it takes time to 
transform the nature of energy conversion practices. As a consequence, the first burst in 
innovation tends to work within the prevailing economic landscape. The innovations 
may be radical but they are less likely to transform the economy to the full extent imagi-
nable. The second one has the benefit of the earlier surge's changes and should be more 
revolutionary in its implications for how economic production is accomplished. Hence, 
the anticipated beat should not be 1–1 but, perhaps, something more like 1–1.5–2, with 
the second wave having a greater impact than the first. This differential beat rhythm is 
not a fact – merely a hypothesis taken and generalized from Griffin (2010: 123) who 
argues for a slow start for the British industrial revolution given the organic environment 
in which it began. She notes that the initial innovations relied on organic resources 
(horses, charcoal, and water) and then came to depend increasingly on inorganic re-
sources (coal extracted from under the soil) with greater productivity as a result in a sec-
ond surge. It may be that this differential beat is more discernible in more recent innova-
tion surges. Nonetheless, the logic might well fit earlier growth surges too. Consider the 
Portuguese first growth surge based on West African pepper, slaves, and silver. Only in 
the second wave did the Portuguese enter the Indian Ocean. Or, the first Dutch growth 
surge was focused on its traditional Baltic trade. It is the second wave that is linked to the 
Dutch penetrating the Indian Ocean and the Spice Islands.11 The initial 18th century British 
lead was predicated on its transportation of Asian products while the second wave was 
more focused on American production (e.g., sugar and tobacco). It does not seem unwar-
ranted to regard the first surge in the set to be more constrained by the environment  
in which the innovations occur in comparison to the second surge which can build on  
the first. 
                                                          
10 A number of efforts to model K-waves based on aggregate data have been made without a great deal of success. Part 
of the problem is relying on the aggregate data but another part may be that the K-wave activity simply becomes 
more regular and therefore empirically discernible as we move toward the current period (see, e.g., Korotayev and 
Tsirel 2010). 
11 However, there are also strong incentives to re-examine Dutch energy utilization of peat and windmills. De Vries 
and Van de Woude (1997) make a good case for calling the 17th century Netherlands the first modern economy. 
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Table 4. The twin peak timing of leading sector growth surges and global war 
First High Growth Surge Global War Second High Growth Surge 
Portugal   
1460–1494 1494–1516 1516–1540 
Netherlands   
1560–1580 1580–1609 1609–1640 
Britain   
1660–1688 1688–1713 1713–1740 
1763–1792 1792–1815 1815–1850 
United States   
1873–1914 1914–1945 1945–1973 
 
Incorporating energy obviously expands the focus on what lead economies need to do. This 
fourth implication is sketched in Fig. 1. Energy must have a source that can be tapped in 
some systematic matter.12 Extraction and transportation from the source to production 
sites, therefore, becomes an important set of routines for the system leader either directly 
or indirectly. The focus on production sites (and commercial entrepots) is long standing 
and has been manifested in looking at sequences of pioneering and monopolizing lead-
ing sectors for periods of time. More storage and transportation of goods to their respec-
tive markets is the next step, followed by consumption, market share considerations, and 
waste associated with consumption. 
Energy Source 
 
Extraction 
 
Transportation/Storage 
 
Commerce/Manufacture 
 
Transportation/Storage 
 
Consumption-Recycling/Destruction 
 
Waste / Environmental Degradation 
 
Fig. 1. Energy flows 
The leadership long cycle research program has focused primarily on the middle of this en-
ergy flow process, although the stress on naval power underlines the need for coercive pro-
tection of the two transportation links in the flow. Moreover, naval navigation hardware 
(compasses, rudders, and so forth) have also been standard foci (Devezas and Modelski 
2008). But, fortunately, Bunker and Ciccantell (2005, 2007) have already analyzed the ex-
                                                          
12 Keohane (1984: 32) argues that hegemons must control raw materials in addition to capital, markets, and competitive 
advantages in production. Once I thought a definitional emphasis on resource control was wrong but as long as the 
raw materials are focused on energy sources, I would now agree. 
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traction-transportation and manufacture-transportation links. They do not look at what is 
manufactured; rather, they stress obtaining raw materials and building a transportation infra-
structure. What is needed then is a synthesis of their model, perhaps subject to modifications, 
into the leadership long cycle perspective. Waste is not exclusively a function of lead econ-
omy manufacture and consumption but it is likely to be a major, if not the major, source of 
problems associated with waste and, its corollary, environmental pollution. Were we to 
combine the production and consumption efforts of the lead economy and its main rivals, a 
lion's share of the generation of global wastes can be attributed to a small number of elite 
economies. Certainly, the lead economy is also a leader in waste and pollution production. 
Waste disposal and environmental degradation, thus, also become grist for the extended ana-
lytical mill.13 
A fifth implication of giving more emphasis to energy is that some of the uncertain-
ties of assessing relative decline may be eliminated. There are at least two problems that 
are affected. One is that it is remarkably difficult for most observers to distinguish be-
tween absolute and relative decline. Seeing no or little absolute decline, the popular re-
action is what decline? Per capita income, for instance, falls in absolute decline phases 
but it is likely to improve in periods of relative decline. Without a clear impact on the 
quality of life, the notion of relative decline seems highly abstract. Relative decline is 
also difficult to gauge and even more difficult to assess in terms of its meaning. System 
leaders can enter into relative decline almost from the onset of their periods of predomi-
nance. Even so, any initial relative decline is apt to move very slowly and only pick up 
speed much later as competitors manage to catch up and perhaps, surpass the former 
leader. When other states and economies do transit past the incumbent leader, the rela-
tive decline becomes obvious. Before the point of transition, it is more nebulous even 
when many indicators point in the same direction. 
The second problem lies with interpreting relative decline once it is recognized. 
How much decline makes a significant difference? If a system leader's lead diminishes 
by ten per cent, is that huge, modest, or minor? Of course, that assessment must be 
contingent on the size of the gap between a leader and its followers. The greater is the 
size of the gap, the more room there is for relatively insignificant decline. But we have 
no practice in working out a metric that tells us when relative decline has reached sig-
nificant proportions and when it has yet to pass some threshold mark. That has been 
especially the problem with interpreting U.S. relative decline. Its initial lead was quite 
commanding. Its rate of decline has been slow. It continues to possess a number of 
advantages over its rivals. Thus, it is not surprising that observers disagree contempo-
raneously about whether any decline has occurred. 
One of the advantages of inputting more energy into the technological innovation 
box is that there is less emphasis on decline and more stress on attaining a steady state 
phase. Ascending economies tend to increase their consumption of energy. But at some 
point their increasing consumption levels off due to a combination of greater energy ef-
ficiency practices and reaching a point of optimal production given the types of energy 
sources that are available. The attainment of the phases of steady state energy consump-
tion are quite clear in the British and U.S. cases. 
                                                          
13 Dealing with environmental degradations could well become a leading sector of the 21st century. See as well Chase-
Dunn and Hall's (1997) iteration model and subsequent revisions that include environmental degradation as a func-
tion of economic productivity.  
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Fig. 2 charts British consumption per capita as reported in Humphrey and Stanislaw 
(1979).14 
 
Fig. 2. British energy consumption per capita, 1800–1970 
Not shown in Fig. 2 are estimates for the 18th century that suggest that energy consump-
tion roughly doubled between 1700 and 1800 (47 to 100 on the index). Between 1800 
and 1900, the increase in consumption per capita was nearly fivefold (100 in 1800 to 
587 in 1900). The series peaked around 1910 and then went flat through World War II 
before beginning to ascend once again. The more contemporary (post-World War II) 
ascent, however, is associated with changes in fuel sources in a second energy transition. 
The flattening in the first half of the 20th century (and de-accelerating in the latter 
19th century) presumably reflects the waning years of coal dependence as the principal 
fuel source, along with declining manufacturing activity. 
Fig. 3 plots the U.S. energy consumption per capita in million BTUs.15 Between 
1950 and 1975, there was a 47 per cent increase (227 in 1950 to 333 in 1975). The series 
peaks in 1980 at 344 and stays flat through 2005, before declining in 2009. This last de-
cline presumably reflects the global financial meltdown and losses in economic produc-
tion and is thus likely to be temporary. Yet, overall, the series appears to have flattened 
from the 1970s on. As in the British case, there are multiple factors at work, including de-
clining manufacturing demands and increased efficiency, but the combination of the two 
figures suggests that the flattening in Fig. 3 probably also reflects the waning years of 
the petroleum energy regime and the attainment of a steady state status in terms of ener-
gy consumption.16 
                                                          
14 Humphrey and Stanislaw focus on mineral fuels and hydro-power and normalize their series in terms of 1800 = 100. 
15 The data are taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Review, 2008 – see table 1.5 
(Energy Consumption, Expenditures, and Emissions Indicators, Selected Years, 1949–2009), URL: 
http://www.eia.doe.gove/aer/pdf/pages/sec1_13pdf. 
16 A related issue is the quite significant extent to which the U.S. trade deficits are expanded by petroleum imports. 
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Fig. 3. The U.S. energy consumption per capita, 1950–2009 
In this vein, LePoire (2009: 215) suggests that a transition to the Chinese leadership is a 
long way off. The Chinese energy consumption is very large but on a per capita basis is 
only about ten per cent of the U.S. usage. That would imply that any plot of Chinese per 
capita consumption would show a positive trend perhaps for a number of years into  
the first half of the 21st century, other things being equal, but still not catching up to the 
leader. The other interesting facet of the Chinese consumption is that has been heavily 
dependent on coal and will probably continue to be reliant on coal through at least 2050. 
From these observations, one might infer that the U.S. relative decline may easily be 
exaggerated, as are concerns about a transition to Chinese leadership in the near future. 
The real question from an energy perspective is which economy or economies will lead 
the way in replacing petroleum, especially in terms of automobile propulsion. Since we 
are in the very early stages of that movement, it is probably much too soon to tell – but it 
hints at what we might pay most attention. 
The sixth implication is that leadership and energy transitions appear to have be-
come increasingly intertwined. It makes sense that if lead economies are the vanguard of 
new and increased energy supply and consumption, they would also be an important 
agent in ushering in new eras of energy use. This tendency did not emerge full-blown 
with the advent of lead economies. Only the last two lead economies, Britain and the 
United States, have been involved so far in the transitions depicted in Fig. 4.  
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Fig. 4. Energy transitions in the United States 
Britain led the shift to coal and competed intensely with the United States for control of 
petroleum reserves in the interwar years (Hugill 2011). By the beginning of World War II, 
the United States controlled some 50 per cent of the world's then known petroleum 
sources (Thompson 2007a).  
It follows then that when we are speculating about leadership transition, it is not 
enough to simply look for innovation in a new wave of gadgets. We should also be look-
ing for leadership toward a new era of energy use in which movement away from reli-
ance on hydrocarbon sources is part of the pattern. In other words, the next lead econo-
my will probably be the vanguard of employing alternative sources of energy – whether 
it be nuclear, solar, wind, natural gas, or some combination. It may also be that one rea-
son for leadership transition is some inherent disadvantage in making the transition to 
the next era. Britain, for instance, was heavily committed to coal, did not possess large 
petroleum reserves at home, and was slow to make the switch to electricity. Given the 
pronounced U.S. reliance on petroleum, we may find that economies that are less de-
pendent thanks to a lower level of development will encounter less inertia and resistance 
in the movement toward new energy sources.17 Alternatively, the next lead economy is 
likely to need to have ample access to relatively inexpensive energy resources. 
The question may then hinge on the distribution of resource endowments. 
Recognizing systemic leadership as a vanguard of new energy consumption practic-
es creates opportunities to link contemporary processes to both ancient and cosmological 
processes. Early centers of ‘civilization’ developed similar resource acquisition net-
works and innovated novel ways to expand the supply of energy by building and main-
taining irrigation canals and other ways to control water use. Sumer, the initial lead 
                                                          
17 One area worth more exploration are the implications of the system leader's dependence on weapons platforms de-
veloped in earlier global warfare but also reflecting a dependence on the prevailing energy regime. The commitment 
to the petroleum fueled twentieth century ships, tanks, and planes well into the 21st century would seem to be a good 
example. 
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economy, is the example par excellence. What lead economies do is a more modern ex-
tension of older and even ancient political-economic practices and processes. We need 
to appreciate the continuity and to build on it analytically. 
If a stronger connection to ancient developments is the seventh implication, an 
eighth is an intriguing link to a cosmological argument. Chaisson (2001: 120) contends 
that the ‘emergence, growth, and evolution of intricately complex structures’ is keyed to 
energy flows and governed by thermodynamic principles. 
Nature's many ordered systems can now be regarded as intricately complex struc-
tures evolving through a series of instabilities. In the neighborhood of a stable 
(equilibrium) regime, evolution is sluggish or nonexistent because small fluctua-
tions are continually damped; destruction of structure is the typical behavior 
wherein disorder rules. By contrast, near a transition (energy) threshold, evolution 
accelerates and the final state depends on the probability of creating a fluctuation 
of a given type. Once this probability becomes appreciable, the system eventually 
reaches a unique though dynamic steady state, in which construction of structure 
wherein order rules is distinctly possible. Such states are thereafter starting points 
for further evolution to other states sometimes characterized by even greater order 
and complexity (Chaisson 2001: 78).  
This argument (see also Adams 1975, 1982, 2010; Spier 2005, 2010) reflects a general 
theory of the evolution of complexity in all processes predicated on energy consump-
tion. All ‘natural entities’, spanning physical, biological, and cultural phenomena, ex-
tract energy for survival, maintenance and reproductive purposes or, alternatively, put 
for resisting entropy. Greater complexity is achieved by tapping into greater quantities 
of matter and energy. Table 5 offers a representative list of the ‘free energy rate densi-
ty’ – an index of the amount of energy available per unit of mass – of various types of 
structures. All of these entities take energy from their environment to continue function-
ing. We are most familiar with our own participation in this fundamental process. Food 
allows us to live. Without food energy, we die. So it is with all other entities.18 
Table 5. Some representative, estimated free energy rate densities 
Structure Average Densities 
Galaxies 0.5 
Stars 2 
Planets 75 
Plants 900 
Animals 20,000 
Human brains 150,000 
Society 500,000 
Note: The densities are expressed in erg units of energy per time per mass. 
Source: based on Chaisson (2001: 139). 
                                                          
18 One interesting hypothesis is whether each successive lead economy is associated with significant improvements in 
the free energy rate density. 
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The attractiveness of this interpretation for our own purposes is that it provides a differ-
ent way to view human efforts to improve their existence and quality of life. The basic 
process is one of energy acquisition and the expansion of how much energy is acquired. 
One way to look at the evolution of technological innovation, then, is the development 
of ways to convert various types of matter into successively greater amounts of energy 
to fill sails, to spin cotton or to drive automobiles and air conditioners. This process, 
over time, has moved along at different rates but is similar from the expansion of Su-
mer's resource acquisition network in the fourth millennium BCE to contemporary com-
petitions to find ways to move automobiles by electricity or to convert solar energy into 
electricity. Political economies become successively more complex as energy densities 
are increased. But the process of acquiring and harnessing more and more sources of 
energy is not characterized by widespread innovation. It tends to occur first in one place 
and diffuse unevenly to other places that are in a position to emulate and, often, to im-
prove on the initial innovations.19 
This basic pattern of pioneering innovations subject to uneven diffusion has struc-
tured long-term economic growth and is most clearly discernible in the Sung-Genoa-
Venice-Portugal-Netherlands-Britain-United States succession in pioneering lead econ-
omies in the modern era of the last millennium. But it is not just successive clusters of in-
novation that is involved but also successive increases in the flow of energy acquired and 
energy density. The ability to convert sources of energy into successive advances in 
transportation and production is what long-term economic growth is all about.20 Lead 
economies are thus principal agents in generating new drivers for economic develop-
ment and growth. We should expect each successive leader to be associated with in-
creased free energy rate densities. The leadership long cycle research program is orga-
nized very fundamentally around this insight. If the core process being examined also 
fits into a larger picture of parallel patterns in growth and development from the Big 
Bang on, so much the better. It reinforces the belief that the research program is on the 
right track. At the same time it also broadens and helps to justify lengthening the track 
on which the research program proceeds. 
Technological innovation is about many things. The argument here is not that we 
scrap what has been said previously about the linkages between innovation and world 
politics. Rather, we need to broaden the nature of the inquiry by integrating energy con-
siderations into the long cycle weave. The two perspectives are complementary because 
technological innovation and energy have been highly interdependent. Greater integra-
tion should enhance our understanding of both energy, the K-wave phenomenon, and 
processes of world politics. 
                                                          
19 There are certainly exceptions to this pattern. Agriculture, for instance, was invented independently in multiple 
places. 
20 LePoire (2009: 217) offers an interesting frame on this problem by arguing for viewing history as a complex adap-
tive process in which succeeding phases of energy intensification over time have led to greater complexity. He 
thinks the succeeding phases are recognizable in five-fold expansions in energy intensity and dates them as follows: 
civilization (3000 BCE–400 CE), commerce (700–1720), industrialization (1720–1950), and knowledge-based 
(1950–?). 
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Strategic Stability and the Role  
of the Global Energy Sphere 
 
Yury Sayamov 
 
 
The article focuses on the problem of the strategic stability in energetics, pointing 
out that the fight for energy sources became one of the main reasons for wars and 
conflicts of the past and present. It can seriously poison the mankind's future, as 
well, and lead to a global confrontation which may be the last in its history, if a 
consensus is not found how to secure needs in energy on the basis of safety and in-
terests of all participants in the energy process. As an example of a joint search for 
solutions the author presents the discussion platform of the International Club of 
Nice ‘Energy and Geopolitics’ on which a new initiative was born with the support 
of the city and region to establish an office of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
aimed at the development of the scientific cooperation. 
Keywords: energy, geopolitics, strategic stability, Club of Nice. 
In the search for the answers what the emerging world order would be, the factor of energy 
becomes of key significance, if not the most important one. The notion of strategic stabil-
ity which appeared in the general political discourse in the mid-1980s taking its origin in 
the joint research works on military and defense issues by Soviet and American scientists 
of that time, could be applied to the sphere of global energy. It is exactly about the world 
strategic stability when questions are considered in their complexity about the energy se-
curity including the aspects of offer, demand and delivery of energy. The security of the 
offer should provide owners of energy resources with the freedom of sale void of any kind 
of pressure, or sanctions in favor of other interested parties. The security of the demand 
should guarantee the respective quantity of energy resources for the payment agreed upon. 
The security of the delivery should cover the transport of energy resources through transit 
territories and countries.  
The struggle for energy sources, especially for oil, became one of the main reasons for 
contradictions, conflicts and wars of the past and present. It can seriously threaten the hu-
mankind's future and also lead to global confrontation which may in the worst of cases 
become the last in human history, if a consensus is not found how to secure needs in ener-
gy on the basis of safety and with due account of interests of all participants of the energy 
supply including producers, consumers and transiters. 
It goes without saying that their interests differ as in any other trade activity.  
The producer would like to sell at a higher price whereas the buyer tries to pay less.  
The transiter acting as a provider of a service would like to get more for it. This is why at 
the world energy markets acquiring a global character it is used the principle of the so 
called ‘reasonable prices’ which are formed in the gap between the dumping and specula-
tive prices. Those producing and exporting the energy strive for reasonably higher prices 
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while the consumers and transiters long for reasonably lower prices. The establishment  
of mutually acceptable prices is the result of bargaining, negotiations, and attainment of 
agreements which is a civilized and respectful approach for making positions of the parties 
closer to each other and it may include agreed concessions, compensatory accords and 
other possibilities. 
The achievement of agreements on the basis of reasonable prices presupposes a reason-
able behavior of participants which excludes blackmail or threat by force or its use. Geopo-
litical circumstances should not be used in order to force partners to not justified conces-
sions. A mutual compromise between rivals being partners at the same time in the spirit of 
cooperation is ever broader understood as more profitable than the confrontation and the 
desire to achieve by one-sided preferences all means. It occurs in the context of the ever 
more obvious need and interest in the stability and predictability of world energy markets 
since their volatility and sharp fluctuations of prices can make suffer any participants.  
The growing interdependence of states in the contemporary quickly globalizing world 
strengthens their vulnerability from eventual abrupt disturbances in the system of the energy 
supply in the absence of a global regulating mechanism what makes energy resources, in 
particular, oil and gas, a powerful tool of world politics and international relations. 
The history which, however, sometimes does not teach, testifies that starting from a 
very distant past all whatsoever important conflicts were in one way or another related to 
the fight for energy resources conducted first of all by the states which being geopolitical 
centers were large consumers.  
By the First World War the oil was confirmed as a significant geopolitical factor of 
the confrontation between the Great Powers. During the Second World War one of the 
most important principles of the world energy geopolitics was formed – to control ways 
and means of the energy delivery to consumers rather than the territories where the energy 
resources are produced.  
After the Second World War the United States of America which used to be a big 
world oil exporter began to import it thus creating the principle of conservation what 
meant the preferential use of foreign energy resources in order to safeguard the national 
resources for future generations or for the case of an unfavorable development of the in-
ternational situation.  
In the post-soviet period the energetic strategy of the United States was expanded on 
previously inaccessible or little accessible for them spheres previously influenced by the 
USSR. It enabled the United States to ever more actively use energy steering levers for 
their main goal of retaining the elusive world leadership and consolidating a unipolar geo-
political system with the United States at the head. 
After a terrible shock and severe trials Russia like the mythological bird Phoenix aris-
es from the ashes of perestroika. The international project ‘Oil and Gas of Russia’ by the 
Russian Association of International Cooperation together with foreign experts – French 
and Swiss leading specialists – helped to return the country's energetics at the world fore-
front, thus establishing a new structure of cooperation instead of the old non-operating 
mechanisms.1 
The presentation of the project in Paris brought together more than 600 leaders of the 
world oil and gas sector, including such key figures as the head of ‘Total’ Christophe de 
Margerie (who tragically perished in an avia catastrophe in 2014 and whose contribution 
to the development of global energy is widely known). On the margins of the presenta- 
                                                          
1 Oil and Gas of Russia. History and Perspectives. Published in Paris in French and in Russian in 1995. 
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tion the first agreement between Gazprom and Gas de France was signed marking a new 
era in the post-soviet energy relations.  
Meanwhile, the structure of the global energy sector has been rapidly changing thus 
acquiring features of the increasing and dangerous instability. The state formations on the 
territories of the oil producing countries were crushed down, as it happened in Iraq and 
Libya, or demonized, as the current situation around Iran. It has been preceded by the in-
troduction of international sanctions and the establishment of embargo zones against these 
countries. When developing a very dangerous game, its authors had better take into ac-
count that the regime of sanctions in international relations is not a norm, but an exclusive 
action of semi-military, sometimes even of military character which may bring the most 
serious negative consequences for the international cooperation. 
The mistake with Al Khaida which turned finally against its creators was repeated 
when the Islamic fighters from another terrorist organization of ‘Islamic state’ (an organi-
zation banned in Russia) were supported against the legal government of Syria. As a result,  
a serious threat for the international security emerged, especially dangerous with the view to 
the fact that terrorists got access to oil sources thus, having daily around US$ 3 million from 
the sale of the stolen oil to consumers rather preferring lower oil price to high moral prin-
ciples. The dirty oil money permits the purchase of arms and financing of terrorist actions 
and military operations. 
Ways and means of delivery of energy resources became less secure and reliable. Un-
der conditions of the general global unbalance the transiters more often yield to the temp-
tation to use their position for additional profits through rising the payments for transit, or 
demanding to exclusively reduce the price of energy resources for them and sometimes 
even falling to vulgar stealing of oil and gas from pipelines. 
Anyway, the global energy became intrinsically linked and world politics. This is the 
main conclusion of the study ‘Energy politics’ conducted by an American researcher 
Brenda Shaffer (2016). The whole life of mankind and any human activity from produc-
tion of goods to means of transport and defense heavily depend on access to energy. 
In its foreword to the World Energy Issues Report 2014 the Secretary General of the 
World Energy Council Mr. Christoph Frei points out that this is a time of unprecedented 
uncertainty for the energy sector. Secure, reliable, affordable, clean and equitable energy 
supply is fundamental to global economic growth and human development and presents 
huge challenges for all. Energy demand will continue to increase, driven by non-OECD 
economic growth. The pressure and challenge to further develop and transform the energy 
system is immense. To make things more daunting, it is in the context of this uncertainty 
that today's policymakers and business leaders have to take critical decisions on the com-
mon future energy infrastructure (Frei 2014). 
The world energy consumption increases at the background of a decreasing energy re-
sources available which leads to international conflicts and fight for energy. The link be-
tween the global energy security and the world security in general is ever more evident, 
especially after the chaos forced instead of the so called ‘undemocratic regimes’. War in 
Iraq marked bluntly as ‘the war for oil’, destruction of the oil state Libya and devastation 
of Syria produced millions of refugees invading Europe and caused the rise of the terrorist 
‘Islamic state’ – a new illegal actor on the world oil scene. The turnover in Ukraine made 
the transit of energy resources through its territory not reliable while it is of vital im-
portance for many European countries. The importance of natural gas is obviously grow-
ing also having certain implications for global security. 
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Meanwhile, in the period between 2000 and 2014 China's share of the world's total 
gross domestic product (GDP) nearly quadrupled, Russia's share tripled, India's share al-
most doubled, while the US share decreased by 28 percent. The USA still remains the 
world most powerful state, but its pretentions for the global leadership requiring a lot of 
hard and soft power, which the both demand a certain wealth, can continue to diminish 
together with the ability to influence the world in case of a prolonged steep economic de-
cline (Lane 2015). 
However, after about 30 years without vivid achievements in oil and gas production 
the USA successfully began to use new technologies to extract gas and oil from formations 
that had been considered too difficult and not profitable for exploitation. The oil produced 
from such formations is usually referred to as tight oil. Its output increased from 1.5 mil-
lions of barrels per day (MBD) in 2010 to 4.7 MBD in 2014 including the condensate out-
put – the type of very light oil that turns from a gas to a liquid at the extraction. Thanks to 
it, the daily rate of the US crude oil output and the gas production exceeded the volumes of 
Saudi Arabia and Russia. The results from the development of shale resources for the 
American economy are estimated as a quite modest one per cent GDP growth by 2040 and 
seem to be not as important as their reflection lowering world oil prices. In 2015 the world 
oil prices went down to approximately half of the levels of the previous year. Low oil 
prices threaten the world energetic stability since there is a risk of a disruption in oil ex-
porting countries suffering from the decrease of oil incomes. 
Behind pharisaical deliberations on themes of freedom and democracy there is felt  
a hidden hope that low oil prices staying low enough for long enough can overthrow the 
governments of oil exporting countries which are pursuing an independent policy on  
the global arena. 
From the Persian Gulf to Europe and Central Asia and from the United States to China 
there could be felt a serious concern about global energy stability and security identified as 
the need to protect national interests. States are increasingly adopting defense doctrines 
based on the control of energy resources and ways of their delivery. Some striving to indi-
rectly control strategic energy sources engage military and covert operations thus danger-
ously militarizing the sphere of the global energy. As a result, the previously quite well 
settled and governed region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is presently 
converted to an area of heavy military conflicts, unceasing bloodshed and tremendous 
losses and sufferings for the civil population, explosive for the world situation in general. 
Public declarations about the necessity of the ‘liberalization’ and ‘democratization’ are 
aimed in reality at the countries of the region rich of energy resources. However, it has 
been proved quite regretfully that overthrowing MENA regimes bring instead of any posi-
tive aspirations just negative results. The invasion in Iraq called ‘war for oil’ has led to the 
brutal death of its leader who securely governed the country which to a much greater ex-
tent enjoyed its oil wealth than now, being somewhere in between of the position of a 
failed state and of the role of a puppet in foreign hands. The similar tragic destiny was 
prepared by NATO's aerial bombardment of Libya for its leader brutally killed and put out 
to everybody's observation in the fridge of a local food store. A violent anarchy that fol-
lowed, as well as the provoked outbreak of the civil war in Syria, the rise of the jihadist 
terrorism in the region representing one of the most dangerous contemporary threats to the 
world peace and security, the fall of the state in Yemen and a difficult survival of Egypt 
after the so called ‘Arab Spring’ are in the outcome of ‘civilizing missions’ which inter-
fered into independent states causing just grief and devastation. 
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Besides the MENA region, the geopolitical impact of low oil prices was directed to 
diminish Russia's power and possibilities on the global scale. The United States seeking  
to achieve the world leadership are concerned with the rivals in the face of China and Rus-
sia. Of the two challengers to the US policy of preeminence, China is considered to be a 
greater threat. It already has the world's second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP 
and enjoys a big capacity for its economic growth. Russia represents an ever more mod-
ernized and heavily armed powerful petrostate. Relations between rivals involve heavily 
the energy sector not only inside the countries concerned, but much more in the areas of 
their influence.  
Whatever the future might be, but now the power balance between America and China 
as the main axis of global politics and the relationship in the triangle of China, Russia and 
the USA is decisive for many aspects of world politics and economy including the situa-
tion in the energy sphere. Contrary to claims about the great strategic importance of US 
tight oil, it is having very little effect on this power balance. China has now replaced 
America as the world's biggest importer of crude oil, and lower oil prices add to both its 
current accounts surplus and its GDP growth rate. Claims about the strategic impact on 
Russia of US natural gas exports are also much exaggerated. US liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) exports will for the time being remain a minor factor in Europe's bargaining posi-
tion toward Moscow. Though Poland and the Baltic states have built LNG terminals, Asia, 
where LNG prices are higher, is a more promising US export market than Europe.  
The costs of liquefaction and ocean transport make US gas more costly to produce and 
deliver to Europe than Russian pipeline gas. The combination of low prices and sanctions 
are, however, demanding a high price from Moscow. The IMF estimates that the conflu-
ence of these two factors may contract Russia's GDP by 3 to 4 per cent. Low oil prices 
have probably also made it easier to maintain the regime of sanctions. Anyway, there is a 
question, if the sanctions have in deed produced a gain in vital US interests. For the Euro-
peans the answer is unequivocally negative. 
The dream of a ‘Big Europe’ from the Atlantic to the Urals, as de Gaulle proclaimed, 
or from Brest to Vladivostok according to contemporary ideas about common historical 
and cultural values of the European continent was moved behind liberating the place for 
the following of the European Union (EU) the lead of the foreign interests from over the 
ocean. Entering this way the EU was consuming more than half of its demand from  
the Russian export in general and 80 per cent of oil and gas in particular. The EU, how 
paradoxically it might occur, becomes an obstacle on the way to a Big Europe able to suc-
cessfully withstand serious global challenges of the contemporary world like the radicali-
zation and pressure of Islam, like the reproduction and survival of the Europeans under 
conditions of a relentless migration and the forthcoming demographic explosion to the 
South of Sahara, like unemployment, poverty, social inequality and injustice, problems of 
women and youth. It is difficult not to agree with the councilor of the French government  
Mr. Jules Remis who is of the opinion that ‘taking into account the significance of com-
mon interests it is necessary to overcome the existing differences in views rather than to 
continue dramatizing them. The Brussels commission, however, gives us the contrary ex-
ample as for questions in its exclusive competence’ (The International Affairs 2013:  
94–95).  
Before the question is raised who is guilty it is important to pay attention to another 
question: what to do. The answer might be to go back to what is uniting rather than divid-
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ing, rejecting the artificially imposed spirit of confrontation and using another kind of the 
energy – that of the energy of knowledge with all its positive instruments.  
As an example in this regard might serve the unique experience of the International 
Club of Nice established 15 years ago, in 2001, by scientists and specialists of the energy 
sphere with the support of the Mayor of Nice and the participation of the Russian Acade-
my of Sciences. The joint work on the international scientific platform of Nice was 
marked with concrete positive results. In 2011, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of 
Club's activities a monograph ‘Energy and Geopolitics’ was published in French and Rus-
sian languages, thus, representing a joint fundamental research of scientists and revealing 
their vision of the situation in the global energy sphere (Kostyuk and Makarov 2011). 
Participants of the Club sessions were far from supporting the anti-Russian sanctions 
considering the creation of instability in the energy sphere as a dangerous play with fire 
which might have unforeseeable consequences. Attaching a great importance to the at-
tainment of strategic stability in global energy, they were convinced that this objective can 
be achieved through a number of subsequent steps forward in geopolitical clusters similar 
as drops of quicksilver are merging with one another making a singular unit through their 
contacts. For this purpose it is important to revive the project of ‘Big Europe’ before the 
time does not run out and the vector of the energy cooperation does not move from  
the West to the East like a compass needle of a ship changing its course. 
Giving way to the development of the international cooperation on the scientific plat-
form of Nice, the Mayor of the city Mr. Christian Estrosi recently elected as the governor 
of the region supported the establishment in Nice of a branch of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. This initiative opposes the madness of supercharging the international tension 
and supports the development of the scientific cooperation in the interest of the vitally im-
portant energy stability. ‘The energy, – as it is pointed out in the already mentioned fun-
damental monograph “Energy and Geopolitics” – represents the basis for the human civili-
zation. Social and economic challenges of the accelerating globalization are insistently 
demanding the vision of perspectives, possibilities and strategic priorities of the develop-
ment of the antropogenic energetics covering the whole of our planet, the unity of means 
of transferring the energy into the forms useful for the human activity’ (cited in Kostyuk 
and Makarov 2011: Ibid.: 9). 
In this connection UNESCO Chairs and networks and other ‘think tanks’ could be 
considered to be able to contribute to the comprehension of uneasy processes in Europe 
and in the world and to the search for solutions in the context of the task of forming a new 
geopolitical system of international relations based on principles of peace and cooperation 
for sustainable development. 
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Globalization has brought countries closer in terms of business, trade, technology, 
knowledge, policies and relations. Globalization, which is partly synonymous with 
rising international trade, has fostered rapid production, and consumption of ma-
terial goods in an unprecedented scale and quantities. This has weighted the eco-
logical footprint of human activities around the world. Thus, in this paper, analysis 
is presented in a manner to see the extent of such global efforts in facilitating cli-
mate change adaptation in developing countries. The paper also attempts to un-
derstand the degree of success achieved by developing countries in terms of cli-
mate change adaptation in the era of globalization. The paper presents climate 
change adaptation examples from few developing countries to delineate the corre-
lation between globalization and climate change adaptation in recent times. 
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Introduction 
Environment itself is inherently global, with life-sustaining ecosystems and watersheds 
frequently crossing national boundaries; air pollution moving across entire continents and 
oceans. The environment is intrinsically linked to economic development, providing natu-
ral resources that fuel growth and ecosystem services that underpin both life and liveli-
hoods (Najam, Runnalls, and Halle 2007). It is not only that globalization impacts on the 
environment, but the environment influences the pace, direction and quality of globalization. 
This takes place because environmental resources provide fuel for economic globalization, 
but also because our social and policy responses to global environmental challenges con-
strain and influence the context in which globalization happens. The relation between the 
discourse of globalization and environment has enabled many scholars to devote their re-
search to climate change adaptation and its relationship with globalization. Globalization is 
not new for the nations of the world. But as a scientific area of study the climate change ad-
aptation has become prominent in the environmental studies since the world started recog-
nizing significant changes in climate. On different occasions both developed and developing 
nations have agreed to work on adapting the recent climate changes and their impacts on the 
natural, social, economic and political environment.  
Developing countries are vulnerable to extremes of normal climatic variability, and 
climate change is likely to increase the frequency and magnitude of some extreme weather 
events and disasters. Adaptation to climate change depends on current adaptive capacity 
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and the development models pursued by developing countries. These countries continue to 
face diverse challenges in forming and implementing climate change adaptation plans. It is 
inevitable that natural forces will contribute to some of those challenges. But, nature is not 
the single source of such challenges. Having considered the variety of sources of potential 
challenges, both developed and developing countries have been trying to figure out suc-
cessful climate change adaptation strategies for last two decades. Due to globalization 
such collaboration has been possible in each and every sector. Globalization has brought 
countries closer in terms of business, trade, technology, knowledge, policies and relations. 
Globalization, which is partly synonymous with rising international trade, has fostered 
rapid production, and consumption of material goods in an unprecedented scale and quanti-
ties. This has weighted the ecological footprint of human activities around the world. Thus, 
in this paper, analysis is presented in a manner to see the extent of such global efforts in fa-
cilitating climate change adaptation in developing countries. The paper also attempts to un-
derstand the degree of success achieved by developing countries in terms of climate 
change adaptation in the era of globalization. The paper presents climate change adapta-
tion examples from few developing countries to delineate the correlation between globali-
zation and climate change adaptation in recent times. 
Key Conceptual Discourses on Globalization and Climate Change 
Adaptation  
Globalization 
Globalization is the cluster of technological, economic and political innovations that have 
drastically reduced the barriers to economic, political and cultural exchange (Drezner 
2001). It is a process of expanding trade and commerce creating borderless market all over 
the world. Globalization is now a part and parcel of our daily life. So what exactly is globali-
zation? Globalization is defined here as a set of economic and political structures and pro-
cesses deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets that comprise the base 
of the international political economy – in particular, the increasing structural differentia-
tion of those goods and assets. Globalization refers to the recent transformations of capital, 
labor, markets, communications, scientific and technological innovations, and ideas 
stretching out across the globe (Carter 2008). Charlton and Andras (2006) define globali-
zation as a phenomenon of modernization, which describes societies characterized by pro-
gressive growth in the complexity of communications, in particular, ‘specifically to the 
increasing dominance of an international network of communications especially in  
the economy, but also in social systems such as politics, the mass media, and science and 
technology’ (Charlton and Andras 2006: 869). Adams, Gupta, and Mengisteab (1999) 
view globalization as an economic discourse that facilitates wealth creation. At the same 
time, they think that economic globalization can dislocate indigenous culture in least de-
veloped countries. Since the mid-1980s globalization has been accelerated considerably by 
two main factors. One involves technological advances that have lowered the costs of 
transportation, communication, and computation and the other factor has to do with the 
increasing liberalization of trade and capital markets. Wallerstein (1995, 1998, and 2000) 
sees globalization as a world system in which the world is dominated by the developed 
nations. Developed nations, in such a world system, seek to infuse their ideas and strate-
gies to developing nations in the areas of production-oriented activities and other econom-
ic activities. Wallerstein (1995) as a proponent of liberalism, thinks that globalization is a 
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system through which developing countries would get better by installing ideas of their 
developed counterparts. But not all developing countries are equally engaged in globaliza-
tion or in a position to benefit from it. Developing countries, except for most countries in 
East Asia and some in Latin America, have been rather slow to integrate with the world 
economy. One review, by Scholte (2000), provides a classificatory scheme of several defi-
nitions: 
Globalization as internationalization: The ‘global’ in globalization is viewed ‘as 
simply another adjective to describe cross-border relations between countries’. It describes 
the growth in international exchange and interdependence. 
Globalization as liberalization: Removing government imposed restrictions on 
movements between countries. 
Globalization as universalization: Process of spreading ideas and experiences to peo-
ple at all corners of the earth so that aspirations and experiences around the world become 
harmonized. 
Globalization as westernization or modernization: The social structures of modernity 
(capitalism, industrialism, etc.) are spread all over the world, destroying cultures and local 
self-determination in the process. 
Globalization as deterritorialization: Process of the ‘reconfiguration of geography, so 
that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial dis-
tances and territorial borders’. 
Globalization cannot be seen only from the economic perspective. Globalization not 
only refers to a series of economic but also technological changes that have modified the 
way the world works and transfers information (Penn 2005: 4 cited in Quigley 2009). 
These changes could include international trade, manpower migration, knowledge man-
agement, and information exchange. Apart from such technological advancement and in-
creased opportunities for developing countries to adopt those technologies there are some 
other issues which also determine the processes of globalization. Politics is one of those to 
be looked at. Politics is a regular feature of globalization as well (Broad 2002). Culture is 
another one which needs to be considered critically. International non-governmental or-
ganizations (INGOs) represent, carry out, and elaborate global principles. It means NGOs 
promote globalization and try to mold cultures of developing nations (Boli and Thomas 
1997). Although globalization does not create a common culture in which everyone holds 
the same beliefs and values, it does create a single arena in which all actors pursue their goals 
by deliberate comparison with others, using at least some common standards as yardsticks 
(Nettl and Robertson 1968; Robertson 2001). Emulation takes the form of selectively in-
corporating ideas from a global arsenal (Robertson 1995a, 1995b). Griffin (2003) points 
out that globalization is asymmetric and developed nations with the help of various inter-
national organizations try to rule this world. In this process developing countries remain 
deprived of free and equal access to knowledge, research opportunities, economic activi-
ties and factors of production. Through globalization the developed nations have been able 
to access the resources of developing nations. But it is unlikely for the developing nations 
to have similar access to the resources in developed nations. It shows that globalization is 
a discourse which is used by developed nations as political, economic and cultural weap-
ons to dominate the developing ones.  
Climate Change Adaptation 
Adaptation to climate change – defined as ‘adjustment in natural or human systems in re-
sponse to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, that moderates harm or ex-
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ploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC 2007) – represents an unprecedented challenge for 
the international system. Adaptation to climate change is given increasing international 
attention as confidence in climate change projections is getting higher. Developing coun-
tries such as Bangladesh have their own unique needs for adaptation due to high vulnera-
bilities. We can define adaptation to climate change as a set of organization, localization 
and technical changes that societies will have to implement to limit the negative effects 
of climate change and to maximize the beneficial ones. Possible adaptation actions in-
clude, for example, removing populations and assets from areas at risk of flooding as a 
result of climate change, adopting crop varieties that are more resistant and better 
adapted to future climates, or adjusting energy networks to expected variations in energy 
consumption (Hallegatte, Lecocq, and de Perthuis 2011). Adaptation to climate change 
has the potential to substantially reduce many of the adverse impacts of climate change. 
Climate change is no longer an external threat to be managed ‘out there’, but is an inti-
mate element of human history – both an outcome and driver of development decisions for 
individuals, organizations and governments (Pelling 2011). To what extent planned adap-
tation measures for climate change are needed at all will depend on a variety of factors. 
One is an ‘exposure’ which is the vulnerability of a region towards climate change. Other 
includes ‘impact’, that is how much damage will be caused by climate change in a specific 
region. In order to address these factors there are two most important measures for climate 
change; 1) proactive and reactive adaptation measures and 2) adaptation and adaptive ca-
pacity. 
Reactive adaptation consists in reacting ex post to adverse impacts of climate change 
when they occur. Whereas proactive adaptation consists of taking action before impacts 
occur to reduce vulnerability to these impacts and to limit adverse consequences or to take 
advantage of them. A distinction between the two measures is typically made between adap-
tation measures taken long before the occurrence of climate change and its impact and 
measures that are taken as a reaction to ongoing climate change (Konrad and Thum 2013). 
For example, evacuating people from a flooded zone and relocating them in a safe zone is 
considered to be reactive adaption, whereas changing the land-use plan in anticipation of 
future flooding is considered to be proactive adaptation. 
The adaptive capacity of communities is determined by their socio-economic charac-
teristics. Enhancements of adaptive capacity represent a practical means of coping with 
change and uncertainties in climate, including viability and extremes. For example, air 
conditioning is an adaptive measure to cope with heat, providing suitable conditions for 
work or life and reducing medical risks. In contrast, measures that improve the general 
health condition of the population are a means of making the population less vulnerable to 
extreme temperature events. Such measures increase the adaptive capacity of the society. 
Enhancement of adaptive capacity is a necessary condition for reducing vulnerability, par-
ticularly for the most vulnerable regions, nations and socioeconomic groups.  
Relation between Globalization and Climate Change Adaptation:  
Developing Countries' Perspective  
Many developing countries have already experienced weather events in terms of floods, 
droughts, heat waves, and tropical cyclones that are more frequent or intense than previous 
experiences (Dai, Trenberth, and Qian 2004), and the resulting impact point to the con-
sequences on the environment, production systems, and livelihoods from future climate 
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variability and change. Given the potential risks associated with climate change, a seri-
ous effort on characterizing and understanding adaptation is now underway. Analogues of 
adaptation in the past are complemented with policy and social science research on the 
present adaptive capacity of governments, civil society and markets to deal with climate 
perturbations. The economic costs of future adaptations are being derived by examining 
the differences between the economic losses associated with scenarios of technology up-
take and diffusion. Among these approaches, a key issue is the identification of successful 
adaptations in the developing world where the greatest risk and vulnerability persists 
(Adger et al. 2003).  
For successful adaptation, developing countries must consider globalization as one of 
the main actors which often shapes a country's social, political, economic and administra-
tive contexts. Globalization has been the proponent of international cooperation through a 
wide range of bilateral and multilateral development convergences. Thus, there is a rela-
tion between globalization and climate change adaptation in developing countries. For 
instance, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) focuses to Community Based 
Adaptation (CBA) strategies in developing countries so that these countries can design the 
strategies of adaptation based on their needs. UNDP is advocating such approach in Boliv-
ia, Niger, Samoa, and Kazakhstan. All these countries have been collaborating with UNDP 
to work on different themes. Bolivia works on climate-resilient watershed management. 
On the other hand, Niger and Samoa work on optimizing resource cooperation in response 
to climate change and addressing climate-driven coastal hazards respectively. Meanwhile, 
Kazakhstan's CBA approach attempts at dealing with winter irrigation to replace the de-
clining snowfall. All these efforts may be questioned because initiatives and strategies de-
veloped by foreign donors quite infrequently bring success in developing countries. Spires, 
Shackletona, and Cundill (2014) point out that CBA approach has three barriers, namely, 
social, resource, and physical and can obstruct the way of achieving successful adaptation 
through community participation. On two Eastern Caribbean islands, the implementation 
of reforestation to combat coastal erosion was met with opposition as community members 
placed high value on having a sea-view and access to the beach. Implementation of sea-
level rise set-back lines was found to be exceptionally slow, with a lack of direct hurricane 
impact being hypothesized as one of the contributing factors (Cambers 2009). This cor-
roborates the experiences from South Africa, where community apathy in relation to cli-
mate change education was apparent (Roberts 2010). These community members had no 
first-hand experience of major climate change impact. Similarly lack of information about 
resources has not allowed the farmers of Uganda to adopt alternative strategies (Roncoli  
et al. 2011). Similarly, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, and Cambodia have been experi-
encing a series of climate change adaptation projects in which communities need to play a 
greater role. Such projects have brought little success as communities lack knowledge and 
skill to implement the suggestions provided by the project teams (Sovacool et al. 2012). 
Guyana has faced problems in successful adaptation of climate change due to the absence 
of skilled manpower (Hickey and Weis 2012). This corroborates the notion of knowledge 
divide created by the practice of globalization. Not surprisingly due to globalization the 
developing countries are suffering from knowledge divide and lack of access to similar 
technologies that are regularly found in the developed ones (Quigley 2009; Griffin 2003). 
The cases mentioned here imply that globalization provide the opportunity to international 
agencies to intervene in developing countries' climate change adaptation. But this has not 
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brought success in all instances. Rather, there are few unsuccessful ones. That means  
the role of globalization in building solid convergence in climate change adaptation is in 
doubt. Due to such questionable role of globalization discourse one can argue that globali-
zation is not a facilitator to climate change adaptation in developing countries. 
However, literature that chronicles barriers and opportunities also explores the reasons 
for the limited conversion of assessments and plans into action. These include behavioral 
and cognitive aspects (O'Brien and Wolf 2010; Nelson 2011), unconducive governance 
arrangements (Amundsen et al. 2010; Storbjo¨rk 2010), lack of or self-interested leader-
ship (Anguelovski and Carmin 2011; Moser et al. 2012), competing planning agendas and 
lack of institutional coordination (Moser and Ekstrom 2010) insufficient financial and hu-
man capital and mechanisms for enabling these (Bryan et al. 2009; Kabubo-Mariara 2009), 
lack of information and data (Deressa et al. 2009; Hammill and Tanner 2011), historical de-
terminacy and path-dependency (Chhetri et al. 2010; Abel et al. 2011), incorrect or incom-
plete diagnosis of problems (Gorddard et al. 2012), the widening science-policy gap associ-
ated with wicked problems and uncertainty and ambiguity (Sarewitz 2004; Dessai et al. 
2007). All these barriers are often found in the process of climate change adaptation pro-
cess in developing countries. One can note that globalization is a system in which devel-
oped countries tend to maintain the dominance over the developing ones. That is why de-
veloping countries find it difficult to globally promote their culture, trade, technologies, 
and political ideas. It has created a wide gap between North and South. It can be pointed 
out that all of those barriers to climate change adaptation are profound in developing coun-
tries only because of increasing gap between developed and developing nations.  
Globalization has been the proponent of international cooperation and collaboration. 
Presumably globalization tends to shape the adaptation strategies in many ways as we 
have already discussed about the advocacy of CBA by different international donor agen-
cies. But Laukkonen et al. (2009) present that successful climate change adaptation de-
pends on the involvement of local people and their inherent ideas of dealing with potential 
changes. On the other hand, Smith et al. (2011) points to the coordination of international 
efforts of climate change adaptation in developing countries. Funds for climate change 
adaptation are coming from various sources. But lack of coordination and integration in 
utilization of those funds in developing countries hamper the adaptation strategies. It im-
plies that globalization recognizes fund for adaptation in an asymmetric way. Globaliza-
tion is often viewed as modernization of society, economy, politics, administration, infra-
structure, and technology. Chittagong city, one of the largest cities of Bangladesh, can be 
mentioned as an example. Ahammad (2011) describes that Chittagong city's adaptation 
to climate change is often deterred by the lack of national level commitment and rapid 
modernization. Here rapid modernization is accompanied by rigorous misuse of land in 
this hilly region. People are prone to disaster like landslide. It shows that modernization 
through the channels of globalization neither helps to adapt necessary strategies nor pre-
sents stable natural condition. Globalization does not always provide the necessary tools to 
design a successful adaptation strategy. It is the social and cultural dimensions of a locality 
which actually determines the degree of success of each and every adaptation measures. 
The case of western Nepal encourages the removal of social barriers to adaptation rather 
than installing western ideas in a setting which may not accept it (Jones and Boyd 2011). 
Local knowledge is crucial in removing the social barriers. Anik and Khan (2012) point 
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out to the case of climate change adaptation in the north eastern region of Bangladesh. 
They describe the level of knowledge of the local people and initiatives they have taken to 
adapt climate changes. Significantly this part of Bangladesh has devised some effective 
adaption plans and strategies (Anik and Khan 2012). It implies that it is not always neces-
sary to incorporate global practices in each locally devised strategy of adaptation. An in-
ward looking strategy of adaptation can be enough to extract best out of each plan. Global 
convergence often confuses developing countries' governments in mapping the climate 
change adaptation strategy. Globalization has boosted the free market system. Due to the 
increase in cross-border trade and economic activities private organizations from devel-
oped countries are frequently setting up their business in developing countries. Unfortu-
nately, institutions playing leading role in global governance have not been the strong pro-
ponents of private business organizations' involvement in climate change adaptation in 
developing countries. Multinational Corporations (MNC) are not frequently seen in the 
process of climate change adaptation (Pauw and Pegels 2013). Globalization has facilitat-
ed the growth of cross-border business through many MNCs but at the same time has ne-
glected the role of those MNCs in managing adaptation process. They have the responsi-
bility to the society and the environment in which they operate. Thus, they need to be in-
corporated in the framework of implementing adaptation plans (Biagini and Miller 2013). 
According to Biagini and Miller (2013) most businesses perceive consideration of climate 
risk in their investments and business plans to be unnecessary, technically difficult, and 
perhaps premature; acknowledging empirical evidence of climate effects and economic 
losses can be seen as politically sensitive.  
Although there are a number of research suggesting localization of climate change ad-
aptations one must recognize the fund and technical expertise, as help, from the interna-
tional donor agencies. But Vidal (2012) thinks otherwise and asserts that wealthy countries 
have not only failed to provide cash to help poor people adapt to climate change, but much 
of what they have agreed to give so far has come out of existing aid budgets or in the form 
of loans that will need to be repaid. However, it is often observed that developing coun-
tries possesses a notable degree of distrust on the suggestions of western countries and 
international organizations led by western countries. It implies that globalization entails a 
significant level of injustice in global climate governance (Parks and Roberts 2006). Due 
to such kind of distrust in the actions of developed nations many developing countries 
have failed to capitalize the assistance from the former. For example, murderous flooding 
from Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, rising sea levels swamping the entire Pacific Island 
atoll nations and devastation from flooding among squatter settlements in Mozambique 
can be noted (Parks and Roberts 2006).  
Discussion and Conclusion 
The relationship between globalization and climate change adaptation in developing coun-
tries presents a scenario in which developing countries find themselves with a bottomless 
basket. Globalization typically possesses some features of neo-liberalism. The emergence 
of neo-liberal ideas has helped those countries which had developed strong market system 
for more than two centuries. Globalization has produced a world system through which 
developed countries have been able to enjoy neo-colonial system of trade and business. 
Globalization has also fostered the urban based colonization in many developing countries 
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as well (Atkinson and Bridge 2013). Exploitation is not only prevalent in the global gov-
ernance but also present in developing countries. Emergence of MNC-based trade and 
business under the umbrella of globalization has been encouraging poor farmers of devel-
oping countries to sell their lands to foreign investors (Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 
2010). It further aggravates the state of exploitation and creates a degree of distrust in in-
ternational cooperation as well as aid governance.  
 
Diagram 1. A cycle showing relationship between globalization and Climate Change 
Adaptation in Developing countries 
Source: Authors. 
Diagram 1 shows what threats globalization poses to climate change adaptation in devel-
oping countries. Based on the analysis and example of some developing countries from the 
earlier section, the cycle of events is presented in this diagram. One can note the conse-
quences of globalization in developing countries at the right hand corner of the diagram. 
The consequences significantly influence the climate change adaptation in developing 
countries. Diagram 1 depicts that exploitation, unequal world system, distrust in aid gov-
ernance and international cooperation for adaptation, knowledge and digital divide both 
among the countries and also within the countries are the major consequences of globali-
zation. Imbalance in global political participation is also needed to be recognized as pow-
erful nations in terms of military strength and wealth often dictate the terms of United Na-
tions (UN) and other international cooperative bodies. 
It further exacerbates the condition of distrust in aid governance. Unfortunately, these 
consequences do not only pose multifarious problems for the poorer nations but also create 
some tough barriers to climate change adaptation in those nations. Governments in devel-
oping nations, burdened with political and administrative problems, tend to collaborate 
with international agencies' suggestions while framing climate change adaptation plans.  
 Khan and Islam • Climate Change Adaptation in Developing Countries 317
It means the local priorities have been overlooked in many occasions. Such plans, bypass-
ing the local architecture of culture, politics and economy, have rarely brought success. As 
there is a certain degree of distrust in international donations and aid, developing countries 
fail to materialize meaningful policy convergence. It does not facilitate in building appro-
priate technology and skill at local level. Developing countries need essential manpower 
with such skills and knowledge. But due to persistent worldwide inequality in research and 
education the developing countries lack such skilled manpower. Globalization produces 
good results only for the developed nations in many ways. Strict barriers to trade and re-
search have not made the developing countries' product and knowledge easily accessible to 
all people, countries, and cultures. That is why meaningful policy convergence is absent in 
terms of climate change adaptation in developing countries. Globalization has fostered the 
growth of MNC based trade and business all over the world. But it has failed to create  
a system of global governance in which those MNCs are held accountable for the absence 
of climate change adaptation in developing countries where most of their production facili-
ties are located. Such failure further impedes a successful adaptation as MNC are one of 
the largest agricultural land acquirers in developing countries (Robertson and Pinstrup-
Andersen 2010). Diagram 1 further shows that failed instances of climate change adapta-
tion in developing countries encourage the proponents of globalization discourse. Such 
cycle of events impedes the ‘demise’ of globalization. Mostly the developed countries, 
who are highly concerned with the future effects of climate change, want to maintain  
a homogenous culture, politics and economy so that they can continuously exploit the de-
veloping countries. They would also advocate globalization as it allows the developing 
countries to receive funds for development and climate change adaptation. But such prop-
aganda cannot hide the contradictory role of globalization in climate change adaptation in 
developing countries.  
Globalization has huge implications for nation-states and governance systems, in their 
diversity of forms and structures. The integration of markets, the extension and complexity 
of climate change, and the increasing homogenization of culture and the lifestyle expecta-
tions accompanying these changes have expanded the scope of what used to be considered 
as primarily domestic problems while creating new challenges to governance that are only 
now being recognized. Nation-state and governance systems have increasingly come under 
scrutiny while deliberately discussing the role of globalization in shaping climate change 
adaptation in developing countries because the state has a greater role to play in mapping 
out the necessary adaptation plan in this era of globalization (Eakin and Lemos 2006).  
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In recent years one has witnessed an increasing interest in the shale gas issue with 
the greatest level of concern at different levels of society, up to the political ones. 
The present article analyzes data on the shale gas resources, both worldwide and 
in certain regions. The authors assess the possibilities of shale gas production  
and prospects of its use to substitute other types of energy. They also present  
the model of atmosphere and climate change due to emissions from additional un-
conventional gas production and combustion. It is shown, that to maintain stable 
climatic system, the production of abundant unconventional gas resources should 
be accompanied by the equivalent reduction of coal use. 
Keywords: unconventional gas resources, world production, atmospheric emis-
sions, climate change. 
Introduction 
The first decades of the twenty-first century were marked by several striking events in 
mass and energy interactions within the ‘man – environment’ system: 
1) for the first time after the oil shock of the 1970s the world energy consumption in-
creased with a rather high annual mean rate of 2.6 per cent (in previous decades it was 1.9 
and 1.3 per cent respectively) (BP 2014);  
2) for the first time since 1965, coal has regained the leading position in the global 
fuel mix (5.33 billion tons of coal equivalent (btce) in 2011), terminating a fifty-year era 
of oil (oil consumption in 2011 was at 5.25 btce) (Ibid.); 
3) for the first time in the two-centuries industrial history, the energy consumption in de-
veloping countries surpassed the level of developed economies starting from 2008 (Ibid.); 
4) for the first time the annual anthropogenic carbon dioxide emission is close to the 
critical value of 10 Gt (Giga=billion tons) of carbon (Ibid.); 
5) the annual average CO2 concentration has reached the level of 400 ppm (parts per 
million), which is an unprecedented amount in the last three million years (Tans and Keel-
ing 2014; Pagani et al. 2010; Fedorov et al. 2013); 
6) the global average surface air temperature increase starting from the pre-industrial 
period has come close to one degree Celsius (Jones et al. 2014), that is unprecedented 
through the late Holocene (last 6,000 years). 
These facts remind that modern society faces the following new great challenges: 
1) Are there enough natural resources on the Earth for the rapidly developing world 
economy? 
2) Will the uncontrolled increase of anthropogenic burden on the climate system lead 
to fatal consequences for civilization? 
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However, to conduct an adequate analysis of the present global trends one cannot ig-
nore some positive signs of the last decade: 
1) the renewable energy sources with virtually zero CO2 emissions demonstrate the 
maximum growth rate among all available types of fuel (in 2000–2009 by 12 per cent per 
year, and the last three years by 18 per cent annually) (BP 2014); 
2) for the first time in the past three decades a slightly negative trend of global air 
temperature is recorded (Jones et al. 2014).  
In the early twenty-first century, probably the most significant event in the world en-
ergy industry was the wide use of a new fuel type (shale gas) in the United States (EIA 
2013a). In just a few years (2007–2012), the production of this unconventional gas 
reached 270 billion m3 there, which allowed the country to reduce its huge gas imports, 
which has quite recently been the largest in the world. Despite the fact that today the ex-
tensive recovery of shale gas takes place only in the United States and Canada, many other 
countries have shown interest in use of this new unconventional fuel type. The peculiarity 
of shale gas consists in its quite a uniform distribution over the world; thus, many coun-
tries currently importing energy resources (e.g., China, Poland, Ukraine, and Turkey) can 
hope to attain higher energy and in some cases even political independence. A notable fea-
ture of recent years is the so-called ‘shale gas euphoria’ which is typical, however, mostly 
of the governmental authorities, political, and business circles. Unfortunately, the discus-
sions concerning the environmental problems related to shale gas production practically 
always imply only such regional aspects as allocation of large territories and soil and water 
pollution. However, shale gas, as well as other unconventional gas sources (first of all, 
coal-bed methane and tight gas), represents a huge reservoir of carbon which, if released 
into the atmosphere, can produce significant changes in the global carbon balance and lead 
to large transformations of the climate system. According to recent estimates (Mohr and 
Evans 2011), these processes may substantially affect global primary energy mix. In its turn, 
the changes in the amount and structure of the world energy consumption will have a pro-
found influence on atmosphere and climate on a global scale. In this study we analyze global 
resource and environmental problems connected with increasing production of unconven-
tional gas. 
Unconventional Gas Resources 
Shale gas falls under the category of so-called unconventional gas sources (Perlova 2010). 
According to geological indications, this category encompasses gas deposits which are 
held by absorption, or dissolved in water, or contained in low-permeable and deep-seated 
collectors. If the technology for commercial production of gas is not developed, such gas 
relates to unconventional gases according to technological or otherwise economic criteria 
if the production cost exceeds the market price. The worldwide resources of gas from un-
conventional sources are huge and amount to more than 4000 trillion m3, which is at least 
by an order of magnitude larger than the resources of natural gas. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of these resources according to the type of gas. One should emphasize that the data 
presented in Table 1 refer rather to geological resources, while technically recoverable 
resources may be considerably smaller and will probably change over time as additional 
information becomes available. 
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Table 1. World unconventional gas resources estimates  
Sources Resources, trillion m3 
Gas hydrates 2500–21000 
Coal-bed methane 200–250 
Gas in deep occurrences 200–350 
Tight gas 180–220 
Shale gas 380–420 
Source: Perlova 2010. 
Gas hydrates, that is gas in frozen state in ice, account for the major part of unconventional 
gas sources. As we see in Table 1, the worldwide resources of methane hydrates are very 
large although they have been estimated rather approximately and thus may vary within an 
order of magnitude. 
Russia, a country with a considerable part of its territory located in the permafrost 
zone, has favorable conditions for the availability of essential resources of gas hydrates, 
which was pointed out by the Soviet specialists already in the 1940s (Solovjev 2003).  
In the 1960s, the first deposits of gas hydrates were discovered in the northern part of the 
Soviet Union. The development of the Messoyakh deposit in Siberia, which started in 
1969, and where attempts to extract natural gas directly from hydrates were, from the ex-
perts' view, a success for the first time (Ibid.), can serve as an example of gas production 
from hydrates. 
According to recent assessments of Gazprom VNIIGAZ experts (Perlova 2010), the 
hydrate gas reserves available in Russia amount to around 400 trillion m3 and are located 
in the north of the European part and Siberia. Huge gas hydrate deposits are also available 
in the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean seas. 
Coal-bed methane comprises an essential part of unconventional sources of gas and 
predominantly refers to methane adsorbed into the solid matrix of coal. 
The distribution of coal methane deposits around the world is presented in Table 2. 
The previously existed technology for extracting gas from coal beds did not allow gas to 
be produced in a purposeful manner and to be used for supplying gas for households and 
industry due to a low yield of gas from these beds. In recent years, the situation has some-
what changed due to the development (and some decrease in the cost) of techniques for 
horizontal drilling and multistage hydraulic bed fracturing (HBF). 
Different kinds of coal contain different amounts of methane. Brown coals have low 
methane content, whereas anthracites have a large content of methane; the latter have es-
sentially lower permeability. In Russia, coals from the Vorkuta and Kuznetsk coal basins 
are the most promising ones for producing gas. The main reserves of coal methane in Rus-
sia are concentrated in Siberia, where experimental commercial production of coal-bed gas 
has recently been organized in the Taldom area of the Kuznetsk coal field. 
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Table 2. Top ten countries with shale gas and coal-bed methane technical-
ly recoverable resources (trillion m3) 
Rank 
Shale gas Coal-bed methane 
Country Resources  estimate* Country 
Resources  
estimate** 
1 China 31.6 Russia 12.6 
2 Argentina 22.7 China 10.9 
3 Algeria 20.0 Australia 6.7 
4 United States 18.8 United States 4.5 
5 Canada 16.2 Canada 3.7 
6 Mexico 15.4 Indonesia  3.2 
7 Australia 12.4 Ukraine  1.7 
8 South Africa 11.0 Kazakhstan  1.7 
9 Russia 8.1 India  1.2 
10 Brazil 6.9 Poland  1.0 
 WORLD 207 WORLD 49.6 
* Source: EIA 2013b. 
** Source: OECD/IEA 2012.  
We will not dwell on the gases in low permeable collectors and deep beds, but will con-
sider the shale gas in more detail, a fuel that has recently attracted especially keen atten-
tion not only in the economic, but also in the wide political circles of different countries. 
Shale Gas Resources 
Shale gas is a kind of natural gas distributed in collectors located in the shale bed layers. 
Individual gas reservoirs contain not large amounts of resource, but they are huge in totali-
ty, due to which special production technologies emerge. 
The estimates of shale gas reserves available in different regions and countries around the 
world that are given in various information sources may differ considerably, which to a signifi-
cant extent can be attributed to short-term and political considerations. 
The most recent report prepared by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA 
2013b) excluded from consideration some Middle East countries, particularly rich in tradi-
tional hydrocarbon resources. The reserves of coal methane were also not considered. Ac-
cording to these EIA assessments, the worldwide recoverable resources of gas (both con-
ventional and unconventional) totaled 648 trillion m3 with shale gas accounting for 32 per 
cent (207 trillion m3) of them (EIA 2013b). Only high-quality formations the most promis-
ing in terms of shale gas production were taken into account in assessing the resources. 
The EIA experts indicate that exploratory drilling will make it possible to obtain more ac-
curate estimates of the reserves taking into account such parameters as yield of gas from 
the wells and the area where production can be organized. 
Thus, shale gas resources suitable for commercial production are estimated around the 
world (except for some Asian countries) at 207 trillion m3 (or 271 btce, which is twice as 
low as the conventional gas resources). However, unlike conventional natural gas, shale 
gas is distributed over the globe more or less uniformly, a circumstance that, of course, 
makes it quite attractive as a local energy resource. Its resources (in trillion m3) are esti-
mated at 47.7 in North America, 40.5 in South America, 38.5 in Africa, and 39.8 in Asia 
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(mainly in China). The reserves of shale gas in Europe are estimated at 17 trillion m3 
(22 btce). 
According to assessments of the Russian Ministry for Economic Development, the 
production of unconventional gas in Europe may amount to 15 billion m3/year (around 
20 million tce), a figure that in itself cannot have even the smallest effect on either the gas 
or the more so total energy balance of the region. In this connection it is appropriate to 
remind that the annual gas consumption in Europe (excluding Russia) exceeds 
540 billion m3, including 180 billion m3 supplied from Russia. 
The EIA report (EIA 2013b) indicates that the majority of shale deposits are located in 
the regions that suffer from shortage of conventional sources, in particular, in China, South 
America, and Europe. Therefore, shale gas could comprise a considerable share in the na-
tional energy balance of only certain countries, for example, in France (the estimated re-
serves amount to 3.9 trillion m3), Poland (4.2 trillion m3), Ukraine (3.6 trillion m3), and South 
Africa (11.0 trillion m3). It is emphasized that shale gas in South Africa which is totally de-
prived of traditional gas resources can be used as raw material for producing liquefied gas. 
The amount of gas exported from Russia might be substituted by the shale gas pro-
duced in the nearest European neighboring states, for example, in Poland and Ukraine. But 
to what extent is such a prospect real? 
Recently, Polish specialists have essentially lowered the data on estimated recoverable 
resources of shale gas in the country's interior, according to the information contained in 
the report of the Polish Institute of Geology published in March 2012. The recoverable 
resources of shale gas in Poland are now estimated at 365–768 billion m3, which is signifi-
cantly smaller than the EIA assessments. In view of the fact that the consumption of gas in 
Poland amounts to 16.6 billion m3/year and import – 11 billion m3/year (EIA 2013a), the 
country can (theoretically) substitute the whole amount of imported gas by domestic pro-
duction for decades. At the same time, coal accounts for a considerable share of fuel used 
in the energy industry of Poland, which in the future should be replaced, at least partially, 
by more environmentally friendly natural gas. Therefore, even with an expected growth of 
domestic production of shale gas, Poland will probably continue to import natural gas. 
Thus, the production of own shale gas will hardly give more than a somewhat diversified 
range of sources for importing natural gas and probably decreased import from Russia. 
Nonetheless, the interest in Polish gas is quite significant. By 2012, Poland had grant-
ed more than a hundred concessions for carrying out exploration works. However, approx-
imately 60 test wells drilled in Polish shale basins did not bring encouraging results, due to 
which the inspiration concerning the prospects of Polish shale gas has calmed down to a 
considerable extent. Moreover, three out of six major US/Canadian companies involved 
(Exxon Mobil, Talisman and Marathon) have pulled out of Polish gas exploration.  
The shares of a few independent companies specializing in European shale gas have 
dropped during the past two years by 70 per cent. On the other hand, sixty wells is a negli-
gibly small number for drawing up important conclusions, while at least one hundred is 
needed to accurately assess the potential of the country's reserves. For comparison, 
13,700 boreholes have been drilled in the single largest American shale basin of Barnett. 
Nevertheless, in 2014 Poland plans to become the first country in Europe to start commer-
cial, although very limited shale gas production in the western Baltic basin. 
The Ukrainian State Geological Service has recently increased its assessment of shale 
gas resources to 12.5 trillion m3, whereas the U.S. Geological Service has reported about 
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only 3.6 trillion m3. At present, Ukraine imports from Russia around 25 billion m3 of natu-
ral gas a year (BP 2014), which is nearly three times larger than the amount of import in 
Poland, but puts forward the objective to increase the shale gas production up to 
13 billion m3 within the next decade. But we will see if Ukraine has enough courage  
to produce such amount of this commodity, which is still very expensive, technologically 
and environmentally unfriendly, to be able to completely get rid of the Russian gas import. 
Nonetheless, one should clearly understand that for Ukraine, as well as for Poland, produc-
tion of own shale gas is one of the most important components in their struggle for nation-
al sovereignty, and there is no doubt that both countries will take every effort to fully im-
plement their ambitious targets in this field. 
In Russia, the Baltic, Baikal, Volga and Pechora, Transbaikal, and Olenek platforms 
are the main shale gas formations, and according to assessments carried out by Gaz-
prom VNIIGAZ (Perlova 2010), the total geological resources of shale gas may amount to 
6–8 trillion m3, which is fully consistent with the EIA recent estimate equal to 8.1 trillion m3 
(EIA 2013b). Some authors give even more optimistic assessments (up to 20 trillion m3), 
which is only slightly smaller than the estimates made by the same authors for Europe and 
China (Ibid.). However, one should bear in mind that at present, the environmental safety 
and production costs rather than the resource availability are the key aspects determining 
possible development of this new natural resource. In this connection one should have a 
closer attention to the experience of the United States, who is an acknowledged pioneer in 
the field of shale technologies.  
At present, the United States occupies the leading position not only in proven recover-
able reserves but also in production of shale gas. In 2012, the production of gas in the 
United States totaled 681 billion m3 (Mohr and Evans 2011) with unconventional sources 
(coal-bed methane and shale gas) share of more than 45 per cent. The shale gas share is 
constantly growing which has already resulted in a significant redistribution of the world 
gas market between the players and a formation of surplus supply by early 2010. As a re-
sult of growing production of shale gas, the previously constructed terminals for importing 
liquefied gas, which remained out of service, are being refurbished for export. In our opin-
ion, this export may soon become quite large, up to 40–50 billion m3 already before 2020, 
and over 160 billion m3 by 2040. No doubt, in the nearest three or four years, the United 
States will become a net exporter of natural gas and the world runner-up to Qatar in the 
liquefied natural gas export. 
The current situation with production of shale gas is entirely different on the other side 
of the Atlantic. Although some EU countries announced their intent to produce gas from 
shale, the environment specialists shortly thereafter subjected these intentions to serious 
criticism. These specialists are of strong belief that HBF operations, which are an integral 
part of shale gas production technology, inflict irreparable damage to the environment. As 
a result, France has already rejected plans of shale gas production and placed focus on its 
nuclear power industry; exploration works have been suspended in Germany, Hungary, 
Romania, and the Czech Republic, and eventually in Bulgaria and Lithuania the HBF op-
erations have been recently prohibited by law. Currently Poland, where it is predominantly 
politicians who make statements about such method of production, Ukraine, where this 
matter also has a serious political context, and the United Kingdom with a strong support 
from its government still remain among a few states in Europe intending to continue at-
tempts to produce gas from shale. 
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Outside Europe and North America it is China, Argentina, Australia, and India who 
have the best perspectives to develop commercial unconventional gas production. China 
has the largest in the world shale gas resources (31 trillion m3 or over 15 per cent of the 
world total) and has already become the third, after the USA and Canada, country to 
commence its commercial production. China is planning to produce over 60 m3 of shale 
gas by 2020 and 90 billion m3 by 2030. The total unconventional gas production in China 
will reach 230 billion m3 by 2030 divided between coal-bed (115 billion m3), shale 
(85 billion m3), and tight gas (30 billion m3) (EIA 2013b).  
In Russia even experimental production of shale gas is not carried out, which is by no 
means surprising in view of huge recoverable reserves of conventional natural gas with the 
cost of production currently 5–6 times lower than for shale gas. However, Russia is plan-
ning to produce some 50 billion m3 of unconventional gas by 2030 from coal-bed and tight 
formations deposits.  
The Environmental Aspects of Shale Gas Development 
For the further analysis, it is worthwhile to point out the specific features relating to the 
shale gas production technology. Already in the early nineteenth century it was known that 
shale rock did contain gas. However, this rock features high density and low permeability, 
and gas accumulates in small isolated ‘pockets’. The first commercial gas well in shale 
rock was drilled in the United States as far back as 1821 near Fredonia town in the New 
York State by William Hart, who is regarded in the United States as the ‘father of natural 
gas’. George P. Mitchell and Tom L. Word are the initiators of large-scale production of 
shale gas in the United States. 
But it is only at the time of energy crisis in the 1970s that the US government assigned 
financial support for the development of shale deposits in search for new sources of fuel. 
The exploration works were carried out, during which four giant shale formations were dis-
covered: Barnett, Haynesville, Fayetteville, and Marcellus, stretching for several tens of 
thousands of square kilometers and, supposedly, containing huge gas deposits. However, at 
that time these reserves were inaccessible, and the works on developing the relevant produc-
tion technologies were suspended after petroleum prices had subsequently dropped in the 
1980s. 
Commercial production of shale gas became possible only after new technologies had 
emerged. The modern shale gas production technology implies drilling of one vertical well 
and a few horizontal boreholes with a length of up to two or three kilometers (Dmitriev-
skiy and Vysotskiy 2010). A mixture of water, sand, and chemical agents is then forced 
under pressure into the wells. After that, the gas collector walls are destructed under the 
effect of hydraulic fracturing, and the accessible gas is pumped back up to the surface. 
Horizontal drilling is carried out by means of innovating seismic modeling techniques 
3D GEO, which involves a combined use of geological investigations and mapping with 
computer-aided data processing, including visualization. As in other gas deposits, gas mi-
grates in natural manner from a high-pressure region to a low-pressure one; therefore, cen-
tral to the gas production technology is setting up regions with variable pressure (Ibid.).  
The theoretical background of the bed hydraulic fracturing technology was developed 
jointly by the members of the Academy of Sciences Sergey A. Khristianovich and Yuri 
P. Zheltov at the Petroleum Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences back in 1953. 
In the United States the Devon Energy Co. was the first to start a large-scale commer-
cial production of shale gas in the Barnett Shale basin, where a horizontal well was drilled 
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for the first time in 2002 (Dmitrievskiy and Vysotskiy 2010). The decadal experience 
gained from operation of wells in the Barnett Shale, Fayetteville Shale, Marcellus Shale, 
and Haynessville Shale formations quite definitely revealed the following problems 
(Ibid.): 
– large bodies of water must be available near the deposits for using the bed hydraulic 
fracturing technology: a mixture of water (7500 t), sand, and chemicals is used for making 
one hydraulic fracture. As a result, significant amounts of used contaminated water are 
accumulated near the deposits, which are not recovered by the producers in compliance 
with the environmental standards; 
– the experience gained from development of the Barnett Shale play shows that the life 
cycle of shale wells is much shorter than that of the wells of conventional natural gas; 
– the formulae of substances used by shale gas producing companies for hydraulic 
fracturing are confidential. According to the data presented in reports prepared by envi-
ronmental specialists, production of shale gas entails significant contamination of ground 
waters by toluene, benzene, dimethylbenzene, ethylbenzene, arsenic, and other substances. 
It is known that some companies use a polymer-thickened salt-acid solution, and 80–300 t 
of chemical agents is used for making a single hydraulic fracturing operation; 
– considerable losses of methane into the atmosphere occur in shale gas production, 
which may lead to aggravation of the greenhouse effect; 
– the production of shale gas is profitable only under the conditions of stable demand 
and high gas prices. 
The chemical mixture used by the Halliburton Co. comprises around 1.53 per cent of 
the total volume of solution and includes hydrochloric acid, formaldehyde, acetic anhy-
dride, propargyl and methyl alcohols, and ammonium chloride. The Chesapeake Energy 
Co. uses its own composition of chemical mixture, but its amount in the hydraulic solu-
tion is much smaller and equal to 0.5 per cent. On the whole, gas producing companies 
use around 85 different toxic substances for producing shale gas. 
There are also other environmental problems connected with shale gas production, 
primarily those concerned with utilizing the spent liquid after HBF. Apart from water and 
sand, this liquid contains various chemical additives for achieving more efficient HBF, 
which entails the danger of groundwater contamination. An increased probability of micro 
earthquakes in the places where HBF was carried out, as well as in places where the used 
liquid is pumped into underground cavities, for example, for utilizing it, has been con-
firmed scientifically. The possibility of gas leakage into the atmosphere during the well 
construction and operation stages relates to more long-term and least studied problems. 
According to the assessments presented in Howarth et al. 2011, the leaks into the atmos-
phere expected during shale gas production may comprise 4–8 per cent of the total gas yield, 
which is about twice as much as by production of conventional gas. 
The use of shale gas instead of coal makes it possible to achieve significantly smaller 
amount of hazardous emissions from thermal power stations into the atmosphere. Thus, it 
can be assumed that the use of shale gas may entail reduction of NOx emissions by a factor 
of two and complete elimination of SO2 emissions. However, in calculating the environ-
mental gains it is important to take into account the amount of emissions over the entire 
chain of production process, and the environmental gain estimated with such an approach 
turns to be significantly smaller, because the leaks of methane, a gas producing an ex-
tremely strong greenhouse effect, which occur during its production and transportation, 
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significantly amplify the total greenhouse effect. With the percentage of leaks correspond-
ing to the upper range of existing estimates (around eight per cent of the gas yield), a pow-
er station burning shale gas becomes similar in total emissions to conventional pulverized 
coal-fired power stations.  
Economic Aspects of Shale Gas Development 
There are extremely contradictory assessments for economic indicators of the shale gas 
production. The Chesapeake Energy Co. is the forerunner in shale gas production in the 
United States, which regularly presents the main indicators of its financial activities in free 
access. According to the analysis of Chesapeake Energy performance indicators, the actual 
net cost of shale gas production in 2008 was equal to $192.6 per 1000 m3. However, some 
experts argue that the real costs for producing shale gas are even higher and amount to 
$212–283 per 1000 m3. Some specialists believe that the companies producing shale gas 
artificially report lower costs, than real net cost of shale gas. 
But now we can state that as of early August 2012, the cost of shale gas production in 
the US deposits ranged between $130 and 260 per 1000 m3 and that in Canada, $140–
230/1000 m3. At the same time, the consumer prices for gas in that region are at a level of 
around $100/1000 m3 (EIA 2013a), which nonetheless is a factor of 2.5 lower than it was 
before the beginning of the ‘shale revolution’ in 2008. 
But there is also another point of view. The point is that shale gas may be ‘dry’ (with-
out admixtures) and ‘wet’ (with gas condensate containing ethane or butane). This con-
densate is widely used in the production of plastics, and the prices for it are higher than for 
gas itself, and it is exactly due to gas condensate that the producing companies get addi-
tional gain in the price. Thus, selling byproduct components makes the shale gas produc-
tion profitable even with low domestic prices. As regards dry gas, its production under the 
currently existing conditions is still unprofitable.  
Nonetheless, the US Government is quite satisfied with the currently existing gas pric-
es, because it is exactly what is badly needed for the US economy for stimulating its 
growth. This is why the Government actively supports the shale projects. The low interest 
rate for loans is a factor stimulating investments in gas wells, despite low prices for consum-
ers. In addition, the US power companies stake serious hopes on export of gas products and 
production technologies as a means for achieving better profitability. In addition, the current 
unprecedentedly low level of domestic prices will hardly remain and will likely start grow-
ing at a stable annual rate of 3.5 per cent already this year (EIA 2013a).  
Unconventional Gas and Changes in Atmosphere and Climate 
Unfortunately, discussions about the environmental problems related to shale gas produc-
tion almost always imply only such regional aspects as disruption to rural communities, 
earthquakes and ground water pollution. However, shale gas, as well as other unconven-
tional gas sources (coal-bed methane and tight gas), contains great amounts of carbon, 
which can significantly change the global carbon balance and lead to substantial changes 
in the climate system, if released into the atmosphere. Here we evaluate the greenhouse 
footprint of unconventional gas production and consumption. 
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Table 3. Various scenarios of natural gas production 
Scenario 
Resources, btce Production peak conventional unconventional total 
conven
tional 
un-
conv
entio
nal 
total year btce / year year 
btce / 
year year 
btce / 
year 
Klimenko and 
Tereshin (2010a) 
490  490 2045 5.8   2045 5.8 
Klimenko and 
Tereshin (2013)  
490 420 910 2045 6 2075 5.5 2065 10.0 
Present study 540* 430* 970 2045 5.7 2080 5.9 2065 11.1 
* Source: EIA 2013b; OECD/IEA 2012.  
The predicted values of unconventional gas production are based on the estimates of uncon-
ventional gas resources given in Table 3, where the results of our earlier calculations 
(Klimenko and Tereshin 2010b) are presented for comparison purposes (note that calcula-
tions in Klimenko and Tereshin 2010b take into account only conventional gas resources).  
It is obvious that an introduction of unconventional gas sources would sharply increase the 
role played by natural gas in the world economy, and the peak of annual recovery would 
grow from 6 to roughly 11 billion tce and shift into the second half of the twenty-first centu-
ry (Fig. 1). Even at the end of the current century, total gas production is expected to exceed 
contemporary values, while a complete depletion of these resources is expected only at the 
end of the twenty-second century. Natural gas will likely become the main component of 
the world energy balance as early as at the beginning of the 2030s. One can assume that by 
this time a mass production of unconventional gas will be developed in several countries 
outside North America and first of all in China, India, Australia, and Argentina. 
 
Fig. 1. Natural gas production (tentative forecast of the present study): total (1), 
including unconventional gas (2), conventional gas based on data from 
(Klimenko and Tereshin 2010b) (3), and the data of energy statistics (BP 
2014; EIA 2013a, 2013b) for the total production (4) and unconventional 
gas production (5) 
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Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of possible changes in the atmospheric composition 
and climate, carbon dioxide emissions from combustion of both natural gas and all other 
fossil fuels are essential, because they depend on the total energy consumption and the 
world fuel mix. The results presented here are based on the genetic forecast of energy con-
sumption (see the detailed description of the procedure in Klimenko and Tereshin 2010a, 
2010b, 2013), which has proved its reliability in long-term forecasting. This method im-
plies stabilization of the world energy consumption at the level of around 30 billion tce by 
the end of the current century, with the dominating role played by non-fossil sources 
(mostly unconventional and renewable sources (URS) – solar, wind, hydro, and bioenergy 
sources). Experience has shown that the long-term forecast of the energy mix represents a 
much more complicated problem; therefore, we will further consider two extreme scenari-
os and an intermediate one, namely: the whole volume of unconventional gas consumption 
is used to substitute either coal (Scenario 1), or URS (Scenario 2), or coal and URS in 
equal portions (Scenario 3). 
The results of simulations presented in Fig. 2 show that the implementation of Scenar-
io 3 would yield a path of future carbon emissions almost the same as that produced by the 
so-called ‘historical’ scenario whose consequences have been comprehensively discussed in 
our recent publications (Klimenko and Tereshin 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Khrustalev et al. 2008; 
Arzhanov et al. 2012) and can be characterized as causing a certain concern with the scale of 
upcoming climate changes. The substitution of coal with unconventional gas would lead to 
rapidly reaching (already in two decades) the peak of carbon emission at slightly above 9 Gt 
of carbon per year, while the replacement of URS causes growth of this peak almost to  
12 Gt of carbon per year and shifts it to the second half of the present century. 
 
Fig. 2. CO2 emission (recalculated to pure carbon) from fossil fuels combustion 
based on Scenarios 1–3 (see text for comments) compared to ‘historical’ 
Scenario 4 (open squares) (Klimenko and Tereshin 2010a) (4) 
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Fig. 3. The model of simulated changes of CO2 content in the atmosphere based on 
Scenarios 1–3 (see text for comments) 
Under different scenarios of unconventional gas resources development, the changes in the 
global carbon cycle are significant and they are clearly seen from the variations in carbon 
dioxide content in the atmosphere (Fig. 3) and the temperature response of the climate sys-
tem (Fig. 4). Simulation of the global variations in atmospheric CO2 content have been 
conducted by Dr. Olga V. Mikushina using the box-diffusion model of the carbon cycle; 
that of the surface air temperature, using the regression-analytical model of climate devel-
oped at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (Klimenko et al. 1997). 
 
Fig. 4. The simulated mean global air temperature changes (departures from the 
mean values for the period from 1951 to 1980) based on Scenarios 1–
3 (see text for comments) compared to instrumental data (4) (Jones et al. 
2014) 
As was mentioned above, the shale gas production is associated with significant methane 
leakage rate into the atmosphere, up to 4–8 per cent of total gas production, and this value 
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is considerably higher than in the case of conventional natural gas production. With re-
spect to this, some researchers claim serious concerns that the release of these amounts of 
methane, whose greenhouse effect is 25 times stronger than that of carbon dioxide, can in-
tensify global warming. Based on our simulations, under the assumption that technologi-
cal leakages amount to six per cent of total gas production, we argue that the maximal 
methane release into the atmosphere from shale gas production will be reached between 
2050–2120 and will account for 100–200 million tons per year, or 10–15 per cent of the 
estimated total emission from all its sources. This will lead to a certain increase in the 
methane atmospheric content and corresponding higher radiative forcing of this gas during 
this period by about ten per cent as compared to the basic scenario (Klimenko and Te-
reshin 2010a). 
However, due to the anticipated decline of unconventional gas production with the re-
spective reduction of methane emission and owing to the comparatively short lifetime of 
this gas in the atmosphere (12 years), the methane concentration will eventually approach 
the value of the basic scenario during the twenty-second century. Finally, we estimate the 
contribution of the additional methane due to shale gas production to the anticipated tem-
perature response a few hundredths of a degree Celsius. Partial substitution of coal by un-
conventional gas in the world energy balance will lead to a noticeable decrease in the an-
thropogenic impact on the climate system, shifting it down from the critical limits of 
500 ppm of CO2 concentration and 2°C of temperature rise as compared to the pre-
industrial epoch. However, a slow-down of URS growth rate and preservation of the cur-
rent orientation to fossil fuels are very dangerous because both the carbon dioxide concen-
tration and then the air temperature will exceed these critical limits well before the end of 
the current century and remain beyond them for at least two or three centuries. Under 
these conditions, a significant increase in the acidity of the oceanic upper layer is inevita-
ble, and this will cause massive extinction of many marine species, first of all, corals 
(Knowlton 2001; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007). This would mean an economic collapse of 
many developing countries where tourism and offshore fishery are the basic sources of in-
come. For example, in Asia coral reefs alone provide about one-quarter of the annual total 
fish catch and food for about a billion people. In the Caribbean basin tourism is a major 
foreign currency earner and in some countries it accounts for up to a half of the gross do-
mestic product. The long-term temperature departure above 2°C (or just 1.2°C above the 
current value) would almost inevitably cause a partial melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet 
and of all non-Antarctic glaciers with the following increase in the global sea level by at 
least two meters (Oppenheimer and Alley 2005; Jevrejeva et al. 2011) and local sea level 
rise up to three meters (Meyssignac and Cazenave 2012) and a significant weakening of 
the meridional overturning oceanic circulation in the North Atlantic as well. The latter will 
likely result in significant changes in the global distribution of surface winds, rainfall and 
soil moisture and could lead to a global reduction of the terrestrial vegetation net primary 
production by several per cent (Vellinga and Wood 2002). 
Conclusions 
1. There is still a substantial uncertainty concerning economic and environmental as-
pects of mass shale gas production which leaves room for doubts and hampers its further 
development. Provided present resources assessments are correct, unconventional gas and, 
first of all, shale gas may solve some regional energy (import substitution) and environ-
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mental (coal substitution) problems. However, unconventional gas cannot be regarded as 
an ‘additional’ energy source, capable to meet the growing energy demand. 
2. The large-scale production of shale gas outside North America will hardly be possible 
in the nearest future. The pattern in which the shale gas reserves are distributed over the 
globe allows us to assume that it can replace to a significant extent the natural gas supplied 
from Russia in some European countries (Poland and Ukraine), but this is unlikely to take 
place until the end of the current decade. However, unconventional gas becomes increasingly 
important and will make up more than 50 per cent of global gas production in the second 
half of the current century. 
3. The net cost of shale gas production is currently several times higher than that of 
conventional natural gas in major gas producing countries. To develop a shale gas deposit 
one should spend from $3 to $4 million per each well. Due to the specific features of shale 
gas production technology, the costs for maintaining shale gas wells in serviceable state 
are significantly higher than in traditional deposits.  
4. The production of shale gas entails considerable emissions of methane into the at-
mosphere. Fortunately, this is not a dangerous factor aggravating the greenhouse effect 
even if the amount of leaks is close to their upper limit estimated at eight per cent of the 
yield. The expansion of shale gas production does not come in serious contradiction with 
the growing climate protection requirements. In addition, a substitution of coal by shale 
gas will result in twofold reduction of NOx emissions and complete elimination of SO2 
emissions.  
5. The shale gas problem has many aspects, of which the political aspect is undoubted-
ly the dominating one. As a new source of energy, shale gas is noticeably inferior to tradi-
tional natural gas not only in its consumer properties (price, environmental, and technolog-
ical attractiveness), but also in the availability of resources and will not be able to serious-
ly compete with natural gas at the global level in the nearest two to three decades. In the 
short term, the shale gas can become an attractive resource only at regional and local lev-
els and only under the conditions of strong protective measures. 
6. To maintain stability of the climate system, the production of abundant unconven-
tional gas resources should be accompanied by the equivalent reduction of coal use. In this 
case one can view shale and other unconventional gas sources as an energy bridge over the 
current century yet reducing greenhouse gases emissions compared to oil and coal. 
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Part V. FUTURE AND FORECASTS  
 
 
The Sixth Kondratieff Wave  
and the Cybernetic Revolution 
 
Leonid Grinin and Anton Grinin 
 
 
In the present paper, on the basis of the theory of production principles and pro-
duction revolutions, we reveal the interrelation between K-waves and major tech-
nological breakthroughs in history and make forecasts about features of the sixth 
Kondratieff wave in the light of the Cybernetic Revolution that, from our point of 
view, started in the 1950s. We assume that the sixth K-wave in the 2030s and 
2040s will merge with the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution (which we call 
a phase of self-regulating systems). This period will be characterized by the break-
through in medical technologies which will be capable to combine many other 
technologies into a single complex of MANBRIC-technologies (med-bio-nano-
robo-info-cognitive technologies). The article offers some forecasts concerning the 
development of these technologies. 
Keywords: production revolutions, production principle, Industrial Revolution, 
Cybernetic Revolution, self-regulating systems, Kondratieff waves, fourth K-wave, 
fifth K-wave, sixth K-wave, World System, center, periphery, medicine, biotechnol-
ogies, nanotechnologies, robotics, cognitive technologies. 
I. Production Principles, Production Revolutions and K-Waves 
According to our theory (Grinin 2007a, 2007b, 2012b, 2013; Grinin and Grinin 2013a, 
2013b), the whole historical process can be most adequately divided into four large peri-
ods, on the basis of the change of major developmental stages of the world productive forc-
es, which we call production principles. The production principle is a concept which desig-
nates very large qualitative stages of development of the world productive forces in the 
historical process. It is a system of the unknown before forms of production and technolo-
gies surpassing the previous ones fundamentally (in opportunities, scales, productivity, 
efficiency, product nomenclature, etc.). 
We single out four production principles: 
1. Hunter-Gatherer.  
2. Craft-Agrarian.  
3. Trade-Industrial.  
4. Scientific-Cybernetic.  
Among all various technological and production changes that took place in history the 
following three production revolutions had the most comprehensive and far-reaching con-
sequences for society:  
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1. Agrarian or Agricultural Revolution. Its result is the transition to systematic pro-
duction of food and, on this base, to the complex social division of labor. This revolution 
is also connected with the use of new power sources (animal power) and materials.  
2. Industrial, or Production Revolution as a result of which the main production con-
centrated in the industry and began to be carried out by means of machines and mecha-
nisms, and at that not only the replacement of manual labor by machines occurred, but also 
biological energy was replaced by water and steam energy.  
3. Cybernetic Revolution which have led to the emergence of powerful information 
technologies, and in future will stimulate transition to wide use of self-regulating systems. 
Structural model of production revolutions. Within the proposed theory we suggest 
a fundamentally new idea that each production revolution has an internal cycle of the same 
type and, in our opinion, includes three phases: two innovative (initial and final) and one 
modernization phase (Grinin and Grinin 2013a, 2013b; see Fig. 1). At the initial innovative 
phase new advanced technologies emerge which spread in other societies and territories 
after a while. As a result of the final innovative phase of a production revolution the new 
production principle reaches its peak.  
Between these phases there is the modernization phase – a long and very important 
period of distribution, enrichment, diversification of the production principle's new tech-
nologies (which appeared in the initial innovative phase) when conditions for a final inno-
vative breakthrough are created.1  
 
Fig. 1. Phases of production revolutions 
Thus, the cycle of each production revolution looks as follows: the initial innovative phase 
(emergence of a new revolutionizing production sector) – the modernization pha- 
se (diffusion, synthesis and improvement of new technologies) – the final innovative phase 
(when new technologies acquire their mature characteristics).  
The scheme of innovative phases of production revolutions in our theory looks as fol-
lows (modernization phases are omitted). 
Agrarian Revolution: the initial phase – the transition to primitive manual (hoe) ag-
riculture and animal husbandry (started about 12,000–9,000 BP); the final – transition to 
                                                          
1 For example, in the modernization phase of the Agrarian Revolution local varieties of plants and breeds of animals 
borrowed from other places were created.  
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irrigation agriculture (or plow agriculture without irrigation) (this began approximately 
5.5 thousand years ago).  
Industrial Revolution: the initial phase starts in the fifteenth century with the devel-
opment of navigation, water-powered equipment and mechanization, with qualitative 
growth of labor division in the manufacturing, and also other processes; the final phase – 
the industrial revolution between the eighteenth and the first third of the nineteenth centu-
ry, connected with the introduction of various machines and steam energy.  
Cybernetic Revolution: the initial (scientific and information) phase dated back to the 
1950–1990s. The breakthrough occurred in automation, energy production, synthetic materi-
als, space technologies, exploration of space and sea, agriculture, but especially in creation 
of electronic control facilities, communication and information. The final innovative phase 
(of self-regulating systems) will begin in the 2030s or 2040s and will last till the 2060s or 
2070s.  
Each of production revolutions means the transition to a fundamentally new production 
system; the beginning of each production revolution marks the borders between correspond-
ing production principles. 
 
Fig. 2. Production revolutions in history  
Structure of the Production Principle 
Development of the production principle is a period of genesis, growth and maturity of 
new forms, systems and paradigms of organization of economic management, which sur-
pass many times the former ones in major parameters.  
The principle of production is a six-phase cycle. Its first three stages correspond to 
three phases of the production revolution. The subsequent three (post-revolutionary) stages 
are a period of the maximization of the potentials of the new forms of production in struc-
tural, systemic, and spatial sense: 
1. The phase of the production revolution's beginning. A new, not yet developed prin-
ciple of production emerges. 
2. The phase of primary modernization – diffusion and strengthening of the production 
principle.  
3. The phase of completion of the production revolution. The production principle ac-
quires advanced characteristics.  
The first three phases of the production principle still present an incomplete produc-
tion principle. 
Production Revolutions 
Agrarian  
(12,000–10,000 – 
5,500–3,000 BP) 
Industrial  
(the last third of the 15th cent. –  
the first third of the 19th cent.) 
Cybernetic  
(1950–2060 / 
2070s) 
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4. The phase of maturity and expansion of the production principle with wide geogra-
phic and sectoral diffusion of new technologies that brings the production principle to ma-
ture forms; there also occur certain transformations in social and economic spheres. 
5. The phase of absolute domination of the production principle. The final worldwide 
victory of the production principle, intensification of technologies which bring opportuni-
ties to the limits beyond which crisis features appear. 
6. The stage of non-system phenomena, or preparatory (for the transition to a new 
production principle) phase. The intensification leads to emergence of non-system ele-
ments which prepare the birth of a new production principle. (When, under favorable con-
ditions, these elements form a system, in some societies the transition to a new production 
principle will begin and the cycle will repeat at a new level.) 
The last three phases of the production principle characterize its mature features. 
Table 1. Chronology of the production principle's phases  
N
o Production 
Principle 
1st phase 2nd phase 3rd phase 4th phase 5th phase 6th phase 
Total 
Production 
Principle  
1. Hunter-
Gatherer  
40,000– 
30,000 
(38,000– 
28,000 BC) 
 
10 
30,000–
22,000 
(28,000– 
20,000 BC)
 
8 
22,000–
17,000 
(20,000– 
15,000 
BC) 
 
5 
17,000–
14,000 
(15,000– 
12,000 
BC) 
 
3 
14,000–
11,500 
(12,000– 
9,500 BC) 
 
2.5 
11,500– 
10,000 
(9,500– 
8,000 BC) 
 
1.5 
40,000– 
10,000 
(38,000– 
8000 BC) 
 
30 
2. Craft-
Agrarian  
10,000– 
7,300 
(8,000– 
5,300 BC) 
 
2.7 
7,300–
5,000 
(5,300– 
3,000 BC) 
 
2.3 
5,000–
3,500 
(3,000– 
1500 BC)
 
1.5 
3500–
2200 
(1500– 
200 BC) 
 
1.3 
2200–
1200 
(200 BC – 
800 AD) 
 
 
1.0
800– 
1430 AD 
 
 
 
 
0.6 
10,000–
570 
(8,000 BC 
– 1430 AD) 
 
9.4 
3. Trade-
Industrial 
1430– 
1600 
 
0.17 
1600–
1730 
 
0.13 
1730–
1830 
 
0.1 
1830–
1890 
 
0.06 
1890–
1929 
 
0.04 
1929– 
1955 
 
0.025 
1430–1955 
 
0.525 
4. Scientific-
Cyberne-
tic  
1955– 
1995/ 
2000 
 
0.04–0.045 
1995–
2030/40 
 
 
0.035–0.04
2030/40–
2055/70 
 
0.025– 
0.03 
2055/70–
2070/90 
 
0.015– 
0.02 
2070/90–
2080/105 
 
 
0.01–0.015
2080/2105– 
2090/2115 
 
0.01 
1955– 
2090/ 
2115 
 
0.135–
0.160 
Note: Figures before the brackets – absolute scale (BP), figures in the brackets – BCE. Chronology in the table 
is simplified (a more detailed chronology see in Grinin 2006b, 2009; Grinin and Korotayev 2013). The 
duration of phases (in thousand years) is marked by the bold-face type. Duration of phases of the scien-
tific-cybernetic production principle is hypothetical. The duration of the scientific-cybernetic production 
principle is also given in Fig. 3.  
As is clear, the scientific-cybernetic production principle is at the beginning of its devel-
opment. Only its first phase finished, and in the mid-1990s the second started. The second 
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phase is proceeding now and will last till the early 2030s. The third phase is likely to begin 
approximately in the 2030s or the 2040s. At this particular time the final phase of the Cy-
bernetic Revolution should start. The end of the scientific-cybernetic production principle 
will fall on the early 22nd century (for more details see Grinin 2006b). 
 
Fig. 3. Development of the scientific-cybernetic production principle 
Note: The dashed line depicts one of the scenarios of expected development of the scientific-cybernetic 
production principle and corresponds to the dates before the slash in the fifth column of Table 1. 
The industrial production principle as a cycle, consisting of K-Waves. We have estab-
lished a close correlation between production principle cycles and Kondratieff cycles (for 
more details see Grinin 2012a, 2013). Taking into account that K-waves arose only at a 
certain level of economic development of societies, we can consider K-waves as a specific 
mechanism connected with the emergence and development of the industrial-trade produc-
tion principle and the way of expanded reproduction of industrial economy. Given that 
each new K-wave does not just repeat the wave motion, but is based on a new technologi-
cal mode, K-waves in a certain aspect can be treated as phases of the development of the 
industrial production principle and the first phases of development of the scientific-
cybernetic production principle.  
In the mentioned articles (Grinin 2012a, 2013) it has been shown that the first three  
K-waves are connected with the industrial production principle. The special attention is 
paid to the correlation between the duration of the industrial production principle phases 
and the duration of K-wave phases. Certainly, there can be no direct duration equivalence 
of both K-waves and their phases, on the one hand, and the industrial production principle 
phases, on the other, due to the different duration of the industrial production prin- 
ciple phases (that is within the principle of production's cycle its phases differ in duration, 
but their duration proportions remain the same in each production principle [Grinin 2006b, 
2009]). However, we have succeeded in establishing a more complex ratio according to 
which at the average one K-wave corresponds to one phase of the industrial production 
principle. In general, we found out that three and a half waves coincide with three and  
6th phase 
 
5th phase 
 
4th phase 
 
3rd phase 
 
2nd phase 
 
1st phase 
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a half phases of the industrial principle of production! It is clearly seen in Table 2. Such a 
correlation is not coincidental, as innovative development of the industrial production 
principle is realized through long Kondratieff cycles which are largely defined by large-
scale innovations. 
Table 2. Periods of the industrial production principle and Kondratieff waves  
Phases of Indus-
trial Production 
Principle  
The Third Phase,  
1730–1830 
≈ 100 years 
The Fourth 
Phase,  
1830–1890 
≈ 60 years 
The Fifth 
Phase, 1890–
1929 
≈ 40 years 
The Sixth Phase, 
1929–1955 
≈ 25 years 
Total: 
≈ 225 years, 
from 
1760 – 
195 years 
The Phase of the 
K-wave 
Zero  
(В-Phase) /  
The First Wave 
(А-Phase), 
1760–1817 –  
about 60 years 
The End of the 
First Wave / The 
Second Wave, 
1817–1895 –  
more than  
75 years 
The Third 
Wave, 
The Upward 
Phase, 
1895–1928 – 
more than  
35 years
Third wave, 
The Downward 
Phase, 1929–
1947 – 
about 20 years 
 
About  
190 years 
The Phase of  
K-wave  
B-Phase of the 
Zero Wave,2 
1760–1787 
The Second half 
of the Down-
ward Phase, 
1817–1849 
The Upward 
Phase,  
1895–1928 
The Downward 
Phase,  
1929–1947 
 
The Phase of  
K-wave  
The Upward 
Phase, 1787–1817 
The Upward 
Phase, 1849–
1873 
   
The Phase of  
K-wave 
 The Downward 
Phase,  
1873–1895 
   
Note: For simplicity, we take concrete years for the beginning and the end of the periods, though such a 
transition obviously lasts for a certain period of time. 
II. The Cybernetic Revolution, Scientific-Cybernetic Production 
Principle, the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth K-Waves  
The production revolution which began in the 1950s and is still proceeding, causes pow-
erful acceleration of scientific and technological progress. Taking into account expected 
changes in the next 50 years, this revolution deserves to be called ‘Cybernetic’ (see our 
explanation below). The initial phase of this revolution (the 1950s – the 1990s) can be re-
ferred to as a scientific-informational as it was characterized by the transition to scientific 
methods of planning, forecasting, marketing, logistics, production managements, distribution 
and circulation of resources, and communication. The most radical changes took place in the 
sphere of informatics and information technologies. The final phase will begin approximate-
ly in the 2030s or the 2040s and will last until the 2070s. We called this phase a ‘phase of 
self-regulating systems’ (see below). Now we are in the intermediate (modernization) phase 
which will last until the 2030s. It is characterized by powerful improvement and diffusion 
of innovations made at the initial phase in particular by a wide proliferation of easy-to-
handle computers, means of communication, and formation of macrosector of services 
                                                          
2 We took as the beginning a zero K-wave which downward phase coincided with the beginning of the Industrial Revo-
lution, i.e. the 1760s (as we know, it is downward phases that are especially rich in innovations). 
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among which information and financial services took the major place. At the same time 
the innovations necessary to start the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution are being 
prepared. 
The Cybernetic Revolution is a great technological breakthrough from the industrial 
production principle towards production and services based on the operation of self-
regulating systems. In general, it will become the revolution of self-regulating systems 
(see Grinin 2006a, 2007b, 2012b, 2013; Grinin and Grinin 2013a, 2013b).  
Table 3 demonstrates the connection between three phases of the scientific-cybernetic 
production principle (which coincide with three phases of the Cybernetic Revolution) and 
three Kondratieff waves (the fourth, fifth and sixth). Correlation is here even stronger than 
between the first three K-waves and the industrial production principle phases, due to the 
shorter duration of the scientific-cybernetic production principle phases in comparison 
with those of the industrial production principle.3 
Table 3. The scientific-cybernetic production principle (initial phases) and Kon-
dratieff waves  
Phases of the Scientific 
Cybernetic Production 
Principle  
The first phase (ini-
tial phase of the Cy-
bernetic Revolution)
1955–1995 
 
 
 
≈ 40 years 
The second phase 
(middle phase of 
the Cybernetic 
Revolution) 
1995 – the 
2030s/40s. 
 
≈ 35–50 years 
The third phase 
(final phase of 
‘self-regulating 
systems’ of the 
Cybernetic Revolu-
tion) 
the 2030s/40s– 
2055/70s 
≈25–40 years 
Total: 
≈ 100–120 
years 
 
K-Wave and Their 
Phases  
The Fourth Wave, 
1947 – 1982/1991 
 
 
 
 
 
≈ 35–45 years 
The Fifth Wave, 
1982/1991 –  
the 2020s. 
The beginning of 
the upward phase of 
the sixth wave 
(2020–2050s) 
≈ 30–40 years 
The sixth wave,  
2020 – 2060/70s.  
The end of the up-
ward phase and 
downward phase  
(the latter ≈ 2050 – 
2060/70s) 
 
≈ 40–50 years 
About 
110– 
120 years 
K-Wave and Their 
Phases  
Upward phase, 
1947 – 1969/1974s 
Downward phase of 
the fifth wave,  
2007– 
2020s
 
K-Wave and Their 
Phases  
Downward phase, 
1969/1974 – 
1982/1991
Upward phase of 
the sixth wave, 
2020 – 2050s.
K-Wave and Their 
Phases  
The fifth wave, 
1982/1991 – 2020s, 
upward phase, 
1982/1991 – 2007
Taking the theory of production principles into account, we have also revised the sequence 
of change of the major (leading) production sectors during the change of K-waves (Grinin 
2012a).4 
                                                          
3 The reason for the shorter duration is the general acceleration of historical development.  
4 During the table compiling we took into account ideas and works cohering with the theories which explain the nature 
and pulsation of K-waves by changing of technological ways and/or techno-economic paradigms: Mensch 1979; 
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Table 4. K-waves, technological modes and leading macrosectors 
Kondra-
tieff 
Wave 
Date A New Mode  Leading Macrosector 
Production Prin-
ciple and Num-
ber of Its Phase  
First  1780–1840s The textile industry Factory (consumer) 
industry
Industrial, 3 
Second 1840–1890s Railway lines, coal, steel Mining industry and 
primary heavy indus-
try and transport 
Industrial, 4 
Third 1890–1940s Electricity, chemical indus-
try and heavy engineering 
Secondary heavy 
industry and mechan-
ic engineering 
Industrial, 5/6 
Fourth 1940-е –
the early 
1980s 
Automobile manufacturing, 
manmade materials, elec-
tronics 
General services Industrial, 6, 
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 1 
Fifth 1980s –
~2020 
Micro-electronics, personal 
computers 
Highly-qualified 
services 
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 1/2 
Sixth 2020/30s – 
2050/60s 
МANBRIC-technologies
(medical-additive-nano- 
bio-robo-info-cognitive)
Medical human 
services  
Scientific-
Cybernetic, 2/3 
Peculiarities of the fourth K-wave in connection with the beginning of the Cybernetic 
Revolution. The fourth K-wave (the second half of the 1940s – 1980s) fell on the initial 
phase of the Cybernetic Revolution. The beginning of a new production revolution is a 
special period which is connected with the fast transition to a more advanced technological 
component of economy. All accumulated innovations and a large number of new innova-
tions generate a new system that has a real synergetic effect. It would appear reasonable 
that an upward phase of the K-wave coinciding with the beginning of a production revolu-
tion can appear more powerful than A-phases of other K-waves.5 That was the feature of 
the upswing A-phase of the fourth K-wave (1947–1974) which coincided with the scien-
tific-information phase of the Cybernetic Revolution. As a result a denser than usual clus-
ter of innovations (in comparison with the second, third and fifth waves) was formed dur-
ing that period. All this also explains why in the 1950s and 1960s the economic growth 
rates of the World System were higher, than in A-phases of the third and fifth K-waves. 
The downswing phase of the fourth K-wave (the 1970s – 1980s) in its turn also fell on the 
last period of the initial phase of the Cybernetic Revolution. This explains in many re-
spects why this downswing phase was shorter than those of the other K-waves. 
The fifth K-wave and the delay of the new wave of innovations. It was expected 
that the 1990s and the 2000s would bring a radically new wave of innovations, comparable 
in their revolutionary character with the computer technologies, capable to create a new 
technological mode. Those directions which had already appeared and the ones, which are 
now supposed to become a basis for the sixth K-wave, were considered to be a break-
through. However, it was the development and diversification of already existing digital 
Kleinknecht 1981, 1987; Dickson 1983; Dosi 1984; Freeman 1987; Tylecote 1992; Glazyev 1993; Mayevsky 1997; 
Modelski and Thompson 1996; Modelski 2001, 2006; Yakovets 2001; Freeman and Louçã 2001; Ayres 2006; Klein-
knecht and van der Panne 2006; Dator 2006; Hirooka 2006; Papenhausen 2008; see also Lazurenko 1992; Glazyev 
2009; Polterovich 2009; Perez 2002. 
5 Therefore, it appears reasonable that A-phase of the sixth K-wave can also make a great progress, as it will coincide 
with the beginning of the Cybernetic Revolution final phase. Thus, the sixth wave is to have a stronger manifestation 
than the fifth one. We will return to this point below. 
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electronic technologies and rapid development of financial technologies that became  
a basis for the fifth K-wave. Those innovations which were really created during the fifth 
K-wave as, for example, energy technologies, still have a small share in the general ener-
gy, and, above all, they do not grow properly. Some researchers believe that from 1970s 
up to the present is the time of the decelerating scientific and technological progress (see 
discussion about it in Brener 2006; see also Maddison 2007). Polterovich (2009) also sug-
gests a notion of a technological pause. But, in general, the mentioned technological delay 
is, in our opinion, insufficiently explained. We believe that taking features of the interme-
diate modernization phase of a production revolution (that is the second phase of the pro-
duction principle) into account can help explain this. Functionally it is less innovative; 
rather during this phase earlier innovations are widely spread and improved. As regards 
the 1990s – 2020s (the intermediate phase of the Cybernetic Revolution) the question is 
that the launch of a new innovative breakthrough demands that the developing countries 
reach the level of the developed ones, and the political component of the world catches up 
with the economic one; all this needs changes of the structure of societies and global rela-
tions (see about some aspects Grinin and Korotayev 2010b). Thus, the delayed introduc-
tion of innovations of the new generation is explained, first, by the fact that the center can-
not endlessly surpass the periphery in development, that is the gap between developed and 
developing countries could not increase all the time. Secondly, economy cannot constantly 
surpass the political and other components, as this causes very strong disproportions and 
deformations. And the appearance of new general-purpose technologies, certainly, would 
accelerate economic development and increase disparities. Thirdly, introduction and dis-
tribution of the new basic technologies do not occur naturally, but only within the appro-
priate social political environment (see Grinin 2012a, 2013; see also Perez 2002). In order 
for basic innovations to be suitable for business, structural changes in political and social 
spheres are necessary, eventually promoting their synergy and wide implementation in the 
world of business. 
Thus, the delay is caused by difficulties of changing political and social institutions 
on the regional and even global scale, and also (and, perhaps, first of all) within the in-
ternational economic institutions. The latter can change only thanks to the strong politi-
cal will of the main players, which is difficult to execute in the framework of the modern 
political institutions. These institutions rather can change under the conditions of de-
pressive development (and probable aggravation of the foreign relations) compelling to 
reorganization and breakage of the conventional institutions that could hardly be 
changed due to the lack of courage and opportunities under ordinary conditions.  
The above said explains as well the reasons of different rates of development of the 
center and periphery of the World System during the fifth K-wave (for more details see 
Grinin 2013; see also Grinin and Korotayev 2010a). The periphery was expected to 
catch up with the center due to the faster rates of its development and slowdown of the 
center development. However, one should not expect continuous crisis-free development 
of the periphery – a crisis will come later and probably in other forms. Without slow-
down of the development of the periphery and serious changes full harmonization of the 
economic and political component will not happen. Consequently, it might be supposed 
that in the next decade (approximately by 2020–2025) the growth rates of the peripheral 
economies can also slow down, and internal problems will aggravate that, as said above, 
can stimulate structural changes in the peripheral countries and strengthen international 
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tension. Thus, we suppose that in the next 10–15 years the world will face serious and 
painful changes. 
As is known, among researchers there is no agreement about periodization of the 
Kondratieff waves (about this see Korotayev and Grinin 2012). We believe that at present 
we witness the downward phase of the fifth K-wave which will last till the early or the 
mid-2020s. However, for example, Leo Nefiodow in his contribution to this yearbook and 
the other works (Nefiodow 1996; Nefiodow and Nefiodow 2014) argues that the sixth  
K-wave began in the late 1990s. Thus, according to Nefiodow's logic, now we observe an 
upward phase (however, the crisis of 2008–2014 and prospects for the next years contra-
dict this), and in the 2020s the downward phase should come. 
III. Characteristics of the Cybernetic Revolution  
What are self-regulating systems and why are they so important? Self-regulating sys-
tems are systems that can regulate themselves, responding in a pre-programmed and intel-
ligent way to the feedback from the environment. These are the systems that operate with a 
small or completely without human intervention. Today there are many self-regulating 
systems around us, for example, the artificial Earth satellites, pilotless planes, navigators 
laying the route for a driver. Another good example is life-supporting systems (such as 
medical ventilation apparatus or artificial hearts). They can regulate a number of parame-
ters, choose the most suitable mode of operation and detect critical situations. There are 
also special programs that determine the value of stocks and other securities, react to the 
change of their prices, buy and sell them, carry out thousands of operations in a day and 
fix a profit. A great number of self-regulating systems has been created. But they are most-
ly technical and informational systems (as robots or computer programs). During the final 
phase of the Cybernetic Revolution there will be a lot of self-regulating systems connected 
with biology and bionics, physiology and medicine, agriculture and environment. The num-
ber of such systems as well as their complexity and their autonomy will dramatically in-
crease. Besides, they will essentially reduce energy and resource consumption. The very 
human life will become organized to a greater extent by such self-regulating systems (e.g., 
by monitoring of health, regimen, regulation of or recommendation concerning the exer-
tions, control over the patients' condition, prevention of illegal actions, etc.).  
Thus, we designate the modern revolution ‘Cybernetic’, because its main sense is the 
wide creation and distribution of self-regulating autonomous systems. Cybernetics, as is 
well-known, is a science of regulatory systems. Its main principles are quite suitable for 
the description of self-regulating systems (see, e.g., Wiener 1948; Ashby 1956; Foerster 
and Zopf 1962; Umpleby and Dent 1999; Tesler 2004). 
As a result, the opportunity to control various natural, social and production processes 
without direct human intervention (that is impossible or extremely limited now) will in-
crease. At the fourth phase (of maturity and expansion) of the scientific cybernetic produc-
tion principle (the 2070s and 2080s) the achievements of the Cybernetic Revolution will 
become quite systemic and wide-scale in its final phase (for more details see Grinin 
2006a).  
Below we single out the most important characteristics of the Cybernetic Revolu-
tion. One can observe them today, but they will realize in mature and mass forms only in 
the future. These features are closely interconnected and corroborating each other (for 
more details see Grinin and Grinin 2013a, 2013b).  
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Group of self-regulating properties: 
1.  Transition to self-regulating systems of various types and nature and qualitatively 
growing controllability of systems and processes. 
2. Transition to the control over deeper and more fundamental processes and levels  
(up to subatomic particles), using tiny particles as building blocks (as is clearly seen in 
nano- and biotechnologies). 
3. Control over humans activities to eliminate the negative influence of the so-called 
human factor, and control the lack of human attention in order to prevent dangerous situa-
tions (e.g., in transport) as well as to prevent human beings from using means of high-risk 
in unlawful or disease state (e.g., not allowing driving a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs).  
The group of attributes of task-aware adaptation of materials and systems: 
1. Radical increase in systems' abilities to choose optimal regimes for different objec-
tives and tasks. 
2. Individualization as trend of technology. The opportunities of self-regulation will al-
low choosing a particular decision for the variety of individual tasks, orders and requests 
(e.g., with 3D- and 4D-printers and choosing of programs adapted to specific individual 
needs). We also expect a rapid increase in the market of cosmetic corrections and plastic 
surgery of any kinds and other private orders to change individual organisms.6 
3. Resource and energy saving in many spheres. 
4. Increasing opportunities in the synthesis of materials with previously lacking prop-
erties in biological and bionic (techno-biological) systems (as in Chemistry).  
5. Miniaturization and micro-miniaturization as a trend of the constantly decreasing 
size of particles, mechanisms, electronic devices, implants, etc.  
Various directions of development should generate a system cluster of innovations.7 
Medicine as a sphere of the initial technological breakthrough and the emergence 
of MANBRIC-technology complex. It is worth remembering that the Industrial Revolu-
tion began in a rather narrow area of cotton textile manufactory and was connected with 
the solution of quite concrete problems – at first, liquidation of the gap between spinning and 
weaving, and then, after increasing weavers' productivity, searching of the ways to mecha-
nize spinning. However, the solution of these narrow tasks caused explosion of innovations 
conditioned by the existence of a large number of the major elements of machine production 
(including abundant mechanisms, primitive steam-engines, quite a high volume of coal pro-
duction, etc.) which gave an impulse to the development of the Industrial Revolution. In a 
similar way, we assume that the Cybernetic Revolution will start first in a certain area. 
Given the general vector of scientific achievements and technological development and 
taking into account that a future breakthrough area should be highly commercially attrac-
tive and have a wide market, we predict that the final phase (of self-regulating systems) of 
this revolution will begin somewhere at the intersection of medicine and many other tech-
nologies. Certainly, it is almost impossible to predict the concrete course of innovations. 
However, the general vector of breakthrough can be defined as a rapid growth of opportu-
nities for correction or even modification of the human biological nature. In other words, 
                                                          
6 Even now this market is growing rapidly, and in the future it will run up to hundreds billion dollars. 
7 So, for example, resources and energy saving can be carried out via the choice of the optimal modes by autonomous 
systems that fulfil concrete goals and tasks and vice versa, the choice of an optimal mode will depend on the level of 
energy and materials consumption, and the budget of a consumer. 
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it will be possible to extend our opportunities to alter a human body, perhaps, to some ex-
tent, its genome; to widen sharply our opportunities of minimally invasive influence and 
operations instead of the modern surgical ones; to use extensively means of cultivating 
separate biological materials, bodies or their parts and elements for regeneration and reha-
bilitation of an organism, and also artificial analogues of biological material (bodies, re-
ceptors), etc.  
This will make it possible to radically expand the opportunities to prolong the life and 
improve its biological quality. It will be the technologies intended for common use in the 
form of a mass market service. Certainly, it will take a rather long period (about two or three 
decades) from the first steps in that direction (in the 2030–2040s) to their common use. 
The drivers of the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will be medicine, bio- and 
nano-technologies, robotics, IT, cognitive sciences, which will together form a sophisticat-
ed system of self-regulating production. We can denote this complex as MANBRIC-
technologies. As is known, there is the widely used abbreviation of NBIC-technology (or 
convergence), that is nano-bio-information and cognitive (see Lynch 2004; Dator 2006; 
Akayev 2012). However, we believe that this complex will be larger. 
It should be noted that Leo Nefiodow has been writing about medicine as the leading 
technology of the sixth Kondratieff wave for a long time (Nefiodow 1996; Nefiodow and 
Nefiodow 2014; also in this volume). In general, we support his approaches (including the 
ideas about a new type of medicine), but it is important to point out that Nefiodow be-
lieves that it is biotechnologies that will become an integrated core of a new mode. How-
ever, we suppose that the leading role of biotechnologies will be, first of all, in their possi-
bility to solve the major medical problems.8 That is why, it makes sense to speak about 
medicine as the core of a new technological paradigm. Besides, Nefiodow practically does 
not mention nanotechnology that will be of great importance in terms of the development 
of biotechnologies and medicine (they are supposed to play a crucial role in the fight 
against cancer; at the same time nanotechnologies will play a crucial role in other spheres 
too, in particular in energy and resources saving). It is difficult to agree with his opinion 
that psychosocial health, which, in his opinion, cover not only psychotherapeutic, psy-
chological and psychiatric services, but also numerous measures of people's health im-
provement that is capable to reduce, in his terms, social entropy, will be the second leading 
mode. The problems of this social entropy which he points out (corruption, growth of 
small and large crime, drug addiction, loss of moral guide, divorces, growth of violence, 
etc.) have always existed in society; many of them even had a greater share than today. 
Social changes can be really extremely important for creation of starting conditions for a 
long-term upswing and its keeping (for more details see Grinin and Korotayev 2014 in this 
issue). However, it is production and/or commercial technologies that represent the driving 
force of the K-Waves upward phases.  
Thus, we suppose the following:  
1. Medicine will be the first sphere to start the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolu-
tion, but, later on, self-regulating systems development will cover the most diverse areas 
of production, services and life.  
2. We treat medicine in a broad sense, because it will include (and already actively in-
cludes) for its purposes a great number of other scientific branches (e.g., the use of robots 
                                                          
8 We agree with Nefiodow that it is also necessary to include in this complex food, pharmaceutics and ecology (see 
Grinin and Grinin 2013a, 2013b). 
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in surgery and care of patients, information technologies in remote medical treatment, neu-
ral interfaces for treatment of mental illness and brain research; gene therapy and engi-
neering, nanotechnologies for creation of artificial immunity and biochips which monitor 
organisms; new materials for growing artificial organs and many other things to become a 
powerful sector of economy). 
3. The medical sphere has unique opportunities to combine the abovementioned tech-
nologies into a single system. 
4. There are also some demographic and economic reasons why the phase of self-
regulating systems will start in medicine: 
– Increase in average life expectancy and population ageing will favor not only the 
growth of medical opportunities to maintain health, but also allow the extension of work-
ing age, as population ageing will be accompanied by the lack of working-age population;  
− People, in general, are always ready to spend money on health and beauty. Howev-
er, the growth of the world middle class and the cultural standard of people implies much 
greater willingness and solvency in this terms;  
− Medical corporations usually do not impede technological progress, but, on the con-
trary, are interested in it. 
Thus, today medicine is a very important sector of the economy, and tomorrow it will 
become even more powerful. 
In the present article we confined ourselves to a short description of the spheres which 
represent a new, in a broad sense, medical system or realm of medicine, creating a com-
plex of technologies and their application with other perspective directions.  
Surgery. Robots have become widely used in surgeries (see Fig. 4). The da Vinci ro-
bot has become especially popular. In the future, an increasing number of surgical opera-
tions will be performed with less involvement of professionals. Many simple surgeries will 
need no human participation at all.  
Robots can perform a wide range of surgeries because of: 
● easy access to the zone of surgery; 
● small scars; 
● superhuman accuracy; 
● no hand tremor; 
● possibility to control a robot at a distance via Internet.  
 
Fig. 4. Robots in surgery 
Source: Pinkerton 2013. 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 350
Biochips represent a new trend of combining medical and nanobiotechnologies. Biochips 
are able to register a wide range of physiological changes and respond to them or per-
form specific actions. In the long term, biochips will permit a continuous control of a 
person's health. There are many biochips in medicine today. For example, cardio-chips 
which are connected to the heart cells, register all necessary indices, and transmit them to 
devices. Some biochips are so small in size that can be placed into a cell or tiny spheres of 
lipids, liposomes. They can be used for different purposes, for example, for targeted drug 
delivery.  
Artificial organs are the key to resolving the urgent lack of enough donor organs. In 
medicine scientists already use or work to design different artificial organs: skin, retina, 
trachea, vessels, heart, ear, eye, limbs, liver, lungs, pancreas, bladder, ovaries. This will 
definitely increase life expectancy and can have various consequences. The artificial 
womb, for example, can provide an opportunity to have children for people irrespective of 
age and, perhaps, even gender.  
Artificial immune system is an autonomous intellectual system against diseases and 
pathogenic organisms. For example, a nanorobot can travel through the body and collect 
pathogenic organisms into a special module, where they are decomposed. Organic com-
pounds are further used by human organism. 
Gene therapy is an explosively developing sector. It is a powerful tool for correcting 
hereditary diseases as well as developing new abilities that an organism lacked before. In 
our view, the crucial breakthroughs in gene therapy will be made in the treatment of genet-
ic disorders and sport medicine. 
Neural interfaces are an interaction between brain and computer systems that can be 
realized via electrode contact with head skin or via electrodes implanted into the brain. 
The implementation of neural interfaces is already wide-spread. They have developed neu-
ral interfaces that allow prosthetic devices to be moved via brain signals. Today, scanning 
techniques have been developed that allow studying brain signals. This gives an oppor-
tunity to reproduce any brain response.  
So the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution:  
– will create various self-regulating systems;  
– will start in medicine, which in the conjuncture with other fields will create the rev-
olutionizing system of MBNRIC (med-bio-nano-robo-info-cognitive) technologies;  
– will improve the quality of life particularly of old people and disabled persons;  
– will increase average life expectancy (up to 100 years); 
– will lead to the emergence of opportunities to correct and modify human biology  
itself.  
However, the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will have ambiguous conse-
quences. On the one hand, vigorous growth of production volume will be expected. On the 
other hand, due to the diffusion of various self-regulating systems the number of specialists 
needed in different spheres will decrease. For instance, due to the development of self-
regulation and remote medical care the number of doctors will significantly diminish. 
The possibilities of medicine will hugely increase. At the same time the emergence of 
opportunities to radically change the human organism may bring about unprecedented eth-
ical issues and seriously damage such vital aspects as family, gender, and morals. That is 
why it is very important to search for some optimal social, legal and other means before-
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hand. Then those changes will not be completely unexpected and their negative conse-
quences could be minimized.  
IV. The Phase of Self-Regulating Systems and the Sixth K-Wave  
А-Phase of the sixth K-wave: acceleration to enter  
the final phase of the cybernetic revolution  
The sixth K-wave will probably begin approximately in the 2020s. Meanwhile the final 
phase of the Cybernetic Revolution has to begin later, at least, in the 2030–2040s. Thus, 
we suppose, that a new technological mode will not develop in a necessary form even by 
the 2020s (thus, the innovative pause will take longer than expected). However, it should 
be kept in mind that the beginning of the K-wave upswing phase is never directly caused 
by new technologies. This beginning is synchronized with the start of the medium-term 
business cycle's upswing. And the upswing takes place as a result of the levelling of pro-
portions in economy, the accumulation of resources and other impulses that improve de-
mand and conjuncture. One should remember, that the beginning of the second K-wave 
was connected with the discovery of gold deposits in California and Australia, the third 
wave with the increase in prices for wheat, the fourth one with the post-war reconstruction, 
the fifth one with the economic reforms in the UK and the USA. And then, given an up-
swing, a new technological mode (which could not completely – if at all – realize its po-
tential) facilitates overcoming of cyclic crises and allows further growth. 
Consequently, some conjunctural events will also stimulate an upward impulse of the 
sixth K-wave. And, for example, the rapid growth of the underdeveloped world regions 
(such as Tropical Africa, the Islamic East, and some Latin American countries) or new 
financial and organizational technologies can become a primary impulse. Naturally, there 
will also appear some technical and technological innovations which, however, will not 
form a new mode yet. Besides, we suppose that financial technologies have not finished 
yet its expansion in the world. If we can modify and secure them somehow, they will be 
able to spread into various regions which underuse them now. One should not forget that 
large-scale application of such technologies demands essential changes in the legal and 
other systems, which is absolutely necessary for developmental levelling in the world. 
Taking into account a delay of the new generation of technologies, the period of the 2020s 
may resemble the 1980s. In other words, it will be neither a growth recession, nor a rise, 
but rather an accelerated development (with stronger development in some regions and 
continuous depression in others). 
Then, given the above mentioned favorable conditions, during this wave the final 
phase of the Cybernetic Revolution will begin. In such a situation it is possible to assume 
that the sixth K-wave's A-phase (the 2020–2050s) will have much stronger manifestation 
and last longer than that of the fifth one due to more dense combination of technological 
generations. And since the Cybernetic Revolution will evolve, the sixth K-wave's down-
ward B-phase (2050 – the 2060/70s), is expected to be not so depressive, as those during 
the third or fifth waves. In general, during this K-wave (2020 – the 2060/70s) the Scien-
tific and Information Revolution will come to an end, and the scientific and cybernetic 
production principle will acquire its mature shape. 
Another scenario. The final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution can begin later – not 
in the 2030s, but in the 2040s. In this case the A-phase of the sixth wave will terminate 
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before the beginning of the regulating systems revolution; therefore, it will not be based on 
fundamentally new technologies and will not become so powerful as is supposed in the 
previous scenario. The final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution in this case will coincide 
with the B-phase of the sixth wave (as it was the case with the zero wave during the Indus-
trial Revolution, 1760–1787) and at the A-phase of the seventh wave. In this case the 
emergence of the seventh wave is highly possible. The B-phase of the sixth wave should 
be rather short due to the emergence of a new generation of technologies, and the A-phase 
of the seventh wave – rather long and powerful. 
The end of the Cybernetic Revolution and disappearance of  
K-waves 
The sixth K-wave (about 2020 – the 2060/70s), like the first K-wave, will proceed general-
ly during completion of the production revolution. However, there is an important differ-
ence. During the first K-wave the duration of the one phase of the industrial production 
principle significantly exceeded the duration of the whole K-wave. But now one phase of 
the K-wave will exceed the duration of one phase of production principle. This alone 
should essentially modify the course of the sixth K-wave; the seventh wave will be feebly 
expressed or will not occur at all (on the possibility of the other variant see above). Such 
a forecast is based also on the fact that the end of the Cybernetic Revolution and distribu-
tion of its results will promote integration of the World System and considerably increas-
ing influence of new universal regulation mechanisms. It is quite reasonable, considering 
the fact that the coming final phase of the revolution will be the revolution of the regulat-
ing systems. Thus, the management of the economy should reach a new level. So, K-waves 
appear at a certain stage of social evolution and are likely to disappear at its certain 
stage. 
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Providing the Balance of Technological  
and Social Changes in Real-Time Regime Plus 
the Economic Growth 
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In this article, the author argues and proves that the causes of the crisis in the 
world can only be understood through the prism of the world-view approach. It is 
also stated that the problems pertaining to socio-economic and technological pro-
gress, acceleration of economic growth and formation of a new model cannot be 
resolved within the framework of the existing development paradigm. The author 
reasonably and objectively proves that the world undergoes the most difficult stage 
of transition from one to another development paradigm, and substantiates the 
possibility of proceeding to a new development paradigm. In order to realize such 
paradigm-oriented transition and to reach the objectively set development goal 
speedily, the author sets forth a proposal to develop and realize the mega-project 
for building a new life model and the mechanisms of its realization – that is, coor-
dination, at each local level, between the state, societal and business interests with 
interests of any given particular individual. Balance of technological and social 
changes is a basis for transition to the new model of the economic growth. 
Keywords: systemic crisis, worldview, new cognition methodology, new devel-
opment paradigm, megaproject, economic growth. 
Introduction 
There is a long list of reasons and factors being seen as responsible for declining economic 
growth, no matter which country or region is analysed (see, e.g., Korotayev, Tsirel 2010; 
Grinin, Korotayev 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015; Korotayev, Zinkina, 
Bogevolnov 2011; Grinin, Korotayev, Malkov 2010; Grinin, Tsirel, Korotayev 2015). But 
are these listed or yet-to-be-found reasons and factors the root causes that really hold back 
the economies of most countries in the world? Or are they consequences of some deep-
lying processes, reflecting the effects of objective patterns of development that are still 
concealed from researchers – despite  the fact that famous economists wrote about the in-
creasing uncertainty in economy and politics?  (Friedman 1956; Krugman 1979; Bernanke 
1984). Nowadays, many people see the number one reason in the ineffective modelling of 
further economic growth as there are no visible ways to reverse this trend, and no solutions 
have come up for any of the problems. Ben Bernanke, the former Chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve System (FRS), stated that a victorious war or vigorous preparation for 
such a war could be the best ways to lead the American economy out of the growing crisis 
                                                          
 The work has been done with the support from the Russian Humanities Foundation (project № 14-02-00330). 
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(Polunin 2015). The Russian academic literature features debates on the need for a shift to 
a different model of economic growth in Russia (Kudrin and Gurvich 2014).  
Therefore, we keep insisting on the following. The existing model of economic devel-
opment cannot be changed before objective reasons for the origin and roll-out of the global 
systemic crisis have been convincingly identified. Understanding these reasons, the society 
will be able to arrive at a model that will ensure a radical positive breakthrough in all as-
pects of human life and lay the groundwork for transition to crisis-free development or, at 
least, proactive crisis management. 
There are a lot of scientists in the world who have addressed these highly challenging 
issues in their research work. Consider, for example, the well-known reports to the Club of 
Rome. However, not a single country around the globe can boast of a long-term strategic 
crisis management plan or vision of the future. 
Thus, we have to note that today, more than ever, there is a pressing need for a new at-
titude to the crisis that we observe both in Russia and globally. The search for a new evo-
lutionary model and a new concept of human development becomes inevitable.  
Regularities of the Human-System Development 
More than thirty years ago, in an attempt to throw some light on the inconsistencies of the 
Soviet Union's economy, we concluded that the then existing economic theories and scien-
tific knowledge in general had run out of their explanatory capabilities in the search of 
ways to overcome negative developments. The main reason behind it is that so far scien-
tific knowledge, including economic knowledge, has been gained through acquisition and 
processing of empirical evidence of the past and subjective judgement based on data inter-
pretation. Thus, if we take a look at references to present-day textbooks, for example, mac-
roeconomics course books, then we will find that they are totally based on the content that 
dates back to the second or third quarters of last century (e.g., Romer 2015). The author of 
another book on the theory of economic growth writes, ‘In the theory of growth, just as in 
macroeconomics and mainstream economic theory, research is closely linked to, conclu-
sions verified and confirmed through empirical developments, or it is questioned, dis-
proved and often initiated by empirical studies’. In other words, all these reflections are 
very much based in a constant forward projection of given data, interpreted not only with 
unchanged means bit also without changing the methodology. 
Empirics of economic growth have expanded the range of countries and periods 
under study and revealed material gaps between the basics of neoclassical eco-
nomics and reality. There is a fair amount of such factors and determinants that 
impact on long-term growth, and their list is neither definitive nor exhaustive. 
Among other factors and determinants, determinants defined by subjective be-
haviour of people, society and government are of major significance. Consider-
ing the objectives defined by new empirics, the theory of economic growth is fo-
cused on the search for models that can help to explain the impact of subjective 
(behavioural and institutional) parameters on long-term growth... However, the 
progression of empirical studies has given rise to certain questions being ad-
dressed to the fundamental theory with no answers found. Furthermore, persis-
tent inconsistency with previous stylized facts has been revealed and required 
clarification, and additional determinants of growth have emerged beyond the 
core theory. Ultimately, the key driver of sustainable growth in the neoclassical 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 358
model, i. e. technological progress seen as a ‘black box’ of a kind, requires in-
creasingly more explanation (Sharaev 2006: 23–24).  
This is why it has become quite obvious that in order to resolve the existing problems 
and identify the source of inconsistencies in systemic development, it is necessary, in 
terms of political economy, to find the only possible form of production relations, or hu-
man connected with production, distribution, exchange and consumption of social bene-
fits, and with thereto relevant and new adequate productive forces. Since then, we have 
been looking for a way of theoretical thinking (in terms of political economy) and meth-
odological tools that would help to see the objective (and free from empirical lay-ups) pic-
ture of the human-society development. This, in turn, would enable us to identify objective 
reasons behind the origin of crises and to suggest a possible model of human relations that 
might be adequate to technological advancements that break into the life of the human 
society at an incredible speed. This is achieved through the application of the worldview 
approach.  
The worldview approach is based upon: 
 The identification of the goal of development of humankind on the Earth, which is 
the human being with a multitude of needs and the satisfaction of her or his highest-level 
human need, which is evolving into a spiritually, intellectually and physically perfect hu-
man being with a high level of consciousness; 
 The identification of the need for applying a holistic, systemic and interdisciplinary 
approach to all aspects of the human society development; 
 The identification of a single measure for all and any processes and phenomena, 
which is the time;  
 The identification of a single criteria to assess the development of humankind, i. e. 
the time between the need to achieve the common goal of the development and the reality 
where the human society finds itself at every moment, in any form of presentation, and 
each particular person in relation to this goal. Within this perspective, if the time between 
arising of a particular person’s need and the fulfilment of this need tends to shrink,  
the humankind demonstrates correct and effective progression toward the goal.  
Thus, our search has resulted in a new methodology of cognition, helping us to identi-
fy some regular patterns of the development of human society.  
Since ancient times, the goal of development of human society and humanity has been 
a focus of research for experts from various disciplines of science and spiritual knowledge. 
For example, back in 1784, Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher and the founding father 
of classical German Philosophy at the turning point of the Age of Enlightenment and Ro-
manticism, treated in his article titled ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan 
Point of View’ world history as a goal-oriented process. He was looking for a way to sub-
ject history to a rule of law, and he believed that this law of history must by all means be 
the law of development. Immanuel Kant saw the solution of this problem in connecting 
history to the goal it had been originally committed to, which could make history regular 
in nature. Subjecting history to law means making it move towards a goal. In other words, 
he suggested understanding history in a teleological way. He suggested making an attempt 
to discover, in the meaningless course of human routine, the purpose of nature which 
could potentially underlie the history of human beings, living without a plan of their own. 
According to Kant, the ultimate purpose of the world's existence is to fully develop the 
rational inborn abilities of the human being (Kant 1963–1966: 8). 
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The authors of the reports to the Club of Rome have also endeavoured to formulate  
the goal of the global society's sustainable development and, based on that, offer new ideas 
for reshaping the international order (RIO) and find a new ideal form of social organiza-
tion of people (Tinbergen 1976). A special attention is given to this issue in the Fifth Re-
port to the Club of Rome titled ‘Goals for Mankind’. In this report, global problems are 
analysed in terms of a system of goals and values, which suggests a revolutionary transi-
tion from quantitative to qualitative analysis. In the opinion of the authors, led by Ervin 
Laszlo, this requires the goals of global development to be formulated and presented to the 
global community (Laszlo et al. 1977).  
Governed by the challenge of formulating the goals of global development, Ervin 
Laszlo and his working group in the course of their study analysed the ‘atlas of goals’ both 
at the national and transnational levels, representing various regions, countries, churches, 
multinational corporations, the UN, and other international organizations. They inter-
viewed numerous people from a great variety of areas of human activity, and proposed 
four global goals. The first and foremost is to ensure global security, i. e. to stop the arms 
race, prevent wars and conflicts, and repudiate the violence. The second important goal is 
to resolve the food crisis on a global scale. According to the researchers, the achievement 
of this goal must eliminate famine and create a world system capable of satisfying the hu-
mankind's need for food. The third goal suggests the creation of a system for global con-
trol over employment of energy resources and raw materials, which will facilitate the tran-
sition to sustainable and environmentally friendly energy consumption, control over tech-
nologies and promotion of efficient management of natural resources. And the fourth goal 
is the global development toward a better quality of life and social justice in terms of the 
distribution of both physical and spiritual wealth (Laszlo et al. 1977). 
To achieve this goal, the authors offered several scenarios of the ‘global solidarity 
revolution’. They hope that scientists, religious leaders and business representatives of one 
country could have influence one their peers from other countries, and then they, all to-
gether, could address critical issues and work out general solutions. Unfortunately, first, 
these calls for coordinated efforts could hardly be heard while the existing model of hu-
mankind development is at work. Second, in view of the systemic approach to the devel-
opment of human society, as a result of simultaneous setting of multiple goals, none of 
them might fail in achievement, and such pattern is well known from history. 
I also set the task to identify the initially specified goal of the human-system devel-
opment. That is, the task was to find the goal that cannot serve a means to attain the higher 
objective within the framework of the earthly human existence. At the same time, this goal 
must signify the start (reverse connection) of the qualitatively new spiral of development 
for the entire system as well as for each of its sub-systems. Hence, if any socio-economic 
and political system may be analysed through the prism of the realization of the ultimate 
goal, then such goal is of the planetary, global nature. Moreover, if the current practice of 
socio-economic and political development in any country of the global community is jux-
taposed with the ultimate goal, then we can identify the redundant or missing link in the 
mechanism of the realization of this goal, finding the least time-consuming and hence the 
most efficient and stable way to its attainment. 
As evidenced by the studies, such goal can be represented only by the human being 
and attainment of the Supreme Reason. Otherwise, development would go along entirely 
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the opposite path, ending in a deadlock and retrogress, so that everything would have to be 
started anew, or even be brought to the catastrophic finale, the apocalypse.  
The second component of the new methodological tool-kit, represented, as said above, 
by the integrity, systemic nature and cross-disciplinary approach, is based on the premise 
that the world is a unity, and the laws of the nature and society are the same anywhere. 
The world, being an integral system, can only be understood when all sciences and spiritu-
al knowledge are unified into a single systemic, integral and cross-disciplinary or, rather, 
trans-disciplinary knowledge. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that scholars and 
scientists have learned already to borrow or combine different disciplines with the spiritual 
knowledge while cognizing some processes or phenomena. 
And, finally, using the only possible index to measure and compare all processes and 
phenomena – that is the time, and the only criteria for efficiency of the human-system de-
velopment – that is on the one part, the time between the need to attain the single devel-
opment goal, and on the other part – the reality, in which, at any given moment, the socie-
ty and each human individual find themselves in relation to such goal, would provide us 
with the entirely new understanding of the human-system development.  
Today, the humanity is distributed over the time-lines between the origin of the need 
for implementation of the goal and satisfaction of such need in various points and within 
various time domains. The greater the distance between human communities, regions, 
countries and systems on this vector of time, the harder, if not impossible, is to establish a 
dialogue between them and to ensure peace. When civilizations, peoples, nations, large 
and small communities and individuals find themselves in different linear and spherical 
time domains, they have different levels of consciousness, which prevents them from ever 
aligning their interests and understanding. This underlies the origin and aggravation of all 
woes of humankind. And this makes communities migrating around the globe in search of 
a better life. This implies that the crisis in global development, wars, terrorism, riots, man-
made and natural disasters and all other negative developments stem from deep-lying laws 
that are common for both nature and humankind. Moreover, as long as people live in differ-
ent linear and spherical time domains, there will be a semblance that the planet is inhabited 
by numerous co-existing local civilizations different from one another (Bondarenko 2014a). 
This is why it is extremely important to set a new direction to the development of humankind 
so that all people on Earth are equally ‘in-between’. In this case, the level of consciousness 
of each individual will be brought in harmony with other people's levels of consciousness, 
and they will be able to coordinate their interests in identifying a model for their existence. 
Hence we will comprehend and realize faster that we all live towards the objective goal of 
attaining perfection. In all other cases, as we set out in previous articles and would like to 
emphasize again, development may result in a totally different, opposite scenario: dead end, 
reverse development to start anew, or a catastrophic finale, of ‘apocalypse’. 
We should give due credit to those scientists who address the issue of determining the 
development goals and even emphasize that, ‘like a living creature, a nation cannot exist 
without a goal and orientation. Planning does exist, but the question is: how are things 
planned, to who's benefit and based in which methodology?... The goals of development 
must refer to human qualities...’ (Buzgalin 2015) 
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Two Paradigms of Human Society Development 
The worldview approach based on the application of all provisions of the new methodo-
logical tools makes it clear that for many centuries of the human-society development 
there have been two major paradigms (Fig. 1):  
– Paradigm 1 implies a direct relationship between production and consumption, 
which is short in terms of time and space. It originated when everything was produced 
with manual labour that was in the possession of the humankind, and all produce was con-
sumed soon afterwards. This is the pre-industrial type of production for one's own needs 
and on a made-to-order basis for a particular consumer at the level of a household (crafts-
men). Therefore, the time between arising of a particular person’s need and the satisfaction 
thereof was the shortest. But since the goal was not recognized, the manufacturing capabil-
ities were limited, and the range of needs was narrow, undeveloped and inaccessible for 
most of the population, then the development was challenged by some troublesome times, 
food riots, epidemics, uprisings and wars, a great number of deaths, demographic and en-
vironmental disasters, urban destruction and decay, downturn in trade and crafts, etc. (see, 
e.g., Turchin 2003; Turchin, Korotayev 2006; Turchin, Nefedov 2009; Korotayev, Khalto-
urina 2006; Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006; Korotayev 2014; Korotayev et al. 
2011; Korotayev, Malkov, Grinin 2014). The human society development towards the goal 
was spontaneous, either approaching it or moving away from it.  
– Paradigm 2 implies that the relationship between production and consumption is 
mediated. This development paradigm originated at the outset of technological develop-
ments, division of labour, emerging markets, diffusion of middlemen and the universal 
equivalent for exchange of deliverables, i.e. money. Progressive geographical expansion 
and development of foreign trade brought about the transformation of the first direct de-
velopment paradigm into the second mediated one. Its development was accelerated by the 
transition to industrial technologies. The flow of production was formed. Domestic and 
foreign trade was evolving, too, featuring geographical expansion to a global scale. Pro-
duction and trade were focused on mass markets to achieve the only goal, namely generat-
ing as much profit as possible. Demand from the abstract end-consumer is met through a 
spontaneous, archaic, market-based form of communication, mediated by the extension of 
time and space. The needs of individuals are not considered. Under these conditions, un-
certainty of consumption resulted in the emergence of an increasingly growing dispropor-
tion between the time of production and the time of circulation of goods and money and, 
finally, caused them to grow utterly desynchronized. The time of circulation exceeds man-
ifold the time of production. A huge gap appeared between the dynamics of physical and 
monetary factors of production. The development towards the goal is spontaneous with 
evolution followed by involution, and vice versa (see, e.g., Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 
2010). Therefore, cycles and crises, chaos and complexity, and all other negative events in 
human society development, being the result of this kind of development. They are, re-
peating themselves, but on a greater scale and with greater probability of a catastrophe in 
the final stage. Moreover, the increase in the time of circulation of goods and money com-
pared to the time of their production is the underlying reason for inefficient use of all, in-
cluding human, resources, or for non-recoverable losses.  
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Combating the financial crisis with the tools of monetary policy only aggravates this 
gap in the movement of the real product and money, and makes for a greater disproportion 
between the time of production and the time of circulation of goods and money. This is 
exactly why Raghuram Rajan, President of the Reserve Bank of India, believes that the 
monetary policy of the advanced countries creates an environment similar to the one that 
triggered the Great Depression 80 years ago. Raghuram Rajan presented this outlook at the 
International Conference on Economics held by the London Business School in late June 
2015. Rajan's words become even weightier, considering his predictions for the 2007–
2008 crisis back in 2005 and his record of service. For example, before taking over leader-
ship of India’s central bank, he worked as a chief economist with the IMF and is a recog-
nized authority in the world of economics. ‘I am concerned that in order to accelerate eco-
nomic development we are slowly drifting into the same problems that existed in the 
1930s’, Raghuram Rajan said while speaking from the platform during the conference in 
London. ‘I think this is a universal problem. This is not just a problem of advanced or 
emerging markets. It is all much broader and more complex’ (Manukov 2015).  
When speaking about the problems driving the world to a new Great Depression, Ra-
jan refers to the efforts made by the central banks of many developed countries to spur 
sluggish economies after a financial crisis through ultra-low interest rates and quantitative 
easing (QE). The US, Japanese and European banks have resorted to these measures in 
recent years. Raghuram Rajan fears that quantitative easing programs may cause the de-
veloping countries to retaliate to maintain their share in the markets, as it was the case in 
the 1930s. He says, ‘[t]he problem is that while trying to achieve growth through QE out 
of nothing, we do not create this growth but take it away from one another’ (Manukov 
2015). All the more so as the US FRS ‘created’ several trillions of dollars for the three QE 
waves. They have not demonstrated any spill-over effects yet since the velocity of money 
is still lagging behind the pre-crises levels (Manukov 2015). Thus, the fears expressed by 
Raghuram Rajan that the world may be slipping into a new Great Depression are reaso-
nable.  
In other words, the financial crisis is, in the chain pattern, increasingly transforming 
into the economic, political and, ultimately, systemic crises. This is the dominant model 
today.  
The present-day systemic crisis is the peak, agony and inevitable decline of this de-
velopment paradigm. That is, the model of human relations based on indirect relationship 
between production and consumption has worked itself out and nowadays constitutes the 
objective basis and source of almost all major adverse events.  
Let us provide a few examples on certain phenomena. Poverty and inequality, emer-
gence of the Bretton Woods System, creation of controlled chaos systems and systems for 
manipulation of human consciousness, economic slowdown, rise in prices and inflation, 
de-industrialisation, terrorism and corruption, some ‘natural’ anomalies and disasters, in-
formation and real wars with numerous victims and losses of property – all these are links 
of the same chain, a product of the mediated development model. The recent events in 
Ukraine, the EU, the USA, Russia and other countries of the world are the yield of this 
development paradigm. The factor of time in this paradigm of human relations plays the 
most negative role. 
Any attempts and real efforts that have been recently made to reshape the existing 
model of development, e.g., through renunciation of the Bretton Woods System and  
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the dollar as the only world currency, will only lead to greater disproportions. Thus, in its 
efforts to create an equivalent of western international financial structures, today China 
has taken part in the establishment of a BRICS international bank, a currency pool, and a 
bank for Asian infrastructure development, and emerges as one of the world’s leaders in 
terms of its influence in Asia and other parts of the world (see, e.g., Grinin, Tsirel, Korota-
yev 2015). China is already using its holdings of gold and foreign exchange to assist the 
weak and struggling nations, to which China is going to extend loans. For instance, China 
provides support to Venezuela and Argentina, and makes similar promises to Russia – 
meaning that China is strengthening its position as a lender of last resort for many coun-
tries, thus reshaping dramatically the global economy. Even though the Western suprema-
cy in the world economy may or may not be terminated, under these conditions there is no 
guarantee that the Chinese supremacy will not occur. If the Yuan, which accounts for over 
80 % of all trading operations and more than 90 % of all international transactions worth 
hundreds trillion dollars, becomes the world reserve currency, there is no guarantee that 
China, like the USA, will not begin printing national money without any limits. Once it 
ceases to be the world's factory supplying its goods to all destinations on the planet, China 
may replace them with the only commodity, i.e. money, and make for another Bretton 
Woods System or a greater gap between real products and money. The disproportions will 
increase whose consequences are rather obvious. 
The same negative consequences will result from evolvement of the existing devel-
opment model, e.g. consolidation of BRICS, the Eurasian Union or any other union, since 
the new environment with a common global market based on the consolidated space offer-
ing free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, will not allow to become new 
powerful centers of economic development. Why? Because it maintains and enhances the 
lack of balance between the time of circulation of goods and money and the time of their 
production. And secondly, because today all countries have different ‘in-between’ time 
positions, i e. at different levels of development compared to the objective development 
goal, and they will never be able to get their interests coordinated. 
The Balance of Technological and Social Changes – the Basis for 
Transition to the New Model of Economic Growth  
So we can see that the existing paradigm of human development represents mediated rela-
tionships between people that are not consistent with the present era of hypervelocities, 
digital, info-, cogno-, nano- and other technologies of the 21st century, and the employ-
ment of these technologies is not yet intended for implementation of the objective goal of 
the human society development.  
And here is the objective reason why the interests of nation, business and communities 
become too different in the vast ‘in-between’ domain, and they do not match the interests 
of an individual. At the moment the world objectively finds itself in the most challenging 
time period, the period of transition from one development paradigm to another (Fig. 2). 
According to Christopher Coker, Professor of International Relations at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) and philosopher of war, ‘[n]obody wants to live in the days 
when the world order is breaking down. These are really dangerous times’ (Coker 2015).  
The highest priority is now seen in the need for driving the development toward the 
objective goal not by trial and error, but in a conscious manner. It turns out that we really 
need a new model of development. But what should it be like? When offering their version 
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of a new model, some scientists think, for example, ‘that this model must combine strate-
gic planning and self-organized markets, and a continuously growing private sector sup-
ported by the government. The key element of this concept is harmonization of interests’ 
(Buzgalin 2015). To substantiate these suggestions, examples from Asian and Scandinavi-
an experience are given. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Representation of transition to the new (first) development paradigm 
But are the above-cited suggestions really correct? As for the Chinese experience, we 
should note as follows: yes, indeed, we witnessed a Chinese economic miracle called a 
socialist market economy. As some researchers of China suppose, this economy incorpo-
rates the systemic approach and determines the way a modern economy can and must de-
velop. But our studies based on the worldview approach have shown (we mentioned it in 
our previous section) that the Chinese economy is not quite effective. Let us refer to facts. 
For example, in 2009–2013, USD 6.8 trillion of investment was wasted because of the 
Chinese government’s endeavours to stimulate economic growth and hyperactivity  
of the construction industry. This is what research conducted by the National Development 
and Reform Commission and the Academy of Macroeconomic Research showed. During 
this period, nearly half of all investments in the Chinese economy were ‘ineffective’, as 
pointed out by the authors. Evidence of this can be found, for example, in ghost cities with 
empty high-rise buildings (Fig. 3), unused motorways and abandoned steelworks 
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(Nevelsky 2014; Grinin, Tsirel, Korotayev 2015). Similar examples of inefficient use of 
all resources, including human resources, can be found in every country of the world, in-
cluding Russia. 
 
Fig. 3. New ghost cities with empty high-rise buildings 
Let us return to China. While demonstrating a very high level of income inequality and 
inevitable reorientation from foreign trade to the domestic market, the growth rates of the 
Chinese economy are going down dramatically. ‘Persistent slowdown of the Chinese 
economy within the next years may lower global economic growth below the level of 2 %, 
which is interpreted as a recession, Ruchir Sharma, Head of Emerging Markets at Morgan 
Stanley Investment Management, one of the world's largest investment banks explains: 
“The next global recession will be made in China,” he predicted in his interview to 
Bloomberg. According to Sharma, “over the next couple of years, China is likely to be the 
biggest source of vulnerability for the global economy”’ (Los 2015). This is confirmed by 
many other facts as well. For example, ‘Chinese corporate debt is estimated at USD  
16.1 trillion, or 160 % of GDP, which is twice as much compared to the USA. Experts see 
the reason for such a big debt in Beijing's endeavours to stabilize economic growth. Wang 
Tao, Chief China Economist at UBS (Switzerland), whom the agency quotes, believes that 
the current situation may lead to “a crash landing” of the Chinese economy. He emphasiz-
es that over the past few years Chinese officials have been trying to stimulate capital in-
flows into the real economy. But now corporate incomes slow down as the prices decrease, 
which makes debt repayment even harder’ (IA lenta.ru 2015). Let us give another exam-
ple. On July 27, 2015, for the second time in the past month, the Chinese stock market 
tumbled by 8.5 %. This marked the record-breaking fall of the Chinese indices in the past 
eight years… (IA Interfax 2015) These facts fully confirm our implications for the lack of 
effectiveness of the Chinese model (Grinin, Tsirel, and Korotayev 2015). 
As for the Scandinavian economic model, many economists point out that, firstly, it 
suggests the largest extent of government interventions in the national economy, the high-
est level of GDP redistribution through the national budget, and at the same time the low-
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est level of corruption, bureaucracy and abuse. Secondly, this exists because the Scandina-
vian system is based on truly democratic principles, when the government acts transpar-
ently and is controlled by a network of civil society institutions. As far as the Scandinavian 
economic model is concerned, using the worldview approach we can state the following: 
on the one hand, redistribution-based relations not directly related to labour input, which 
these countries are so proud of, ultimately suppress motivation to increase labour produc-
tivity and cause decay of personality. On the other hand, there is, for example, Iceland that 
was recognized in 2007 as the best country of the world to live in, but in terms of area and 
population this country is equal to our municipalities, although, unlike them, Iceland is 
financially autonomous. Moreover, with the use of information technologies Iceland, 
peacefully and without a revolution, shifted to direct and open democracy. That is, they 
managed to get individual interests of each particular person taken into account, and cap-
tured this decision in the new Constitution. The first line of the fundamental law says, 
‘We, the people who inhabit Iceland, wish to create a just society where every person has 
equal opportunity’. This is the preamble of the Constitution (IA RSP 2013).  
Therefore, we can conclude that the existing model of development represents mediat-
ed relations between people, which, on the one part, are not consistent with the present era 
of hypervelocities, digital, info-, cogno-, nano- and other technologies as we have said 
before, and, on the other hand, it is rather ineffective and tends to exhaust all types of re-
sources. All this multiplies as long as the development towards the objective goal occurs 
by trial and error, unconsciously, or as the model is denied. Or it occurs in a conscious 
way, but to the benefit of a limited number of people and their individual goals. This is 
why transition to another path of development is of the highest priority. But this path must 
make for development towards the objective goal in a conscious way, through evolution-
ary, irreversible and continuous minimization of the ‘in-between’ time, and full achieve-
ment of the goal. 
The worldview approach not only enables us to objectively see the virtual inevitability 
of transition back to direct relationships that are typical of the first development paradigm, 
but also the way to shape another model of human relations and arrangement of life pro-
vided that the objective development goal is met. It only becomes possible with the emer-
gence of digital and other technologies of the 21st century, through which production aims 
to meet the needs of each particular person again, and no excess produce is left, and with 
digital equality in terms of access to wealth in its full diversity. Only digital equality be-
tween particular people, equal access to wealth based on ordering, as well as coordination 
of people's interests at each local level through self-management, will allow eliminating all 
systemic shortfalls in social and economic development of each country. This condition, 
being the only one possible, will ensure security of the person, his/her neighbourhood, 
region, country and the world as a whole. 
This is the only way to solve the complex tasks of coordinating the joint activity of all 
economic agents and optimising their relationships in a fundamentally new social envi-
ronment. Thus, transition to the direct relationship between production and consumption 
makes it possible to exclude the root cause of the systemic crisis and shift to an evolution-
ary path towards the development goal. 
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Fig. 4. Representation of a new model of living arrangement 
Here is a diagram of a new model of living arrangement (Fig. 4). This is a new model of 
relations, and it must develop at each local level simultaneously. Information technologies 
adequate to these relations will allow creating a mechanism for coordination of the inter-
ests of the government (self-governing authorities), society and business with the interests 
of individuals towards the sole goal of creating an environment where each individual 
would be able to attain perfection. It is not without reason that Ervin Laszlo emphasizes in 
one of his articles that ‘deliberate movement towards a well-organized system of coopera-
tive communities that are focused on the common goals of maintaining the system of life 
on the planet is vital necessity’ (Laszlo 2012). More details on this model of living ar-
rangement can be found in other works of the author of this article (Bondarenko 2014b, 
2015a, 2015b).  
Using the existing and future digital additive technologies, any physical thing could be 
produced almost instantly. Wide availability of digital technologies in industry is already 
challenging the traditional business models specific to the mediated model of develop-
ment, since digital production rests on personalisation, that is, production for a ‘single-
person market’.  
These examples are fully indicative of the fact that the paradigm of human relations 
based on a mediated relationship between production and consumption has run dry with 
regard to flow, or mass, non-targeted production. This model is very costly and rather inef-
ficient, it has caused most of those negative and (in some cases) catastrophic consequences 
that we are witnessing today.  
That is, we already find evidence of the laws of the human society development iden-
tified theoretically through the worldview approach in life. 
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At the same time, there is another side of the digital revolution in industry and other 
areas, which increases the time between the need to achieve the objective development 
goal and today's reality dictated by the model of living arrangement. In other words, transi-
tion to a new unmediated paradigm of development will occur sooner or later, but it alone 
does not guarantee that this will happen to the benefit of a particular person for him/her to 
attain perfection. 
Thus, for example, US military experts engineered a technology for cooking food un-
der combat conditions using a 3D printer. American scientists, with the participation of a 
research team from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have designed a 3D printer 
capable of producing food according to pre-defined parameters. These parameters include 
calories, proteins, carbohydrates and vitamins, they consider preferences of soldiers and 
allow a bigger choice of food in the combat ration. Therefore, by using the 3D printing 
technology the US military seek to improve combat readiness, extend its potential and en-
hance military unit effectiveness.  
Another example. Today, in the light of the ongoing crisis and deterioration of pur-
chasing power, the existing retail sector, as one of the key elements of the mediated devel-
opment paradigm, is looking out for new ways to expand its impact and influence con-
sumers. Previously, NLP technologies were used to influence the customer, thus boosting 
sales and generating profit. Nowadays digital technologies have replaced them. They do 
not only include interactive digital assistants used for promotional purposes, but also 3D 
printers in e-commerce to print goods in a specially equipped delivery truck while on the 
way to customers (Fig. 5), promotion of cyber and wearable technologies, and technolo-
gies offering to carry your physical presence over into the virtual world using mirror touch 
screens. 
The need for such systems is supported by the fact that ‘the time lag between the re-
ceipt of an order and delivery of goods to the customer potentially decreases the level of 
customer satisfaction and has a negative impact on revenues’ (Quirk 2015). 
 
Fig. 5. 3D printing of goods in a specially equipped delivery truck while on the way 
to customers 
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On the one hand, this means a decrease in the demand for warehouse premises but, on the 
other hand, the stock of goods will become endless. That is, flow production of goods is 
drawing towards trade. Thus, the mediated development paradigm is supplied with new 
capabilities to survive on. 
However, the greatest hazard about prolonging the agony of the mediated develop-
ment paradigm does not belong to the aforementioned digital technologies. The hazard is 
that retailing becomes subject to virtual-reality technologies, promotion of wearable tech-
nologies, and technologies offering to carry your physical presence over into the virtual 
world using mirror touch screens (Bird 2015), and it becomes capable of influencing the 
mind of each customer individually. The Internet of Things (IoT) is gaining ground. This 
is a network that enables physical objects to communicate without requiring human inter-
action and mind. 
In retail, these technologies pursue the same objective of having impact on the human 
being so as to get the person trapped and promote sales. Digital technologies allow re-
membering the customer's search queries, which makes software more personalised when 
used often (Sinha-Roy and Richwine 2015).  
According to recent research conducted by ResponseTap, 73 per cent of respondents 
representing the business community stated the information on individual purchasing ex-
periences was of great importance. These days dominance is potentially assigned not to the 
Internet that offers human-to-human interaction, but the Internet of Things. The inventors 
of these systems believe that pretty soon big customer data are likely to transform to super 
data. Using them, the IoT technologies will be able to collect and interpret information, 
and send findings directly to marketing specialists. As we can see, all this predetermines 
artificial intelligence surpassing that of humans.  
Therefore, if we take a look at the retail sector, we can see that we are here also mov-
ing towards our own ‘singularity’. We refer to the point where the time between the origin 
of the need for some product and availability of this product for purchasing tends to zero, 
where the digital and physical retail worlds converge, and the borders disappear complete-
ly; when traditional stores become as ‘smart’ as their Internet peers (or even ‘smarter’); 
when purchasing data and history are instantly registered and stored by the system; and the 
level of Artificial Intelligence impresses customers all over, regardless where they decide 
to pick and buy products. Soon there will be no borders between offline and online trad-
ing, as the ‘retail singularity’ or, rather, technological singularity in commerce would 
sweep off all such borders on the way (Rees 2015). Is not what the American scientist 
Vernor Vinge wrote about in 1993 in his article ‘The Coming Technological Singularity: 
How to Survive in the Post-Human Era’, a topic also looked at by other scientists (Vinge 
1993; Hanson 1998], including Russian researchers (Novoselov 2001). According to 
Vinge, ‘singularity’ is to occur as soon as ‘in thirty years (i.e. in 2023), when technologies 
allow for superhuman intelligence creation. Shortly afterwards, the age of human suprem-
acy will inevitably come to an end’. Whatever the case, according to Vinge (and, by the 
way, Stephen Hawking and other prominent scientists, as well), we still have a long way to 
go to Apocalypse. But is it really only about moving to apocalypse? Whether Vinge and 
Stephen Hawking are right or not, we will uncover below.  
A similar situation that shows that the world stands on the brink of technological sin-
gularity is observed when ‘smart’ cities of the future are created. The first smart city ap-
peared in South Korea. This largest project for construction of a ‘smart’ city is called 
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Songdo. It is located on a man-made island. This grand project is being implemented by 
Cisco, 3M, Posco E&C and United Technology (IA Mico. Technologi 2014).  
Songdo was conceived to become an important business hub in North-East Asia, and 
the developers expect the city to attract many companies that wish to engage in trading 
and business activities in this region. Similar objectives are set when designing smart city 
concepts in other regions of the world. Such projects are included in the urban develop-
ment plans of China and India. Traditional cities and towns are growing “smarter”, as 
well. A new smart city called Innopolis is being created near Kazan in Russia. The devel-
opers pursue the same goal, i.e. to develop high-tech business (Shchukin 2015).  
But what makes smart cities different? All life-support systems in each building of a 
smart city intercommunicate through a single centre. A variety of robots and automated 
solutions are everywhere, including garbage collection, cleaning of skyscraper windows, 
traffic control, trading, etc. All this is done by smart machines, not people.  
A single network may power a fridge and a multi-cooker, traffic lights at an intersec-
tion and, say, automatic equipment at a power plant. City objects start living on their own 
with minimum human intervention. The weather station registers precipitation and a fall of 
temperature, while the signal from it is transmitted to the air conditioning system in every 
office making it adapt to a new regime, and the coffee machine makes hot coffee to meet 
you because your car has already communicated your arrival at the parking place. We can 
provide many more images, but we should not forget that it is not about an individual's 
way of life. It is rather about a streamlined housing and utilities infrastructure, security and 
life-support systems, etc. In other words, the purpose of smart cities is to create an envi-
ronment for businesses and scientists who invent high-tech systems, and to try out the 
smart city technologies for the sake of their subsequent roll-out in order to generate profit, 
but not the people who will inhabit them. 
This is why the smart city concept can boast of both supporters and critics today.  
The critics say that a smart city offers a human being a good many opportunities, but at the 
same time it makes him/her a small dot on a huge screen that displays where the person is, 
and what he/she is doing at any moment of time. According to Adam Greenfield, the au-
thor of ‘Against the Smart City’, the concept of a city as a huge high-performance robot is 
attractive for major IT companies, like IBM and Cisco, which look forward to big munici-
pal contracts. It is of no use to individuals and communities (Beresneva 2014).  
Using the example of Songdo, experts began to discuss another problem of a smart 
city, apart from continuous monitoring of every person, when the Control Centre provides 
images of people at every corner of the city, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It is the 
risk of so-called digital inequality. It turns out that complete integration into the urban en-
vironment is only available for a person who owns an advanced gadget with all applica-
tions installed. Citizens who do not have up-to-date smart phones for whatever reason be-
come deprived of most of their rights and find themselves disconnected from the vast ma-
jority of crucial processes. For example, in a smart city they will not be able to choose to 
make a payment either online or in the same old way through a bank office. They will not 
be able to buy a train ticket at a booking office or take advantage of any other opportuni-
ties.  
During the Future Cities Summit held in early December 2014 in London, many re-
ports were made on new technologies destined to change the living standards of the cities 
and their inhabitants, and quite a few smart city projects were presented, but there was also 
Globalistics and Globalization Studies 372
enough criticism of the idea itself. It may be worth taking notice of the opinion expressed 
by Jonathan Rez from the University of New South Wales quoted by The Guardian. ‘Ar-
chitects engaged in the planning of cities of the future should employ psychologists and 
ethnographers as part of their teams’, he says. ‘What is a city if not people?’ (Beresneva 
2014). 
Finally, experts are apprehensive about situations that may occur once the software is 
out of order. How will such a city carry on without the Internet or in case of a power 
blackout? 
Besides, Russia demonstrates currently a discernible trend towards the ideas of a digi-
tal revolution. We can imagine how dangerous these digital technologies, nano-, bio- and 
cognitive technologies, virtual reality, development of the Internet of Things, creation of 
smart cities, and other artificial intelligence technologies are. Digital inequality will be-
come more severe, and other adverse effects will show up, if these technologies are widely 
used not just within the existing paradigm of development, but also the new one, and if the 
humankind does not recognize the objective development goal.  
This problem could only be solved if ‘technological singularity’ is complemented with 
a singularity in shaping a new model of living arrangement. Combined, they will allow 
achieving a ‘humanistic singularity’ or, rather, accelerating penetration into the area of 
‘singularity’, where the time between the achievement of the development goal and the 
reality for each particular person and society will tend to zero in every possible way. Most 
regrettably, nobody addresses the need for remaking the fundamentals of the human socie-
ty, i.e. the creation of a new model of human relations, a new model of living arrange-
ments that would be adequate to the technologies of the 21st century. 
The Paths to Attaining the Balance of Technological and  
Social Changes  
The most important thing that we have derived from the worldview approach is that it 
helps to define the fundamental concept of the new model of living arrangement and to 
substantiate the need for and possibility of the development and implementation of the 
MEGAPROJECT titled ‘The Territory of Advanced Development: for the Good of  
the People’. The core idea of the Megaproject in solving the strategic goals is to build up  
a new basis at each local level in any country of the world simultaneously, i.e. new direct 
human relations adequate to the technologies of the 21st century, and a mechanism for 
their implementation through real-time coordination of the interests of the government, 
community and business with the interests of an individual. This is the shortest practicable 
way to the desired future. Why? Because while every individual represents being a cus-
tomer and a consumer of all the goods, at the same time represents the government, busi-
ness or civil society, and as the time between the arising of the need for achievement of the 
goal and the fulfilment of this need decreases, the interests will increasingly match. 
One of the examples of well-coordinated interests is the launch of the online project 
Active Citizen in Moscow, which is at its early stage of development as of yet (IA Mos.ru 
2015). The Project invites every Muscovite to take part in urban management and helps 
authorities to make the decisions that most inhabitants of the capital city look forward to. 
The initiators of the Project believe that having experienced the effect of online referen-
dum once, Muscovites will never refuse from the service voluntarily and will not let the 
authorities to wind it down.  
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When addressing the tactical tasks of the Megaproject, the key issue is the following: 
1. For Russia: the project can be developed by scientists from all institutes of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences, which is a motivation for the further existence of the RAS.  
In this connection, we should remember the GOELRO megaproject (the early 1920s) for 
the throughout electrification of Russia, which was accomplished most efficiently and suc-
cessfully.  
2. Globally: an international interdisciplinary team of scientists and practitioners could 
be created to develop the Megaproject with the involvement of the global intellectual 
community in the development of the proposed model where people are united by a net-
work, possibly under the auspices of the UN. Given that in September 2015 in New York 
the international community has approved a new set of goals for sustainable development 
for the next 15 years and the Sustainable Development Agenda (UN 2015), it is crucial for 
all humankind that from the very beginning this set of goals should be considered as part 
of the objective development goal, now that the global demographic development and 
scarcity of natural resources are increasingly problematic (Ibidem).  
3. The pilot project should also be implemented under the auspices of the United Na-
tions locally in different countries, and, once tested and improved, the transfer of the new 
model of living arrangement to the entire world should be ensured. The collective shaping 
of a new model of living arrangement is the message Russia could send out to the world. 
The project could be integrated into the UN Sustainable Development Agenda. It could be 
part of sections like the one regarding social contracts, for example. This will help to en-
sure social protection and not only to provide basic public services in the fields of 
healthcare, education, power, water supply and sewage, but also to make available the ac-
cess to the entire circle of physical and spiritual human needs for each particular individu-
al, not for all people in an abstract way. Moreover, implementation of this project will al-
low to achieve the whole set of goals previously approved by the UN for the first time in 
history, as well as to guarantee the respect of human rights set out in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly back in 1948. 
4. The proposed project may also become an integral part of a new global infrastruc-
ture of the United Nations, a forum aimed not only at stimulating investment in infrastruc-
ture to ensure sustainable development, but also at effective investment management with 
minimum resources and maximum result, which will ensure overall implementation of the 
ideas for protection and conservation of our planet and natural resources, biodiversity and 
climate.  
5. If the project is supported by the UN, the Technology Facilitation Mechanism stipu-
lated in the Agenda will apply, which opens new horizons and facilitates the development, 
transfer and extensive use of corresponding technologies. It is not a coincidence that we 
have already written in our book titled ‘Forecasting Future: a New Paradigm’ (published 
in 2008) that the issue of the UN transformation as an institution for coordinating the in-
terests of humankind at a global level is extremely important. The key objective of the 
UN, or any other institution established under the UN, will be the provision of a dedicated 
structure to accumulate all knowledge, from the origin of humankind to the present day, 
and especially the knowledge received from the future. From this database of scientific 
and technical information, one will be able to retrieve any piece of knowledge for the pur-
pose of building technological connections between the origin of a particular person's need 
and its fulfilment in any point of the planet, which ensures increasing synchronization of 
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all processes in space and their continuous decrease in time. The missing knowledge dic-
tated the need to continue the R&D in the respective spheres (Fetisov and Bondarenko 
2008).  
6. The UN-supported partnership of the government, business, society and an individ-
ual brought together in the pursuit of common goals at each national and supranational 
level gives hope that the theory and practice of solving the issue of sustainable develop-
ment will coincide in time and space. Most importantly, when considering the interests of 
each human being, there is real hope that the effective resolution of challenges faced by 
any country of the world is subject to every inhabitant, and efforts will be made to facili-
tate it. 
Conclusion 
The change of development paradigm is an objective process. However, the outcomes of 
this change may vary depending on the dominant model of living arrangement that will be 
the first to achieve ‘singularity’, i.e. the point of no return. 
Model option 1. The development occurs in a conscious way in the interests of a lim-
ited group of people towards their goal. There is a discernible trend for ‘technological sin-
gularity’ that stems from artificial intelligence and technologies for manipulation and con-
trol of human consciousness. The ultimate goal is to take control over the world. It does 
not match the objective development goal. The future where the time of achievement of 
the objective goal equals zero will never happen. We are edging towards an apocalypse. 
Model option 2. Goals may be chosen in a conscious or unconscious way, and intrin-
sically they may constitute subgoals of a higher goal, i.e. the objective goal of develop-
ment. Simultaneously, a limited group of people set their own goals. The two groups are 
moving in different directions. The development towards the objective goals occurs by 
trial and error. Therefore, in this case the future is uncertain, i.e. the time of achievement 
of goal ‘singularity’ may or may not come. But this will be much extended in time and 
accompanied by significant human and resource losses, and may also lead to an apoca-
lypse. 
Model option 3. The development occurs in a conscious way towards the objective 
goal and in the interests of each particular human being living on the Earth. Focus on the 
interests of an individual and coordination of these interests in real time through produc-
tion at request without unnecessary produce is the only possible prerequisite for sustaina-
ble development toward the goal. In this case, technological singularity is synchronized 
with singularity in shaping new human relations, and their understanding of the need for 
evolutionary and irreversible progression towards the point where the time of goal 
achievement equals zero. 
Thus, the new development paradigm and the benefits of the digital revolution in in-
dustry, all other areas and everyday life will only do the humankind good if there is simul-
taneous creation of a new model of human relations objectively aimed at development for 
the sake of a particular person and his/her attaining the Supreme Intelligence. In all other 
options, mankind is headed towards an apocalypse. It is not without reason that Ervin 
Laszlo notes in his article ‘Global Bifurcation: The Decision Window’ that ‘[w]e have 
reached a watershed in our social and cultural evolution. The sciences of systems tell us 
that when complex open systems ... approach a condition of critical instability, they face  
a moment of truth: they either transform or break down’ (Laszlo 2011).  
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This is why it is important to comprehend that a change in the development paradigm 
will cause the creation of a real-time mechanism for coordination of the interests of the 
government, society, business and an individual through production at request without 
unnecessary produce as the only possible prerequisite for sustainable development towards 
the goal. Given that, the prerequisite for balanced technological and socio-economic 
changes in real time as the basis for eliminating the root cause of the crisis is to recognize 
and accept objectivity of the human society development goal, which is the creation of an 
environment where every individual would be able to attain perfection! 
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This article investigates the transition from the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The authors have set an objec-
tive to demonstrate that sustainable development as a future form of development 
of civilization from the very beginning had a ‘target orientation’ and anticipated 
realization and staging of the whole hierarchy of objectives needed for the estab-
lishment of an effective global governance. In the future, global development in its 
‘anthropogenic’ aspect will be to implement the goals and principles of SD, which 
will be updated with each new stage of the implementation of this kind of socio-
natural evolution. 
The paper argues the position that the concept of SD should be radically 
transformed into a ‘global dimension’. Attention is drawn to the fact that Russia 
recognized another distant, but very important in the conceptual and theoretical 
perspective, global goal of ‘sustainable transition’ – formation of the noosphere. 
Keywords: biosphere, ecological problems, global development, global govern-
ance, MDGs, noosphere, SDGs, security, sustainable development, UN. 
Introduction 
After the United Nations conference on environment and development (UNCED) held in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992, humanity set a goal of transferring from spontaneous and unregu-
lated development to conscious and purposeful socio-natural sustainable development, 
which is the main way of survival. The sustainable development (further denoted as SD), 
which is supposed to become rationally directed at the planetary scale, is understood as the 
most reasonable and safe type of socio-natural evolution, aiming at maintenance of civili-
zation and biosphere, their co-existence and co-evolution.  
The book Our Common Future, also known as the Bruntland Report and devoted to 
justifying the need for transition to sustainable development, gave the following definition 
of SD referring to the future: ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’. In fact, this definition contains the main goal of transition to sustainable de-
velopment – survival and securing human existence for indefinite long-term future.  
The notion of global sustainability also implies ensuring equity with regard to generations, 
so that the future world is comfortably habitable for the future generations. Along with 
this, sustainability in a broad sense, as emphasized in many UN documents, should serve 
as a fundamental principle for all aspects of development and in every society. 
The preservation of biosphere and its co-evolution with civilization will create the 
fundamental conditions and perspectives that will form a completely new ‘nature – socie-
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ty’ system which implements a sustainable development strategy ensuring our common 
future on the planet and outside its boundaries – in perspective of space exploration. 
Preservation of the Earth biosphere also counts as one of the main goals of transition to 
SD. But not only it is a goal, but if achieved, it is a natural foundation for sustainable de-
velopment as a consecutively evolving new socio-natural global process. The most ac-
ceptable scenario of the future of our planet and mankind living on it involves the preser-
vation of the biosphere as the natural basis of existence of all living and intelligent organ-
isms. If taking globally – coordinated actions manages to preserve the biosphere, there will 
be a real possibility of the survival of civilization and its permanent development, not only 
in the next few centuries, but also for the indefinite future. 
The problematics of transition from MDGs to SDGs is very urgent and important and 
this article continues the topic that has been discussed in an earlier article published in the 
journal (Mironenko et al. 2015). 
Towards Establishment of SDGs by 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a continuation of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), which allocated eight priority goals for international development. 
The development of MDGs was based on eight chapters of the UN Millennium Declara-
tion, signed in September 2000. They were adopted by the UN member-states and had to 
be mostly achieved by 2015. One of the main features of the MDGs is their focus on a lim-
ited set of specific targets and human development goals: eradicating poverty and hunger, 
achieving universal access to primary education, reducing child and maternal mortality 
and improving maternal health, promoting gender equality and empowering women, com-
bat HIV / AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and 
creating global partnership for development. MDGs concerned eight development areas, 
which, by the way, were not formally bound to SD (except for the environmental goals).  
The UN's directory believes that impressive success has been achieved in reaching 
many of the global development goals, expressed in the Millennium Development Goals. 
As it was mentioned by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in a foreword to  
‘The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015’: 
The global mobilization behind the Millennium Development Goals has pro-
duced the most successful anti-poverty movement in history. The landmark 
commitment entered into by world leaders in the year 2000 – to ‘spare no effort 
to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing 
conditions of extreme poverty’ – was translated into an inspiring framework of 
eight goals and, then, into wide-ranging practical steps that have enabled people 
across the world to improve their lives and their future prospects. The MDGs 
helped to lift more than one billion people out of extreme poverty, to make in-
roads against hunger, to enable more girls to attend school than ever before and 
to protect our planet. They generated new and innovative partnerships, galva-
nized public opinion and showed the immense value of setting ambitious goals. 
By putting people and their immediate needs at the forefront, the MDGs re-
shaped decision-making in developed and developing countries alike.  
As it is believed in the UN, MDGs have become one of the most successful global 
campaigns to fight poverty in human history. These goals have gained extraordinary popu-
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larity, helping to set global and national priorities and directing the action at the local lev-
el, increasing awareness and forming a vision of the future, while remaining comprehen-
sive framework for the development activities at the global level. The MDGs aimed at re-
ducing poverty, improving access to safe drinking water and improving the lives of 
200 million slum dwellers are already met. The share of children enrolled in primary 
school has increased while maintaining parity between boys and girls. Child mortality has 
reduced dramatically, and targeted investments in the fight against malaria, HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis have saved millions of lives. 
And yet it is quite an optimistic point of view, since the achievement of the MDGs 
took place with great difficulties and inconsistency and not in all countries (Ovcharova 
2015). Also, the implementation of the MDGs was uneven: some countries have already 
achieved many of them, while the others have not started any of them yet. The most spec-
tacular success on this way was achieved in China and India. But in Africa, in least devel-
oped countries, in the developing landlocked countries and small-island developing states, 
this success was very insignificant. Some of the Millennium Development Goals, allocated 
in the Millennium Declaration have not been achieved, in particular goals relating to ma-
ternal, newborn, and reproductive health. Continuing the Millennium Development Goals 
beyond 2015, the SDGs are built on the foundations laid by the MDGs, concluding num-
ber of goals mentioned there, especially in terms of helping the most vulnerable countries, 
but at the same time the SDGs will also respond to the new global challenges and risks 
(Ovcharova 2015). 
SDGs, adopted in Agenda-2030, include 17 goals for sustainable development and 
169 related targets, complex and indivisible that create a set of global priorities and pa-
rameters of sustainability.  
Table 1. Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals 
Millennium Development 
Goals (2000–2015) Sustainable Development Goals (2016–2030) 
1 2 
1. To eradicate extreme pov-
erty and hunger. 
2. To achieve universal pri-
mary education. 
3. To promote gender equali-
ty and empower women. 
4. To reduce child mortality. 
5. To improve maternal 
health. 
6. To combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, and other diseases. 
7. To ensure environmental 
sustainability. 
8. To develop a global part-
nership for development. 
1.  To end poverty in all its forms everywhere. 
2. To end hunger, achieve food security and improved 
nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture. 
3. To ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all 
at all ages. 
4. To ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and 
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. 
5. To achieve gender equality and empower all women 
and girls. 
6. To ensure availability and sustainable management of 
water and sanitation for all. 
7. To ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
clean energy for all. 
8. To promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable eco-
nomic growth, full and productive employment and decent 
work for all. 
9. To build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and 
sustainable industrialization and foster innovation. 
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1 2 
 10. To reduce inequality within and among countries.To 
make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient 
and sustainable. 
11. To ensure sustainable consumption and production 
patterns. 
12. To take urgent action to combat climate change and its 
impacts. 
13. To conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources for sustainable development. 
14. To protect, restore and promote sustainable use of ter-
restrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat 
desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and 
halt biodiversity loss. 
15. To promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sus-
tainable development, provide access to justice for all and 
build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all 
levels. 
To strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize 
the global partnership for sustainable development 
The approach to the establishment of the SDGs was framed not only by logical considera-
tions, but also by chose considerations regarding negotiation and consensus processes and 
anticipated development of a common framework and a system of universal goals applica-
ble to all countries, taking into account different national circumstances, capacities, needs, 
priorities, and in accordance with national objectives, strategies and priorities of SD.  
The most common and priority goals of sustainable development, which will bring the 
maximum benefit to both present and future generations, are already included in Agenda 
2030. 
This Agenda also recognizes the importance of regional and sub-regional factors, in-
teraction in the field of sustainable development, as regional and sub-regional programs 
will contribute to the effective implementation of sustainable development strategies into 
specific actions at national levels. In this regard, all the UN Member States are expected  
to develop a long term national programs covering all aspects of the implementation of the 
new Agenda for SD as soon as possible. These strategies are meant to support the transi-
tion to sustainable development and be based on existing planning instruments such as 
national development strategies and sustainable development strategies, depending on the 
circumstances. Moreover, it is assumed that both general and other SD concepts will 
evolve over time, taking into account emerging issues and new research methodologies.  
While analyzing the SDGs expressed in the Agenda-2030, one gets the impression that 
there has not yet been any significant ideological and conceptual renovation, and even 
more – no theoretical innovation breakthrough. Implicitly, it is assumed that the desired 
concept of SD for the whole world has already been created, and the only problem left is 
its implementation, only changing the development goals after some period of time (ap-
parently, it will be a fifteen-year period). Changing the SDGs in the long run, of course, 
does affect the general understanding of sustainable development and the prospects for its 
implementation, but it is also important to pay special attention to the conceptual trans-
formations affecting the actors' worldview on the movement towards global sustainability.  
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Meanwhile, the imperfection of the modern concept of SD appears to be one of the se-
rious reasons why humankind cannot move fast enough in the direction of its survival, 
which depends not only on environmental factors, which is clearly demonstrated by cur-
rent aggravated geopolitical situation, which has led to new alignment forces in the world. 
Some researchers point out the narrowness of the three-pillar approach to SD and offer to 
convert it into a more comprehensive theory (Ott and Thapa 2003). American scientist 
Robert W. Kates also believes that the current concept of sustainable development needs 
further expansion and development, and environmental component must be regarded as no 
less important than the others (Kates et al. 2005). The author sees the model of sustainable 
development (including its environmental, economic and social pillars) as a set of clear 
and transparent principles of social and natural approaches to development, including the 
protection of natural resources and awareness of responsibility for future generations.  
The first report by the UN System Task Team on the post-2015 development agenda 
‘Realizing the Future We Want’ was released in June 2012, during the discussions of the 
agenda, broadly launched several years before 2015. This report featured not three, but 
already four fundamental dimensions of global vision of sustainable development strategy, 
namely: inclusive social development, inclusive economic development, environmental 
sustainability and peace and security.  
The fourth dimension turned out to be of extreme importance. Indeed, as mentioned in 
this report, at least one fifth of the world population lives in countries affected by violence, 
political conflicts, insecurity and social vulnerability. Moreover, none of the countries ex-
periencing high levels of violence or vulnerability has achieved at least one of the MDGs. 
The level of poverty in countries with extremely high level of violence is more than 
20 percentage points above the average. A much higher level of malnutrition, lack of edu-
cation, high level of infant mortality, high share of households consisting of unmarried 
women with young children, a lack of clean drinking water and basic sanitation services 
are also observed in the vulnerable and conflict-affected countries.   
It is pertinent to note, the SDGs already failed to implement a four-dimensional vision 
of the SD, as all the goals expressed have already been distributed among ‘regular’ three 
dimensions. And in this regard, at least it seems strange that the goal to achieve interna-
tional peace and security was not included in the SDGs, and for this goal the United Na-
tions Organization was initially established. At the UN Sustainable Development Summit, 
the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko as well as many other guests started his 
speech with the issue of global peace and security, because one of the key obstacles of 
implementing the SD strategy has always been the abundance of military conflicts and 
crises, which significantly undermine the progress made. The issues of peace and security, 
including freedom from political persecution, discrimination and all forms of violence, are 
crucial to the development and are one of its main components. One can only assume why 
such a goal was not included in the SDGs, although it is clear that SD should be the safest 
type of human development, ensuring its continuing existence. It is important to analyze 
the security problem from the standpoint of global and interdisciplinary research and to 
ensure the formation of a unified methodology issues and concepts of security studies in 
connection with the expanded interpretation of sustainable development. After all, security 
and development (referring to the progressive development) are guiding principles for the 
higher forms of material systems (Ursul A., Ursul T., and Ivanov 2014).  
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Ensuring peace and security aims to save and preserve a particular object (primarily 
the individual, society and the state), while sustainable development aims at its further, but 
safe progressive development. Merging into a single system providing various types of 
security and non-regressive forms of development turns a real multi-vector development 
into the safest progressive evolution, and security, in turn, begins to be provided through 
sustainable development in its broadest sense.  
Shaping a global world is associated with the emergence of new threats and dangers of 
planetary scale, which can cause man-made global catastrophe. There is a need for expo-
sure to globalization and other global processes through sustainable development, focused 
on comprehensive security and the survival of civilization. Moreover, in the above men-
tioned report ‘Realizing the Future We Want’ the main task of the United Nations Devel-
opment Program for the period after 2015 was seen in the fact that globalization becomes 
a positive force for all peoples of the world for present and future generations. It was noted 
that globalization offers great opportunities, but its benefit is currently distributed very 
unevenly. Constant aspiration to improve the material well-being threatens to exceed the 
capabilities of the resource base without a radical shift towards more sustainable patterns 
of consumption, production and use of resources. And remaining inequalities in the distri-
bution of income and resources, and competition for scarce resources are key causes of 
conflict, famine, insecurity and violence, which, in turn, hinder human development and 
efforts to achieve SD.  
In the future global world with sustainable development, the national and global secu-
rity will be mainly provided not through the defense, as it is in the present, but mainly 
through the SD as the most secure development that will contribute to the consolidation of 
positive and reduce the negative effects of global trends and development (Ilyin, Ursul A., 
and Ursul Т. 2015). In the transition to sustainable development, the security ceases to be 
only one of the conditions of development, but becomes its necessary part. However, it 
also works in the opposite direction: the development, which is in this case non-regressive, 
is an essential component of security that derives its expression in the form of the phrase 
‘security through sustainable development’, acting as the main conceptual idea of Russia's 
national security for the foreseeable future, and not only for our country, that has made an 
important step on the way to secure a sustainable future, but also for the entire world 
community (Ilyin, Ursul A., and Ursul Т. 2015). 
The implementation of the development program after 2015 will significantly depend 
on the governance efficiency at the national, local and municipal levels. Increased negative 
trends, challenges and dangers are now associated with chaotic deployment of globaliza-
tion and other global processes; and, what is now becoming evident, it is necessary to es-
tablish effective global governance to promote SDGs. Global governance is becoming the 
new mechanism of the further development of civilization, which can ensure its further 
progressive development, prevent crises and disasters, acute global problems and in-
creased negative trends on a planetary scale.  
The content, methods and social technologies that all together form the SDGs, can be 
heavily criticized in the same manner they repeatedly voiced criticism over the MDGs. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of the SDGs and especially their implementation should have  
a positive impact on the future of all mankind, to make it more acceptable and safe for 
everyone. 
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SDGs as Continuation and Development of the MDGs 
Today the concept of the MDGs may seem to be pretentious, especially after the adoption 
of SDGs. It became apparent that those goals would not only grow in number, but also 
they would not once undergo radical transformations this century, not to mention the mil-
lennium. However, since the adoption of these goals for the first time took place at the turn 
of the millennium, it seemed that the name ‘MDGs’ looked very good and promising. 
SDGs, continuing the ‘target’ approach does not claim to actually span for thousand years, 
it seems to be more appropriate, not only in terms of the name but also in terms of adopted 
goals and targets. 
It is worth mentioning that a new agenda on SD joined the ‘traditional’ approach to 
the SD strategy, which was typical for the first three summits on sustainable development 
since 1992, and used ‘target’ approach outlined in the MDGs at the Millennium Summit as 
well. A specific monitoring process had been organized for each of these documents, and 
related reports and other materials had been published, as if they were two unrelated pro-
cesses. It is possible that up to a certain point in time the UN leadership for a long time 
had not realized the very close relations between these processes, but then realized the ne-
cessity of their unification.  
The integration of these two approaches to the vision of the future development was 
outlined in Paragraph 246 of the outcome document of the Rio + 20 ‘The Future We 
Want’. A connection between this document (and in general all the ‘Rio process’) and the 
Millennium Development Goals, adopted at the Earth Summit in 2000, is indicated there. 
The paragraph says: 
We recognize that the development of goals could also be useful for pursuing 
focused and coherent action on sustainable development. … The goals 
should address and incorporate in a balanced way all three dimensions of 
sustainable development and their interlinkages. They should be coherent 
with and integrated into the United Nations development agenda beyond 
2015, thus contributing to the achievement of sustainable development and 
serving as a driver for implementation and mainstreaming of sustainable de-
velopment in the United Nations system as a whole. The development of 
these goals should not divert focus or effort from the achievement of the Mil-
lennium Development Goals. 
Paragraph 249 of this document states that the movement towards SD ‘needs to be co-
ordinated and coherent with the processes to consider the post-2015 development agenda’. 
Therefore, these two paragraphs of the final ‘Rio + 20’ outcome document together laid 
the foundation of the unification of the development program, expressed in the SDGs and 
the final report ‘Future We Want’. Also during the Rio + 20 conference, it was agreed that 
‘sustainable development goals should be action oriented, concise and easy to communi-
cate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature and universally applicable to all 
countries while taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of de-
velopment and respecting national policies and priorities’. 
SDGs unlike the MDGs are much more complex and significantly affect the concept 
of development aid. A distinctive feature of the adopted Agenda 2030 is the fact that it 
affects not only developing countries but also the already developed ones. In order to 
achieve these goals it is necessary that the developed states not only provide the develop-
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ing ones with financial aid, but also take political decisions and steps to reform its own 
institutions. On the eve of the adoption of the Agenda, the Sustainable Development Solu-
tions Network established by the UN Secretary General, prepared a report that analyzed 
how developed countries fulfilled the criteria of sustainable development (Kroll 2015). 
The report showed that only five states (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Switzer-
land) had already achieved all of the 17 SDGs, while the rest of the countries were left 
behind. The most serious challenges for the developed countries include: sustainable 
growth and employment for all, sustainable consumption, climate change mitigation and 
income equality.  
Inclusion of the SDG number 10 ‘To reduce inequality within and among countries’ is 
not only the consequence of heated debates over increased inequality, but also an indicator 
that shows that the international community is to find a new balance between the concepts 
of the welfare state and the liberal state. A number of studies, particularly conducted by 
the Oxfam Group in 2015, proved that without significant government regulation, as well 
as without a carefully thought-out framework conditions created by the state, social ine-
quality would continue to increasingly hamper sustainable economic growth which will 
result in the uncontrolled social problems in both developing and already developed coun-
tries. However, while the developed countries need reforms most obviously in the social 
sector, the developing countries first need to establish economic freedom. 
As it was mentioned before, the key peculiarity of the newly adopted Goals is to re-
evaluate the concept of development aid. Previously, with the emergence of the concept of 
development aid or financing for development, and up to this day, it was assumed that the 
global community was divided into two groups – the developed countries and developing 
countries, and that the first group has to provide the second one with financial aid in order 
to enable developing countries to move into the category of developed, thus, implying that 
development aid is only a temporary set of measures.  
But decades of such practice have shown that this approach to development aid is im-
possible. It was found out that financing for development indeed improves living condi-
tions and alleviates suffering of millions of people, but it does not radically change the 
entire situation, and does not solve the backlog and weak economic development issue 
(Easterly 2001). This conclusion is confirmed by the experience of transition of some de-
veloping countries into the group of developed countries, which is basically explained by a 
number of other reasons and not development aid. As a result of active discussions and 
practice of development aid one can see that financing for development is only a support-
ing element while the key to successful growth and development of society (as reflected in 
Agenda 2030) lies in the effective state policy and the proper functioning of international 
institutions and organizations, in the first place – financial and trade organization. Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Develop-
ment pays close attention to the functioning of such institutions.  
In addition to the abovementioned, one should note that the approach to development 
aid has also changed in different ways. Many experts point out that in the new millennium, 
not only states play the key role in the movement towards SD, but also individuals, corpo-
rations and companies that invest considerably in the third world countries development 
(Kharas 2007). Consequently, the SDGs have been developed not only for governments 
and heads of state, but also for other players – companies, private foundations, philanthro-
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pists, and so on. The number of actors in this ‘sustainability process’ has also increased 
due to the implementation of the South-South cooperation projects, which do not replace, 
but complement North-South cooperation and are implemented by those developing coun-
tries that are not part of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. So, at the 
70th UN General Assembly, China announced its intention to invest up to $12 bln into the 
least developed countries until 2030. 
Since the adoption of the MDGs the ideas of what measures should be attributed to the 
process of development assistance and which are not have also changed, as the economic 
development of developing countries is influenced by a combination of factors, such as 
foreign direct investment, debt relief, credit system, etc. Therefore, the OECD has intro-
duced the concept of ‘total official support for sustainable development’ which covers a 
large number of sources of financing developing countries than the notion of ‘official de-
velopment assistance’, that has been used up to the present day.  
The new concept of evaluating the efficiency of development can lead to the creation 
of new tools for the states to monitor their own development. However, it is too early to 
draw conclusions whether such categories as ‘social equality’ or ‘environmental protection 
in the near future’ may be equal in importance to economic indicators when assessing the 
development of the state. 
It still remains unclear how the UN and OECD will cooperate. In the past few dec-
ades, the United Nations took responsibility for the development of action agenda and for 
goals establishment, while the OECD was responsible for the development of applied is-
sues and statistics. But given the increasing number of actors of the development aid as 
well as the increasing number of Goals and evaluation indicators, the commitments that 
the United Nations will have to take also grow in number.  
The MDGs had previously been criticized for several reasons, but one can hardly 
overstate or overestimate the potential of the SDGs. Firstly, the MDGs contradicted them-
selves (Goal number three ‘To promote gender equality and empower women’ cannot be 
possible without realization of the Goals number two ‘To achieve universal primary edu-
cation’, because in certain aspects these two goals correspond to each other). Secondly, the 
included targets are utopian for some states since only a complete solution of the problem 
and not a relative progress was recognized as a success. Because of this position, the pro-
motion of a number of African countries to the path to sustainable development is left 
without proper assessment (Easterly 2009). The mismatch between the official statements 
and the implementation of the Action Plan into practice is often subjected to criticism, for 
example in terms of increased funding for developing countries from developed ones, ad-
dressing critical issues and challenges in the near future. For example, China has agreed to 
invest heavily in the development of non-least developed countries which are commercial-
ly advantageous for national business. Such criticism is valid for a number of other devel-
oped countries. Another example is the reduction in funding of camps for the Syrian refu-
gees in recent months, which also does not meet the statements of officials.  
Some Differences between the MDGs and the SDGs  
The UN Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda identified in 2012 advantages 
and shortcomings of the MDGs. Due to the concentration on the performance of a small 
number of problems, some of the components of the MDGs were underestimated. At the 
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stage of implementation, it became clear that some targets were not delivered properly. 
For example, in some areas the demographic changes were underestimated as well as the 
respective scope of social problems (e.g., the share of urban population living in slums) 
were also underestimated. Moreover, the emphasis on global goals led to the disregard of 
national circumstances and differences in the initial conditions of different nations. This 
caused the failure, even in the cases when the achieved results have been significant, but 
did not provide the achievement of global goals, as is the case with the African countries. 
In addition, the MDGs did not address issues of manufacturing employment, violence 
against women, social protection, inequality, social exclusion, biodiversity, chronic malnu-
trition and an increase in non-communicable diseases, reproductive health and the chal-
lenges associated with demographic dynamics, peace and security, governance, rule of law 
and human rights. The MDGs paid insufficient attention to the exposure to natural disas-
ters and other external crises, which caused gaps in the achievement of the MDGs.  
Several goals and targets related to the global partnership for development were iden-
tified inaccurately, thereby weakening the responsibility of the promised international 
support in the implementation of the MDG framework. Many of the commitments made 
by the international community, remained unfulfilled. Important obstacles on the path to 
sustainable and inclusive development remain in many developing countries: lack of ac-
cess to financing for development sources, export markets, technologies and medicines. 
The global economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 and its aftermath have revealed 
serious shortcomings of multilateral mechanisms to minimize and overcome the shocks 
caused by the instability of world markets.  
Here, still continuing to identify differences between SDGs and MDGs, we do not lay 
claim to completeness, and we only dwell on some of them, which seemed to us the most 
obvious and significant. In fact, this is the setting of the problem (and the same research 
can be conducted in the future regarding the Agenda-1992 and Agenda-2030). Now we are 
going to highlight the following differences between the two documents: 
1. First of all, let us pay attention to the fact that the MDGs mainly concentrated on 
development in its broad sense, while the SDGs only focused on Sustainable Develop-
ment. And this is quite significant: now the SDGs are going to the full extent implement 
the strategy of sustainable development, but not only because there is a greater number of 
just the Goals. No less important is the fact that the change of the term ‘development’ to 
the concept of ‘sustainable development’ means that the action and efforts on the contin-
uation of unsustainable development will no longer be promoted. Although in fact the 
MDGs actually ‘worked’ mostly for the SD, however, formally it was not their main goal 
to focus on this type of development and this made the poor informed population believe 
that everything is as usual, that society only needs to operate a little better and fairer. 
2. The MDGs until 2015 have been developed and adopted for the development of 
the world community on the way to solve global problems such as hunger, extreme pov-
erty, gender and social inequality, and so on (MDG 4 ‘To reduce child mortality’, MDG 5 
‘To combat HIV / AIDS, malaria and other diseases’), while the SDGs seek to completely 
solve them (SDG 5 ‘To achieve gender equality ...’, SDG1 ‘To end poverty… every-
where…’ etc.). The final solution to the problems requires full concentration on the task of 
empowerment of the poorest and most inaccessible countries. 
3. The SDGs are more universal. The MDGs related only to developing countries, 
while the SDGs are applicable to all countries in the world, regardless of their level of so-
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cio-economic development. Therefore, all states face both common and individual chal-
lenges in the implementation of many aspects of sustainable development strategies.  
4. A number of SDGs continue MDGs dividing the already established goals into 
targets, highlighting the ones of the utmost priority. However, the SDGs are more exten-
sive than the MDGs. In contrast to the eight MDGs, 17 SDGs go beyond the issues of 
poverty, health and environment. Agenda-2030 focuses on democratic governance, access 
to justice and the integrity of the person (SDG 16), as well as on the revitalization of glob-
al partnership for sustainable development (SDG 17). Thus, the Legal Research Center 
also affects issues related to human rights, including political, cultural, economic, social 
and civil rights and the right of development. 
5.  SDGs take into consideration all the three pillars of the fight against hunger rec-
ognized by the ‘Hunger Project’, which were largely ignored by the MDGs – empowering 
women, mobilizing everyone, and partnering with local government. The SDGs address 
these crucial components much more effectively, with far stronger gender goals, people's 
participation and government ‘at all levels’.  
6. We also call attention to the division of the goals related to hunger and poverty. 
The MDG concepts of hunger and poverty are linked together: the MDG 1 ‘To eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger’, suggesting that the solution to one problem solves another 
automatically. Since then, the food problem has been studied from different positions and 
prospects and now the SDGs divide problems of poverty and food security. 
7. In contrast to the MDGs, the SDGs, in some way, do tackle the issues of maintain-
ing peace and security, but only in certain spheres. Inclusion of the peace-keeping process 
into the list of priorities for the sustainable development (ensure food security, make cities 
and towns safe, promote the establishment of peace and free from social societies barriers 
for sustainable development) – is an important step towards achieving the goals, which 
was not mentioned in the MDGs. Over the past 15 years the world has witnessed that 
peaceful and reasonably well-governed countries prosper. After 2015, it is expected that a 
significant part of the population living in extreme poverty will inhabit mainly the states 
which are someway affected by armed conflicts. However, as already mentioned above, 
the problem of peace and security, unfortunately, did not become one of the most im-
portant of the MDGs, meanwhile we consider it to be of utmost importance. 
8. It is important to pay attention to the problems of monitoring, evaluation and re-
porting. The Millennium Declaration says nothing about monitoring, assessment and  
reporting of realization of the MDGs. In contrast, SDG 17, Task 18 mentions the problem 
saying that 
By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including 
for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase sig-
nificantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated 
by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic 
location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts. 
9. The MDGs focused on quantitative indicators with regard to access to education 
(and then only to the primary one), not noticing the fall of the level of education in certain 
countries and entire regions. SDGs are the first attempt of the international community to 
put into focus the quality of education, learning process and the role of education in 
achieving a more humane and sustainable world. 
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By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to 
promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education 
for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender 
equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship 
and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable 
development (SDG 4, Task 7).  
The Formation of Noosphere as a Sustainable Development Goal 
Already adopted in Russia ‘Concept for the Transition of the Russian Federation to Sus-
tainable Development’ claims that ‘in the long run the movement towards sustainable de-
velopment of humankind will lead to the formation of the sphere of mind (noosphere) as 
predicted by Vladimir Vernadsky when moral values and knowledge of a Human living in 
harmony with environment, will become a measure for national and individual wealth’. 
This point of the Concept means that two decades ago Russia set another, still distant but 
very important in the long term, global goal of transition to the SD – the emergence of the 
noosphere. And it is very important to understand in which direction the humankind 
should move to achieve SD, which should lead to the deployment of a global process of 
noospheric genesis. 
The main goals of sustainable development in the long run focus on the survival of 
civilization and preservation of biosphere, which are the necessary conditions for the for-
mation of mind-sphere and are an integral part of this process and one of the main sustain-
able development goals in an even more distant period of time.  
As early as in the first half of the twentieth century Vernadsky and two French scien-
tists Edouard Le Roy and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin put forth the idea of formation of a 
mind-sphere – the noosphere – as a key direction for the further human development, 
which should rationalize the civilization processes and ensure the survival of humanity. 
Vernadsky views the noospheric genesis not only as social and moral and intellectual 
transformations, but also as natural continuation of biospheric and geological evolution, in 
which humanity plays the role of the major geological force (Vernadsky 2012). 
If we assume that the ultimate goal of transition to sustainable development is the 
emergence of the noosphere, it is necessary to form the first conceptual and theoretical 
model of the mind-sphere, and then determine an optimal path to achieve it. The peculiari-
ty of the noospheric-futurological approach to the study of the future, including implemen-
tation of the sustainable development strategy, consists in setting moral and fair intelli-
gence and intellectual and spiritual factors as a top priority in the coming transformations.  
It is the noosphere that is considered as a hypothetical future state of the world and at 
the same time as a global process, implemented through the SD of society and its interac-
tion with environment, with collective human intelligence, named as ‘the noospheric intel-
ligence’ taking the leading role, guiding evolution of civilization in progressive and safe 
direction. Sustainable development from the perspective of the ‘noospheric goal’ becomes 
global evolution that can be managed, focused on building up the sphere of the mind as a 
new qualitative state and the outcome of civilizational development.  
If we consider noospherogenesis as a transition process from sustainable development 
to civilizational noosphere, we can assess possibilities of various forms of mind and ra-
tional management of these processes. Formation of the noospheric civilization does not 
only mean making ethical intelligence a priority in social development, but it also means 
that this ethical intelligence obtains new forms and qualities that the mind has never pos-
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sessed before. And the main mechanism of outpacing implementation of the sustainable 
development strategy will also be the collective human intelligence of a global scale, 
which can be significantly transformed during the genesis of the noosphere, turning into an 
advancing noospheric intelligence. The noosphere which is formed through the transition 
to sustainable development and establishment of global information-oriented society will 
demonstrate many of the positive features of a human and humanity (Ilyin and Ursul 
2014). 
Conclusion 
Obviously without formulation of the most important and priority tasks towards the SD it 
makes no sense to talk about establishment of global governance, although global govern-
ance can be used for different tasks as well. SDGs in the first place will have to affect and 
in a balanced way cover at least three basic components (economic, social and ecological 
spheres) of sustainable development and their interdependence.  
Global governance will be implemented in different ways and in different directions, 
for example, with the help of economic, political, environmental and other social tools and 
actions. Speaking about global governance, it is appropriate to note that, in its entirety, this 
phenomenon may appear to the fullest extent only in the future, when globalization enters 
its following and not necessarily ‘final’ stage, by which we mean a controlled transition to 
sustainable development on a global scale. Moreover, globalization as the transition to SD 
and the formation of global governance are very closely linked, and progress in one field 
will stimulate progress in another one. However, it is important to note that today we only 
have an initial simplified and one-sided concept of SD, which is not quite adequate since it 
primarily highlights environmental aspects of development and their interconnections with 
economic and social spheres. Now one needs a substantially more integrated and holistic 
approach to the development of concepts and strategies for sustainable development that 
would provide account not only of the environmental and social costs of economic growth 
as it is now largely emphasized. 
It became evident that the concept of SD should not be reduced to the ‘triad’ of envi-
ronment, economy and social sphere, at least not in its modern manifestation. These three 
‘dimensions’ of the future transition to SD should be significantly expanded, turning  
‘the phase space transition to SD’ into a kind of expanding an n-dimensional space, in 
which there will also emerge some other dimensions, such as outer space or information 
(as we will need to assess in what way a sustainable society interacts with the information-
oriented society and other patterns of modern civilization and the future of civilization).  
The new model of civilization turned out to be, on the one hand, more promising, be-
cause only with its help our civilization can survive and persist. But, on the other hand, 
being created only on conceptual and theoretical level, this model is less than a system and 
does not include many more components in terms of development and security that char-
acterize the modern developmental model, referred to as a model of unsustainable devel-
opment (USD). These components ‘pull back’ movement in the right, but simplified and 
not yet systemic direction. Building a sustainable future confronts the threat posed by long 
non-work areas (they are continuing to be developed in the framework of the model of 
USD) and they significantly hamper progress towards SD.  
In fact, it is necessary to develop a theoretical and methodological concept, and then a 
theory of a new type of human development with transition to global sustainability acting 
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as a global strategy for further safe existence and development of our civilization.  
The transition to sustainable development will contribute to the resolution of the main so-
cio-natural contradiction between the growing needs of the global community and the ina-
bility of the biosphere to satisfy these needs. Sustainable development is becoming more 
and more comprehensive, global and safest type of the socio-economic development. And 
in the broadest sense of SD is a non-regressive type of evolution that eliminates or reduces 
to an acceptable level danger for humanity and biosphere with the purpose of their preser-
vation and further mutual co-evolution.  
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